Women, Gender, and Development

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By many measures, the field of women/gender and development (W/GAD) is quite robust. The UN Development Program (UNDP) and other UN agencies have made gender a focus of their development reviews. The World Bank (2003a), long noted for its resistance to gender issues, recently published Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, linking development to the broader context of women’s rights, the explicit focus of a new volume edited by Maxine Molyneux and Shabana Razavi (2003). Economists Diane Elson (1993a, 2003) and Lourdes Benería (2003) use gender as a fulcrum to better understand and critique economic processes of globalization.

W/GAD analyses have had an impact on development discourse and on the way aid is administered, but they have been less successful in making a material difference for the vast majority of women in developing countries. Development is not mainly produced by the actions of donor agencies, of course. In the last decade, the direction of economic change has been vastly more affected by private capital flows, currency crises, privatization, and the pressure to adopt open markets and export-oriented growth than by public or private development assistance. Cuts in social spending have increased the burdens on women’s labor. Declining incomes and higher male unemployment have pushed women into paid work. Women’s labor is the key to export strategies based on free trade zones (FTZs). Market reforms have not generated the growth that the reformers prom-
ised. Inequalities are increasing, and the number of people living in poverty, a category disproportionately occupied by women and children, has been growing (see Benézra 2003).

Yet donor agencies remain an important arena for addressing development issues and pursuing gender equity. Donors, not markets, engage in policy dialogues, take social criteria into account, and try to implement “participatory development.” Bureaucracies are often thought of as resistant to change. In our experience, development agencies and NGOs actively seek new approaches, and advocates for women can take advantage of these openings. Growing discontent with “market fundamentalism” may also provide opportunities that those in the field should be prepared to pursue.

However, the field is divided, and advocates and scholars seem unable to move beyond the debates that were salient over a decade ago. In the thirty years since Ester Boserup published her classic study, Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970), two major approaches have dominated the field. The women in development (WID) model challenged the male bias in foreign assistance in the 1970s, and the gender and development (GAD) approach, which emerged in the late 1980s, put women and development in the context of gender power relations.

This essay reviews WID and GAD with two goals in mind. The first is historical. It is clear that both models reflected trends in feminism theory: WID drew on the liberal egalitarianism of “second wave” Northern feminism in the 1970s, and GAD responded to the rise of postcolonial feminism and the impressive growth of Third World women’s movements in the 1980s. But the turn from WID to GAD in the late 1980s (and the addition of the “democracy agenda” by the 1990s) were also reactions to major shifts in the international system. In the 1960s and 70s, international development policies operated from Keynesian assumptions, which were being pushed to the left by dependency theory and the North/South dialogue. By the mid-1980s, supply side economics had displaced Keynesianism, and the neoliberal Washington Consensus remains the dominant view twenty years later. Economic “liberalization” was joined by policies to promote political “liberalization”—democracy—in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putting WID and GAD in this broader international context makes it possible to move away from seeing these two models as competing “truths” about how to approach women and development to understanding them as successive efforts to respond to—and influence—changing policy environments.

The second rationale for this essay is political. September 11 has changed the dynamics of the international system once again. It is our hope that refram-
tista revolt in Chiapas, the rise of such populist leaders as Hugo Chavez in Latin America, the resistance of indigenous movements, and protests in Seattle, Cancun, and elsewhere against the World Trade Organization and other symbols of globalization. Criticism of the way the IMF handled the Asian currency crises indicated that the Consensus might be breaking down.

The United States had preponderant power in the 1990s but used it ambivalently. After the first Gulf war, U.S. interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo were carried out under multilateral mandates but were not popular at home. The events of September 11, 2001, moved the United States from debating the costs and benefits of humanitarian interventions to preventive war. The invasion of Iraq undermined the Western alliance, weakened the United Nations, and likely increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks around the globe.

U.S. policy alone does not determine what happens in the international system. But changes in U.S. leadership have set the tone for international politics since World War II. Recent administrations have remained wedded to an economic model that is not only globalizing but hostile to the state, and there is no alternative in sight. Whether the international opposition to U.S. unilateralism will create space for challenges to U.S. leadership—and to economic orthodoxy—is possible, but not a likely outcome. Yet September 11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq have unsettled the international system and may offer a new context for the development debate.

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS
AND THE UN CONFERENCES ON WOMEN

The foregoing brief history of international politics over the last thirty years ignores an important phenomenon: the dramatic rise of women’s movements over these same three decades, which has given women greater voice and has increased their access to political power. In this period, women’s movements have brought about unprecedented changes in women’s roles and status. But the wave of women’s empowerment may have reached its peak. It is clear that, without continued efforts to increase women’s control over resources, current gains could be lost.

After the establishment of the United Nations at the close of World War II (sex was included among the forms of discrimination banned by its charter), a few women on the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), led by Finnish feminist Helvi Sipila, worked within the UN to raise women’s issues. In 1970, the CSW succeeded in getting the General Assembly to pass a resolution encouraging “full integration of women in the total development effort” (Tinker 1990a, 26).

In 1972 the General Assembly declared 1975 International Women’s Year (IWW), and in 1974 it approved a conference on women, to take place in Mexico City in 1975.1

Most CSW efforts had focused on improving women’s legal status. But in the 1970s and 1980s, the UN General Assembly was gripped by the issue of development. Its deliberations were strongly influenced by dependency theory, the view that the South was not merely undeveloped but had been exploited by the North through decades, even centuries, of unequal trade. Declaring the 1970s the Second Development Decade, the General Assembly called for transfers of capital and technology from North to South and the stabilization of the prices of primary products, which comprised the bulk of Third World exports.

In June 1975, just prior to the Mexico City conference, the American Association for the Advancement of Science brought together 95 women and men from 55 countries to discuss women and development. The seminar focused on the lack of reliable data on women’s economic participation. It “naively assumed,” as organizer Irene Tinker later wrote, “that correcting the biases of data concerning women’s work and exposing the constraints on women’s education and credit would automatically solve many [gender] inequalities as planners incorporated the new data and insights into their programming” (Tinker 1990a, 5).

Efforts to put women on the development agenda in the 1970s coincided with the recognition on the part of many donors that their programs had not “trickled down” to the poor. Under the leadership of Robert McNamara (1968–81), the World Bank adopted Basic Human Needs as a priority. Although the Bank remained firmly in the hands of economists, anthropologists and other social scientists joined its and other donor staffs, providing a more sympathetic audience to those concerned about sex discrimination. Private philanthropic institutions like the Ford Foundation (Flora 1982) joined the Rockefeller Foundation (long known for its health and population programs) as significant players in the emerging “development community.” Several UN agencies as well as European and Canadian bilateral donors began to give serious attention to poverty and to women’s status (as it was then called) as related development issues.

As each delegation presented an analysis of the status of women in their country, pulling together basic demographic data, statistics on women’s health, in-
come, labor force participation, education and, where available, political participation, the socialist countries made impressive showings. This reinforced those who argued—much more persuasively in the 1970s than is remembered today—that socialist revolution was a prerequisite to making real advances in equality for women.

The Mexico "Plan of Action" called upon governments, the private sector, and UN agencies to take specific actions to remedy "sex" disparities. It focused on women's legal rights and economic disadvantages, but skirted the issue of political representation, which was not surprising given that the majority of the delegations represented countries under authoritarian rule. The process of preparing for the conference had the unintended effect of raising political awareness of women's issues in many countries and provided an excuse for women to meet, sowing the seeds for a subsequent wave of women's organizing. Those from the North who attended the official meeting and the parallel W/Tribune in Mexico City expected to focus on feminist issues. However, the official debates soon revealed deep divisions between North and South. U.S. feminists who attended the Tribune looked forward to a spirit of global sisterhood, but soon learned that many Third World women rejected "feminism" as hostile to men and believed that economic exploitation by the North, not patriarchy, was the major cause of women's oppression.

After the General Assembly declared 1977–85 the Decade for Women, women's movements grew exponentially, organizing to address issues from human rights and the environment to day care, health, and reproductive rights. Some groups were organized by donor agencies as a means to extend credit and training more effectively, while local self-help organizations proliferated to provide safety nets for those pushed further into poverty by the economic crises of the 1980s. Over the Decade (1977–85), as assumptions about international feminist solidarity were questioned, the issue of violence against women emerged as a shared concern that could bring women together across national, class, and cultural divides.

