Syncretic Sustainability:
The Case of the Peasant’s Association of Tukar, Senegal

Dennis Galvan
Associate Professor
Political Science & International Studies
University of Oregon
dgalvan@oregon.uorgeon.edu
541-346-2851

Draft: please contact author for latest version before citing.

Paper for presentation at the
2002 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association,
Washington, DC, December 2002
In the rural Siin region of Senegal, a group of young men decided that urban unemployment, minimal education at a barely functioning university, and the squalor of living on the margins of capitalist incorporation were not for them. They went back to their home village, a dusty, poor place on the edge of the advancing Sahara. They founded a community organization, a “peasant’s association” they called it, to try to create meaningful work for the young, stem the rural exodus, address poverty and do something to restore soil fertility and stem deforestation. During a cholera epidemic, they launched a community health education campaign (5 drops of bleach in the water jug saves your child!) that prevented many fatalities. They succeeded in attracting foreign aid funding for a garden farming project, and later, an animal husbandry scheme. They set up micro-credit and took over small shop keeping when Mauritanian merchants were expelled from Senegal.

This paper is a case study of this community based organization – the Association des Paysans de Tukar (APT). I use the case study as an empirical foundation to make three wider points. First, this rural Senegalese example underscores the simplistic and utopian nature of much current thinking on community development. The turn toward community, local empowerment, and sustainable livelihoods (Singh, 1998; Macleod 1997) as latest and greatest development panacea du jour (de la decade, in truth) often idealizes community based organizations as extensions of civil society, seemingly intrinsically poised to solve problems of accumulation, distribution and sustainability just by virtue of being close to the “local,” the “people,” the “community.”

Second, I use this case study to suggest some concrete factors which might contribute to the effectiveness of rural self-help organizations: a) a particular kind of openness in the macro-political environment; b) effective, educated leadership, which c) remains socially proximate and capable of mobilizing society by virtue of creating community based organizations which are institutionally syncretic.
Finally, the APT’s relative demise in recent years suggests the weakness of community organization in this part of Africa, but the weakness of an analytic framework which looks at community organizations as institutional structures which, once founded, should be expected to endure and take on a “life of their own.” The search for the institutionalization of community based organizations may itself be a critical flaw in our understanding of how this particular facet of civil society can contribute to sustainable development. I suggest that, rather than reifying the community organization as an institutionalized structure distinct in organization, resource base and historical trajectory from community itself, it makes more sense to envision grass roots self organizations as entities which emerge and disappear, wax and wane in conjunction with the generational life cycle of communities. From the point of view of contributions to sustainable development, the question is not the institutionalization of this or that organization, but the routinization of the participatory, empowering, deliberative socio-political conditions which make possible regular emergence of new grass roots organizations across time within a given community.

Setting

The Peasant’s Association of Tukar (Association des Paysans de Tukar or APT), was founded in 1986 in the village of Tukar. Tukar is a large village of some 3000 inhabitants in the heart of the pre-colonial kingdom of Siin, a part of Senegal where the Serer ethnic group are predominant. Tukar, like many Serer communities in the Siin, appears to have been founded about 800 years ago, by migrants who entered the area from the north, displaced a prior Mandé-related group (the Socé), and established over several generations a system of intensive farming and pastoralism (Becker, 19xx; Gastellu, 19xx). This region is just south of the Sahara, has relatively poor sandy soils and limited rainfall (now about 30cm per year), although there is reason to think that the last century of intensive clearing for peanut

---

1 The Serer are actually a colonially-codified ethnic umbrella category lumping together the people of the former kingdom of Siin, known sometimes as Siin-Siin or Sinig, with six other groups, some closely related to the group in the Siin, others not so closely linked. To conform to contemporary local self-designation and for simplicity’s sake, I refer to the ethnic group predominant in Tukar and the environs as
production and rapid increases in child survival rates have altered the physical environment considerably.

