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VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Marking a Weberian Moment:
Our Discipline Looks Ahead

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That the discipline of International Relations is again in disarray was the prevailing theme of a seminar titled *Visions of International Relations*, held at the University of South Carolina in autumn 1998. This essay is at once a reflection on the discussions that took place at the seminar and a representation of views that I offered as a participant. It comments on the epistemological issues in contention in the "third great debate" in International Relations, and it raises questions about the place and legitimacy of humanistic approaches to the study of relations among states and peoples. By my reckoning, International Relations is a full-fledged, full-blown, autonomous, legitimate and accomplished academic discipline, and ought not to be thought of as a subfield of political science or of any other of the social sciences.

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The appearance of a new journal like *International Studies Perspectives* ought to be a cause for celebration since our filing cabinet for wisdom now has another drawer. Starting a new journal ought perhaps also to be an occasion for reflection on the field of intellectual endeavor that the publication seeks to monitor or on the range of new knowledge that it otherwise seeks to record. Such was the case in 1903, when the editorship of the journal *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* passed into the hands of Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and Edgar Jaffé. Weber grasped the opportunity to inquire into the state of German social science at the turn of the twentieth century. "When a social science journal . . . appears for the first time . . .," Weber wrote, "it is customary to ask about its 'line,'" that is, in the case at hand, what standards of social scientific scholarship were the editors of *Archiv* going to establish (Weber, 1949:50). Weber's inquiry of course became the classic essay "Objectivity" in *Social Science and Social Policy*. It needed to be written, Weber reasoned, because there was at the time some urgency in asking about the scope and especially the methods of social science. German scholarship at the turn of the twentieth century was still caught up in a *methodenstreit*, or quarrel among methods, that, in Weber's words, led to "bitter conflict about the apparently most elementary problems of our discipline" (Weber, 1949:51).

Max Weber's efforts, not only in his methodological essays but in much of his later work, were attempts to bridge the epistemological chasm that separated the "positivists" from the "idealists," or "objectivists" and "historicists" as they were

sometimes called, among European scholars. The former held that human affairs could and should be studied by social scientists using methods similar to those employed by natural scientists. They also expected that similar results in the form of causal laws would follow. The latter, for their part, denied "the possibilities of scientific work in the field of human culture" (Hughes, 1958:302). They stood by their interpretive approaches and doubted whether useful generalizations could ever be gleaned from the countless contingencies of historical experience. Weber managed to transcend the positivist-idealist divide in his own work, integrating as he did systematic observation leading to theoretical generalization and interpretive historiography in works like *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 1958). Not surprisingly, Weber's work drew criticisms from both the positivists and the idealists, which encouraged his colleagues and successors to continue their intellectual feuding.

Déjà Vu?

As we in the field of International Relations¹ are well aware, the *methodenstreit* continues even today. It even raises some of the same issues that divided European scholars in the nineteenth century. We in IR call it the "third great debate." There is among many of us who are professionally involved in trying to better understand the world of relations among states and peoples a rather urgently felt need to more clearly define, or redefine, our field of study. Needed too are increased communication, greater tolerance, and more civility among IR scholars. One effort at encouraging a dialogue among scholars was undertaken in the autumn of 1998 at the University of South Carolina where the Walker Institute of International Studies sponsored a symposium titled *Visions of International Relations*. Prominent scholars from within and without the University of South Carolina who have given serious thought to questions about the disciplinary boundaries, phenomenal contents, and procedures for the study of International Relations were invited to present and discuss their ideas. Not coincidentally, most of the participants were also contributors to the series of books called *Studies in International Relations* that Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and I edited for the University of South Carolina Press between 1986 and 2000.

