Justin Bell (University of Houston, Victoria)

This paper builds on scientific research on the evolutionary origins of depression and investigates what role depression might play in moral inquiry. I argue that depression, understood as a human adaptation, can be an important (albeit unpleasant) part of moral inquiry as it can condition moral imagination in particular ways. When Dewey’s social philosophy is applied, depression can be understood as a unique conditioning of moral imagination which can show important possibilities in moral inquiry. At the onset, I think it is very important to be clear about what I mean by depression. Given that major depression and other mental diseases are not only common but sometimes deadly, I do not want to give the impression that depression is positive or something we should induce. When a depressed person risks harming herself or causing some other harm then intervention of some kind by professionals is required and consistent with health and the possibilities of growth. However, if we consider the real depression that is part of human life, not the exaggerated depression of mental disorder, I argue that we can learn something significant about moral deliberation. John Dewey is clear in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry that there are two major matrices of inquiry: the biological and the cultural. The biological matrix has to do with how our bodies condition us to inquire in certain ways and how the possibilities of inquiry are always embodied. Similarly, Dewey dissolves the mind/body dichotomy and forwards an embodied philosophy of mind-body in Experience and Nature and gives significant attention to aesthetics and emotional states of the body in Art as Experience. A portion of my paper will be dedicated to looking at Dewey’s use of emotions in inquiry and showing the deeply embodied nature of inquiry. Secondly, I will discuss how moral deliberation relies on various aspects of emotion because of emotion’s influence on inquiry in general. This will be supplemented by a discussion of how the inquiry of others plays a role in moral inquiry in communities (which will be an important point later in the paper).

Given the importance pragmatists ascribe to evolutionary theory, embodiment, and emotions by Deweyan pragmatism, it makes sense to look at how the various emotional states condition moral imagination. To this end I will look at how depression, when understood as an evolutionary adaptation of our body in an environment, can be deeply informative of moral imagination and social development. To this end I will survey contemporary work in psychiatry and
psychology on depression as an evolutionary adaptation. Two important theories will be investigated—the social navigation hypothesis of Paul J. Watson and Paul J. Andrews and the evolutionary explanation of depression forwarded by Randolph M. Nesse. Both these theories give an account of depression (at least in instances where the feeling is not exaggerated into the disease of major depression or another disorder) that finds it advantageous to social conduct from an evolutionary perspective. I believe this work can show a new way to think about depression philosophically.

Moral deliberation is emotional and not strictly rational. The embodied states of human beings matter for moral inquiry. Given this, depression is one of many affects which will condition inquiry. Thus, it has a role in our moral deliberations. Both Watson & Andrews and Nesse see depression causing the individual to inquire about his or her social life in such a way as to motivate change. This is important for understanding deliberation and motivation. Furthermore, because of the social nature of depression on this account, there are benefits of group inquiry when the points of view of the depressed are accepted not as aberrant but as a natural human mode of inquiry. In other words, if a community takes the moral inquiry of the depressed seriously, we have a more fruitful and potentially transformative shared moral imagination. Without glorifying depression, I believe this account will show how it is nevertheless useful. This recontextualization of depression would, I believe, lead to a more fruitful and creative moral deliberation.

Tentative Bibliography

In her book The American Pragmatists, Cheryl Misak advances a particular narrative about the Classical Pragmatists whereby the major figures are divided into two groups based on their attitude towards truth. C. S. Peirce and Chauncey Wright are considered the pragmatists par excellence due to their deep commitment to objective truth and optimistic outlook regarding the end of inquiry. William James and John Dewey, on the other hand, are taken to have corrupted the project initiated by Peirce by slipping into relativist thinking. Misak’s justification her position is based on a mistaken, albeit popular, interpretation of James’s The Will to Believe that reads it as advocating a form of wishful thinking.[1] In this paper, I argue that if one corrects Misak’s interpretation of James by putting James’s philosophy back into the context of his psychology, it is clear that James held objective truth in equally high regard as Peirce and Wright. Misak therefore ought to consider them all to be the same camp.

When engaging with The Will to Believe, it is easy to overlook the specificity regarding the cases in which James held that one was justified in holding a belief despite a lack of evidence. If the evidence in a debate is settled clearly in favour of one side over another, it is not legitimate to claim that the defeated belief is a live option, as is the case with the dead hypotheses that James mentions near the beginning of that work. But when the various beliefs are all live options because the evidence has not caused them to cease being live, and especially when one must make a decision from amongst those options, then we are justified in believing in the absence of conclusive evidence. The reasons why this is the case is firmly rooted in James’s view of the organism.