The chief chronicler of pre-colonial agrarian societies in Senegambia, Paul Pelissier, insists that the Serer achieved very robust agricultural productivity and high population densities because, over the centuries, they combined a particular form of animism with an ingenious land and resource management scheme (Pelissier, 1966). Founding lineages of villages like Tukar are thought to have established positive relations with ancestral spirits which inhabit the land and ensure its fertility. In the complex, hierarchical and endogamous occupational caste structure of the Serer of Siin, leaders of founding lineages held positions of great authority as custodians of land in the spiritual sense (maintaining essential relations with the spirits) and in the material sense. Materially, these heads of founding lineages came to manage a three-year crop rotation (early sprouting millet, late sprouting millet, fallow), orchestrated the placement of cattle and other livestock on fallow fields (manure from the animals replenished the soil), and controlled access to critical trees like the nitrogen fixing acacia albida. Up to the 20th century, these spiritual leaders/resource managers appear to have played an important role in ensuring the agricultural success of the Serer.

While the extension of colonial rule, the head tax and the need to grow peanuts (to earn cash to pay the head tax) put pressure on Serer communities like Tukar, they were able to adapt, sometimes in ingenious ways, to respond to these changes. They worked peanuts into their three-year crop rotation scheme (eliminating one of the varieties of millet, thus adding to their famine risk, although the hope was that sale of a cash crop would provide liquid capital to enable them to buy food when needed). Critically, Serer farmers found ways to put more land into productive use without abandoning the long established system of holistic land custodianship by the heads of founding lineages (see Galvan 1997 and 2002 for details on this adaptation).

“Serer.” For more complete reflection on the distinctions among Serer sub-groups and on choice of
Things changed somewhat more dramatically upon independence. Improved health interventions, and a relative decline in infant mortality in the 1960s put significant demographic pressure on this delicately balanced production and resource management scheme. Perhaps more critically, a well-intentioned post-independence socialist land reform (1964), designed to put the land “in the hands of those who farm it,” spelled the end of the system of crop rotation, fallow, pasturing and manure input, and maintenance of nitrogen fixing trees orchestrated by the founding lineage heads. Land reform replaced this ecologically and historically adaptive institutional structure with a simple, clear, but ill-advised redistributional norm. True, after the land reform we found greater levels of access to land, especially among those of low caste. But the land reform, by explicitly effacing the role of the old land managers, created a system of utilitarian free for all with no actor responsible for safeguarding the system as a collective good. A common pool resource management system (of the type Ostrom celebrates) was replaced by an unregulated, individualistic free market in what you planted, where you planted, what you do with livestock, whether you fallow, whether you cut any tree you need for fuelwood.

Given the population pressure, it was rational for everyone to show as little restraint as possible. No one maintained the nitrogen fixing trees, the rotation system, the fallow, the pasturing of animals to get their manure on fallow fields. By the 1970s, soil fertility began to decline, followed not long after by agricultural yields. By the early 1980s, the Siin region, which had once been able to provide for its own subsistence and earn cash selling peanuts, was losing the ability to make any kind of agriculture productive. Young people, seeing there was little hope for a productive life in villages like Tukar, left in droves for the capital Dakar, and for the growing urban centers of the interior (Fatick, Kaolack, Tambacounda, etc). 

---

terminology, see Galvan (2002, chapter two).
The young men and women who would found the Peasants Association of Tukar, the APT, were part of this rural exodus. Like many in their generation, they left for school, the lucky for university, others to join the military, or look for whatever odd work they could find outside the economically dying Siin region. Unfortunately, they chose a poor time to look for wealth and adventure in urban West Africa. Drought, economic crisis, lack of investment, the moribund international prices for locally produced commodities, eventually the structural adjustment induced dismantling of the presence of the state in the economy, made the 1980s and 1990s a particularly tough time for migrants to the cities, be they manual laborers or university graduates.

Each of the seven individuals responsible for founding the APT in the mid 1980s was in Dakar or another urban center for some part of the previous five to seven years. Interviews with each of them reveal similar narrative elements: the common rural exodus search for new opportunity, some level of frustration in pursuit of educational or economic opportunity, a desire to eventually return to Tukar and to avoid marrying a non-Serer person in urban Senegal.

By the spring of 1986, these seven leading figures in what would become the APT, all of them in their late 20s or early 30s, had found their way back to Tukar partly driven by frustration with the “modern” economy, partly pulled by the desire to maintain links with their place of origin, especially as they got to marrying age, some motivated by a feeling that they wanted to “make something happen” in Tukar that would enable young people to stay in the community and not have to experience the struggle and disappointment of urban migration which they had experienced.

