The Muslim Community in History

The history of Islam has often been linked to the existence of an Islamic state or empire. From its beginnings, Islam existed and spread as a community-state; it was both a faith and a political order. Within centuries after his death, Muhammad’s local Arabian polity became a vast empire, extending from North Africa to Southeast Asia. The development of Islam and state institutions [the caliphate, law, education, the military, social services] were intertwined. Again, the Prophetic period provided the paradigm for later generations. For it was in Medina that the Quranic mandate took on form and substance under the guidance and direction of the Prophet.

The Medinan community formed a total framework for state, society, and culture. It epitomized the Quranic mandate for Muslims as individuals and as a community “to transform the world itself through action in the world.” This aspiration and ideal has constituted the challenge for the Islamic community throughout much of its history. It inspired Muhammad to transform a local sheikdom into a transtribal state.

Muhammad and the Medinan State

Seventh-century Arabia was dominated by two great empires: the Byzantine (Christian), or Eastern Roman, empire and the Sasanian Persian (Zoroastrian) empire. In the middle was the Arabian Peninsula, composed of apparently weak and divided tribal societies. Within one hundred years, both empires would fall before the armies of Allah as Muhammad and his successors united Arabia under the umbrella of Islam, which provided a principle of organization and motivation. In time, a vast empire and a commonwealth of Islamic states would come to dominate much of the world. Its missionaries would be soldiers, merchants, and mystics. Islam would provide the basis of community identity and the rationale or legitimacy for rulers and their policies of expansion and conquest. Thus, for example, the wars of conquest were termed faith, “opening or victory” of the way for Islam. As Muhammad governed a transtribal state in the name of Islam, so too the Islamic community became associated with an expansive empire. Why and how did this come to pass?

Shortly after the surrender of Mecca, Muhammad turned his attention to the extension and consolidation of his authority over Arabia. Envoys were sent and alliances forged with surrounding tribes and rulers. The fiercely independent Bedouin tribes of Arabia were united behind the Prophet of Islam through a combination of force and diplomacy. As Muhammad was both head of state and messenger of God, so too were the envoys and soldiers of the state the envoys and soldiers of Islam, its first missionaries. Along with their treaties and armies, they brought the Quran and the teachings of their faith. They spread a way of life that affected the political and social order as well as individual life and worship. Islam encompassed both a faith and a sociopolitical system. Ideally, this new order was to be a community of believers, acknowledging the ultimate sovereignty of God, living according to His law, obeying His Prophet, and dedicating their lives to spreading God’s rule and law. This was the message and vision that accompanied Arab armies as they burst out of Arabia and established their supremacy throughout the Middle East.

What is most striking about the early expansion of Islam is its rapidity and success. Western scholars have marveled at it. Muslim tradition has viewed the conquests as a miraculous proof or historic validation of the truth of Islam’s claims and a sign of God’s guidance. Within a decade, Arab forces overran the Byzantine and Persian armies, exhausted by years of warfare, and conquered Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Persia, and Egypt. The momentum of these early victories was extended to a series of brilliant battles under great generals like Khalid ibn al-Walid and Amr ibn al-A’s, which extended the boundaries of the Muslim empire to Morocco and Spain in the west and across Central Asia to India in the east. Driven by the economic rewards from conquest of richer, more developed areas, united and inspired by their new faith, Muslim armies proved to be formidable conquerors and effective rulers, builders rather than destroyers. They replaced the indigenous rulers and armies of the conquered countries, but preserved much of their government, bureaucracy, and culture. For many in the conquered ter-
through forced conversion but to spread Muslim rule. Many early Muslims regarded Islam solely as an Arab religion. Moreover, from an economic perspective, increase in the size of the community through conversion diminished Arab Muslims’ share in the spoils of conquest. As Islam penetrated new areas, people were offered three options: (1) conversion, that is, full membership in the Muslim community, with its rights and duties; (2) acceptance of Muslim rule as “protected” people and payment of a poll tax; (3) battle or the sword if neither the first nor the second option was accepted. The astonishing expansion of Islam resulted not only from armed conquest but also from these two peaceful options. In later centuries, in many areas of Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia, the effective spread of Islam would be due primarily to Muslim traders and Sufi (mystic) missionaries who won converts by their example and their preaching.

The Caliphate (632–1258)

Given Muhammad’s formative and pivotal role, his death (632) threatened to radically destabilize the community. Who was to lead? What was to happen to the community? The companions of the Prophet moved quickly to steady and reassure the community. Abu Bakr, an early follower of Muhammad, announced the death of the Prophet to the assembled faithful: “Muslims! If any of you has worshipped Muhammad, let me tell you that Muhammad is dead. But if you worship God, then know that God is living and will never die!” Nevertheless, the Prophet’s death did plunge the Islamic community into a series of political crises revolving around leadership and authority. Issues of succession and secession were to plague the early community.

The caliphate (632–1258) has traditionally been divided into three periods: the “Rightly Guided Caliphs” (632–661), the Umayyad empire (661–750), and the Abbasid empire (750–1258). During these eras, a vast empire was created with successive capitals in Medina, Kufa, Damascus, and Baghdad. Stunning political success was complemented by a cultural florescence in law, theology, philosophy, literature, medicine, mathematics, science, and art.

The Rightly Guided Caliphs

The caliphate began in 632 with the selection of Muhammad’s successor. The first four caliphs were all companions of the Prophet: Abu Bakr (reigned 632–634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644), Uthman ibn
Affan (644–656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656–661). Their rule is especially significant not only for what they actually did, but also because the period of Muhammad and the Rightly Guided Caliphs came to be regarded in Sunni Islam as the normative period. It provides the idealized past to which Muslims have looked back for inspiration and guidance, a time to be remembered and emulated.

The vast majority of Muslims (Sunni) believe that Muhammad died without designating his replacement or establishing a system for the selection of his successor. After an initial period of uncertainty, the Prophet’s companions, the elders or leaders of Medina, selected or acknowledged Abu Bakr, an early convert and the Prophet’s father-in-law, as caliph (khilifa, successor or deputy). Abu Bakr’s designation as leader was symbolized by the offering of bayya (oath), a handclasp used by the Arabs to seal a contract, in this case an oath of obedience and allegiance. Abu Bakr had been a close companion and a trusted adviser of Muhammad; he was a man respected for his sagacity and piety. Muhammad had appointed him to lead the Friday community prayer in his absence. As caliph, Abu Bakr was the political and military leader of the community. Although not a prophet, the caliph enjoyed religious prestige as head of the community of believers. This was symbolized in later history by the caliph’s right to lead the Friday prayer and the inclusion of his name in its prayers.

Having resolved the question of political leadership and succession, Abu Bakr turned to the consolidation of Muslim rule in Arabia. Muhammad’s death had precipitated a series of tribal rebellions. Many tribal chiefs claimed that their allegiance had been based on a political pact with Medina that ceased with the Prophet’s death. Tribal independence and factionalism, long a part of Arab history, once more threatened the unity and identity of the new Islamic state. Abu Bakr countered that the unity of the community was based on the interconnectedness of faith and politics and undertook a series of battles that later Muslim historians would call the wars of apostasy. Relying on Khalid ibn al-Walid, whom Muhammad had dubbed “the sword of Allah,” he crushed the tribal revolt, consolidating Muslim rule over the entire Arabian Peninsula, and thus preserved the unity and solidarity of the Islamic community-state.

Abu Bakr’s successor, Umar, initiated the great period of expansion and conquest. One of the great military leaders of his time, he added the title “Commander of the Faithful” to that of “Successor” or “Deputy of the Prophet of God.” He also introduced a new method for the selection of his successor. On his deathbed, Umar appointed an “election committee” to select the next caliph. After due consultation, the council of electors chose Uthman ibn Affan from the Umayyad clan, a leading Meccan family. This was accompanied by the traditional sign of allegiance, the clasping of hands. Thus, based on the practice of the first three caliphs, a pattern was established for selecting the caliph from the Qurayah tribe through a process characterized by consultation and an oath of allegiance.