The Mid-Decade Conference in 1980, hastily switched to Copenhagen from Teheran after the Iranian revolution in 1979, was highly politicized. By contrast, the End of the Decade meeting in Nairobi in 1989 was relatively harmonious and, at U.S. insistence, the language of the final document was decided by consensus. Whether the spirit of cooperation in Nairobi was due to the maturity of the international women's movement or to the strong-arm tactics of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations (which had buried the "North/South dialogue")—or both—is hard to judge. What is clear is that the Decade was a spur to women's organizing and helped create transnational networks of women's groups. Women's organizations used the commitments their governments made in Mexico City, Copenhagen, and Nairobi to lobby for more egalitarian legislation at home. By the 1990s, most of the world's governments (but not the United States) had ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

THE PERCY AMENDMENT AND THE WID OFFICE IN USAID

After Mexico City, "women in development" was quickly adopted as a goal by many national governments and foreign assistance agencies. As Lucille Mair, secretary-general of the 1980 Mid-Decade conference, put it, women came to be seen as "a missing link in development ... half of a nation's resources that could no longer be wasted" (quoted in Tinker 1990b, 31). In the United States, Congress had passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1973 calling for the establishment of an Office of Women in Development in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and encouraged other donors to "give specific attention" to women (Kardam 1997; Stautd 1989). The timing was important. The Percy Amendment (named after the senator who carried the bill in Congress) passed at the height of a wave of feminist legislative reform in the United States, the year the Supreme Court legalized abortion. Antifeminist backlash soon followed (e.g., Faludi 1991), which succeeded in preventing the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and, some have argued, created a constituency of "angry white men" that is still having an impact on U.S. politics three decades later.

But the mood in 1976 was progressive. Jimmy Carter was elected in the wake of the Watergate scandal that had forced President Nixon out of office. Carter's campaign took the moral high road, suggesting that the United States was now willing to accept some responsibility for the mistakes of the Vietnam War and to stop giving unquestioned support to anticomunist dictators. President Carter became actively engaged in the North/South dialogue and issued a report recognizing environmental limits to growth. He gave Pat Derian, the female head of the State Department's new human rights office, substantial leeway to criticize human rights violations in countries such as Argentina and Chile, which had been staunch Cold War allies of the United States.
Carter appointed Arvonne Fraser to head the WID Office at USAID (AID/WID). Fraser, who had chaired Carter’s Midwestern campaign, hired an activist-academic as her deputy, incorporated academic researchers into her policy team, and commissioned research that could be translated into WID initiatives. Her connections with grassroots women’s groups and her political network in Washington helped her move WID higher up on USAID’s agenda. The Pegg Amendment lacked specific guidance on how its mandate should be carried out. Many in USAID were sympathetic to doing “something” about women, but others resisted, ridiculing advocates as “women’s librarians” and labeling WID a “culturally inappropriate” policy that would damage USAID’s credibility. Many men, perhaps uncomfortable with the changes feminists were calling for at home, resisted thinking about development abroad in gender terms (Staudt 1985).

In this environment, a simplified version of Ester Boserup’s thesis in Women’s Role in Economic Development became a useful tool for WID advocates. In the 1970s, fearing the “population bomb” and the possibility of famine, USAID was oriented toward agricultural development. Boserup’s view that African agriculture was based on a “female farming system” drew attention to women’s roles in agricultural production. It soon became clear that the methods used by governments and the United Nations to measure women’s labor force participation, particularly in agriculture, were woefully inadequate. Women were seen as wives and mothers, but not farmers.

Boserup’s analysis of the gendered impact of colonialism in Africa—that cash cropping and technology transfer to men had disturbed earlier patterns of male/female complementarity in food production and household management—made it possible to argue that colonialism, not African tradition or inexorable market forces, had disadvantaged women. In the West, and in the minds of most men working at USAID, progress meant increasing the “family wage” of the male household head, who was supposed to take care of his dependent wife (or wives) and children. In many parts of Africa, however, women remained obliged to meet specific household expenses, including children’s schooling, but those responsibilities were not taken into account in programs designed to increase agricultural production. Armed with Boserup’s thesis, WID advocates could argue that programs that directed resources to women, including training and agricultural inputs, would improve food production, family welfare, and women’s equity—without violating cultural norms. The WID Office also looked at urban women and the problem of women-headed households (Buvinic and Youssef 1978), estimated to be as many as one-third of households worldwide. Income generation projects were developed to increase women’s economic independence and ameliorate poverty.

By 1980, the WID Office could show some successes (see Staudt 1985), but the WID approach was beginning to draw serious criticism. Lourdes Benería and Gita Sen (1981) criticized WID as a Band-aid treating the symptom (women’s poverty) but not the illness (capitalist development). Dependency theorists focused on the lack of attention to women’s unpaid labor (e.g., Kabeer 1994, 49), which was often increased by development projects that seemed to assume women had free time. Canadian scholar Adele Mueller argued that WID turned women into “clients,” removing them “from active and authentic participation in public life.” In her view, WID supported a development discourse that amounted to a “strategy for producing and maintaining First World dominance in the capitalist world order,” although Mueller conceded that feminist reform within aid bureaucracies was the only way for women to gain access to “even a small portion of the millions of dollars which circulate from the First to the Third World” (1986, 36, 38).

WID did open up a new debate over how resources should be allocated at a time when foreign assistance played a greater role in international capital flows than is the case today. The development model of the 1970s was still based on Keynesian assumptions and concerned about “growth with equity.” Many, including many women in developing countries, saw socialism as a viable alternative development model, so it is not surprising that WID advocates were faulted for failing to question capitalism. But in hindsight this seems quixotic; if those who worked in donor agencies had frontally attacked the “capitalist model,” WID would have failed before it was tried. In the 1970s, the debate was between Keynesian “liberals” and Marxist and dependency “radicals.” Few imagined that the paradigm would shift so radically, and that those concerned with women and development would soon become absorbed by efforts to cushion the effects of structural adjustment on the poor and marginalized, especially women and children.

As Marxist revolutionary rhetoric receded over the course of the 1980s, critics of WID turned to postmodernism to frame their concerns (e.g., Marchand and Parpart 1995). As Lucille Mair put it, although “Women and Development” had become “the Decade’s overnight catchphrase,” it evaded “the question of what kind of development women were to be drawn into” (quoted in Tinker 1990b, 31).
THE 1980s: REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE
"SUPPLY SIDE" APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT

The U.S. elections in 1980 were a stunning defeat for Jimmy Carter who, in the view of the victorious Reagan administration, had "lost" Afghanistan, Iran, and Nicaragua to a Soviet bloc bent on expansion. President Reagan was convinced the United States should reassess its strategic power. He found a ready ally in Britain's Margaret Thatcher.

The Reagan administration's foreign policy was also influenced by those in the United States who were hostile to the United Nations, skeptical of the NIEO, and critical of arguments for "concessions" to the South. The rapid expansion of UN membership to include the "newly emerging nations" had produced vocal Third World caucuses in the General Assembly, including the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. With the cooperation of the Eastern bloc, and with the countries of western Europe often abstaining, the United States was increasingly isolated (Jaquette 1995).

In response, the United States withdrew from UNESCO and stopped fully paying its UN dues. Recounting his experiences at the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat who served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in the 1970s, argued that underdevelopment should be blamed on the misguided, "Fabian socialist" policies of Third World leaders (Moynihan 1975b). Reagan was elected by a large margin in 1980 and felt he had a mandate to change foreign policy. His administration got tough with the Soviets, denied that the North was responsible in any way for the economic weaknesses of the economies of the South, and dismissed Carter's concern for environmental limits to growth as too pessimistic. Responding to the religious right, which had mobilized against the legalization of abortion and to defeat the ERA, Reagan stopped U.S. funding for international population programs. The United States, which had earlier pushed population control without attending to women's choices, now attacked China for its "coercive" one child policy.

In this changed environment, the WID Office in USAID took a much lower profile and concentrated on internal training and supported microenterprise projects, in keeping with the new emphasis on market-based development. Leadership on WID issues began to shift to other institutions, including the Canadian and Northern European bilateral aid agencies, UN agencies, private foundations, and NGOs.