---

2 This section is based on extensive open-ended interviews with the seven core founders of the APT, as well as semi-structured interviews with other members of the organizations, as well as on participant observation of APT meetings. The bulk of the interviews took place during field research in 1992-93, as well as during a follow up visit in 2001. Participant observation of meetings of the organization took place in 1988, 1992-93, 1995 and 2001.
The immediate catalyst for founding the APT came from an outbreak of cholera that spring of 1986. The disease was spreading through the Siin region, towards Tukar, taking the lives of the very young and the very old in particular. Although none of the eventual founders of the APT had specialized training in public health matters, they understood the link between the disease and contaminated water supplies. They organized a public health awareness campaign, convincing women in the community to use a few drops of chlorine bleach to purify their family’s drinking water. As the epidemic raged across neighboring villages, Tukar suffered fewer and fewer casualties, thanks in large part to the efforts of the group who later founded the APT.

Emboldened by this experience, by “the chance to actually use something we had learned in Dakar,” the core of group of seven started to discuss possibilities to build on this experience “to make something happen in Tukar.” They were led by a young man who had left the university in Dakar, whose father had been a colonial gendarme and who had traveled extensively in West Africa as a young boy. His cousin, who had been a marine posted to Gambia during the experiment at confederation, later joined the core group of the APT. A second leading figure was a prominent son in the family of the village founder’s lineage, the lineage that had been responsible for holistic resource management. This young man had also spent time at the university in Dakar. The eldest son of a key public official became a leading member of the group, as well as the local tailor’s son, and two women of about the same age who had completed primary school and were considered of “good farmer stock.” Together this group of seven had led the campaign against cholera, and in the ensuing months, began to think of this experience as a model for future activities.

If they had succeeded in teaching their neighbors about the use of chlorine bleach, and in so doing had saved so many lives, perhaps they could take other steps to give people the chance to make a living in Tukar. After considerable discussion, they reached out to another dozen people of about their age in the community, making sure to include more women and to
make sure there were at least a few representatives of the low-status occupational castes (storytellers, blacksmiths, leatherworkers, potters, weavers). They prepared a document outlining the goals of a proposed “peasants association,” establishing officers: the visionary and administrative leader, the son of the gendarme, as Secretary-General; the son of the local political official as President (he was also the oldest of the group); the member of the village founder’s lineage as Vice President; the tailor’s son as Treasurer; one of women in the original core group as head of the “women’s section.”

The organization was officially registered with local government officials. An older brother of the Secretary General had a university classmate who worked for a Franco-Senegalese non-profit development and training organization in Dakar, *Environnement et Développement du Tiers Monde* (ENDA). The APT was just the sort of local, grass roots organization ENDA liked to work with. The collaboration between ENDA and APT eventually brought a series of US university students as interns to Tukar, mostly to observe and learn (I was in the first batch of such interns, in 1988). Eventually, ENDA helped the APT General Secretary formalize their top priority plan (a catchment basin for rainwater, to be used for an irrigated vegetable garden in the dry season, which would give young people something to do during those nine months of the year, other than migrate to the cities). The proposal was funded by Lutheran World Relief in 1990, which dug an enormous basin next to a plot of land that the APT had secured as an experimental garden plot.

This project, however, suffered from poor soil analysis: the water basin never held much rain water. The APT moved on to other activities – they received grants from other funders to establish a revolving credit fund to help community members buy, raise and sell cattle. This dovetailed nicely with the already existing entrepreneurial interests of local farmers, and went on for a number of years, with a slice of each farmers’ proceeds used to replenish the revolving credit fund.
In the mid-1990s, much of these resources were reinvested in buying and running the local “boutique,” or general goods store. The APT took on this task, for which it was not perhaps particularly well qualified, in response to a community crisis: ethnic unrest on the Senegal-Mauritania border had resulted in the forced expulsion of most Mauritanians in the early 1990s. Mauritanians had a lock on the small general goods sector (the “boutiques”) in Tukar and in many similar sized rural communities. With the much resented Mauritanians gone, there were no shopkeepers, and therefore no easy way for people in the community to buy tea, sugar, cooking oil, notebooks, cigarettes, plastic tubs, rope all manner of everyday goods.³