Participating were: Yosef Lapid from New Mexico State University, author of the ground-breaking article "The Third Debate" which appeared in the *International Studies Quarterly* a decade ago (Lapid, 1989); Margaret G. Hermann from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, past editor of both *Political Psychology* and the *Meridian International Studies Review*, and past president of both the International Studies Association and the International Society of Political Psychology; Harvey Starr from the University of South Carolina, past editor of *International Interactions* and author with Benjamin A. Most of *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics* (1989); Charles W. Kegley, Jr., from the University of South Carolina, past president of the International Studies Association and editor of *Controversies in International Relations Theory* (1995); Gregory A. Raymond from Boise State University and co-author with Charles W. Kegley, Jr., of *How Nations Make Peace* (1999); Richard W. Mansbach from Iowa State University, presently the editor of the *International Studies Quarterly* and author with Yale H. Ferguson of *The Elusive Quest* (1988); Nicholas Onuf from Florida International University, author of *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (1989), the seedbed for the later flourishing of constructivism; and me, Donald J. Puchala, from the University of South

¹In this essay I shall refer to the discipline or field as international relations (or simply IR), and the object of study, that is, relations among states and peoples, as international relations.

Carolina, whose tickets for entry into the symposium were my "Woe to the Orphans of the Behavioral Revolution" (1990) and "The Pragmatics of International History" (1995).

Because I want to avoid either appropriating or misrepresenting my colleagues' views, I am not going to summarize the *Visions* seminar here. The symposium will in any event soon appear as a book titled *Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field* (Puchala, ed., forthcoming). What I will offer is one vision of the field of International Relations. It combines reflections upon what I believe I heard at the seminar with what I presented at the seminar and with what I have come to understand more generally about the state of our field. My aim is to encourage more discussion by inviting responses, perhaps by provoking them.

A Discipline in Disarray?

To the extent that the discipline of International Relations is in disarray, as the course of discussion at the *Visions* seminar clearly suggested, the major differences and disagreements among scholars are not for the most part about the contours, concerns, or even the causes of the post-Cold War world. There is, I believe, substantial agreement that studying international relations today requires examining interactions between states and peoples, with at least as much attention paid to peoples as to states. If Samuel Huntington's provocative recent writings alert us to anything it is that intercultural interactions are likely to be as consequential in shaping the world of the twenty-first century as intergovernmental interactions (Huntington, 1996). Encounters among cultures via their agents need to be studied more intensely and much more creatively than has heretofore been the case. It is also accepted that contemporary international relations, or perhaps more accurately *transnational* relations, increasingly involve consequential interactions among organizations other than states. This we have been aware of at least since Keohane and Nye's *Power and Interdependence* (1977), but now such transnational phenomena are best conceptualized as elements of *globalization*, and this poses a number of fascinating questions about borders, markets, networks of interaction, diffusing values, civil society, and global governance, all of which warrant the increasing analytical attention that they are today receiving (see, e.g., Greider, 1998; Held et al., 1998; Mann, 1999). The Westphalian state system has not been eliminated, since states, their sovereignty, their interests, their power, and their governments' geopolitical calculations and machinations all continue to be agents and ingredients of international politics (e.g., Brzezinski, 1997). But it appears that in the post-Cold War world, international politics are most likely to take the form of states reacting to domestically generated events abroad, amplified and echoed via networks of interdependence, and states reacting to social, economic, demographic, and physical movements and forces impacting everywhere. States moving about geopolitical chessboards, contending for power, wealth, glory, and domain, seem no longer to be what international relations are centrally about. There were international relations before Westphalia. They were not Westphalian. If these were more systematically examined and better understood, what appears today to be the lessening relevance of sovereignty, the reduced importance of territoriality and the marginalization of interstate politics per se might be seen as less than extraordinary (Ruggie, 1993; Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996). Whatever the agents, old or new, international relations, particularly in political modes, are still about values—identity, equity, justice, autonomy, security, and more—usually embedded in ideologies and acted upon by protectors and projectors. It is as likely as not that twenty-first century international relations will be about liberalism and its challengers, just as twentieth-century international relations were (Kohn, 1946).

national relations had evolved into a third, which is racking our field today (Lapid, 1989). The issues that centered both of the earlier debates are still in contention among us, and some insist that ontology and/or methodology remain the principal concerns. However, this third debate is really much broader because it raises questions about the identity of the academic field of International Relations. It is also much deeper because it brings to the surface epistemological issues concerning what we can know.