The debt crisis and the emerging Washington Consensus provided the opening for international financial institutions to impose structural adjustment reforms. In conventional economic terms, SAPs were justifiable. Government regulations, inefficient state ownership of enterprises, high external deficits, and runaway inflation had distorted investment decisions and, along with high tariffs and opportunities for rent-seeking provided by the state's overinvolvement in the economy, could plausibly be cited as causes of low growth and high prices to consumers. The structural adjustment "cure" called for cutting tariffs and lowering barriers to foreign capital, controlling inflation by reducing government spending, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. High growth rates in the export-promoting Asian "tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and Chile's adoption of an open, market-based economy under Augusto Pinochet were cited to prove that the model worked.

In many countries, however, the implementation of structural adjustment policies had devastating social consequences, hitting the middle class and the poor (e.g., Bakker 1994) as well as small and medium local enterprises, which were unable to compete. Unemployment rose, government services were severely cut back, and price controls, which many governments had used to keep down the cost of basic goods and services, were phased out. In Latin America, where SAPs were widely adopted, incomes fell for most of the "Lost Decade" of the 1980s. But these reforms did not produce sustained growth, and the gap between rich and poor world wide grew larger.

As Lourdes Beneria pointed out, women were the first to feel the effects of these policies and women's organizations were the first to "make the connections between global development and everyday life" (quoted in Lind 1997, 1206). In Latin America, women were increasingly pushed into the labor force, often taking part-time and marginal jobs and in some cases driving even lower class, less skilled men further down the employment ladder or into joblessness. Women (and men) moved into the informal sector and into homework, that is, industrial piecework done at home. In some countries, women organized neighborhood self-help organizations, including communal kitchens and consumer boycott groups (Lind 1997; Jaquette 1989). Although donors began to provide safety nets to counteract the social costs of structural adjustment (Elson 1995a; Azlan-beigui et al. 1994; Cagatay et al. 1995; Datta and Kornberg 2002), the earlier notion of assisting women in development was replaced by fears of the feminization of poverty. The fact that structural adjustment took place in a strongly pro-
market, antistate environment was critical, postponing needed reforms in state capacity and preempting all arguments for redistributive policies (Jaquette 2003). The positive role of the state in the Asian development experience was ignored. Government spending cuts, which were justified to reduce the state’s role in economic production, to reduce the opportunities for corruption, and to control inflation, required disinvesting in education and health, with long-term implications for income distribution, competitiveness, and the quality of life.14

THE GAD CRITIQUE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MODEL

At the end of the 1980s, a new “gender and development” (GAD) model emerged. Arguing that WID had been ineffective in improving women’s material conditions and that it was insensitive to the differences among women, GAD advocates suggested an innovative approach that would take account of women’s diversity (Priest and Meyer 1999, 6) and confront the gender power relations that were holding women back.

Carolyn Moser’s “Gender Planning in the Third World” (1988) and 1989a) is widely cited as foundational to the GAD approach. Moser acknowledged that WID had brought about a progressive shift in development thinking, which no longer viewed women solely as mothers. But, she noted, under WID, AID had treated women as an untapped resource in development, ignoring their triple burden of reproductive, productive, and community work. Moser called for a deeper analysis based on gender, that is, on an understanding that women’s and men’s roles are socially constructed, not biologically determined. Because gender constructions vary by culture, GAD would be able to respond to the differences among women rather than seeing them as a homogeneous group.

Moser cited Mayra Buvin’s observation that donor policies had moved from an emphasis on growth (from which women had largely been excluded), to equity (following Boserup’s implicit “affirmative action” argument), to anti-poverty as SAPs took hold. In Buvin’s view, however, donors had never given more than lip service to equality; she believed anti-poverty projects were more readily adopted because they were less threatening (see Kabeer 1994, 71; Jackson 1998). Moser suggested that bureaucratic resistance had kept women’s projects small and focused on training in “activities traditionally undertaken by women” (1988, 18–29). Labeling WID’s emphasis “home economics,” she argued that it did not recognize “women’s productive role” or their “practical gender need” to earn an income (13).15

Moser then outlined a new GAD approach intended to challenge gender roles in several ways: by training women in “male” skills, changing zoning regulations to allow household enterprises, ensuring women’s ownership rights to land and housing, and providing child care and transport facilities suited to the demands made on women. On macroeconomic issues, Moser questioned UNICEF’s claim to be doing “structural adjustment with a human face” by asking whether any international agency in the neoliberal environment could possibly implement policies that would “increase the independence of women” (33).

As the GAD critique gained adherents, its proponents increasingly treated WID as the problem. The WID model was dismissed as too women-specific and welfare to make a difference. Negative assessments of WID became common in the mainstream development literature. To cite two typical examples, John Brohman’s text *Popular Development* labels WID efforts as “Western-style reformist measures that obviated the need for more radical structural change” (1996, 283), and a recent study of women in Latin America and Asia concludes that GAD was an improvement over WID because it went beyond “document[ing] the negative impacts of economic development on women” to addressing “the dynamics and structures of gender relations” (Smith, Hünfeld et al. 2004).

But this binary comparison distorts the WID model and exaggerates the possibilities for radical feminist and anticapitalist outcomes. Like GAD, WID made women’s economic empowerment a priority and was not convinced that WID was unnecessary because existing health, education, and population programs were already reaching women. WID advocates maintained that health and population programs did not look at the consequences of women’s economic marginalization (e.g., Blumberg 1995). Boserup did not construct women as “hapless victims,” as some have argued (e.g., Parpart 1995), but portrayed them as independent economic actors within a decaying but still viable system of complementarity, and she emphasized their capacity to enter into market activities. When GAD advocates attacked population programs as “the WID approach,” they ignored the fact that WID advocates in USAID and elsewhere were highly critical of existing population programs for manipulating women’s choices and for ignoring the many economic, social, and political factors that made it difficult for women to control their own fertility (e.g., Jaquette and Staudt 1981; Helzner and Shepard 1997).16

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women's status since the 1950s and calling for project evaluations that would distinguish their differential impacts on men and women. The statistical office at the UN eventually developed more sophisticated measures of gender differences (the GDI and GEM indexes) that directly measure male/female differentials, but the intent to draw attention to gender inequities in order to influence policy was behind both efforts. Despite the current tendency among critics of development to dismiss quantitative data as part of a larger, modernist hegemony in development studies (e.g., Brohman 1996; Escobar 1995), we firmly believe that such indexes are the most differentiated project data remain critical policy tools.

The WID Office also sponsored a series of "country studies," using household time budgets and anthropological methods to get a fuller picture of women's lives. These showed that women worked longer hours than men, often spending a substantial part of their workday gathering firewood and carrying water. This led to projects to introduce intermediate technologies, such as more efficient cookstoves and water pumps, which did not directly challenge definitions of women's work but, when successful, did increase women's access to an important resource: time.

In the 1970s, AID/WID consciously tried to come in below the radar, offering programs that provided economic benefits for women without focusing on a cultural backlash in the host country. The WID Office did not fund projects that emphasized "consciousness-raising" in order to avoid the charge that it was promoting Western-style feminism. Its emphasis on economic rather than political participation made sense in the 1970s and early 1980s when a majority of the world's states were controlled by authoritarian governments. New opportunities presented themselves as local women's movements grew in numbers and visibility and came to be perceived as an important component of civil societies resisting authoritarianism during the 1980s.

The WID approach had been conceived in terms of reaching women who lived in households and were constrained by cultural norms and responsibilities. The rapid growth of women's grassroots organizations during the 1980s made it possible to reach women through women's groups and to call openly for empowerment, allowing GAD to build on a growing organizational capacity among Third World women. This suggested new possibilities for dialogue and partnering. Moser cited a statement by Dawn (Development Alternatives With Women for a New Era), a transnational group of Southern activists and researchers organized prior to the Nairobi conference, as setting the goal for future cooperation:

"We want a world where basic needs become basic rights and where poverty and all forms of violence are eliminated. . . . Meeting the basic rights of the poor and transforming the institutions that subordinate women are inextricably linked and can be "achieved through the self-empowerment of women." 17 GAD pushed to broaden WID's horizons while pressuring for greater bureaucratic leverage. Because women's projects had been "ghettoized" in specialized WID offices, GAD advocates called for "mainstreaming" to integrate gender into all development projects and programs. 18 Ironically, given GAD's emphasis on gender structures of power, Moser argued that GAD would provoke less resistance among bureaucrats in donor agencies. 19 Using Maxine E. Oppenheimer's (1983) conceptual distinction between strategic and practical gender interests (that is, needs derived from an analysis of women's subordination to men whereas practical needs are those derived from the concrete conditions women experience), Moser observed that it was not necessary for all projects to address "strategic" issues. GAD could thus "diffuse" the "hostile and negative" reactions to feminism (1988a, 10) that WID's demands for equality had provoked among women as well as men in donor bureaucracies. GAD's participatory "empowerment" approach meant that Third World women themselves would choose whether and how to make their "practical" needs "strategic." 20

GAD built on WID's successes and learned from WID's failures. Mainstreaming could be tried because WID had been entering wedge into bureaucratic discourses and practices. Mainstreaming might disavow women-specific projects as too narrowly conceived but, in the end, GAD needed women-only programs for the same reasons WID did: because women often could not attend meetings where men were present, because women have different work schedules from men, or because women's leadership is more readily nurtured in women-specific projects than in mixed groups. A recent review of mainstreaming argues that women-only projects are "still widely and profoundly, if not universally, necessary" (Chant and Gutman 2000, 41).