One of the beliefs central to James’s psychology was that we are biological organisms embedded within an environment and that we have evolved highly complex means of adapting to challenges that arise in that environment. Our capacity to believe and to act on those beliefs is one such evolved means of adaptation. If the belief leads to successful navigation of the world, then we are more likely to believe that it is true and to continue to act in that way. If it leads to failure, we are less likely to believe it. The world thus serves as a constraint on what can be considered true, thus avoiding relativism. However, James also sees that beliefs are always the result of a particular problem that particular individuals need to resolve, meaning that all beliefs will necessarily be incomplete and must always be open to revision. Thus, while James shares a commitment to objective truth with Peirce and Wright, he is less optimistic about the end of inquiry.

In the longer paper, I shall also demonstrate how James’s conceptions of the will and of the emotions further exemplifies this point.

A central theme in American philosophy is the identification of America as a locus of diversity. As a nation of immigrants, the United States of America is a place in which the co-existence of (cultural, religious, linguistic, ideological, philosophical) difference is a fact of life. This co-existence of difference can be best understood as a co-existence of different worlds, in which a world comes to refer as the semiotic and conceptual horizon through which subjects make meaning. W. E. B. Du Bois and Gloria Anzaldúa’s respective narratives of being confronted with the two-ness (or three-, four-ness) of self—which leads to both the feeling of debilitating self-contradiction and the creative rejection of dualist thinking—is best described as the result of living in the margins of multiple worlds. They are, in this regard, distinctly American world-travelers that provide compelling accounts of the experience of living in the margins of different worlds. World-travel for Du Bois and Anzaldúa both contain an element of psychical damage—an internal “warring” for Du Bois and loquería for Anzaldúa—as well as epistemic privilege in recognizing the extent to which America is constituted by different worlds. The borderlands position is thus presented as a mix of trauma and psychic damage on the one hand, and as one of epistemic privilege and creativity on the other.

If we take seriously the claim that American philosophy is a philosophy of resistance that confronts the co-existence of different worlds, then we must cultivate the ability to foster genuine dialogue amongst different worlds. Given that this genuine dialogue requires traveling across worlds, I consider the possibility of world-traveling to the margins, and in particular the possibility of productive white world-travel. While Du Bois and Anzaldúa exhibit the ability to travel to the dominant White world (though it comes at a cost), they seem to suggest that the ability to travel across boundaries is asymmetrical in relation to whites. How might their accounts be broadened to consider travel from White worlds to Black/Latino worlds? In considering the possibility (and desirability) of travel to the borderlands, I draw on Shannon Sullivan and Maria Lugones’ concerns about the arrogance and ontological expansiveness of White world-travel, which prevents genuine dialogue and further damages and alienates borderdwellers.

The hope of genuine world-travel is to “meet” in the borderlands in order to cultivate a greater degree of comfort in the indeterminacy and recognition of the creative possibility of resisting rigid dualisms. Insofar as American philosophy confronts the co-existence of different worlds, it is a philosophy that must occur in the margins—in this productive space of indeterminacy and contradiction. In this respect, I take Anzaldúa and Du Bois’ accounts to exemplify the positive potential for creative resistance within the borders of multiple worlds. Their accounts are both descriptions of life in the margins and invitations to world-travel to these margins. They demonstrate that American philosophy (at least its resistance strand) is a kind of thinking that must occur in the margins.
This paper discusses both the plausibility of justifying democracy by reference to our epistemic commitments, and how we ought to understand the relationship between epistemic and normative values in this context. This is accomplished primarily by providing a critical analysis of Robert Talisse’s Peircean theory of democracy, epistemic perfectionism, as presented in *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy*. According to Talisse, all reasonable people participate in the epistemic norm whereby the holding of a belief entails a commitment to the truth of that belief. That is, if one believes some proposition x, one necessarily takes x to be true. Talisse argues that this epistemic commitment to the truth of our beliefs requires that we test them against experience and alternative viewpoints to ensure that they correspond to reality. The necessity of using the scientific method, in turn, commits us to participating in a community that promotes the open discussion of beliefs and their justifications. Thus, according to Talisse, our epistemic commitments alone, without reference to moral values, justify a democratic political organization that promotes a community of inquiry. Furthermore, since all reasonable people participate in the relevant epistemic norm, Talisse holds that no ‘reasonable pluralism’ of epistemic values can exist. As such, Talisse asserts that his justification of democracy cannot be reasonably rejected, and is therefore legitimate.

I argue, first, that in order for Talisse’s argument to succeed in establishing a universal commitment to democracy, he must assign normative value to our commitment to truth. If he maintains that this commitment is strictly epistemic, two problems arise. First, Talisse does not provide a reason for us to endorse, as opposed to simply participate in, the epistemic norm he discusses. Second, although I agree that his theory may provide us with a reason to support democracy, he does not address the question of how we ought to view the relationship between our epistemic commitment to truth and the other values and commitments we may hold which also provide us with reasons for acting. Since Talisse maintains that this commitment is purely epistemic, it is unclear if and how we should weigh it against, for example, our moral values when determining how to act. If, however, Talisse acknowledges that our epistemic commitment can be weighed against our other values, he must provide a reason why we ought to prioritize this commitment above others, in particular those that may lead us to reject democracy. If someone holds her other commitments to be of a higher value than her commitment to truth, it appears that she could legitimately reject epistemic perfectionism.