Before long, tribal factionalism and the threat of rebellion resurfaced in the community. Uthman’s family had been among the strongest foes of the Prophet. Many of the Medinan elite, who had been among the early supporters of Muhammad, resented Uthman’s accession to power and the increased prominence and wealth of his family. Although personally pious, Uthman lacked the presence and leadership skills of his predecessors. Accusations that the caliph was weak and guilty of nepotism fueled political intrigue. In 656, Uthman was assassinated by a group of mutineers from Egypt. The caliph’s murder was the first in a series of Muslim rebellions and tribal fratricides that would plague the Islamic community’s political development.

The Caliph Ali and the First Civil Wars

Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, succeeded Uthman as the fourth caliph. Ali was devoted to Muhammad and among the first to embrace Islam. He had married Fatima, the only surviving child of Muhammad and Khadijah, with whom he had two sons, Hasan and Husayn. Ali was a charismatic figure who inspired fierce loyalty and commitment. Many of Ali’s supporters (Alids) believed that leadership of the Islamic community should remain within the family of the Prophet and that, indeed, Muhammad had designated Ali as his rightful successor and heir. For these partisans of Ali, later to be called Shi (shat-u-Ali, party of Ali), the first three caliphs were interlopers who had denied Ali his rightful inheritance. However, their satisfaction and expectations were to be short-lived. Within the few short years that Ali ruled, the caliphate was racked by two civil wars. Ali’s authority was challenged by two opposition movements: first, by a coalition headed by Muhammad’s widow, Aisha (the daughter of Abu Bakr), and second, by the forces of Muawiya, the governor of Syria and a relative of Uthman. Ali’s failure to find and prosecute Uthman’s murderers became the pretext for both revolts. In the first, Ali crushed a triumvirate led by Aisha, the youngest wife of Muhammad. The “Battle of the Camel,” so named because it took place around the camel on which Aisha was mounted, marked the first time a caliph had led his army against another Muslim army.
Of greater long-range significance was Muawiyah’s challenge to Ali’s authority. Securely established in Damascus with a strong army, Muawiyah, the nephew of Uthman, had refused to step down and accept Ali’s appointment of a replacement. In 657, at Siffin (in modern-day Syria), Ali led his army against his rebellious governor. Faced with defeat, Muawiyah’s men raised Qurans on the tips of their spears and called for arbitration according to the Quran, crying out, “Let God decide.” Although the arbitration proved inconclusive, it yielded two results that would have lasting effects. A splinter group of Aids, the Kharijites or “seceders,” broke with Ali for having failed to subdue Muawiyah; Muawiyah walked away from Siffin and continued to govern Syria, extending his rule to Egypt as well. When Ali was murdered by Kharijites in 651, Muawiyah laid successful claim to the caliphate, moving its capital to Damascus and frustrating Aids belief that leadership of the community should be restricted to Ali’s descendants. With the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty, the “golden age” of Muhammad and the Rightly Guided Caliphs came to an end and the caliphate became an absolute monarchy.

Despite the turmoil during the early caliphal years, Muslims regard the period of Muhammad and the first generation of companions or elders as normative for a variety of reasons. First, God sent down His final and complete revelation in the Quran and the last of His prophets, Muhammad. Second, the Islamic community-state was created, bonded by a common religious identity and purpose. Third, the sources of Islamic law, the Quran and the example of the Prophet, originated at this time. Fourth, this period of the early companions serves as the reference point for all Islamic revival and reform, both traditionalist and modernist. Fifth, the success and power that resulted from the near-miraculous victories and geographic expansion of Islam constitute, in the eyes of believers, historical validation of the message of Islam.

Organization and Institutions

The early caliphate established the pattern for the organization and administration of the Islamic state. Islam provided the basic identity and ideology of the state, a source of unity and solidarity. The caliph’s authority and leadership were rooted in his claim to be the successor of the Prophet as head of the community. Muhammad’s practice provided the model for governance. The caliph exercised direct political, military, judicial, and fiscal control of the Muslim community. He was chosen through a process of consultation, nomination, and selection by a small group of electors who, after pledging their allegiance, presented the caliph to the people for acceptance by public acclamation. The caliph was the protector and defender of the faith; he was to assure the following of God’s law and spread the rule of God through expansion and conquest. The community was a brotherhood of believers, a society based on religious rather than tribal solidarity.

In general, the Arabs did not occupy conquered cities but established garrison towns nearby, such as Basra and Kufa in Iraq, Fustat (Cairo) in Egypt, and Qairawan in North Africa. From these towns, conquered territories were governed and expeditions launched. They were centered around a mosque, which served as the religious and public focal point of the towns. Conquered territories were divided into provinces, each of which was administered by a governor who was usually a military commander. The internal civil and religious administration remained in the hands of local officials. An agent of the caliph oversaw the collection of taxes and other administrative activities. Revenue for the state came from the captured lands and taxes.

The Islamic system of taxes took several forms: the tithe or wealth tax to benefit the poor and a land tax paid by Muslims, the poll tax and tribute, later a land tax, paid by non-Muslims. All revenue was owned, collected, and administered by the state. The distribution of revenue was managed by the registry at Medina through a system of payments and pensions based on priority in accepting Islam. The Muslims at Medina and the family of the Prophet enjoyed a special place of honor because of their closeness to Muhammad and their fidelity to God’s call.

Muslim society was divided into four major social classes. The elites of society were the Arab Muslims, with special status given to the companions of the Prophet because of their early support and role in establishing the community. Next came the non-Arab converts to Islam. Although in theory all Muslims were equal before God, in fact, practice varied. Under the Umayyads, non-Arab Muslims were clearly second-class citizens. They continued to pay those taxes levied on non-Muslims even after their conversion. The dhimmi, or non-Muslim People of the Book (those who possessed a revealed Scripture, Jews and Christians), constituted communities within and subject to the wider Islamic community-state. In time, this protected status was extended to Hindus and Buddhists. Finally, there were the slaves. As in much of the Near East, slavery had long existed among the Arabs. Although the Quran commanded the just and humane treatment of slaves (16:71) and regarded their emancipation as a meritorious act (90:13; 58:3), the system of slavery was adopted in a modified form. Only captives in
battle could be taken as slaves. Neither Muslims nor Jews and Christians could be enslaved in early Islam. Thus, religion played an important role in the government, law, taxation, and social organization of society.

The Umayyad Empire: Creation of an Arab Kingdom

The advent of Umayyad rule set in motion a process of continued expansion and centralization of authority that would transform the Islamic community from an Arab shaykhdom into an Islamic empire whose rulers were dependent on religion for legitimacy and the military for power and stability.

In 661, Muawiyah (reigned 661–80) laid claim to the caliphate and ushered in the Umayyad era (661–750); imperial, dynastic, and dominated by an Arab military aristocracy. The capital was moved to Damascus. This permanent shift from the less sophisticated Arabian heartland to the established, cosmopolitan Greco-Roman Byzantine city symbolized the new imperial age. From this new center, the Umayyads completed the conquest of the entire Persian and half the Roman (Byzantine) empire. When Muawiyah seized power, Islam had already spread to Egypt, Libya, the Fertile Crescent, Syria, Iraq, and Persia across Armenia to the borders of Afghanistan. Under the Umayyads, Muslims captured the Maghreb (North Africa), Spain, and Portugal, marched across Europe until they were halted in the heart of France by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732, and extended the empire’s borders to the Indian subcontinent. The accomplishments of the Umayyads were indeed remarkable. Damascus became an even greater imperial capital than it had been under Byzantine rule. Umayyad rulers developed a strong centralized dynastic kingdom, an Arab empire. The more advanced government, institutions, and bureaucracy of Byzantium were adopted and adapted to Arab Muslim needs. Native civil servants and ministers were retained to guide and train their Muslim masters. In time, through a process of conversion and assimilation, language and culture, state and society were Arabized and Islamized. Arabic became the language of government as well as the lingua franca of what today constitutes North Africa and much of the Middle East. Islamic belief and values constituted the official norm and reference point for personal and public life.