If GAD was not that different from WID in practice, why did GAD supporters insist so passionately that it was? One explanation is the way bureaucracies work. By portraying GAD as a new, coherent alternative that could correct the defects of WID, GAD supporters could gain traction in bureaucracies suffering from "WID fatigue." GAD advocates were sought after by donor agencies. Moser took a position in the World Bank, and Eva Rathgeber, a fellow architect of GAD, was named head of the Gender Section of the Canadian International Development Agency.
(GIDA) and then of its regional office in Africa. GAD gave non-U.S. donors the opportunity to move into the space left by a now cautious AID/WID and allowed them (and Southern project recipients) to distance themselves from USAID.

GAD's emphasis on "bringing men back in" provided not only a bureaucratic strategy but a new analytical focus. Instead of talking just about women as a uniform category, GAD emphasized the differences among women and drew attention to gender conflict. As issues of violence against women became more salient for women's movements worldwide, for example, GAD advocates pointed out that improving women's access to resources in an environment where men are losing jobs and status creates male resentment and, in some cases, violence. Some projects tried to address this by increasing women's and men's productivity in tandem.21

THE 1990S: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The 1990s created an unanticipated unipolar world. The first President Bush (1988–92) organized a broad coalition, under the auspices of the United Nations, to force Saddam Hussein to relinquish Kuwait. Victory in Iraq did not guarantee his reelection, however. Bill Clinton tried to position himself as part of a "Third Way," joining Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder as a group of young leaders seeking a more socially responsible capitalism (J. Richardson 2001, 192–200). Despite his doubts, Clinton eventually supported the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and worked with the UN and NATO, engaging in "humanitarian" interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, and Kosovo, although not Rwanda (Halberstam 2001). He restored funding to international family planning programs.

The global context of foreign assistance was also shifting once again. As GAD advocates worked to "get the institutions right," as Anne Marie Goetz (1997a) put it, the international system was moving further away from state-led development. Public capital flows were strongly outpaced by private capital, except for the poorest countries. Short-term private investment flows into emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America, and Southeast Asia produced a new round of crises due to capital volatility. Democratization gave some donors, including USAID, new direction, shifting resources from economic growth to political institution-building and support for civil society (Carothers 1999; Lewis and Wallace 2000).

In the 1990s, women's international networks showed they could effectively influence the outcomes of UN conferences. The environment became the organizational focus of NGOs like WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organization) which helped coordinate NGO strategies at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 and the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 (Higer 1999, 114). In Cairo, the international women's health movement—which had been in the making since the 1960s when heavy-handed U.S. population control policies had provoked feminist as well as nationalist resistance—came into its own, the result of an effective women's caucus, greater feminist representation on national delegations, and more lenient accreditation rules for NGOs attending UN meetings. Cairo dealt with controversial issues such as abortion, female circumcision, and violence against women (Higer 1999, 156–58; Stienstra 2000) and put women's fertility choices in a larger context, including women's access to education and credit.

Women also made important gains at the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The conflict in Bosnia made it easier for the international community to accept that rape was a "weapon of war" and toward accepting the view that "women's rights are human rights." In 1993, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration against Violence Against Women by a unanimous vote. UNIFEM, which had resisted adding women's rights to its programs throughout the 1980s, began to treat violence against women as a development issue (Joachim 1999, 152–57).

The conferences on environment, human rights, and population were major advances in progressive international norm-setting and proved that women's movements could work cross-nationally within the UN context (Meyer and Prigl 1999). But there were signs that the progressive phase of women's international organizing might have peaked; successes in Vienna and Cairo came under attack from the left and the right. Amy Higer points out that the victories of the "pragmatists" in Cairo (who succeeded in getting their feminist approach to reproductive health adopted) deepened divisions between them and the "outsiders" who wanted to put the population issue in a different global frame: "By not pushing on debt relief issues... they risked having alienated the very movement they claimed to represent" (Higer 1999, 173). Among human rights activists there was a similar split between those who saw human rights in individual and political terms and those who believed that human rights should include economic and social rights.

More ominously, in Cairo there were early signs of a growing conservative backlash that gained greater strength at the Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing in 1995. The Vatican, backed by some Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, contested the word “gender” everywhere it appeared in the Beijing Platform of Action. Conservatives challenged the idea that sex roles are “constructed,” calling the concept of “gender” an attack on traditional, heterosexual definitions of the family. Feeling they had lost the battle in Cairo, conservative groups came better prepared to Beijing, claiming that feminist NGOs had distorted the draft platform, that heterosexuality was determined by nature and supported by religious belief, and that feminism was an “ideology” that most women did not share, even in the West. After Beijing, many feared that future global conferences might reverse the feminist advances already made (e.g., Eccher 1999). Concerns about backlash affected planning for Beijing+5 and Beijing+10 activities.

In this more conservative environment, many felt GAD offered a way to extend the life of the dependency and socialist critiques of capitalism that had become difficult to sustain in the neoliberal policy climate. But GAD advocates did not push an anticapitalist agenda for the same reasons that WID advocates had not done so. Like WID, GAD was funded by donor agencies in states committed to liberal capitalism. During the 1990s, as persistently low growth rates and increasing inequalities made the promises of neoliberalism appear to ring hollow, GAD was no better equipped than WID to counter the neoliberal agenda. Increasingly anticapitalist critics, male and female, found a platform in antiglobalization movements. Grassroots women are taking significant roles on the local level in these movements (see “Women’s Movements in the Globalizing World” in this book), but women’s issues have been marginalized and women’s movements are not seen as important social actors in the push for radical change (see Eschle 2003).

The emphasis on participation and empowerment brought out the conflicts between multiculturalism and projects promoting gender equality. Some theorists have defended universal norms (e.g., Nussbaum 1999; Ackery and Okin 1999; Phillips 2002) against the view that they represent Western cultural hegemony. Ironically, GAD’s postmodern embrace of “difference” may have weakened its ability to rebut cultural defenses of gender discrimination. As Elisabeth Prügl and Mary K. Meyer point out, “gender” has resulted in “a proliferation of descriptions of women’s local experiences” and “gender feminisms in diverse contexts,” bringing about a “retreat from claims to commonality, including those of common oppression . . .” (1999, 6).

In the 1990s, feminist international relations theorists challenged IR realist orthodoxy (e.g., Sylvester 1998; Zalewski 1991). One approach broadened the narrow military definition of security to include issues like environmental and economic security and security against torture and gender violence (e.g., Tickner 1992). Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum put women at the center of their “capabilities” approach to development, drawing attention to the devastating impact of inequalities on the life chances of individuals (Nussbaum 2000; A. Sen 1999, 1993). DAWN continued to contest top-down development while feminist economists critiqued the masculinist assumptions of neoclassical economics (e.g., Folbre 2001b) and structural adjustment (Cagatay et al. 2000). Others documented the continuing exploitation of, and resistance by, women workers in export production and in the international trafficking of prostitutes and domestic workers (e.g., V. Peterson and Runyan 1999; Rowbotham and Mittner 1994; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Enloe 2000; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). Social development advocates promoted “development with a human face” (see Green 2001). “Fair trade” advocates contested the value of “free” trade.

But for many, GAD, like WID before it, has become part of the policy status quo. And sadly, women’s organizations (and other groups in “civil society”) have been criticized as enablers of neoliberal policies, for example by providing social services that reduce the state’s responsibility and make it more “efficient.” Whatever their achievements, critics claim, women are deluding themselves into thinking they are empowered when in fact they are co-opted.

DEMOCRATIZATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND GLOBALIZATION

As more countries made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the United States and other donors put greater emphasis on electoral assistance, legal reform, and strengthening civil society. Women’s organizations were an integral part of this strategy (see Carothers 1999). UN agencies were also deeply involved in democratization efforts, particularly in postconflict situations ranging from Guatemala and El Salvador to Bosnia and Cambodia. The rise of women’s organizations in authoritarian states showed that civil society could emerge in hostile settings in ways that appeared to reinforce progressive ideals: women’s organizations were participatory, lacking internal hierarchies, with commitments to goals beyond the narrow economic concerns ascribed to interest groups in capitalist democracies.

Democratization provided a new rationale for directing resources to women: women’s groups could help promote political development by their active partici-
The recent crisis in Latin America, making political parties more representative and governments more accountable. Women's organizations also gained international recognition as civil peacemakers, although they were rarely given a place at the table when it came to negotiating. In Africa, research suggested that, in some cases, women's groups had succeeded in working around the dysfunctional politics of ethnic patronage that had crippled many African states (e.g., Tripp 2000a).

Not all donors and lenders equated “good governance” with deepening democracy, however. For the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, good governance meant limited social spending and reduced regulations on private capital, whether internal or foreign, policies many democratic electorates have balked at (e.g., Chua 2004). On the other side, not all civil society movements have been willing to work within the neoliberal frame. On January 1, 1994, the NAFTA agreement came into force, and on the same day, the Zapatista rebellion began in Chiapas. The Zapatistas attacked the neoliberal rationale for NAFTA, which required privatizing communally held ejido lands in order to marketize agricultural production. The plight of the people of Chiapas provided a dramatic illustration of the injustices—material and cultural—of unfettered capitalism.

In 1999, in Seattle, groups from around the world came together to protest globalization, including the growing power of multinational corporations, sweatshop labor, the loss of the local (jobs and indigenous traditions), large-scale infrastructure projects, disregard for the environment, and the damage caused by unregulated international capital flows. Although the protests in Seattle, Genoa, Cancun, and elsewhere could not have happened without another form of globalization—the Internet—and although the protesters did not agree on what the problems were or what their goals should be, the movement attracted those who saw antiglobalization as the most promising path of resistance to policies that had been set in Northern and Southern capitals but that were rejected by most of the people affected by them.

The 1990s also brought a new generation of development critics. Arturo Escobar (1995) labeled the antipoverty perspective a “sociological perspective” that made it easier for the Northern donor bureaucracies to expand their grip (31). He criticized the sustainability discourse, arguing that behind the “we” of sustainability were the “Western scientist[s] and manager[s]” who had predicted environmental catastrophe in the 1970s (193). John Brohman criticized development for its “grand theories and ethnocentric biases” and called for multidisciplinary approaches with more attention to the “subjective realm” and less to quantitative data (1996, 324–27). In Brohman’s view, aid must be “uncoupled” from the foreign policies of donor states (354).

Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce directly criticized the policy of “developing” civil society, noting that the rubric was convenient for donors because it seemed to address problems of development “outside the state” (thus fitting neoliberalism’s antistate bias) while suggesting activities that could be “fashioned into fundable programs” (2001, 6). Howell and Pearce were particularly impatient with the U.S. democracy agenda for taking a narrow, “Tocquevillean” approach that defined civil society and markets as “similar realms of individual freedom” and allowed the United States to tie its funding for civil society groups to their support for the U.S. economic agenda. Like Escobar and Brohman, Howell and Pearce prescriptive “popular development” and conclude that NGOs “need support in developing their own agendas” and not “in implementing those of external donors” (223).

**Beyond GAD?**

The international context matters. During the course of the last thirty years, shifts in the international system opened new opportunities and created new challenges to addressing the strategic and practical interests of women. Liberal egalitarian feminism and a generally Keynesian developmental model opened the door to WTO in the 1970s; the debt crisis and the conservative revolution of the 1980s produced SARS, but also antifeminist backlash. Multiculturalism and the rise of women’s organizations shaped a more culturally sensitive, participatory approach to foreign assistance but have made it difficult to make claims for women as a whole. Democratization expanded the development agenda and increased support for women’s organizations, but civil society groups feared co-optation and were unable to mount a significant challenge to neoliberalism.

The international context is important, but feminist thinking matters as well. Over the past two decades, significant differences have emerged among feminists that have implications for development policies. Feminists are divided between egalitarian and “difference” feminists; between those who see substantial grounds for unity among women and those who think that cultural differences should outweigh any universal claims; between those who insist on autonomy and those who think that change will require working with and within the state; between those who support “radical change” and those who are working to “get the institutions right,” Socialist feminists have assumed a low profile, and critique is privileged
over action among postmodern feminists. Many feminists reject globalization on the grounds that it is attacking national and local economies that are otherwise viable; others see it as a process that must be managed because it cannot be delayed.24

As the new century began, there were signs that GAD was losing momentum. Mainstreaming had not redirected a significantly greater proportion of development assistance to women, and GAD criteria were not fully internalized by donor agency management and staff.25 Empowerment did not have the radicalizing effects its advocates had hoped for. As Jane Parpart recently pointed out, “When people talk about women’s empowerment, they use the word power in a nonthreatening, almost romantic way,” and almost always in local, not global terms (Staudt et al. 2001, 1253). The location and scale of GAD empowerment initiatives diffused their impact while allowing advocates to avoid potentially divisive debates within donor bureaucracies. Donors (and scholars) often simply substituted the word “gender” for “women.” Sometimes gendered approaches actually redistributed resources from women to men, despite the paltry spending on women. Finally, the shift from what Nancy Fraser (1998) called the “politics of redistribution” to the “politics of recognition” depoliticized economic disparities.

Some see deepening GAD as the solution. On one hand, Andrea Cornwall (2002) makes the troubling point that although scholars may make important distinctions as they try to grapple with gender and development, these are often lost in development practice, where “operational frameworks tend to treat women and men as if they constituted immediately identifiable groups” with conflicting interests. Men are generalized about as “powerful, shadowy figures who need to be contained,” while women “are invariably the weaker party” (2002, 202-3). On the other hand, Deniz Kandiyoti (1998) calls the tendency to slip back into using the word “women” rather than “gender” evidence of a “tactical essentialism” and a form of “identity politics” that fails to “reveal how all forms of social hierarchy are ultimately gendered” (145-46).

Not all groups are pleased with the change from “women” to “gender.” Roula Jahan (1992) observes that the term is not translatable into most languages (and we note that it did not have its present meaning in English until the 1980s). In Jahan’s view, gender obscures rather than highlights the power disparities between men and women. An account of debates about gender at the Fourth Women’s Conference in Beijing reported that some Third World women felt that

GAD emphasized “processes rather than results” and that gender was being used “to deny the very existence of women-specific disadvantage” (Baden and Goetz 1998, 38-39).

UNIFEM’s Beijing and Beyond (1996), an institutional public relations report, painted a picture of progress on gender equity in the 1990s. It identified successful projects from women’s banking and microcredit to women’s rights, women refugees, women’s health, and women’s growing roles in political leadership; gave space to Third World voices, from dawn to the Asian Indigenous Women’s Network; and featured the views of women in leadership positions in UN agencies. But another UNIFEM report (Heyzer 1995), directed toward a narrower audience knowledgeable about the field, offered a more critical assessment of progress, emphasizing the negative effects on women of the globalization of trade and increases in intrastate conflict. An acerbic essay on mainstreaming in this collection (Longwe 1995) suggests that male bureaucratic resistance to integrating gender into development planning has not changed much from the early days of WID.

September 11 marks another shift in the international system. Although we do not yet know what the long-term implications of the “war on terror” will be, it seems clear that military power is again at the center of international politics, and this “war” is likely to have profound effects on domestic and international issues from civil liberties to migration. U.S. unilateralism has brought the future of multilateral institutions into question and is testing the limits of international law. The second Bush administration treats women’s rights instrumentally, using accounts of women’s oppression to demonize its enemies and portraying its desire to “liberate” women as evidence of its good intentions.

Perhaps the rift between the United States and most of its traditional Western allies will create a new opportunity to press for change as the “rest of the West” tries to distance itself from American policy. Howell and Pearce look to Europe for examples of strong states with strong civil societies, evidenced by the fact that Europeans are more committed than Americans to public goods and more tolerant of the taxes to pay for them. To date, however, these differences have not meant that European governments are ready to challenge the neoliberal model of development. We may need to look to the South to find alternative approaches.

