The politics of late eighteenth century America were arguably marked by three revolutions, not one:
The background of the constitutional debate can be divided into three spheres: the political and economic problems of the country under the Articles of Confederation; the universe of political discourse--republican, liberal, and nationalistic but also, on a different level, patriarchal and racist--existing at the time; and the social and economic relationships which determined who could speak in the debate and whose interests were likely to be articulated and considered in it.
Congress under the Articles did have some significant powers, including the authority to make war or peace and to fix state quotas of men and money for the national army (Art. VI, VIII); to make treaties and alliances (Art. VI, IX); to settle interstate disputes, limit state boundaries, and admit new states (Art. IX); to borrow money and regulate standards of coinage and of weights and measures (Art. IX); and to create executive departments (five were established: foreign affairs, finance, war, a board of admiralty, and a post office) (Art. IX) (Hofstadter, 221).
However, the powers denied Congress often prevented it from functioning effectively, and the decision-making rules which governed it made it virtually impossible to incrementally correct defects in the Confederation’s basic structure.
Decision-making process: Each state had one vote, and the approval of nine of the thirteen states was required to make important decisions. In addition, the unanimous consent of the member states was required in order to amend the Articles (Art. XIII).
Powers denied Congress: It had no powers of direct taxation, no power to levy its own troops, and no authority to regulate domestic or foreign commerce. Moreover, it had no means to enforce such powers as were granted; enforcement depended on the good will of the states. Madison wrote in 1786 that "A Sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government. A federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a political constitution. Under form of such a constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity and of alliance between independent and sovereign states."
Many of the specific political difficulties of the period are traceable, in part at least, to the form of government under the Articles of Confederation. For example:
There was often no visible head of government: Congress frequently lacked a quorum, making it impossible to conduct business. Moreover, no effective, permanent executive body existed. Many thought this made the government appear weak and vulnerable in the eyes of other nations.
Example: ratifying the treaty of peace with Great Britain (1783-1784): So slow were the delegates in reaching a quorum (of nine states) that adoption was delayed until almost too late to meet the stipulated deadline. A mishap at sea in fact prevented the treaty from reaching Britain in time, but the British declined to make a fuss about it.
Interstate disputes and separatist sentiments: Serious divisions had already appeared over several issues, including western land claims, regulation of commerce, and slavery. There was talk of splitting the Confederation into several autonomous republics (Hofstadter, 242).
Financial weakness: Despite Secretary of Finance Robert Morris’s prodding, Congress failed to enact a national tariff or a land tax, poll tax, excise tax on distilled liquor or to establish any other substantial source of revenue independent of requisitions solicited from the states (who, for example, contributed < $1.5 million when $10 million was asked for in 1782) (Hofstadter, 228).
Shay's Rebellion (1786-87): Shay’s rebellion, because it signaled deepening class divisions in the infant republic and scared the propertied classes, undoubtedly lent a greater sense of urgency to efforts already under way to found a new government. Hofstadter’s sympathetic account of the rebellion makes the following main points:
What particularly alarmed the wealthier classes about the rebellion is that when Massachusetts appealed to the Confederation for help, Congress was unable to do anything (Morrison, 304).
Briefly, the autonomous individual is the preeminent value in liberalism. The security of private property and freedom of economic exchange, along with freedom of conscience and expression, must all be guaranteed and protected by government. The liberalism of the period was often joined with a more or less frank political elitism. This is evident, for example, in Madison’s famous Federalist #10 essay, which justifies the Constitution as a system designed to prevent effective majority rule, because the rights of the propertied elite must be protected from the tyranny of jealous majorities.