In contrast to what happened during the second debate, what is currently dividing scholars in our field is much more than a quarrel about research methods. For one thing, methodological issues per se are less contentious than they once were since quantification has been largely taken off of the debating table. Nowadays most would agree that statistical analyses have their uses, and also, of course, their limitations. The issues today are much more epistemological than methodological. Concerns about the philosophy of knowledge were largely circumvented in earlier renditions of the "great debates" about the study of international relations. Notably, even Max Weber wanted to avoid questions such as these, and side-stepped them in his methodological essay as "questions far deeper than those raised here" (Weber, 1949:49). But, as I will explain in a moment, epistemological issues can no longer be avoided in the study of international relations (or in social science more generally) because gauntlets have been tossed by both postmodernism and constructivism. Complicating the epistemological debate is the question of whether the study of international relations ought to be an exclusively social-scientific undertaking. Some opt for this exclusiveness, while others point out that the works of humanists, not only historians but also novelists, poets, dramatists, sculptors, and painters, constitute legitimate and oftentimes important contributions to understanding the realm of human experience we call international relations. Can our field accommodate the artists' insights, and how will it handle the methodological/epistemological, and indeed the pedagogical, questions that such intellectual catholicity would raise?

All of these concerns about foundations, methods, and scope of course beg the question of what exactly is our field? What is it that the student of international relations studies? What is central? What is marginal? What belongs intellectually elsewhere? Is the student of international relations a contributor to a discrete academic discipline, or a putterer within a curious subfield of one or another of the broader disciplines? In whatever way this question is answered, or even if the issue of disciplinary autonomy is dismissed as not being very important (Starr, forthcoming), with us still is the question of *why* we are studying international relations. Should we be seeking pronouncements of recognizable relevance to the world of practical affairs, or will esoteric communications amongst ourselves meet our professional obligations? (Kurth, 1998). Questioning the policy relevance of our work interestingly brings us back to Max Weber (Weber, 1949). But it also raises some gnawing normative issues, not least of which is the matter of where our "ideologies" (realism? liberalism?) end and where our "theories" begin.

A Third Debate?

The picket lines in the third debate are not as readily discernible as in the earlier ones, although it is not too far off the mark to say that one main group of contenders deems the study of international relations to be a project for social science and in so doing accepts rather uncritically the epistemological assumptions that support a correspondence theory of truth (Rorty, 1979:131-164). This was the position of the majority of contributors to the *Visions* symposium, who rather forcefully made the case for science. To wit, there is an objective reality "out there," which is not only knowable but sufficiently regular in its causes and

Enduring challenges to the Enlightenment project are hibernating in Russia, and new ones are coming from Asia and the Islamic world (Mazrui, 1990; Said, 1993; Kelly, 1998; Kelly, 1999). These need to be attentively assessed.

When problematized, all of these aspects of the changing world around us add to a promising research agenda for our field. The real problem, and the thrust of this essay, is how to proceed through the agenda. As most of us are well aware, considerable controversy surrounds how research in International Relations should be conducted, and there are even questions about who is qualified to conduct it. In these regards, the exercise at the University of South Carolina removed any expectations that discussing *visions* of international relations could or would yield a singular *vision*. To this extent at least, our discussions echoed our disciplinary, which is surely again immersed in a "great debate."

One might dismiss the "great debates" in the study of international relations as intellectual diversions, describe them as "games that professors play," deconstruct them as Foucault-inspired genealogies, or dignify them as Kuhnian paradigm shifts. But, the questions debated are intellectually important because they are about the identity of an institution, that is, our field, International Relations. Moreover, the debates themselves have been anything but trivial in their consequences. Scholarly careers have been (and are today being) established, challenged, and in some cases ruined depending upon parousanship. Journals have been turned into ramparts, book reviews into cannonades, academic meetings into gatherings of cults, academic departments into cathedrals, tenure and promotion processes into inquisitions, graduate students into foot soldiers or pawns, and idealists into cynics. Concurrently, contributions to understanding have slipped between subcultural cracks, or been garbled in mutually incomprehensible discourses or politicized into issues about intellectual turf. Would that academic debates were only diversions, but they almost never are.