If conflict is a prerequisite to change, the current turmoil in the international system could provide the impetus to link new ways of thinking about international politics to new ways of thinking about women and about development. Both WID and GAD succeeded in turning complex intellectual critiques into effec-
tive arguments for changing bureaucratic priorities and practices within donor agencies; both contributed to bringing women into development discourse and to shaping new international norms. This suggests that theory can affect practice.

Our essay does not develop new theory. But in what follows we try to sort out some of the elements that would be necessary to begin thinking systematically about how to regain momentum.

**TOWARD A NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR WOMEN:**

**ARENAS OF POWER**

We identify four arenas of power that must be taken into account in any revitalized effort to address women’s practical and strategic interests: bureaucracies (both donor and knowledge generating), markets, states, and civil societies. Cultures and families are also critical to how institutions function and how normative regimes are translated into daily life. We considered giving them separate attention, but opted instead to view them as permeating all other arenas. We do think, contrary to assumptions often made about them, that families and cultures are dynamic factors rather than “givens,” capable of acting as agents, not merely objects, of change.

**Bureaucracies**

The WID and GAD models were largely designed to influence the behavior of public and private donor bureaucracies and UN agencies. Any new effort to work from within donor agencies to bring about change must first be institutionalized within those agencies. There are several excellent books on how donor institutions can be rethought and reformed, and it is not our intent to summarize them here (e.g., Goetz 1998; Staudt 1997, 1998; Miller and Razavi 1998b; Parpart et al. 2000; Rai 2003; Rao et al. 1999; Cockburn 1997). Insiders analyses of rule making in the less transparent organizations of global economic governance are harder to come by but critical to forging a new approach.

We emphasize a few key issues. First, mainstreaming cannot fulfill its promise if it is not backed by real resources and incentives. GAD, like WID, was forced to rely on a combination of moral suasion and arguments based on economic efficiency, retreating to welfareist appeals when macroeconomic policies set women back and always underfunded. As Buvicin observed nearly twenty years ago, donor institutions easily brush aside demands for equity. Some development practitioners may make women and gender an ongoing part of their work because they have a personal stake (Goetz 2001, 9), but individual commitment does not add up to institutional change. Recent assessments (e.g., Chant and Gutmann 2000; Jahan 1999; Staudt 1998; see also “From ‘Home Economics’ to ‘Microfinance’” in this book) suggest that mainstreaming has been only halfheartedly implemented and that gender issues are still assigned low priority by most donor institutions. We believe that incentives—that is, promotions, salaries, and respect—are the only way to ensure that bureaucrats implement mainstreaming rather than merely giving it lip service. Mainstreaming should not become an excuse for eliminating WID or GAD focal points (Anderson 1999) that can monitor, train, apply research findings, and perform other necessary roles that are often lost in mainstreamed projects; mainstreaming that reinserts male preference undermines several decades of effort. For example, the Dutch government recently used mainstreaming as a rationale to cut off its funding to UNIFEM.

Bureaucracies are arenas in which to generate paper trails and reports, useful leverage to maintain pressure on recalcitrant institutions. For example, the UNDP regularly reports on the eight Millennium Development Goals and their progress toward achievement in its annual Human Development Reports. The third Millennium goal is “Promoting Gender Equality and Empowering Women.” UNDP reports are replete with gender-disaggregated data, charts, and figures (2002b, 16–33) that show where progress has been made and where more effort is needed.

WID and GAD largely succeeded through small-scale programs carried out by women’s organizations and through microcredit projects. Many thought the emphasis on participatory development would increase women’s leverage. But, as Goetz observes, local participation does not necessarily support gender equity. In mixed groups, which are preferred under the mainstreaming model, women are involved in development programs “on male suffrage” (1997b, 189). Participatory development may actually silence women’s voices, in part because of the way fieldworkers frame what they see, according to Cornwall (2002; see also White 1996).

Just as GAD tried to enlarge the scope of WID, going from women-specific projects to mainstreaming, we believe a new strategy must set its sights on larger issues. Even a “poverty” focus is too narrow, Maia Green argues, because an emphasis on “narrow social categories” denies advocates access to the “central institutional space” where policy is made (2002, 57). Strong ties between donors and women’s organizations have meant working with women’s groups at the project level rather than thinking systematically about what kinds of sectoral interven-
tions might be worthwhile. In the late 1980s, the World Bank funded studies on gender differentials in primary and secondary education. These showed that a year of additional schooling for girls produced more support for the family than an additional year for boys at the same level—a finding that challenged the conventional wisdom not only of educators but of families making decisions about investing in their daughters (Hers and Sperling, 2004).

Whatever criticisms can be made on the implementation side (including the failure of international institutions to give adequate support to education while they were insisting that governments cut their budgets, and the lack of attention to gender biases in educational curricula), increased education for girls arguably empowered many more women than hundreds of individual projects.

Today, policies on trade and debt may matter more than those on aid, yet feminist analysts and activists have rarely taken them on (Liebowitz 2002). Exceptions are those feminist economists who have challenged mainstream orthodoxy. But macroeconomic analysis cannot deal with the complexities of differences among women and the lack of sex-disaggregated data. Asking about the gender consequences of a given policy may raise consciousness but does not provide specific proposals for action. Feminists will need to engage in provocative thinking. One example is the suggestion of the “Tobin Tax” on currency transactions that can devastate nations overnight, and another the notion of the “Maria Tax” (Baxi 2004), which has an explicit gender agenda. If such taxes are authorized, who will administer their fruits? How likely is it that resources will trickle down to those who deserve them, men or women?

Designing ways to improve the conditions under which women work in RTST, while avoiding using “labor standards” or bans on child labor as excuses for Northern protectionism, suggests one area worthy of a more focused attention, along with the criminal bases of human trafficking. Feminist revisions of macroeconomic models deserve a wider discussion. All such efforts should take advantage of the increasing number of women in political office in many countries, which might suggest alliances that could support greater independence from Northern donors and help groups improve local bureaucratic performance (Jaquette 1997; Krook 2003).

Universities are also bureaucracies of a specific kind: they are arenas for the generation of knowledge. Women and gender studies units have proliferated over the last three decades. But even with a female majority in U.S. universities, women and gender studies programs struggle with inadequate budgets and far-

from-perfect mainstreaming (Wiegman 2002). The issues universities identify will affect the way development problems are framed, the expertise available to address them, and the energies and commitment of those who are engaged in them. Universities are important foci of any strategy for change, because they help shape the intellectual and action coalitions that can emerge in civil societies, both national and transnational. Scholarly work on globalization should automatically include gender, but this is still rarely the case.

Civil Societies

Civil society organizations have power to set agendas and create new expectations. Organizations do not have to change “the system” to change the world. Howell and Pearce compare civil societies that take a “problem solving approach” to produce “socially responsible capitalism” with those that are “critical of the global economy.” They ask whether “the pursuit of commercial interest and gain is compatible with social and ethical responsibility to the wider society” (2001, 17). But we think pitting civil society against globalization and commercial interest against social responsibility misses the range of ways in which civil society can relate to the state and to markets. It implies that civil society cannot be both critical and constructive.

Civil society recipients of foreign assistance have been concerned about dependency and co-optation, and rightly so. But it is unrealistic to think that either private or public donors will begin to give away money with no strings attached, as Brohman, Escobar, and Howell and Pearce propose. GAP advocates should expand their interest in cultural construction to include politics, and draw attention to the many patterns of state and civil society interaction that exist in the world today. For example, what would be seen as “co-optation” by some women’s groups in Latin America is viewed as “access” and even empowerment in various East Asian contexts, with important implications for NGO strategies and effectiveness.

More awareness of these differences might also make it easier to encompass those who work “inside” bureaucracies and political parties and those who remain “outside” within a single worldview, allowing women’s organizations to be both independent and influential and to make governments more effective and accountable. In the end, the self-empowerment DAWN championed in the 1980s is the only real road to full autonomy for civil society organizations, but lack of local traditions of philanthropy, low rates of growth, and persistent class differ-
ferences make it unlikely that we will see influential civil society organizations in the South that are fully independent. The process of “ngo-ization” (Alvarez 1999) is likely to continue, as organizations professionalize yet remain dependent on external or governmental funding.

Feminist attention needs to be paid to how to “thicken” civil society and how to more closely balance the negotiating power of NGOs and grassroots organizations with that of governments and other donors. Thickening may involve coalition building with partners that feminists might have once deemed hopeless. Whether at national or transnational levels, for example, labor unions not only look more to women in their recruitment pools but also have their own advocacy units within that have strategically placed feminists and resources. Women’s advocates may need to work with the Catholic Church on issues of poverty, even as they oppose the Church’s stance on reproductive rights.