Classical republicanism emphasized the importance of civic virtue and community self-governance, the latter sometimes achieved directly (as in town meetings) but usually through representation. Republicanism was the ethos of the thousands of small settlements of agrarian America. In them, it is true, economic independence (and independence of character) were prized, but so to were mutual aid and communal loyalties--all the more so because these settlements were often socially and economically isolated. In them, and even in most of the states, the distance between elected officials and citizens was short indeed, and accountability was real and nearly immediate. Republicanism is preoccupied with the interrelated dangers of tyranny and of corruption, the latter referring not so much to office holders as to the people themselves. Tyranny destroys self-rule, abolishes liberty and corrupts people, while a people corrupted by ambition and avarice opens the way for tyrannous rule.
In contradistinction to liberalism, which stressed individual self-interest and competition, republicanism regarded a willingness to sacrifice for the common good as emblematic of citizenship. Yet because the republican notion of citizenship depended on economic independence (and the ability to bear arms) it was largely restricted to property owning men. The ownership of property established one’s “interest” in the welfare of the nation and thus was treated as both a source of power and of moral obligation. Belief in gender and racial hierarchies, combined with its appreciation for organic community, meant the republicanism often had a conservative cast.
Odd though it may be, nationalism is often neglected in discussions of the dominant ideologies of this period, yet nationalistic appeals and anxieties figure prominently in the constitutional debate. Much of the nationalist rhetoric is negative, as in Hamilton’s dire warnings about the threats posed to America’s security by foreign nations. The danger of war, real or contrived, becomes a prime justification for establishing a strong national government. Nationalism here means international competition--in trade, technology and even culture, as well as over the control of territory--which can easily descend into war unless a balance of power is maintained.
Nationalism does, however, have a positive face, and this is especially true in the case of America. America has a special mission. As Hamilton puts it, the outcome of the constitutional debate will determine "whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force." A mistake will "deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind" (v1, 219). In its positive expression, nationalism associates the aspirations of the country with those of the humanity itself.
In his history of eighteenth century Europe Isser Woloch summarizes the ambitions of the rulers of the newly consolidated nation-states as: (1) coercion (legal disposition of armed force); (2) taxation (collection and expenditure of taxes); (3) administration (bureaucracy for the control of public life); and (4) lawmaking (setting public policy and enacting the laws governing civil society) (Woloch, 4). This rather exactly describes the desire of the Federalists, though most sought to reconcile nationalism with liberty.
Despite the elite character of rule, one cannot automatically infer that support for the Constitution was largely confined to wealthy white men or that opposition was widespread among the disenfranchised. In the first place, the Anti-Federalists generally came from the same sectors of society as did the Federalists; thus there was an opposition within the elite. Secondly, between the elite and the disenfranchised lay a substantial middle class of yeoman farmers and artisans. A bi-polar model of early republican society is far too simple. Thirdly, it is a mistake to simply project emancipatory desires on disenfranchised people; what they think and hope for is, in part, an empirical question. Beyond this, however, those ideologies through which elite rule was justified also shaped the consciousness of the ruled; hence it is unreasonable to expect among them a pervasive and radical doctrine of liberation.
Conflict between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the Constitution counterposed two very different conceptions of a republic, each of which contained significant internal variations. Put simply, the Anti-Federalists defended traditional republican ideals while the Federalists articulated a radically new theory of liberal and national republican government. Thus Herbert Storing calls the Anti-Federalists conservatives who “saw in the Framers’ easy thrusting aside of old forms and principles threats to four cherished values: to law, to political stability, to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and to federalism.”
Of course, their conservatism has little connection with the meaning of the term today--they wished to conserve the principles of local self-government and civic virtue upon which the American Revolution had been fought. Moreover, they were put on the defensive by the extra-legal and secretive Federalist strategy. The Convention was authorized only to consider revisions to the Articles of Confederation, and this virtually all of the Anti-Federalists were prepared to do. What they did not want to see was the abandonment of the confederal system. Their vision of a reformed Confederation would have conceded to a national government only those powers minimally required to rectify obvious disabilities while preserving the greatest possible autonomy for the states in their own spheres.
Federalist and Anti-Federalist perspectives can be contrasted along numerous dimensions, including the desirable size of a republic, the mode and purposes of representation, and the attractiveness of consolidated national government.