Questions about the focus, nature, integrity, procedures, and objectives of scholarship in the field of International Relations are certainly not new. During the last half century, many of us working in this field have seen such issues debated at least three times, once by "realists" vs. "idealists," then by "traditionalists" vs. "scientists," and at present by what I suppose we could call "mainstreamers" vs. "dissidents." The issues were framed and focused somewhat differently at different times: the first debate centered on questions of ontology and concerned the true or real nature of relations among states. E. H. Carr, as we all know, debated the first debate with himself and displayed his thinking for the rest of us in his classic *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939). This exercise initiated in the late 1930s prompted three succeeding scholarly generations to take sides, which indeed they did. The second debate centered on questions of methodology, that is, on what are the most reliable ways to study international relations. Hedley Bull, Raymond Aron, and Stanley Hoffmann, among others, rallied the traditionalists around interpretative historiography and historical sociology, while Morton Kaplan, J. David Singer, Charles McClelland, and others affirmed a science of International Relations with nomological aims (Hoffmann, 1960; Kaplan, 1961; Aron, 1966; Bull, 1966; McClelland, 1966; Singer, 1969). The methodological confrontation was highlighted in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau's *Comparing Approaches to International Politics* (1969). Its intensity was dramatized in Oran Young's memorable "naked Emperor" review of Bruce Russett's *International Regions and the International System* in the April 1969 issue of *World Politics* (Russett, 1967; Young, 1969). This second debate prompted two succeeding generations to take sides, and again they did.

Neither the first nor the second of the great debates were really debates at all, inasmuch as contenders spoke past one another and closure was never reached. Therefore, these debates never really ended. Acknowledging this, Yosef Lapid signaled in 1989 that the first and second debates about the study of inter-

effects to be understood nomologically. The careful invocation of inductive and deductive logics applied to the analysis of systematic observations, as required by the scientific method, will render the real world incrementally intelligible. As Charles Kegley affirmed at the *Visions* seminar, "science can best provide a set of principles for the reunification of scholarship in International Relations" (Kegley, forthcoming). The scientific approach to the study of human behavior is systematic, efficient, elegant, and compelling, as long as the assumptions about the world and about knowledge which philosophically ground it are accepted.

Among the scientists we also find the "theorists" who are at the moment esoterically debating, largely among themselves, whether "Liberalism," "Realism," or one or another of the "neo-isms" best describes international relations. This ancillary debate makes good theater: it fills anthologies, decorates journals, and suggests questions for doctoral examinations. But it contributes rather little to furthering our understanding of contemporary international relations. The arcane vocabularies in which the debaters choose to cast their discourses also obscure more than they clarify. To the extent that Liberalism depicts a pluralistic, norm-regulated, complexly interdependent international arena, the picture thus displayed is largely accurate, but it is hardly new. It may have to be repeatedly reaffirmed for the edification of Realists, but not for the rest of us. To the extent that Liberalism projects a culturally undifferentiated, ideologically homogenizing, democratizing world, it is probably wrong (Gray, 1995). As for Realism, structural, classical, neo-, or otherwise, its project in parsimony, assumptions about anarchy, and fixation upon geopolitical gamesmanship among major powers tends to reproduce trivial truisms such as the "discovery" that we live today in a unipolar world. Moreover, by attributing motives derived from the logic of games to abstract agents, rather than directing analytical attention toward the actual motives of statesmen, Realism may perhaps capture some of the form of inter-state relations, but it ignores the substance. It creates a logically elegant world in which nobody lives.

Many among the scientists would keep the study of international relations for themselves. Some political scientists in particular insist upon relegating the study of international relations to the status of a "subfield" within their discipline, designating it "international politics" (Schmidt, 1998). Conceptual, methodological, and terminological borrowing from other social sciences, especially from economics these days, is approved and encouraged, and works from the humanities are sometimes looked upon as sources of *data*. History, for example, is to be mined for facts to be packed into data bases. But the products of the humanities are not accepted as sources of explanation, causal or otherwise, or as legitimate contributions to the corpus of knowledge about international relations, because, in the case of history, researchers' methods are deemed unsystematic, subjective, atheoretical, nonreplicable, and therefore unreliable. One can, after all, find in history almost anything that one seeks, and one can invariably also find there its opposite or antithesis. Artistic works, including histories, are more generally suspect because their epistemological groundings are questionable. Intuition, inspiration, revelation, and interpretation are not accepted by scientists as pathways to truths about objective reality.