Umayyad rulers relied on Islam for legitimacy and as a rationale for their conquests. Caliphs were the protectors and defenders of the faith charged with extending the rule of Islam. The basis of Umayyad unity and stability was the establishment of an Arab monarchy and reliance on Arab, in particular Syrian, warriors. Contrary to previous practice, hereditary succession, not selection or election, restricted the caliphate to the Umayyad house. This innovation, or departure from early Islamic practice, became the pretext for later Muslim historians, writing with Abbasid patronage, to denounce Umayyad rule as kingship and thus un-Islamic. In fact, a form of hereditary succession and dynastic rule became standard practice for the remainder of the caliphal period. Centralization and militarization of the state resulted in an increasingly autocratic and absolutist government supported and protected by its military.

Umayyad society was based on the creation and perpetuation of an Arab military aristocracy that constituted a hereditary social caste. Syrian troops were the heart of the caliphs’ powerful military. As the source of caliphal power and security, they were amply rewarded from the booty and tribute that poured into Damascus as a result of the conquests. Arab Muslims enjoyed special tax privileges, exempted from the more substantial taxes levied on non-Arab Muslims and non-Muslims. This preferential treatment became a source of contention, especially among non-Arab Muslims, who regarded their lesser status as a violation of Islamic egalitarianism. Their alienation contributed to the eventual downfall of the Umayyad dynasty.

Divisions Within the Islamic Community

As had been done from the time of the Prophet, critics and opponents used an “Islamic yardstick” to judge or condemn the Umayyads and legitimate their own actions and aspirations. Political, social, economic, and religious grievances were viewed through the prism of an Islamic ideal relevant to all areas of life. Thus, Umayyad practice incurred an opposition that ranged from Kharijites, Alids (Shi`i), and disgruntled non-Arab Muslims to the early legal scholars and mystics of Islam.

The Kharijites. The Kharijites originated in the time of the caliphs Uthman and Ali. They represent the earliest example of radical dissent in Islam and were the first, in a series of movements, to offer a different concept of the nature of the community and its leadership. Combining a rigorous puritanism and religious fundamentalism with an “exclusiveist egalitarianism,” the Kharijites emerged as revolutionaries who, despite their seeming lack of success in their own times, continue to inspire contemporary radical groups like Egypt’s Takfir wal Hijra and Jamaat al-Jihad.
As previously noted, the occasion for the Kharjite secession from the main body of the community was Ali's submission to arbitration in his struggle with Muawiyyah. For the Kharjites the situation was simple. Muawiyyah had challenged the legitimate authority of the caliph; this grave sin rendered him an apostate or infidel, and thus Ali, and all true Muslims, had an obligation to wage jihad until Muawiyyah desisted or was subdued. When the arbitration was announced, the Kharjites shouted, “Only God can decide.” It was not the job of human beings to counter God’s command and sit as judge. As a result, the Kharjites believed that Ali too was now guilty of a grave sin and no longer the legitimate head of the community. This early incident illustrates the basic Kharjite beliefs. The Kharjites were extremist. They were very pious believers who interpreted the Quran and Sunna [example] of the Prophet literally and absolutely. Therefore, they believed that the Quranic mandate to “command the good and prohibit evil” must be applied rigorously and without compromise. Acts were either good or bad, permitted or forbidden. Similarly, their world was divided neatly into the realms of belief and unbelief, Muslim (followers of God) and non-Muslim (enemies of God), peace and warfare. Faith must be informed by action; public behavior must rigorously conform to Islamic principles if one was to be a Muslim. Therefore, any action contrary to the letter of the law constituted a grave sin that rendered a person a non-Muslim, subject to excommunication [exclusion], warfare, and death unless the person repented. Sinners were not simply backsliders but apostates who were guilty of treason against the community-state. All true believers were obliged to fight and subdue these nominal or self-styled Muslims.

Within their exclusivist view of the world and the nature of the Muslim community, the Kharjites incorporated an egalitarian spirit that maintained that any good Muslim, even a slave, could be the leader, or imam, of the community, provided he had community support. Their puritan absolutism demanded that a leader guilty of sin be deposed.

When the Kharjites broke with Ali, they went about establishing their vision of the true charismatic community based strictly and literally on the Quran and Sunna. Modeling themselves on the example of the Prophet, they first withdrew (hijra) to live together in a bonded community. From their encampments, they waged battle (jihad) against their enemies, seeing themselves as the instruments of God's justice. They were the people of God [paradise] fighting against the people of evil [hell]. Since they were God's army struggling in a heavenly crusade against the forces of evil, violence, guerrilla warfare, and revolution were not only legitimate but obligatory in their battle against the sinful usurpers of God's rule. Defeated by Ali at Nahrawan in 658, they continued to lead uprisings and join in revolts against Muawiyyah’s Umayyad descendants and engaged in guerrilla warfare against subsequent Abbasid caliphs. A moderate branch of the Kharjites, known as the Ibadiyya, followers of Abd Allah ibn Ibad, founded Ibadite imamates in North (Tripolitania and Tahert) and East (Zanzibar) Africa, Yemen, and Oman. Their descendants still exist in small numbers in North Africa and in Oman, where the Ibad faith is the official state religion.

Shii Islam. The first civil war between Ali and Muawiyyah, which had resulted in the secession of the Kharjites and the alienation of Ali’s supporters, came back to haunt the Umayyads. During the reign of Muawiyyah’s son, Yazid, a second round of civil wars broke out. One of these, the revolt of Ali’s son Husayn, would lead to the division of the Islamic community into its two major branches, Sunni and Shii, and shape the worldview of Shii Islam.

When Yazid came to power in 680, Husayn, the son of Ali, was persuaded by a group of Alids in Kufa [Iraq] to lead a rebellion. However, when popular support failed to materialize, Husayn and his small band of followers were slaughtered by an Umayyad army at Karbala. The memory of this tragedy, the “martyrdom” of Alid forces, provided the paradigm of suffering and protest that has guided and inspired Shii Islam. For these partisans (shia) of Ali, the original injustice that had denied Ali his succession to Muhammad had been repeated, thwarting the rightful rule of the Prophet’s family. Thus, the Shii developed their own distinctive vision of leadership and of history, centered on the martyred family of the Prophet and based on a belief that leadership of the Muslim community belong to the descendants of Ali and Husayn.

The fundamental difference between Sunni and Shii Muslims is the Shii doctrine of the imamate as distinct from the Sunni caliphate. As we have seen, the caliph was the selected or elected successor of the Prophet. He succeeded to political and military leadership but not to Muhammad’s religious authority. By contrast, for the Shii, leadership of the Muslim community is vested in the Imam (leader), who, though not a prophet, is the divinely inspired, sinless, infallible, religiopolitical leader of the community. He must be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali, the first Imam. He is both political leader and religious guide, the final authoritative interpreter of God’s will as formulated in Islamic law. Whereas after the death of Muhammad,
Sunnī Islam came to place final religious authority for interpreting Islam in the consensus (ijma) or collective judgment of the community (the consensus of the ulama, the traditional religious scholars), the Shiites believe in continued divine guidance through their divinely inspired guide, the Imam.

Sunnī and Shiite Muslims also developed differing doctrines concerning the meaning of history. For Sunnī historians, early Islamic success and power were signs of God's guidance and rewards to a faithful community as well as validation of Muslim belief and claims. For the Shiites, history was the theater for the struggle of an oppressed and dispossessed minority community to restore God's rule on earth over the entire community under the Imam. A righteous remnant was to persist in God's way against the forces of evil (Satan), as had Ali against Musa'ib and Husayn against the army of Yazid, to reestablish the righteous rule of the Imam. The lives of the suffering Imams, like that of Husayn, were seen as embodying the oppression and injustice experienced by a persecuted minority community. Realization of a just social order under the Imam was to remain a frustrated hope and expectation for centuries as the Islamic community remained under Sunnī caliphal governments.