Size: The Anti-Federalists favored a small republic. “A free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of inhabitants” (Brutus, v1, 170). In “a large extended country, it is impossible to have a representation, possessing the sentiments, and of integrity, to declare the minds of the people, without having it so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government” (Brutus, v1, 172).
“Only a small republic can enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to the government and a voluntary obedience to the laws. Only a small republic can secure a genuine responsibility of the government to the people. Only a small republic can form the kind of citizens who will maintain republican government” (in Storing, 16).
The Federalists, particularly Madison, saw in a large republic a way to prevent the formation of “tyrannous majorities” of the propertyless. The “most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society” (Madison, v1, 406). Traditional republicanism cannot be relied upon to control factions. Where the faction forms a minority, the “republican principle [of majority rule], which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote” is sufficient. But when a faction forms the majority, it can “sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens” (Madison, v1, 407-408).
Madison sees in the extensive republic an effective way to prevent majority factions from controlling government. First, it enables the delegation of ruling power to “a small number of citizen.” These will be the wisest members of the body politic, who “may best discern the true interest of their country . . .” (Madison, v1, 409). Second, he argues that larger electoral districts will make it “more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried” (v1, 410).
Finally, the extensive Republic encompasses a greater diversity of parties and interests. As a result, “you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other” (Madison, v1, 411).
Nature of representation: For the Anti-Federalists, representation must accurately mirror the diversity within society, and representatives must remain closely tied to the people they represent in order to know their will and be accountable for their actions. Brutus carefully delineated the Anti-Federalist conception of representation while criticizing the mode of representation embodied in the new constitution:
The Anti-Federalists adhered to a traditional republican view of representation. Federalist ideas, by contrast, were a dramatic departure, indeed almost an inversion, of republican doctrine. Madison was a penetrating exponent of these ideas. He rejected the ideal of an actual representation of the people--that is, a representation as faithful to their temper as possible, since he considered majority faction, that is the majority “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” to be the characteristic problem of republican government (in Storing, 39; Federalist #10). Instead, he hoped that the use of large electoral districts would lead to the selection of leading citizens (wealthier and better educated) for public office, and that an extensive republic would make it difficult for the majority to organize itself politically.
Moreover, the very distance between representatives and the represented that Anti-Federalists decried struck Federalists as an advantage. By having a very few represent the many, the direct, collective participant of the people in government would be severely curtailed, diminishing the danger of popular excesses. “As a Virginia Federalist argued, 'the more independent a government is . . . of the people, under proper restraints,' the more likely it is to produce the security of persons and property which is the end of government” (in Storing, 43).
Madison extended this fear of an actual representation of the people in the government to a theory of checks and balances. His version of checks and balances grows out of an apprehension that the legislative branch, which is closest to the people, will come to predominate in government. After lamenting that the danger of “legislative usurpations” has been overlooked (Madison, v2, 137), he outlines his theory of internally divided government. The problem, he states, is that of “so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places” (Madison, v2, 163). This entails “that each department should have a will of its own . . .” and that it be as little dependent on the others as possible for “the emoluments annexed to their offices.” Fundamentally, “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”
Madison concludes by making explicit his desire to see sovereignty doubly divided: the people prevented from forming a majority faction, and government divided against itself: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions (Madison, v2, 164).
Union: The Anti-Federalists opposed what they often call
“consolidated government” because they saw in it the destruction of
liberty, both personal liberty and that popular sovereignty which people
possessed vis-a-vis their state governments. Brutus framed the fundamental
question in the debate as, Should the United States “continue [as]
thirteen confederated republics” with a federal head for “certain
defined national purposes only” or “be reduced to one great republic,
governed by one legislature, and under the direction of one executive and
judicial”? (Brutus, v1, 164). They granted the need for reform of the
federal government, but resisted any large or ill-defined grants of power to
that government. This left them open to the charge that they wanted to entrust
the government with essential national interests without giving it the power to
effectively attend to those interests. The Anti-Federalists responded that
prudence dictated granting only those powers that were obviously necessary, and
doing so in a miserly fashion, since "rulers will always exercise their full
legal powers" (in Storing, 30) and “‘governments find a use for as
much money as they can raise’” (in Storing, 30). Federalists
attacked them for an excessive reliance on what Storing calls “voluntary
recognition of mutual dependence” among states (in Storing, 25).