Because science as applied to the study of international relations genuinely is the disciplinary mainstream today, we need to call the other contenders in the third debate "dissenters." They question not only the results of three decades of scientific efforts, but also the assumptions underpinning such efforts. In his paper prepared for the *Visions* seminar, Richard W. Mansbach looked somewhat askance at the accomplishments of science as applied to the study of international relations, noting that "rigorous empiricism has not achieved for our field what it promised when J. David Singer proclaimed victory over 'traditionalists' three decades ago" (Mansbach, forthcoming). He is certainly not alone in

his skepticism: great fanfare, methodological virtuosity, and prodigious efforts have thus far yielded rather few notable findings and even fewer "laws" of international behavior. Granted that normal science is slow moving, as the scientists of IR are quick to emphasize, but it has been forty years, and we might perhaps expect somewhat more from the project.

Still, the most important issues are epistemological, not methodological. Space considerations here do not allow for an elaborate critique of scientific epistemologies, though, as I trust my readers are aware, there has been considerable philosophic pondering in recent decades about the origins of knowledge, scientific, humanistic, or otherwise. Much of this points to the recognition that there are no unimpeachable groundings for anything we might like to define as "truth," particularly when truth is conceived of as observational or propositional correspondence with something we define as "reality" (Marcus and Fisher, 1986:7-16; Puchala, 1995). Critics therefore contend that science, and particularly social science, as an approach to knowledge is not sufficiently distinct from other approaches to warrant any privileged epistemological position (White, 1978:29). Some in the field of International Relations welcome this as refreshing news.

The harshest critics of science as applied to the study of international relations are the apostles of postmodernism (see, e.g., Smith, 1995; and contributions to Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996, and Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989). Postmodernists deny that there is an "objective reality" that can be known, or that, in any event, there is no objective language in which knowledge can be coded and intersubjectively transmitted. Therefore, what are purported to be scientific truths based on correspondence to reality can be nothing more than justifications for beliefs (Rorty, 1979:170). Statements about reality invariably privilege the values of subjects, that is, those making the statements, and these utterances therefore can and should be deconstructed down to their normative cores. The postmodern project reduces knowledge about international relations (or anything else) to subjective prejudice, and while it can evoke skepticism about science, as it surely has, it nevertheless offers no alternative. In postmodernism there is no research agenda for International Relations, save deconstruction, because there can be no attainable knowledge. This is harsh criticism indeed. Still, those of us who remain committed to trying to better understand international relations are entitled to wonder where it gets us.

More moderate dissenters against the mainstream recognize that science is but one of the several meaningful discourses available for describing and explaining the human experience (for philosophical context see Cassirer, 1944). Yet, unlike the postmodernists, these scholars accept that such experiences can be explained in intersubjectively meaningful ways. Constructivists, for example, posit that the only "reality" we can know is that which we construct using the signs and symbols of our language (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). This of course also makes "objective reality" an oxymoron and similarly challenges the epistemological foundation of science. However, the constructivists say, we are able to "socially construct" our worlds through communication and conversation, which permits us to reach intersubjective agreements about their contours and dynamics. We may even verify these worlds by intersubjectively agreeing upon what constitutes evidence for their existence, which is probably what many of us as scholars have been doing anyway, although we have seen ourselves as doing science (Onuf, forthcoming). We then live in the worlds we have socially constructed until believing in them so contradicts our experience as to require reconstruction.

IR research in the constructivist mode consists in describing the worlds that the agents of international relations socially construct. This is accomplished by studying and interpreting the vocabularies of their discourses. Since these worlds are built of symbols, we gain access to them by interpreting these symbols. The methods here are essentially hermeneutic, which amounts, interestingly, to the

International Relations; several grant degrees in International Relations, including the doctorate. We might call International Relations a *field* if we are so predisposed, as long as we understand that what we mean by "field" is the intellectual canvas that displays the phenomena in which we are interested. This would be similar to Hayden White's use of the term "field" when, discussing historiography, he described the historian's field as a phenomenal range, extending through time and across space, which displays the chaos of human motivations, perceptions, actions, relationships, and results which intellectuals seek to render intelligible (White, 1978:63-66, 1973:5-6). Our field too is to be identified in terms of the world in which we are interested, and the purpose of our *discipline* is to render this world intelligible. Let us, then, avoid thinking of our discipline as a "subfield" of something else. It's not. Our discipline has subfields of its own.