In spite of considerable debate and dissent within the organization (“Serer people don’t run shops!” “That’s something only foreigners do!” “What do we know about how to keep a shop anyway?”), members of the community were complaining about the absence of the 24/7 “boutique” retail outlets. The APT shifted most of its resources in the early and mid 1990s into re-opening and running one of these shops. It was a constant headache keeping the store stocked, finding APT members to staff it at all times, and perhaps most critically, managing the free flow of credit to customers. The shop was forced to shut down on a number of occasions in the five years the APT ran it because, having given most of its inventory away to relatives and friends on credit, the shelves were bare and there was no reserve left to restock. When other Serer entrepreneurs took over some of the other closed shops, and eventually, by the late 1990s some Mauritanians returned and reopened their old places of business, many APT members were relieved. They had in part rediscovered/recreated the original rationale whereby shop keeping and retail sales had been relegated to marginalized ethnic outsiders with few or no kin-reciprocity ties to the community (and thereby, a fighting chance at capital accumulation).

³ Tukar still had a once per week market day, where all these and other commodities could be found. Communities a long walk or short horse-cart tide away had market days on other days of the week. But the loss of the Mauritanian run boutiques having to wait up to a week to get a hold of these goods. It also reduced available supply on market days, because the Mauritanians played a critical role in importing and distribution, as well as retail sales.
In the years since the shop keeping experiment, the APT has tried to return to its cattle-raising revolving credit scheme, but has lacked the capital needed to run the project on the scale of previous years. Women in the organization have run a malaria-prophylaxis purchasing arrangement on a shoestring throughout the life of the APT. In their individual neighborhoods within Tukar, these women collect funds from relatives and neighbors to purchase the readily available quinine products used as malaria prophylaxis (chloroquine, mefloquine; more recent, non-quinine based drugs have been beyond their reach financially), stocking up on the medicine to give out to as many children as possible during the rainy season. Although comparative infection rate data are not available, members of the community consider it a very successful project. In the present day, it remains the APT’s most active initiative. Much of this relative decline in activity has to do with the life trajectories of key APT members, to be examined in the last section of this paper.

*Explaining the APT’s Period of Success*

At least three factors help account for the period of relative success of the APT, from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s: state neglect, educated leadership, institutional syncretism. Of course, this single case study is an exercise in theory building, rather than theory testing: empirical work beyond this one case, examining similar community based organizations in a variety of settings, will be needed to test the degree to which these factors actually contribute to the success of these types of local development organizations.

First, at the political-structural level, it is important to note that a) the APPT came to exist at all, and b) that it thrived and indeed accumulated resources in a relatively autonomous fashion for the bulk of its existence. The story here is the story of what did not happen with to the ambitious young seven returnees to the village of Tukar. In other parts of Senegal, and indeed in other post-colonial settings the patronage politics of the ruling party machine/state officialdom (then the Parti Socialiste, now the Parti Democratique Senegalais – the dynamic on this level is essentially the same) might have loomed larger on the scene. Crawford
Young’s *Bula Matari*, the hypertrophic state of the colonial and post-colonial periods, a state with administrative, extractive and coercive resources which dwarf those of civil society and the private sector economy, had in effect ignored the Siiin region of Senegal.

This particular corner of Senegal was the stereotyped homeland of the recalcitrant Serer peasant: unwilling to cooperate with peanut production in the early days; rebellious with regard to taxation and regulation (a large 1906 tax protest in Diohine, the village just south of Tukar, was violently repressed); unwilling to accept induced relocation to Eastern Senegal when the French colonial state sought to move “productive” Serer peasants to Eastern Senegal to counter what colonial officials saw as the agriculturally rapacious practices of the Islamic brotherhoods there. After independence, founding President Senghor, simply by being himself a Serer “son of the Siiin” could reliably guarantee Serer votes for his ruling Parti Socialiste: there was little need to extend the patronage system of the party to this “safe” area. As an unintended side effect, rural electrification, phone lines, laterite roads, investments in education and health had bypassed Tukar and the Siiin in general.

Given the overall political economy of even relatively stable and democratic post-colonial African regimes (predatory-centralist), not to mention the political cultural implications of these regimes in the eyes of ordinary citizens (questionably legitimate, at best, à la Ekeh’s classic “two publics” formulation), Tukar’s relative neglect was an important ingredient in the *success* of community based organization. Elsewhere, the seven young founders might have been coopted by a local party baron, might have been able to find resources to address their dreams from the patronage coffers of the party and state. They might have then been beholden to the patronage party calculus of the regime, and would have likely been *less able* to mobilize ordinary fellow villagers because their actions would carry the taint of self-aggrandizement, ambition, the pursuit of power without regard to human relations as such.