The Federalists argued that a debate over a federal versus a national government "amounts to a debate over whether it shall be a nation" (24). Hamilton asserted that what is at stake is "the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world." (Hamilton, v1, 219). The need and desirability of a centralized national power is the lynchpin of Jay’s argument in one of the first Federalist essays: “One government,” he says, “can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. . . . It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part” (Jay, v1, 47-48).
The following table summarizes these points as well as several addition points of contrast between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
| Category | Anti-Federalist | Federalist |
|---|---|---|
| size | small | large |
| nature of representation | representatives like and closely connected with those represented | a filter selecting the best representatives (most successful, energetic, intelligent, etc.) and putting them at a distance from the represented |
| union versus confederation | the Union conceived primarily as a confederation of sovereign states; this should be preserved as much as possible | the Union asserted to be, from the moment of its Revolutionary formation, an indissoluble unity of the states. Strong national government needed to defend against foreign enemies and to harmonize relations among the states |
| goal of legislative deliberation | identification of the common interest; the maintenance or restoration of amity--thus protracted discord is undesirable | balancing of contending interests; trade-offs; regulated conflict--thus protracted discord is expected and must be managed |
| some salient values | civic virtue; organic community and localism; personal liberty | self-interest; commercial development; administrative rationalization; strong national identity |
| basis of public acceptance of government (of government’s legitimacy) | public trust based on close ties between representatives and citizens (roughly, subjective bonds) | public trust based on effective administration (roughly, objective results) |
| primary danger | the tyranny of elites exercised through “aristocratic” and “consolidated” government | the tyranny of majorities, chiefly against the rights of property, exercised through overly democratic governmen |
| basic solution to primary danger | keep government close to the citizenry | “checks and balances”; a large republic; and representation as a filter, all in order to prevent effective majorities from forming or at least from persisting long enough to carry through their programs |
Arguably, the Anti-Federalist model of government was incompatible with a rapidly growing capitalist economy and with aggressive frontier expansion. It was incompatible because, first, it relied upon largely voluntary amity among the states and an unforced stability in their relationships with each other, while in a capitalist economy one would expect exactly the sort of competitive and fractious relationships that Hamilton and Jay pointed out. Secondly, it was incompatible because it supposed that consumption would be limited by what we might call an ethic of voluntary simplicity, and thus that trade would be centered on states and regions, while in a capitalist economy consumption must increase and markets constantly expand. Thirdly, the Anti-Federalists opposed the establishment of a national military at a time when aggressive frontier expansion probably depended upon this. In addition, frontier expansion threatened civil war unless there was a strong national government to prevent states from battling over land claims.
Storing concludes that “The basic problem of the Anti-Federalists was that they accepted the need and desirability of the modern commercial world, while attempting to resist certain of its tendencies with rather half-hearted appeals to civic virtue" (46).
An assessment more sympathetic to the Anti-Federalists might emphasize that differences between Federalists and Anti-Federalists about republican government rested upon equally fundamental differences about the kind of economy that was socially desirable and, implicitly at least, the sort of relations with Indians that the new nation should cultivate. Let me acknowledge that the latter claim is speculative, though the next reading lends some support to it.
Federalists sought to create a unified national market, to centralize control over foreign trade, to confer upon the national government taxing and credit powers sufficient to undertake infrastructural development and provide investment capital, and to cultivate support for the national government chiefly among merchants, public creditors and manufacturers.
In opposition to this, the Anti-Federalists espoused the values of local self-determination, personal liberty, and organic community over the attractions of an expanded market economy. Markets, therefore, were to be subordinate to communities and to civic culture.