Despite all of its differences and debates, the discreteness of our discipline is in the objects of our attention, and our unity is in our research agenda. Scholars in the discipline of International Relations seek to identify and explain phenomena that result from encounters among states and peoples, and in particular to contemplate the uniqueness of such phenomena. We seek to identify and understand what happens when states encounter one another, when other organizations operating across political or cultural boundaries encounter one another, when peoples as cultural communities encounter one another, and when entities of all of these varieties encounter all others. Such encounters involve agents that need to be identified, processes that need to be tracked, and outcomes that need to be inventoried and explained. As a result of the efforts of several generations of scholars, our discipline has made considerable progress toward building a comprehensive understanding of encounters among states. We now have a rather how, and why such outcomes occur. With regard to other kinds of inter-organizational encounters, our discipline has some way yet to go, and with regard to inter-cultural encounters, which we have neglected for far too long, we have not yet reached the point of identifying exactly what happens, or may happen, when cultural communities meet in either space or time. There is, therefore, a great deal of work still to be done.

To be sure, phenomena analogous to those in which our discipline is interested may occur in other fields of human affairs and the student of international relations can gain insight by examining these. It is also the case that practitioners of cognate disciplines may wish to carve out subfields within their disciplines concerned with international or transnational manifestations of problems that interest them. They are welcome to do this, and we can learn from them. But the distinctiveness of International Relations as a discipline is that we focus our attentions on a cluster of inter-organizational and inter-cultural phenomena that we have *theoretically identified and conceptually constructed*, and that are pre-eminently of interest to us because they occur in a realm of human affairs that we are motivated and trained to study. Our investigations into these outcomes have contributed to a distinctive corpus of knowledge that may or may not inform the "international" subfields of other disciplines. Other disciplines should perhaps be learning more from International Relations than they apparently are, but this is something about which we can do little. Our concerns must be with the phenomena that we are trying to explain and not with what cognate disciplines are trying to explain.

As for our intra-disciplinary debates, they will likely continue. The third debate, however, may turn out to be salutary by establishing that there are multiple pathways to knowledge about international relations, and this at least should open the way to the incorporation of the insights of the Humanities into our discipline. Acknowledging that there are multiple pathways to knowledge might

dramatic opposite of scientific procedures. Instead of distancing oneself from the object under investigation to *observe* it, the researcher empathetically closes with the object, or "lives into it" as Wilhelm Dilthey long ago instructed, in order to understand it (Holborn, 1967; Gadamer, 1975:265-380). Explaining and predicting behaviors accordingly follow from understanding the constructed realities. Is it not also possible that we may sometimes innuit the truth? And is it not also possible that revelations can be intersubjectively transmitted, and inspirations intersubjectively shared? Demoting science from an epistemologically privileged position to the status of one promising discourse among many has opened the way to tapping the wisdom of the humanities (Alker, 1996: esp. 238-302). History, for example, need not only be mined for facts to be converted into social scientists' data. Historians' work can be studied for insights into causes, effects, and meanings in human affairs. Literature and literary criticism, painting, sculpture, and architecture embody visions of the human condition that artists and their interpreters identify as "truths." Are these not worth pondering? Perhaps even accepting? Artists' renderings also send signals about emotion and passion that perhaps ought to be taken into greater account by those of us who study international relations. How do international relations feel? An interesting question.