---

4 Despite its proximity to Dakar, the capital (2.5 hours drive), only in early 2002 did the first telephone line reach Tukar. Electricity has yet to come to the village. The last 18km of roadway to Tukar are still sand path – almost impassable by vehicle in the rainy season.
what Schaeffer’s close ordinary language analysis shows to be the semantic, cognitive and moral content of the term “politik” (Schaeffer 199x).

If community based organizations like the APT are going to truly bolster that much-discussed, oft idealized realm of “civil society,” they must not only be autonomous from the state (the tautological essence of civil society). In post-colonial settings like that of Senegal, it is unlikely that effective community based civil society organizations will come to exist and thrive in the institutional presence of the machinery of the state.

Second, the APT would not have been possible without effective leadership on the part of the “group of seven” who founded the organization, and most critically, the son of the gendarme who became Secretary-general, articulated the original vision for the organization, was its key agent of mobilization, and effectively ran the operation from its founding through its years of success. In this particular case, I would break the effectiveness of leadership into at least four components, which may or may not apply in the case of other CBOs, a matter which merits further empirical analysis: 1) education and administrative skill; 2) legitimation based on extra-community experience and expertise; 3) mobilizational skill that approximates Weberian charisma; and 4) neo-traditionalism.

The leadership of the APT had all these qualities: their time abroad had given them educational and administrative skills that helped them conceive of a new form of collective action as a means to address poverty and rural exodus with concrete new initiatives, not to mention giving them the know how to draft the formal organizational charter and give it credibility to state officials, external partners, and funders. Interviews with community members suggest that people trusted the Secretary General and other leaders of the organization, because, in spite of their youth, they had “spent time outside Tukar,” and their educational and other experiences meant that “they have knowledge of how the world works that can help us here.” In effect, we see a form of the legitimation of the techno-scientific expert bolstering the credibility of the APT as an organization.
These two elements of leadership alone are of course not enough – technically trained experts, drawn from within and from outside communities, are the very foot soldiers of the development enterprise, yet community based organizations as effective as the APT in its heyday are rather unusual. The leaders of the APT, especially the Secretary General, were especially skilled at motivating and inspiring their fellow community members to see a new vision of how to organize economic and social life in the community. The Secretary General was himself a kind of attraction, a celebrity in the community, who people trusted because he articulated a vision of collaboration and cooperation that addressed their current very real crisis and suggested a way to reorganize work, farming, livestock raising, financial cooperation that would break with old habits and provide a path to a plausibly better future.

But the Secretary General was a Weberian charismatic only in a very limited sense – his program was not revolutionary in the sense of upending the old order and building a new society on the rubble of old institutions and ways. Indeed, a key ingredient of leadership success in this case was in fact neo-traditionalism – the leaders of the APT clearly articulated in their rhetoric not only a respect for Serer custom, history, culture and way of life, but a kind of idealized reverence for it. They were legitimate and effective, in part, respondents indicate, because they came home to live in Tukar out of a desire to marry Serer spouses, retain Serer cultural identity, revere the Serer ancestral spirits and way of life. Numerous conversations with the leaders of the APT suggests to me that this was not a conscious instrumental tactic (although it worked well in that way); rather, a kind of rejection of modernist materialism – in religious terms in particular – was a key element in the personal value systems of these individuals.

The neo-traditionalism of the APT leadership goes hand in glove with the third and final contributor to the success of the organization, the fact that it was institutionally syncretic, it combined institutional elements (organizational structure, formal rules, informal rules, habits or values) of more than one socio-cultural origin. This peasant’s association, in one guise an
egalitarian, Weberian formal organization versed in Roberts’ Rules of Order, was also in fact a re-mobilized circumcision age-cohort. The five young men in the core founding group had undergone the circumcision ritual in the same cohort, and were thus already linked to each other in a durable local institutional structure. The two founding women were of the same generation and thus shared less formal ties to the male age-cohort group. Circumcision groups in his society to tend to grow up together supporting one another as quasi-kin in finding brides, in farming activities, in times of personal crisis and celebration. There was, for Tukar, a certain innovativeness in using this structure as the kernel for a farmer’s self-help organization.