States

The other half of the state and civil society relationship is the state. In the United States, neoliberal critiques of “statism” have been joined to politically popular campaigns against the redistributive state. This is reflected in the tax revolts that have repeatedly occurred in the United States since the late 1970s, despite the benefits middle class and even wealthy voters gain from public goods, and the almost inexplicable lack of state-based responses to the threat of terrorism within the United States, which is relying on the self-interest of companies in sensitive areas like chemicals and transportation to spend the money to protect themselves (Flynn 2004). U.S. public opinion on these domestic matters affects U.S. foreign policy.

Howell’s and Pearce’s European model of a “strong state and a strong public” sounds desirable. But Howell and Pearce do not recognize the anistate bias of their own position, which draws on feminist and Marxist views of the state as patriarchal and an instrument of capitalist exploitation. They seem to assume that popular movements are progressive and democratic, when they may be neither. Strong states and strong civil societies do go together. Those who claim to represent women’s interests should be wary of delegitimizing the state. States are critical to implementing norms, disciplining markets, and making investments in public goods. They can promote better access to markets for those who are marginalized (a category that fits most women and not just those who are poor) and rescue those who fall between the cracks. States give concrete meaning to citizen-ship and, when functioning well, energize people to seek ends beyond material gain and above partisanship. As John Ackerman argues, we may need to move beyond notions that “envision and defend an arm’s-length relationship between state and society” (2004, 6). “Co-governance,” such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, offers a model with gender-inclusive implications and opportune spaces to alter power relations.

Of course, not all state activity is productive. And when states regulate markets, redistribute wealth, or provide public goods, there is always the danger of corruption, which is perhaps the greatest barrier to increasing state capacity today as “democratizing” publics become increasingly cynical about their political leadership. Yet, as long as women take most of the responsibility for social reproduction, doing the unpaid labor of child care and elder care, they will need states strong enough to discipline markets and underwrite social services. Women’s organizations can be particularly effective in promoting transparency and demanding better performance from politicians and civil servants, reforms that are needed to restore confidence in the state, deepen the rule of law, and build state capacity.

Empowerment strategies look to the local as well as the global, often with the vision of “going around” or even substituting for the state (Elliot 2001). Lappe and Lappe offer many examples of women challenging global capitalism (2002), and many have argued that decentralization is positive for women. But there is also evidence that the devolution of power to local governments can simply re-include local hierarchies (e.g., G. Sen and Grown 1985). Creating “visible alternative organizations” in local communities requires a commitment of time and money that goes beyond what most donors are willing to provide (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997, 1994). Further, the emphasis on participation and decentralization often ignores the “increased burden upon poor households and poor women in particular” (Lind 1997, 2118). More attention to local political contexts and how to empower women within them could be an important direction for future research and a critical issue as “traditional” cultural values are locally reasserted and enforced, often with negative implications for gender equality (e.g., K. B. Warren and Jackson 2002, 29; Braidotti 1997).

Howell and Pearce argue that the relations between the state and civil society should not be too “partnered.” But the stance of civil society toward the state should not be too destructive, either. Strategies of resistance are seductive, but they do not solve problems and implement solutions. Popular mobilization
strategies often succeed by offering a radical alternative, but the likely radical alternative to liberal capitalism today is a theocratic, not a socialist, state.

Promoting an effective state requires progressive political involvement. We think that what has gone "wrong" in the United States is not its Tocquevillean model of civil society, as Howell and Pearce suggest, but the dramatic political shift to the right over the last thirty years. (We forget, for example, that Republican President Richard Nixon proposed universal health care.) There is evidence that U.S. values are diverging from those held elsewhere in the industrialized West on critical dimensions ranging from religiosity to the death penalty and gay marriage. Given the direction of these trends, the United States government cannot be relied upon to support progressive policies in international forums.

Many U.S. feminists and their organizations develop only a narrow and selective interest beyond U.S. boundaries, as perusal of Web sites quickly shows for the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the Feminist Majority, among others. As Liebowitz underscores, U.S. women's national and transnational organizing around gender and trade has been limited (2002, 176). Perhaps U.S. women's organizations are too deeply engaged in trying to hold onto gains at home to engage in a serious discussion of international development. We need a new generation to go beyond GAD the way GAD reinvented WID, but there is little sign that this thinking will come out of antiglobalization movements with their multiple agendas and lack of interest in women's issues.

Markets

Markets are an arena to which women need access, but on their terms. In general, it is easier for women to affect the governmental policies that shape markets rather intervene in markets directly, although boycotts and protests against corporate practices can be effective. As Lourdes Beneria urges, feminists should be supporting the rights of women to organize in labor unions (2003), and they should be pressing harder for action against human trafficking.

The WID view was that women were excluded from or discriminated against in markets and that they would act entrepreneurially if they had even minimal resources to do so. The democracy agenda and GAD's focus on gender power relations broadened the arenas of empowerment, but also diverted attention from the core issue of improving women's incomes. Feminist economists have tried to convince their mainstream colleagues to address gender by pointing out that discrimination distorts markets and therefore reduces the optimal production of goods and services (e.g., Elson 1998 and 2001). But affirmative action in employment has not been a priority for most Third World women, and discriminatory hiring practices are still widespread for those who work in the formal sector. Women will continue to enter the market at a substantial disadvantage, even where they are allowed public mobility and can gain access to education and other resources. Class and race discrimination are often most keenly felt by poor women.

Some have criticized microcredit projects by arguing that women turn the money over to men or use it to serve their status and kinship needs rather than invest it. There are data showing that women are significantly less likely than men to "grow" their microenterprises (e.g., Gold 1991) or move out of the informal sector. But a feminist analysis should defend women's use of these resources, pointing for example to the evidence that microcredit has given women greater leverage in their families and communities, even if the accounting is not strictly economic (Tinker 1999). Following earlier analysis by Boserup, Tinker (1999b) has observed that microcredit projects are successful for women because they are not fully marketized, and therefore are compatible with women's needs to fit entrepreneurial activities into schedules largely determined by unpaid care work (see Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 2003). Poor women are likely to benefit more from programs that are not evaluated on economic grounds alone, yet the failure to understand this may lead to misguided reductions in microcredit funding.

Some argue that feminism and economic analysis are simply incompatible. But others have tried to change the field from within. Nancy Folbre (2000b) maintains that neoclassical economics takes too narrow a view of human beings, excluding all human characteristics except those relevant to profit maximizing (see also C. Scott 1995). Diane Elson and Lourdes Beneria have called mainstream economists to task for tolerating gender distortions that their theories do not allow; they have looked for ways to measure the economic costs of implementing the neoliberal model. Women's organizations (like Wage for Housework) have insisted that national economic statistics recognize the value of women's unpaid labor.

Folbre's view that economics is biased toward the competitive and selfish male personality may be correct. But it may also be the case that, if we want more of the goods and services that (women's) unpaid labor provides and we want to reward the women (and men) who provide those goods and services, then their production will have to be more, not less, marketized. What we want from mar-
highly valued seem utopian. By contrast, a fairer redistribution of wealth is justifiable on both moral and economic grounds and can build on the strengths of liberal capitalism rather than trying to resist on the hope that, if we just had the political will, we could have an economic system that is radically different. Global trends in economic growth, if anemic and unreliable, are positive enough to avoid a full-scale rejection of the neoliberal model. This suggests the need to seek ways to reshape it rather than hoping it will self-destruct.

Markets do not recognize much of the work that women already do. Many feminists argue that care is real work that needs to be recognized and properly valued, and we agree. The question is how to do so. Individuals and families can decide to reward care more (an outcome more likely to occur when there is feminist awareness, and women can negotiate rather than obligingly produce free goods). Or states can intervene with policies that support child care or tax credits for elder care, for example, which admit the social value of domestic labor. Or men could be pushed by law and social control to reward unpaid labor within households, a desirable goal, but one likely to be implemented at the cost of identifying women too closely with the home and with men deciding at their own discretion how such work will be materially recognized. Working on markets from the standpoint of care may increase the value of “women’s work” but will inevitably blur the line between marketized and nonmarketized, selfish and altruistic labor.