My own brief in criticism of social science's hegemony over the study of international relations, which I suppose aligns me with the dissenters in the third debate, is that the Humanities have been systematically, and rather arrogantly, excluded from so-called mainstream IR. In the paper that I prepared for the *Visions* seminar I therefore asked rhetorically whether History, Religion, Comparative Literature, Philosophy, Art, and Music really have nothing to contribute to our better understanding international relations. "As if not only Thucydides (who has apparently been admitted as a proto-IR theorist) but also Herodotus, Xenophanes, Seneca, Caesar, Cicero, Livy, St. Augustine, St. Jerome, Vico, Voltaire, Croce, Burkhardt, Firenne, Gibbon, Ranke, Macaulay, Acton, Adams, Taylor, Toynbee, McNeill, and Kennedy have no insights to offer concerning international Relations, or that the *Koran* or the *Bhagavad Gita* instruct us not all about statesmanship and moral choice. As if Homer, Euripides, Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton, Kipling, Conrad, Tolstoy, Remarque, Vonnegut, Hemingway, Giraudoux, Camus, Malraux, Tennyson, Elliot, and Auden do not deepen our grasp of the meaning of relations among states and peoples! As if Goya's "Execution of the Defenders of Madrid," his "Horrors of War," and Picasso's "Guernica" are not about international relations, or that Dvorak's "New World," Shostakovich's "Fourth," Tchaikovsky's "1812," Bob Dylan's "Blowin' In The Wind," or Bob Marley's "Sheriff" for that matter, are not about war and peace or the coming together of cultures!" (Puchala, forthcoming). Some of the most penetrating questions we are wont to ask about the world may not be questions about fact or cause, but rather questions about *meaning* that concern such matters as historical significance, moral rectitude, mythological import, or aesthetic quality. Such questions of interpretation are typically handled poorly by social scientists, but they can be elegantly dealt with by humanists and brilliantly broached by artists. Ought we not as students of international relations to have in our methodological quivers the interpretative tools required to extract truths from artists' visions?

The Discipline of International Relations

If we in International Relations become too engrossed in third debating, chances are good that we will overlook our common interests, or perhaps even forget about our intellectual identity. International Relations is an academic *discipline*: full fledged, full-blown, autonomous, intellectually legitimate and accomplished. A number of colleges and universities in the United States have departments of

also lead us to accept what William James frequently referred to as pragmatic truth, or knowledge that is useful enough to guide human behavior reasonably successfully toward human objectives (James, 1975). If epistemological exclusiveness could be waived, and today it is largely up to IR's scientists to waive it, the way would also be opened to transforming the study of international relations from a battleground of contending factions into a continuing, and indeed exciting, dialogue among intellectuals interested in better understanding relations among states and peoples. What those of us who study international relations might agree that we are seeking is edification. This is different from objective truth, which is at least elusive and possibly mythical. Edification, Richard Rorty wrote in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, means human intellectual and spiritual growth arrived at by considering and contrasting constantly new or alternative ways of describing reality (Rorty, 1979:361). Each project—mythology, religion, history, art, science—has its own discourses, and each of these yields interpretations of human beings and human affairs by its own methods and its own justifications. Edification comes from a continuing conversation among discourses. Would it not be refreshing if such continuing conversation, and not periodic great debates, became the intellectual mode of International Relations?

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PEDAGOGY IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Stimulating Simulations: Making the European Union a Classroom Reality

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This article examines the organization and development of the Mid-Atlantic European Union Simulation Consortium (MEUSC), with special emphasis on linking theory to practice within its simulation program. The MEUSC program, initiated in 1993, brings fifteen colleges and universities to Washington, D.C., each December for an intercollegial experiential learning exercise on the European Union. During the simulation, students meet with professional diplomats from both the United States and Europe, and they engage in consensus-building activities that mirror the decision-making processes of the EU Commission, Parliament, Council of Ministers, and the European Council. As a result, participants are able to refine and enhance a range of academic and practical skills that are keys for success in today's political and business worlds. The authors of this article make special use of a survey that was undertaken to gauge the impact of the simulation on its participants and, thus, its success as an educational venture.

Keywords: European Union, simulation, decision-making, active learning

"I had no idea I knew so much!"¹ As educators at the college level, students to internalize and draw upon the knowledge that is imparted in teaching process. Very simply, we try to instill within our students a ownership about the material we teach and expect them to learn. One easier said than done. Yet a growing number of political scientists and have succeeded in accomplishing this goal by participating in a multi-in academic venture that models the primary decision-making institution cesses of the European Union.

¹Student comment during the December 1999 MEUSC European Union Simulation.