It was also no accident that the leadership group gave pride of place to a son of the lineage of the village founder/resource manager, as well as the son of the highest ranking local political official. When it came time for the head of the founder’s lineage to lead community wide celebrations surrounding fertility rites and the agricultural cycle, the APT leadership made great efforts to incorporate the APT in places of prominence in these celebrations. Indeed, it was this tie that gave them access to the plot of land used for the irrigated farming experiment, donated to the APT by the head of the founder’s lineage. When the project failed, members of the APT were faced with the critique that the heavy machinery used to dig the catchment basin had offended the ancestral spirits living in that land, who “knew no such noisy things.” APT leadership then organized their own rituals of repentance, patterned on those held by the founding lineage, conducted over many years out on the site of the failed project.

Members of the Tukar community felt they could trust the APT and follow its lead because it was “a group of good young kids who respect the values of our people.” This careful attention to syncretism, to the need to render external education, techno-scientific legitimation, partnering with external funders locally familiar and non-threatening by

---

5 This official had no effective or strong ties to the ruling party or the state, although he worked tirelessly and largely without success to change this.
integrating elements of local culture and social structure, was essential to the partial success of the organization.

**Conclusion: Decline and the Life Cycle of Community Based Organizations**

By the late 1990s, the APT began to fragment, losing both its leadership position in community development efforts and its ability to mobilize various sectors of Tukar society. The circumstances and apparent causes of this demise were prosaic. The organization’s visionary and de facto leader, the Secretary General, received a long-sought scholarship to study in the United States. He left in 1993 for a mere six-month stay, but given unexpected educational and career opportunities, has yet to return to Senegal.

The departure of the most instrumental leader of the APT was itself an important blow. But others in the organization’s leadership “moved on” in ways structurally analogous to, if less dramatic than, the Secretary General’s departure for the U.S. Key figures in the organization, who had been young, mobile and unmarried in the days of the fight against cholera and the animal husbandry scheme, grew older, married, settled down. Acquiring new responsibilities, they were less able to find the time and resources to organize community purchase of malaria prophylaxis or take turns running the local boutique. By early 2002, the Vice President could speak for the organization as a whole when he declared, “the APT is now pretty much dead.”

So, another promising community based organization failed. In spite of its apparent success at raising consciousness, building legitimacy, harnessing tradition, this organization could not survive the simple aging of its key members. Indeed, its very syncretic quality – as a redeployed age cohort – may have doomed it to irrelevance when the age cohort became less a tool to secure status and resources for an up and coming generation, more an economy of affection network of social support among an already established elite.
Yet we should not read the rise and fall of the APT as another indicator of the intractability of underdevelopment in rural Africa. This case study does not, at the end of the day, give us reasons to summarily dismiss local empowerment and community organizations. Rather, it reminds us that it may be a mistake to focus too much on the institutionalization of particular community organizations like the APT. This concern for building strong and durable institutional structures – be they of the state in a previous era, or of civil society in the present day (Wilson 19xx) -- has long been a central theme in development theory.

Yet the very focus on institutionalization might itself be a misunderstanding of the actual relationship between communities as social organisms and community organizations as institutional structures. Too much concern for institutionalization might artificially reify the CBO, separating it in an unrealistic way from the dynamics of change in the community of which it is a part/reflection. The demise of an organization like the APT, rather than a sign of the ephemerality of the experiment, may be a natural, expected and even useful part of the overall dynamic of community based development. Generational change and life cycle dynamics might make the rise and fall of any given CBO over a period of years not an indicator of dysfunctionality, but the norm.

If this is the case, then the crucial question becomes not under what circumstances can any given community organization, like the APT, become durably institutionalized – we should expect that no such organizations will ever really be durably institutionalized. In stead, we might look to the pre-conditions, the good soil which can nourish the ongoing creation of new community organizations, generation after generation.

In the case of Tukar, the particular combination of state neglect, institutional syncretism and leadership which is educated, technocratically legitimate, charismatic and neo-traditional, has not re-coalesced to form a new group. The structural ingredients remain, but the agent-specific elements may be lacking. Nevertheless, the experience of the APT might help
suggest a schema for the analysis of what can generate repeated cycles of successfully community based organization, not simply in Tukar, but in the many, metaphorical Tukars of the developing world.