Rule of the Imam over the entire Muslim community was frustrated not only by 'usurper' Sunnī caliphs, but also by disagreements within the Shiite community over succession. This led to three major divisions: Zaydī, Isma'ili, and Ithna Ashari or Imamī. The Zaydīs claimed that Zayd ibn Ali, a grandson of Husayn, was the fifth Imam. The majority of the Shiites recognized Muhammad al-Baqir and his son Jafar al-Sadiq as rightful heirs to the imamate. Unlike other Shiites, who restricted the imamate to the descendants of Ali by his wife Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, Zaydīs believed that any descendant of Ali could become Imam. They were political activists who, like the Kharijīs, believed that the duty to enjoin the good and prohibit evil was incumbent on all Muslims at all times. They, too, rebelled against both Umayyad and Abbasid rule. The Zaydīs were the first Shī'a to gain independence when Hasan ibn Zayd founded a Zaydī dynasty in Tabaristan, on the Caspian, in 864. Another Zaydi state was established in Yemen in 893, where it continued to exist until 1963.

In the eighth century, the majority of the Shī'ī community split again into its two major branches in a dispute over whom the sixth Imam, Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765), actually designated as his heir. While most accepted his younger son, Musa al-Kazim, some followed Ismai'l, the elder son. This resulted in the two major Shī'ī communities, the Ithna Asharis, or Twelvers, and the Ismailis (sometimes called the Seveners). The numerical designation of each group stems from a crisis caused by the death or disappearance of their Imam and thus the disruption of hereditary succession. For the Twelvers, or Ithna Asharis, the end of imamate succession occurred in 874 with the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, the child Muhammad al-Muntazar (Muhammad, the awaited one). Shī'ī theology resolved this dilemma with its doctrines of the absence of occultation of the Imam and his return in the future as the Mahdi (the expected one). For Shī'ī, the Imam had not died but had disappeared and gone into hiding or seclusion. He would return as a messianic figure, the Mahdi, at the end of the world to vindicate his loyal followers, restore the community to its rightful place, and usher in a perfect Islamic society in which truth and justice will prevail. During the absence of the hidden Imam, the community was to await his return and be guided by its religious experts, mujtahids, those ulama (religious scholars) who interpret God's will, Islamic law, for the community. The Ismai'lis split into a number of subdivisions. For a major group of Ismai'lis, the line of Imams ended in 760 when Ismai'l, the designated seventh Imam, died before his father. Another group believed that Ismai'l had not died but was in seclusion and would return as the Mahdi. Others accepted Ismai'l's son, Muhammad, as Imam.

The Ismai'lis. The image of the Ismai'lis today as a prosperous merchant community, led by the Aga Khan, belies their early revolutionary origins. The early Ismai'lis were a revolutionary missionary movement. They attacked and assassinated Sunnī political and religious leaders, seized power, and at their peak, ruled an area that extended from Egypt to the Sind province of India. For the Ismai'lis, as for Shī'ī in general, the Quran had two meanings: an exoteric, literal meaning and an esoteric, inner teaching. This secret knowledge was given to the Imam and through a process of initiation to his representatives and missionaries. The followers of the Imam, as distinguished from the majority of Muslims, constituted a religious elite who possessed the true guidance necessary for salvation and a mission to spread or propagate, by force if necessary, the message and rule of the Imam. Often functioning as secret organizations to avoid the Abbasid police, Ismai'lis also used taqiyya (to shield or guard), a common Shī'ī practice that permits concealment of one's belief for self-protection or survival as a persecuted minority. The Ismai'lis consisted of a variety of such missionary communities or movements. During the early tenth century, one branch, the Qarmatians, attacked Syria, Palestine, and southern Mesopotamia, and set up their own state in Bahrain. Other groups
spread to North Africa and Egypt that the Ismaili Fatimid dynasty (named for Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter, from whom the ruler claimed descent) was created. After an abortive attempt to conquer Syria, Ubayd Allah had fled to Qairawan (Tunisia), where he successfully seized power in 909, declaring himself the Mahdi and establishing a line of Fatimid Imams. In 969, Egypt was conquered and a new capital, Cairo [al-Qahirah, the victorious], was built outside the older city of Fustat to celebrate the conquest of Egypt. The Fatimids established an absolute hereditary monarchy. The infallible Imam ruled over a strong, centralized monarchy that relied on its military and religious missionaries. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the Fatimids successfully competed with a weakened, fragmented Abbasid empire, spreading their influence and rule across North Africa, Egypt, Sicily, Syria, Persia, and Western Arabia to the Sind province of India. Although the state was Fatimid, the majority of the population remained Sunni. During this period, the Fatimid caliphate flourished culturally and commercially as well as militarily. Among its most enduring monuments was its religious center, the al-Azhar mosque in Cairo, which served as a training center for its missionary propagandists. Reputed to be one of the world’s oldest universities, al-Azhar has remained an internationally recognized center of [Sunni] Islamic learning, training students from all over the Islamic world and issuing authoritative religious judgments on major issues and questions.

Although the Fatimids even managed to briefly capture Baghdad, their attempt to rule all of the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) came to an abrupt end in 1171 when Salah al-Din (Saladin) conquered Egypt and restored the Sunni rule of the [Seljuq] Abbasid caliphate. However, the Ismaili persist through several offshoots. The Nizari Ismaili began as a Persian-based sect under Hasan al-Sabah that broke away from the Fatimids in 1094. Called the assassins and guided by a series of Grand Masters who ruled from a stronghold on Mt. Alamut in northern Persia (thus each becoming known as the Old Man of the Mountain), they were particularly effective in murdering Abbasid princes, generals, and leading ulama in the name of their hidden Imam.11 They struck such terror in the hearts of their Muslim and Crusader enemies that their exploits in Persia and Syria earned them a name and memory in history long after they were overrun and driven underground by the Mongols in 1258. A descendant of Hasan al-Sabah, Hasan Ali Shah, received the honorary title Aga Khan through marriage to the daughter of the shah. He fled to India in 1840 after a failed revolt in Persia. Centered in Bombay, these Nizari [Khoja] Ismailis were led by a series of Imams, known as the Aga Khan, whose personal fortunes have been matched by the wealth of remarkably successful and thriving Ismaili communities in East Africa, South Asia, Britain, and Canada. Currently, the Aga Khan oversees the spiritual and cultural life of the community. As its living Imam, he has been able to reinterpret Islam to respond to modern life. At the same time, he oversees extensive commercial and industrial Ismaili investments and supervises the many educational, medical, and social welfare projects of its philanthropic foundation.

The Druze. Among the sectarian offshoots of Ismailism were the Druze of Lebanon. The Druze date back to two Fatimid missionaries named Darazi [d. 1019] and Hamza ibn Ali, who had been encouraged by the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim [reigned 996-1021] to spread the Ismaiili faith in southern Lebanon. Al-Hakim was an eccentric ruler who took the title Imam and progressively came to believe that he was not only the divinely appointed religiopolitical leader but also the cosmic intellect, linking God with creation. Darazi and Hamza became leaders of a movement centered on recognition of al-Hakim as a divine incarnation, the highest or first cosmic intellect. This supernatural status became the excuse for his erratic, authoritarian behavior, which at times included the persecution of Ismaili, Sunni, and Christian leaders alike. When al-Hakim disappeared or was killed, they maintained that he had gone into seclusion to test the faith of his followers and would return to restore justice in the world. After Darazi’s death, Hamza, now claiming to be the leader [imam] in Hakim’s absence, organized and developed Hakim’s cult into what became a separate religion. Hamza then disappeared, and was expected to return as the Mahdi at a later date with al-Hakim. In the interim, Baha al-Din al-Mukhtara served as the earthly link between Hamza and the community.