CONCLUSIONS

U.S. unilateralism and the remilitarization of international politics are edging out the more layered approaches to women’s issues that were emerging during the 1990s, which incorporated issues of gender, the environment, justice, and human rights in a transnational framework. Even before September 11 there were indications that the period of feminist norm setting may have reached its peak. “Gender” became a contested term in Cairo and Beijing, and the UN moved to limit NGO access to international conferences. Beijing, Beijing+5, and Beijing+10 are signals that backlash could have what had appeared to be an almost irreversible trend toward increasing women’s rights and voice.

Together, GAD fatigue and U.S. overreach may offer new opportunities to rethink both aid and macroeconomic policies, taking advantage of broader economic and ideological shifts. The history of WID and GAD suggests that clear and well-articulated models can make a difference in donor policies. It is time to refocus attention on women and on development and to reconnect analysis
and practice. This effort will require cooperation between North and South and among scholars, advocates, and practitioners. It will depend on the active involvement of women themselves as agents of change and protectors of the traditions they value. It will need to recognize that although radicalism can inspire reform, neither capitalism nor patriarchy is going to be swept away by revolutionary fiat. We have to begin where we are.

NOTES

1. E.g., Gonta (1972); Monsen (1994); Jackson and Pearson (1998); Miller and Razavi (1988); Razavi (2000); Rais et al. (1999); Connolly et al. (2000).

2. Apsanek (2000) has argued, based on a DAD study of U.S. WID aid, that "foreign aid programs hinder women's realization of their economic and social rights" (6) because aid programs are negatively correlated with improvements in women's status. Foreign assistance plays a very small role in the global processes affecting "women's status," and very little foreign assistance goes to women, but her thesis does show how difficult it is to justify WID/DAD programs on the grounds of effectiveness alone. The data in Engineering Development (World Bank, 2000) suggest that, in general, as equality of rights and income for women improve, other gender indicators also improve (25).

3. Tiiker notes that the UN General Assembly approved the conference but did not authorize UN funding (Tinker, 1996, 99). See also WIOA (1996).

4. See Kardam (1994). The Bank's Basic Human Needs approach was adopted when Marxist insurgencies were on the rise, and Vatican II and liberation theology had moved the Catholic church to the left. The growing number of Third World states in the United Nations shifted the power balance in favor of the South in the General Assembly, which played a central role because of the Cold War standoff in the Security Council.

5. This point is made in Tinker and Jaquette (1987) but has been reinforced by subsequent research in several regions. There were "women's emancipation" movements in many countries during the first decades of the twentieth century, organized to achieve the vote and other legal rights for women. International women's groups that were still active in the 1970s include the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Zonta International, the Soroptimists, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded in 1864.

6. Australia, Canada, and Israel joined the United States in voting against the Program of Action for Language Equating Zionism with racism. The vote was 91 to 4 with 22 abstentions, including most Western European countries (Jaquette, 1995, 56).

7. As of 2004, over 180 countries had ratified the convention. For the history of CEDAW, see A. Fraser (1995); on women's movements and international norm-setting, see Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Meyer and Pentti (1997).

8. This essay starts from an AIDS/WID standpoint, where the authors worked as policy analysts in the AIDS/WID Office in 1979 (Staudt) and 1979–80 (Jaquette). WID was adopted by a range of agencies (see Kardam, 1994; Marks, 2001; and M. Snyder and Tedesco, 1994), but many critics of WID have focused on how WID was implemented by UNAIDS.

9. Similar arguments were encountered in other agencies; see Kardam (1994), essays in Staudt (1983 and 1997), Longwe (1995), see also "From 'Home Economics' to 'Microfinance'" in this book.

10. Intrahousehold gender dynamics have received attention only in the past twenty years or so, e.g., Dwyer and Bruce (1988); A. Sen (1999); and Kaber (1994). Labor unions, historically male dominated, have been strong supporters of the "family wage" (e.g., Timken 2000), and it appears in the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

11. Sadlier Huntington (1997) rejected Boerup's characterization of female farming systems as complementary but equal, arguing that women had been oppressed in traditional systems. But the image of "female farming systems" resonated with the feminist search for patriarchal societies, particularly in Africa. The idea of a female farming system applied less well to women's roles in Asia and Latin American agriculture, although women's contribution to agricultural production was grossly underestimated in both regions. Boerup portrayed women as "active actors," but her discussion of precolony gender complementarity is compatible with difference feminism. She rejected the assumption that modernization was good for women and emphasized the heterogeneity of premodern societies.


13. Razavi (1997, 311) notes the importance of the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. She argues that instrumental ("efficiency") arguments arose under neoliberalism, but we observe that efficiency arguments had already been widely used in the late 1970s and that equity arguments (as Burris and Moser note below) were resisted. On the implications of equity, welfare, and efficiency arguments for WID, see Jaquette (1996); for discussion see Tinker (1996b), Kaber (1994), and Staudt (1997).

14. See, for example, Anagnostos (2002). In Elson's critique, SAPs "privatize the costs of social reproduction" (1994a, 1995), with women "filling the gaps"; they diminish future growth by cutting investment in public health and education. Countering those who were arguing that there were women among the "winners" as well as the "losers" from neoliberal policies, Elson argued that SAPs destroy "alternative remunerative job opportunities" for women, and for their "fathers, brothers and husbands." Female employment in export zones is just a new kind of "women's work" (1993). Elson concludes that the weaknesses of SAPs have not been sufficiently acknowledged by mainstream economists: SAPs assume supportive relations between the state and the private sector that their implementation undermines; they ignore the effects of weak demand as a constraint on investment and growth, fail to register the value of social goods outside the monetized economy, and do not take into account how the gender dynamics of household decision making affect policy outcomes (1994b). See Micravidi (1992) and Engle (1994). Elson's critique is a model for gender dynamics in the family.

15. WID project heads were often trained in home economics, not because the WID model called for this, but because of bureaucratic realities. UNAIDS projects were usually put together by university teams drawn from consortia of U.S. agricultural universities and, given sex discrimination on campuses, the women faculty who were interested in development were concentrated in home economics or human ecology departments.

16. In a recent discussion of whether the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (1998a) address gender, Elaine Zuckerman and Ashley Garrett (2001) criticize eight such country papers for "carefully reinscribing gender in Development approach," because they define gender issues as "reproductive health" and "girls' education." But, reproductive health advocates have moved much closer to the WID/DAD position analyzing women's reproductive choices in the broader context of women's empowerment. On the centrality of economic power to other forms of power for women, see Blumberg (1995).

18. Tisdell, Roy, and Ghose (2001) critique the neo and aristocratic indexes, largely on the grounds that they are not fine grained enough to identify subgroups effectively and that they cannot assess nonmarket exchanges. See also Bardhan and Klasen (1999).

19. GAD favored participatory development, but Mann’s use of the term “empowerment” suggests a concern about the strings attached to foreign aid as well as the fear of external vulnerabilities under neoliberalism.

20. For reviews of mainstreaming, see “Mainstreaming Gender in International Organizations” in this book; Chant and Guttman (2000); Jahan (1997); Rai (2003). Chant and Guttman argue that “while the short-term goals of GAD are often considerably similar in character to those of WIOs (for example, improved education, access to credit, and legal rights for women), these are nominally conceived as stepping stones toward long-term goals” to empower women by “collective action,” and “encouraging them to challenge gender ideologies and institutions that subordinate women” (2000, 9).

21. Moore’s desire to avoid contentious confrontations over gender power relations within donor bureaucracies is also visible in her substitution of gender “needs” for Molyneux’s more provocative gender “interests.” Although Nancy Hartsock (1983) criticizes interests as too conventionally liberal, Sapiro (1978) and Jasnađottir (1988) defend the idea of women’s interests as feminist.

22. Jennifer Schirmer (1992) and others attacked the “strategic/practical” distinction as elitist, noting that women organized for practical goals often raised strategic issues. For her response to such critics, see Molyneux (1998).

23. Thanks to Deborah Minzley for this point.


26. For useful discussions of gender and the state, see Randall (1989) and Chariton et al. (1982).

27. P. Richardson and Langdon (2000, 179) note that few NGO staff are trained in entrepreneurial skills, and they often have values that are antientrepreneurial.

28. For example, J.K. Gibson-Graham sees globalization as a triumph of masculine rhetoric and suggests “replacing the rational, abstract and dominating masculine order with the emotional, connected, peace-loving and egalitarian one” (quoting Bergeron 2001, 99). Janet Gabriel Townsend (1995) emphasizes a feminist preference for “networks” over “institutions.”