The Druze call themselves the unitarians, followers of al-Hakim who embodied and revealed the one true God. Forming a distinct religion, the Druze possess their own Scripture, the Risail al-Hikma (the Book of Wisdom), and law. The Book of Wisdom is a collection of letters from al-Mukhtara, al-Hamza, and al-Hakim. The Sharia, mosque, and ulama were replaced by Druze law, places of prayer, and religious leadership. The community is hierarchically organized. The two major divisions are the majority of ordinary members, the so-called ignorant, and the wise, those men and women who are initiated and as such can read the Scriptures and are expected to lead an exemplary life of regular prayer and abstention from wine, tobacco, and other stimulants. They can be recognized by the quality of their lives and their special dress or white turbans. Among the wise are a group of religious leaders
ply govern Egypt, but, as we have seen, followed other Ismaili groups in sending their missionaries to spread their Shi'ite doctrine. This Shi'ite challenge elicited a religious as well as a military response as Sunni ulama moved to protect their version of orthodoxy in the face of Shi'ite innovations. They were supported in their endeavors by the royal court, which wished to counter Shi'ite anticaliphal sentiments. This contributed to a growing tendency among the Sunni ulama to preserve the unity of Islam through greater self-definition and standardization. In the face of the internal breakup of the central empire, this meant achieving a consensus on the corpus of Islamic law in order to protect and maintain the sociopolitical order.

Islam and the West: The Crusades and Muslim Response to Militant Christianity

Despite their common monotheistic roots, the history of Christianity and Islam has more often than not been marked by confrontation rather than peaceful coexistence and dialogue. For the Christian West, Islam is the religion of the sword; for Muslims, the Christian West is epitomized by the armies of the Crusades. From the earliest decades of Islamic history, Christianity and Islam have been locked in a political and theological struggle, because Islam, unlike other world religions, has threatened the political and religious ascendancy of Christianity. Muslim armies overran the Eastern Roman empire, Spain, and the Mediterranean from Sicily to Anatolia. At the same time, Islam challenged Christian religious claims and authority. Coming after Christianity, Islam claimed to supersede Christian revelation. While acknowledging God's revelation and revering God's messengers, from Adam through Jesus, as prophets, Islam rejected the doctrine of Christ's divinity, the finality of Christian revelation, and the authority of the church. Instead, it called on all, Jews and Christians as well, to accept finality of revelation and prophecy in Islam, to join the Islamic community, and to live under Islamic rule. Islam's universal mission had resulted in the spread of Muslim rule over Christian territories and Christian hearts. While conversions were initially slow, by the eleventh century large numbers of Christians living under Muslim rule were converting to Islam. Even those who had remained Christian were becoming Arabized, adopting Arabic language and manners. The European Christian response was, with few exceptions, hostile, intolerant, and belligerent. Muhammad was vilified as an imposter and identified as the anti-Christ. Islam was dismissed as a religion of the sword
led by an infidel driven by a lust for power and women. This attitude was preserved and perpetuated in literature such as the Divine Comedy, where Dante consigned Muhammad to the lowest level of hell. Christian fears were fully realized as Islam became a world power and civilization while Christianity staggered and stagnated in its Dark Ages.

By the eleventh century, Christendom’s response to Islam took two forms: the struggle to reconquer (the Reconquista) Spain (1000–1492) and Italy and Sicily (1061), and the undertaking of another series of Christian holy wars—the Crusades (1095–1453).

Two myths pervade Western perceptions of the Crusades: first, that the Crusades were simply motivated by a religious desire to liberate Jerusalem, and second, that Christendom ultimately triumphed.

Jerusalem was a sacred city for all three Abrahamic faiths. When the Arab armies took Jerusalem in 638, they occupied a center whose shrines had made it a major pilgrimage site in Christendom. Churches and the Christian population were left unmolested. Jews, long banned from living there by Christian rulers, were permitted to return, live, and worship in the city of Solomon and David. Muslims proceeded to build a shrine, the Dome of the Rock, and a mosque, the al-Aqsa, near the area formerly occupied by Herod’s Temple and close by the Wailing Wall, the last remnant of Solomon’s Temple.

Five centuries of peaceful coexistence elapsed before political events and an imperial-papal power play led to centuries-long series of so-called holy wars that pitted Christendom against Islam and left an enduring legacy of misunderstanding and distrust.

In 1071, the Byzantine army was decisively defeated by a Seljuq (Abbasid) army. The Byzantine emperor, Alexius I, fearing that all Asia Minor would be overrun, called on fellow Christian rulers and the pope to come to the aid of Constantinople by undertaking a “pilgrimage” or crusade to free Jerusalem and its environs from Muslim rule. For Pope Urban II, the “defense” of Jerusalem provided an opportunity to gain recognition for papal authority and its role in legitimating the actions of temporal rulers. A divided Christendom rallied as warriors from France and other parts of Western Europe (called “Franks” by Muslims) united against the “infidel” in a holy war whose ostensible goal was the holy city. This was ironic because, as one scholar has observed, “God may indeed have wished it, but there is certainly no evidence that the Christians of Jerusalem did, or that anything extraordinary was occurring to pilgrims there to prompt such a response at that moment in history.” In fact, Christian rulers, knights, and merchants were driven primarily by political and military ambitions and the promise of the economic and commercial (trade and banking) rewards that would accompany the establishment of a Latin kingdom in the Middle East. However, the appeal to religion captured the popular mind and gained its support.

The contrast between the behavior of the Christian and Muslim armies in the First Crusade has been etched deeply in the collective memory of Muslims. In 1099, the Crusaders stormed Jerusalem and established Christian sovereignty over the Holy Land. They left no Muslim survivors; women and children were massacred. The Noble Sanctuary, the Haram al-Sharif, was desecrated as the Dome of the Rock was converted into a church and the al-Aqsa mosque, renamed the Temple of Solomon, became a residence for the king. Latin principalities were established in Antioch, Edessa, Tripoli, and Tyre. The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem lasted less than a century. In 1187, Salah al-Din (Saladin), having reestablished Abbasid rule over Fatimid Egypt, led his army in a fierce battle and recaptured Jerusalem. The Muslim army was as magnanimous in victory as it had been tenacious in battle. Civilians were spared; churches and shrines were generally left untouched. The striking differences in military conduct were epitomized by the two dominant figures of the Crusades: Saladin and Richard the Lion-Hearted. The chivalrous Saladin was faithful to his word and compassionate toward noncombatants. Richard accepted the surrender of Acre and then proceeded to massacre all its inhabitants, including women and children, despite promises to the contrary.

By the thirteenth century the Crusades degenerated into intra-Christian wars, papal wars against its Christian enemies who were denounced as heretics and schismatics. The result was a weakening, rather than a strengthening, of Christendom. As Roger Savory has observed:

An ironical but undeniable result of the Crusades was the destruction of the position of Christian minorities in the Holy Land. Formerly these minorities had been accorded rights and privileges under Muslim rule, but, after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom, they found themselves treated as “loathsome schismatics.” In an effort to obtain relief from persecution by their fellow Christians, many abandoned their Nestorian or Monophysite beliefs, and adopted either Roman Catholicism, or—the supreme irony—Islam. By the fifteenth century, the Crusades had spent their force. Although they were initially launched to unite Christendom and turn back the Muslim armies, the opposite had occurred. Amid a bitterly divided Christendom, Constantinople fell in 1453 before Turkish Muslim con-
The Sultanate Period: Medieval Muslim Empires

By the thirteenth century, the Abbasid empire was a sprawling, fragmenting, deteriorating commonwealth of semi-autonomous states, sultanes, governed by military commanders. It was an empire in name only. The fictional unity of a united Islamic community symbolized by the caliph in Baghdad, stood in sharp contrast to the underlying reality of its political and religious divisions. Invaded and ruled successively by the Buyyids and then the Seljuks, Baghdad was completely overrun in the thirteenth century by the Mongols. Pouring out of Central Asia, the armies of Genghis Khan had subjugated much of Central Asia, China, Russia, and the Near East. In 1258, the Mongol army under Hulagu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, captured Baghdad, burned and pillaged the city, slaughtered its Muslim inhabitants, and executed the caliph and his family. Only Egypt and Syria escaped the Mongol conquest of the Muslim empire. In Egypt, the Mamluks (“the owned ones”), Turkish slave soldiers who served as a sort of praetorian guard, seized power from their Ayyubid masters. The Mamluk sultaneate successfully resisted the Mongols and ruled until 1517.

Although the destruction of Baghdad and the abolition of the Abbasid caliphate brought an end to the caliphal period and seemed to many an irreversible blow to Muslim power, by the fifteenth century Muslim fortunes had been reversed. The central caliphate was replaced by a chain of dynamic Muslim sultanes, each ruled by a sultan, which eventually extended from Africa to Southeast Asia, from Timbuktu to Mindanao, as Islam penetrated Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Among the principal missionaries of Islam were traders and Sufi brotherhoods.

Muslim power peaked in the sixteenth century. Three major Muslim empires emerged in the midst of the many sultanes: the Ottoman Turkish empire, centered in Istanbul but encompassing major portions of North Africa, the Arab world, and Eastern Europe; the Persian Safavid empire, with its capital in Isfahan, which effectively established Shi‘i Islam as the state’s religion; and the Mughal empire, centered in Delhi and embracing most of the Indian subcontinent (modern-day Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh).21 Baghdad’s successors were the imperial capitals of Istanbul, Isfahan, and Delhi. Political ascendency was accompanied by a cultural florescence. As in Abbasid times, great sultans, such as the Ottoman Sulayman the Magnificent (reigned 1520–66), Shah Abbas in Persia (reigned 1587–1629), and the Mughal emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) in India, were patrons of learning and the arts.

The Ottoman empire was the heir to the Mongol-Turkish legacy of Genghis Khan and his successors. The fall of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 to the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II and the conquest of Byzantium realized the cherished dream of Muslim rulers and armies since the seventh century. The acknowledgment of Mehmet as “The Conqueror” throughout the Islamic world and his cosmopolitan capital at Istanbul, which sat astride both Europe and Asia, symbolized the power and mission of an emerging imperial giant.

The Ottomans drew on their Mongol-Turkish and Islamic roots and traditions, combining a warrior heritage with an Islamic tradition that believed in Islam’s universal mission and sacred struggle (jihad), to establish themselves as worldwide propagators and defenders of Islam. They became the great warriors of Islamic expansion through military conquest. The titles taken by Ottoman sultans, such as “Warrior of the Faith” and “Defender of the Sharia,” reflected this religiopolitical justification and rationale. Ottoman suzerainty was extended to the Arab Middle East and North Africa, incorporating such major Islamic cities as Mecca, Medina, Cairo, Damascus, and Tunis along with great centers of Islamic learning like Egypt’s Al-Azhar and Tunisia’s Zaytuna Mosque-University. Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Tripoli, the Balkans, and much of Eastern Europe were also absorbed. A besieged Europe struggled for its existence. After two centuries of confrontation, Ottoman forces were decisively turned back by the navies of Christian Europe at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. The Ottoman defeat and the truce of 1580 in the Mediterranean “confirmed the frontier between Christian and Muslim civilizations that has lasted to the present day.” In 1683 Ottoman expansion in Eastern Europe was checked by the failure of the siege of Vienna.

During the 1600s the Ottoman empire fully evolved. Istanbul, whose population of 500,000 was more than twice the size of any European capital, became once again an international but now Islamized center of power and culture. Scholars, artists, and architects from all over the Islamic world and Europe were commissioned, as Muslim conquerors also proved to be great builders of civilization as well. The skyline of Istanbul was transformed by the distinctive cupolas of palaces and mosques. The royal family lived in splendor in the Topkapi
Within a decade, he had conquered the rest of Iran, rapidly building an empire east of the Ottoman frontier. The creation of the Safavid dynasty made Shi'i Islam the official religion of an Islamic empire.

Shi'i Islam was effectively imposed in Iran through a process of persecution and doctrinal interpretation. Shah Ismail imposed Twelver Shi'i Islam upon Iran's Sunni majority to unify his rule. He sought religious legitimacy and leadership by asserting that he was a descendant of the twelfth (hidden) Imam and a mahdi, or divinely guided reformer. Thus, the shah was both temporal and spiritual ruler, emperor and messianic messenger. The religious pretensions of Safavid rulers were symbolized by their title, "Shadow of God on Earth." Rival Islamic groups or interpretations of Islam (Sunni and Sufi) as well as non-Muslim communities were suppressed. The Safavids enforced their own brand of Shi'i religiopolitical ideology and identity in an attempt to legitimate their political authority and to forge a new Safavid Shi'i Iranian bond of solidarity. A full-blown Shi'i alternative to Sunni Islam was skillfully developed. Sufi ideas, philosophical doctrines, and popular religious practices such as saint veneration were selectively appropriated. Emphasis was placed on the veneration of sacred "Shi'i" persons: Husayn, the imams, and their families. Visits to their shrines replaced popular Sufi village shrines. Sunni persecution of Ali and his family was commemorated, while the first three caliphs were ritually cursed as usurpers. The martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala, the scene of the original massacre of Husayn and his followers by Sunni forces, became a central religious symbol, rituallyreenacted during the sacred month of Muharram in passion plays which emphasized mourning, self-sacrifice, and atonement. Karbala served as an alternative pilgrimage site to Mecca, which was under Ottoman control. Shi'i ulama from Iraq, southern Lebanon, and Bahrain were brought to Iran as missionaries and became part of the state-created and controlled Shi'i religious establishment, responsible for preaching Shi'i doctrine and manning the schools, universities, seminaries, and courts.

The Safavid empire reached its zenith guided by the genius of its most celebrated sultan, Shah Abbas (1588–1629). From his capital in Isfahan, he oversaw an ambitious program of state building, implementing administrative, military, economic, and religious reforms. Generous religious endowments supported the building of major religious monuments, schools, mosques, and hospitals. As with the Ottomans, the ulama and their educational and judicial institutions were brought within the Safavid state bureaucracy.

The splendor and accomplishments of the Ottomans in the Arab Middle East and Eastern Europe and the Safavids in Iran were matched
The political and religious accomplishments of Akbar and his successors were accompanied by the florescence of Mughal art. Mughal painting and architecture reflected both Persian and Ottoman influences. As with its Safavid and Ottoman counterparts, Mughal art reached great heights in manuscript illustration and miniature paintings as well as the design and building of religious and public monuments—grand mosques, forts, and palaces. Perhaps the most famous product of this period is the Taj Mahal, built in Agra by Shah Jahan, a grandson of Akbar, as a memorial to his beloved wife.

Despite the division of the Muslim world into separate sultanates, a Muslim traveler across this vast area could experience an international Islamic order that transcended state boundaries, particularly in the urban/intellectual culture of cities and towns. All Muslim citizens were members of a transnational community of believers, citizens of the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) who, despite differences of interpretation, professed faith in one God, His Prophet, and Revelation. All were bound by the Sharia, Islamic law, and obligated to observe the Five Pillars of Islam. The Islamic city reflected this common framework and culture in its organization and institutions (mosques, legal codes and courts, schools and universities, Sufi convents, religious endowments, a political establishment of sultans, military commanders, and soldiers as well as a religious establishment of ulama and Sufi shaykhs or piris—scholars and mystics).

Despite variations and the individual policies of some rulers, the imperial Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal sultanates demonstrated a somewhat common Islamic ideological outlook and approach to state organization, support, and use of Islam. Rulers bore the title “sultan” (the one who possesses power or authority). Their rule was based on a blend of military strength and religious legitimacy. The sultan appropriated the caliph’s charge as defender and protector of the faith. Islamic law continued to enjoy pride of place as the official law of the state. Religion not only supported the state but was itself supported by state patronage. In particular, many of the ulama became part of a prosperous religious establishment that assisted the sultan’s attempt to centralize and control the educational, legal, and social systems. They educated the military, bureaucratic, and religious elites in their schools, supervised and guided the interpretation and application of Islamic law in the Sharia courts, and oversaw the disbursement of funds from religious endowments (waqf) for educational and social services from the building of mosques and schools to hospitals and lodges for travelers. During this time, a number of the nonofficial
ulama in particular developed strong international linkages. Many people came from far and wide to study at Mecca and Medina or at the renowned al-Azhar University in Cairo. After years of study and interchange, they returned to their home territories or took up residence in other parts of the Islamic world. Scholars, in particular, often traveled throughout the Muslim world to study with great masters and collect Prophetic traditions and reports about the Prophet's words and deeds. Islamic learning and interpretation possessed truly international character due to the sacrifice and commitment of these learned men. As the ulama developed and prospered, so too did the Sufis. Their eclectic, syncretistic tendencies enabled Islam to adapt to new environments and absorb local religious beliefs and customs. This complemented and enhanced the general process of adaptation pursued by the sultans and attracted droves of converts as Islam spread at an astonishing rate in Africa, India, and Southeast Asia. Established Sufi orders, like the Naqshbandi, spread from the Indian subcontinent to the Mediterranean, becoming vast international networks, and new orders sprang up and prospered.

Within the diversity of states and cultures, Islamic faith and civilization provided an underlying unity, epitomized by a common profession of faith and acceptance of the Sharia, Islamic law. Islam provided the basic ideological framework for political and social life, a source of identity, legitimacy, and guidance. A sense of continuity with past history and institutions was maintained. The world was divided into Islamic (dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam) and non-Islamic (dar al-barb, the abode of warfare). All Muslims were to strive to extend Islam wherever possible. Thus, merchants and traders as well as soldiers and mystics were the early missionaries of Islam. The sultan was the protector and defender of the faith charged with extending the Islamic domain. Citizenship, taxation, law, education, social welfare, defense, and warfare were based on Islam. The ulama for their part successfully asserted their role as protectors and interpreters of the tradition. Thus, both the political and the religious authorities, the "men of the sword" and the "men of the pen," appealed to Islam to legitimate their authority. For the majority of believers, there was a continuum of guidance, power, and success that transcended the contradictions and vicissitudes of Muslim life, and validated and reinforced the sense of a divinely mandated and guided community with a purpose and mission.

By the turn of the eighteenth century, the power and prosperity of the imperial sultanates were in serious decline. The decline of the great Muslim gunpowder empires coincided with the Industrial Revolution and modernization in the West. The emergence of modern Eu-
responsible for the formulation that, after great resistance and debate, became the classical doctrine of Islamic jurisprudence, establishing a fixed, common methodology for all law schools. According to al-Shafii, there are four sources of law: usul al-fiqh, roots or sources of law; the Quran, the example (Sunna) of the Prophet, consensus (ijma) of the community, and analogical reasoning or deduction (qiyas).

Al-Shafii taught that there were only two material sources of law: the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet, as preserved in the hadith. He maintained that Muhammad was divinely inspired, and thus his example was normative for the community. He restricted the use of the term sunna to the Prophet. Henceforth, it came to be identified solely with the divinely inspired practice of Muhammad and no longer with tribal custom or the consensus of law schools. Al-Shafii also transferred the authority for legal interpretation from individual law schools to the consensus of the community. Basing his opinion on a tradition of the Prophet—"My community will not agree upon an error"—the agreed practice of the community (ijma) became the third infallible source of law. Finally, the role of personal reasoning in the formulation of law was restricted. Where no explicit revealed text or community consensus existed, jurists were no longer free to rely on their own judgment to solve new problems. Instead, they were to use deductive reasoning (qiyas) to seek a similar or analogous situation in the revealed sources (Quran and Sunna), from which they were to derive a new regulation. Reasoning by analogy would eliminate what al-Shafii regarded as the arbitrary nature of legal reasoning prevalent in the more inductive approach of those who relied on their own judgment.

The Sources of Law

The literal meaning of Sharia is "the road to the watering hole," the clear, right, or straight path to be followed. In Islam, it came to mean the divinely mandated path, the straight path of Islam, that Muslims were to follow, God's will or law. However, because the Quran did not provide an exhaustive body of laws, the desire to discover and delineate Islamic law in a comprehensive and consistent fashion led to the development of the science of law or jurisprudence (fiqih). Fiqih, "understanding," is that science or discipline that sought to ascertain, interpret, and apply God's will or guidance (Sharia) as found in the Quran to all aspects of life. As a result of al-Shafii's efforts, classical Islamic jurisprudence recognized four official sources, as well as other subsidiary sources.

Quran

As the primary source of God's revelation and law, the Quran is the sourcebook of Islamic principles and values. Although the Quran declares, "Here is a plain statement to men, a guidance and instruction to those who fear God," it does not constitute a comprehensive code of laws. While it does contain legal prescriptions, the bulk of the Quran consists of broad, general moral directives—what Muslims ought to do. It replaced, modified, or supplemented earlier tribal laws. Practices such as female infanticide, exploitation of the poor, usury, murder, false contracts, fornication, adultery, and theft were condemned. In other cases, Arab customs were gradually replaced by Islamic standards. Quranic prescriptions governing alcohol and gambling illustrate this process. At first, the use of alcohol and gambling had not been expressly prohibited. However, over a period of years, a series of revelations progressively discouraged their use. The first prescription against the old custom is given in the form of advice: "They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: in them is great sin and some use for man; but the sin is greater than the usefulness" (2:219). Then, Muslims were prohibited from praying under the influence of alcohol: "Approach not prayer with a mind befogged until you can understand all that you say" (4:43). Finally, liquor and gambling were prohibited: "Satan's plan is to incite enmity and hatred between you with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of God and from prayer: Will you not then abstain?" (5:93).

Much of the Quran's reforms consist of regulations or moral guidance that limit or redefine rather than prohibit existing practices. Slavery and women's status are two striking examples. Although slavery was not abolished, slave owners were encouraged to emancipate their slaves, to permit them to earn their freedom, and to "give them some of God's wealth which He has given you" (24:33). Forcing female slaves into prostitution was condemned. Women and the family were the subjects of more wide-ranging reforms affecting marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Marriage was a contract, with women entitled to their dower (4:4). Polygamy was restricted (4:3), and men were commanded to treat their wives fairly and equally (4:129). Women were given inheritance rights in a patriarchal society that had previously restricted inheritance to male relatives.

Sunna of the Prophet

Quranic principles and values were concretized and interpreted by the second and complementary source of law, the Sunna of the Prophet,
the normative model behavior of Muhammad. The importance of the Sunna is rooted in such Quranic injunctions as “obey God and obey the Messenger...”. If you should quarrel over anything refer it to God and the Messenger” (4:59) and “In God’s messenger you have a fine model for anyone whose hope is in God and the Last Day” (33:21). Belief that Muhammad was inspired by God to act wisely, in accordance with God’s will, led to the acceptance of his example, or Sunna, as a supplement to the Quran, and thus, a material or textual source of the law. Sunna includes what the Prophet said, what he did, and those actions that he permitted or allowed.

The record of Prophetic deeds transmitted and preserved in tradition reports (hadith, pl. abadith) proliferated. By the ninth century, the number of traditions had mushroomed into the hundreds of thousands. They included pious fabrications by those who believed that their practices were in conformity with Islam and forgeries by factions involved in political and theological disputes. Recognition that many of these traditions were fabricated led to the development of the science of tradition criticism and the compilation of authoritative compendia. The evaluation of traditions focused on the chain of narrators and the subject matter. Criteria were established for judging the trustworthiness of narrators—moral character, reputation for piety, intelligence, and good memory. Then a link by link examination of each of the narrators was conducted to trace the continuity of a tradition back to the Prophet. The process required detailed biographical information about narrators: where and when they were born, where they lived and traveled, and so forth. Such information might support or refute the authenticity of a narrator. For example, it might be shown that a reputed narrator could not have received a hadith from his predecessor because they did not live at the same time or because they neither lived nor traveled near each other.

The second criteria, evaluation of a tradition’s subject matter, entailed an examination to determine whether, for example, a tradition contradicted the Quran, an already verified tradition, or reason. After traditions had been subjected to both external (narrators) and internal (subject matter) examination, they were categorized according to the degree of their authenticity (authority) or strength as sound, good, or acceptable, and weak.

Throughout the ninth and tenth centuries, scholars traveled throughout the Muslim world collecting traditions and gathering information on their narrators or transmitters. Faced with the enormous corpus of traditions that had grown up, they sought to study and sift through them in order to authenticate and compile those traditions worthy of being conserved and followed by the Muslim community. Six collections came to be accepted as authoritative: those of Ismail al-Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim ibn al-Hajaj (d. 875), Abu Dawud (d. 888), al-Nisai (d. 915), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), and Ibn Maja (d. 896). Among these, the collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim have enjoyed an especially high status as authoritative sources.

Authentication of Tradition Literature. Modern Western scholarship has seriously questioned the historicity and authenticity of the hadith, maintaining that the bulk of traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad were actually written much later.26 Joseph Schacht, the most influential modern Western authority on Islamic law, building on the work of his European predecessors, concluded that the term “Sunna of the Prophet” developed for the first time in the eighth century due to the influence of the Traditionist Movement and under the seigis of al-Shafi’i, and that this usage gave legal authority to later customary practices and traditions. On the basis of his research, Schacht found no evidence of legal traditions before 722, one hundred years after the death of Muhammad. Thus, he concluded that the Sunna of the Prophet is not the words and deeds of the Prophet, but apocryphal material originating from customary practice that was projected back to the eighth century to more authoritative sources—first the Successors, then the Companions, and finally the Prophet himself.

Most Muslim scholars, while critical of some Prophetic traditions, take exception to Schacht’s conclusions.27 To state that no tradition goes back prior to 722 creates an unwarranted vacuum in Islamic history. Schacht’s “first century vacuum” with regard to the existence of Prophetic traditions is a theory or conclusion that completely overlooks or dismisses the Muslim science of tradition criticism and verification and does violence to the deeply ingrained sense of tradition in Arab culture, which all scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim, have acknowledged. As Fazlur Raham notes:

The Arabs, who memorized and handed down the poetry of their poets, sayings of their soothsayers and statements of their judges and tribal leaders, cannot be expected to fail to notice and narrate deeds and sayings of one whom they acknowledged as the Prophet of God.28

Accepting Schacht’s conclusion regarding the many traditions he did examine does not warrant its automatic extension to all the traditions. To consider all Prophetic traditions apocryphal until proven otherwise is to reverse the burden of proof. Moreover, even where differences of opinion exist regarding the authenticity of the chain of narrators, they
need not detract from the authenticity of a tradition's content and common acceptance of the importance of tradition literature as a record of the early history and development of Islamic belief and practice. As H.A.R. Gibb observed regarding the significance of tradition literature:

It serves as a mirror in which the growth and development of Islam as a way of life and the larger Islamic community are truly reflected. . . . It is possible to trace in hadiths the struggle between the supporters of the Umayyads and the Medinan opposition, the growth of Shiism and the divisions between its sects . . . . the rise of theological controversies, and the beginnings of the mystical doctrines of the Sufis.29

**ANALOGICAL REASONING**

Throughout the development of Islamic law, reason had played an important role as caliphs, judges, and, finally, jurists or legal scholars interpreted law where no clear, explicit revealed text or general consensus existed. The general term for legal reasoning or interpretation was *iqtiṣad* (to strive or struggle intellectually). It comes from the same root as *jihād* (to strive or struggle in God's path), which included the notion of holy war. The use of reason (legal reasoning or interpretation) had taken a number of forms and been described by various terms: personal opinion, jurist preference, and analogical reasoning (*qiyyas*). Reasoning by analogy was a more restricted, systematic form of *iqtiṣad*. When faced with new situations or problems, scholars sought a similar situation in the Quran and Sunna. The key is the discovery of the effective cause or reason behind a Sharia rule. If a similar reason could be identified in a new situation or case, then the Sharia judgment was extended to resolve the case. The determination of the minimum rate of dower offers a good example of analogical deduction. Jurists saw a similarity between the bride's loss of virginity in marriage and the Quranic penalty for theft, which was amputation. Thus, the minimum dower was set at the same rate that stolen goods had to be worth before amputation was applicable.

**CONSENSUS OF THE COMMUNITY**

The authority for consensus (*i'jām* as a fourth source of law is usually derived from a saying of the Prophet, "My community will never agree on an error." Consensus did not develop as a source of law until after the death of Muhammad, with the consequent loss of his direct guidance in legislative matters. It began as a natural process for solving problems and making decisions; one followed the majority opinion or consensus of the early community as a check on individual opinions. However, two kinds of consensus came to be recognized. The consensus of the entire community was applied to those religious duties, such as the pilgrimage to Mecca, practiced by all Muslims. But despite al-Shafi'i's attempt to define the fourth source of law as this general consensus, classical Islamic jurisprudence defined the community in a more restricted sense as the community of legal scholars or religious authorities who act in behalf of and guide the entire Muslim community.

Consensus played a pivotal role in the development of Islamic law and contributed significantly to the corpus of law or legal interpretation. If questions arose about the meaning of a Quranic text or tradition or if revelation and early Muslim practice were silent, jurists applied their own reasoning (*iqtiṣad*) to interpret the law. Often this process resulted in a number of differing legal opinions. Over time, perhaps several generations, certain interpretations were accepted by more and more scholars, endured the test of time, while others disappeared. Looking back upon the evolving consensus of scholars, it was concluded that an authoritative consensus had been reached on the issue. Thus, consensus served as a brake on the vast array of individual interpretations of legal scholars and contributed to the creation of a relatively fixed body of laws.

While all came to accept the four sources of law, Islamic jurisprudence recognized other influences, designating them subsidiary principles of law. Among these were custom, public interest, and jurist preference or equity. In this way, some remnant of the inductive, human input that had characterized the actual methods of the law schools in their attempt to realize the Sharia's primary concern with human welfare, justice, and equity was acknowledged. However, the ultimate effect of the acceptance of al-Shafi'i's formulation of the four sources of law, with its tendency to deny independent interpretation and derive all laws directly from revelation, the inspired practice of Muhammad, or the infallible consensus of the community, was the gradual replacement of the real by the ideal. The actual, historical development of the law was forgotten.

By the tenth century, the basic development of Islamic law was completed. The general consensus (*i'jām*) of Muslim jurists was that Islamic law (Islam's way of life) had been satisfactorily and comprehensively delineated in its essential principles, and preserved in the regulations of the law books or legal manuals produced by the law schools.
This attitude led many to conclude that individual, independent interpretation (ijtihad) of the law was no longer necessary or desirable. Instead, Muslims were simply to follow or imitate (taqlid) the past, God's law as elaborated by the early jurists. Jurists were no longer to seek new solutions or produce new regulations and law books but instead study the established legal manuals and write their commentaries. Islamic law, the product of an essentially dynamic and creative process, now tended to become fixed and institutionalized. While individual scholars like Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and al-Suyuti (d. 1505) demurred, the majority position resulted in traditional belief prohibiting substantive legal development. This is commonly referred to as the closing of the gate or door of ijtihad. Belief that the work of the law schools had definitively resulted in the transformation of the Sharia into a legal blueprint for society reinforced the sacrosanct nature of tradition; change or innovation came to be viewed as an unwarranted deviation (bid'a) from established sacred norms. To be accused of innovation—deviation from the law and practice of the community—was equivalent to the charge of heresy in Christianity.

There is a danger in overemphasizing the unity and fixed nature of Islamic law. First, while an overall unity or common consensus existed among the law schools with regard to essential practices such as the confession of faith, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca, the divergent character of the law schools was preserved by differences in such areas as the grounds for divorce, the levying of taxes, and inheritance rights. Acknowledgment of this diversity within the unity of law was sanctioned by the reported saying of the Prophet, “Difference of opinion within my community is a sign of the bounty of Allah.” This diversity continued in practice as judges applied the laws of the various law schools in their courts. Second, some limited legal development and change did occur where scholars interpreted and clarified details of legal doctrine. This was especially true as regards the activity of the mufti, a legal expert or consultant. These experts advised both judges and litigants on matters of law. Their formal, written legal opinions (fatwa), based on their interpretation of the law, were often relied on in judicial matters. Many of the more important opinions became part of collections of fatwas, which became authoritative in their own right.

**Schools of Law**

Although there had been many law schools, by the thirteenth century the number became stabilized. For Sunni Islam, four major schools pre-