Although Talisse could respond by asserting that this rejection is not ‘reasonable,’ I argue that this response is not satisfying, since an overriding commitment to truth is built into his definition of ‘reasonable.’ As such, although one may not be able to ‘reasonably’ reject epistemic perfectionism, one may legitimately do so if her commitment to truth is outweighed by conflicting values. Finally, I argue that although I do not believe that Talisse’s argument is successful in grounding a universal commitment to democracy, his theory makes a significant contribution to democratic theory. Similar to arguments that rely on moral values such as liberty and equality, Talisse’s theory of epistemic perfectionism provides a convincing justification of democracy for those who place a high value on truth. This, I believe, is an important, if often undervalued, contribution to democratic theory.
This essay takes steps towards answering what Julia Wright referred to as Richard Wright’s literary enigma: “how the creator of the inarticulate, frightened, and enraged Bigger Thomas ended up leaving us some of the most tender, unassuming, and gentle lines in African-American poetry.”[1] In this essay it will be argued that the ‘enigma’ is less so, but more of a telling secret of Wright’s own intellectual voice: the inner-relationship between Nature, Nature thinking, and politics (and political writing). As such, it will be argued that in Wright’s work there is no juxtaposition between Bigger Thomas, or the man who brought us closer to Bigger Thomas, and his haiku work; rather, they are coextensive, one needing the other to voice itself through.

Scholars have accounted for this ‘enigma’ biographically: it is argued that Wright, through his travels, marriages, birth of children, and, most importantly, months leading up to his death transitioned from Marxism, literary realism, to cosmopolitanism, and, finally, to haiku. This accounting, though, does little to explain the appearance of Nature writing and Nature thinking (attributed to his latter life) in his early works, most notably Black Boy and, Native Son. It will be argued here that Nature writing and Nature thinking were always a significant part of Wright’s works; but, and what is more, that they are indispensable for understanding Wright’s Marxism and literary realism—that is, for understanding Wright’s social and political works/criticism.

In bringing together his social/political works and his haiku Nature works, this essay places Wright into a larger context concerning the relation between eco-poetics and politics, generally; but, and perhaps most importantly, it expands our understanding of Wright, taking him beyond the ‘traditional’ American and European conversations, and placing him within an under-mined history of Black eco-poetics and Nature writing.

In such context, we are not only charged with re-thinking Wright’s biography and the relation of politics to eco-poetics—we are forced to stretch our understanding of political engagement, political thinking/writing, thinking Wright and thinking blackness.

Josiah Royce’s theory of loyalty is an integration of the personal and the political: “The cause to which loyalty devotes itself has always this union of the personal and the seemingly superindividual about it. It binds many individuals into one service.”[1] The relational aspect of a commitment to a common cause makes Roycean loyalty an intriguing potential resource for feminist care ethics. Although there has been significant growth in the application of care ethics to political theory, care theorists continue to struggle with the fundamental social and political question of how to create care for unfamiliar others. Royce’s notion of loyalty, and specifically loyalty to loyalty, provides a method for thinking about the nature of a commitment to care that moves beyond family and friends. In other words, Royce may offer another means for developing a robust political ethic of care.

This paper begins by defining care ethics in an expansive way, integrating some of the latest works on care theory that have moved beyond the original formulations of care in the 1980’s. Then Royce’s concept of loyalty is introduced with particular attention to its relational aspects and points of potential contact with care theory. There is also discussion of the pitfalls and promise of theoretical appropriation given Royce’s contested relationship to the empowerment of women. The bulk of the paper is taken up with addressing how Roycean philosophy of loyalty can contribute to a political ethic of care. Specifically, Royce’s formulation of duty as an internal chosen commitment resonates with care’s tenuous relation to normativity. Although care has normative elements, it is not normative in the sense of a predetermined rubric of moral assessment—authentic caring responses cannot be known in advance or in the abstract separate from the context of the caring relation. Some care theorists are resistant to application of principles or formulaic moral responses. The Roycean construction of loyalty may provide a means for applying an appropriate understanding of duty to care. Furthermore, Royce frames causes that elicit loyalty as fundamentally social: “you cannot be loyal to merely an impersonal abstraction.”[2] In this manner, Royce brings together the psychological dimension of loyalty together with the political dimension of loyalty. This approach may provide a useful method for bringing together the more personal branches of care theory (as in the works of Nel Noddings) with the political branches of care theory (as in the works of Joan Tronto). Ultimately, this paper explores whether it is viable to suggest that the answer to the question of why one should care for unfamiliar others is because of an overarching loyalty to care akin to Royce’s loyalty to loyalty.

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Richard Hart (Bloomfield College) and John Ryder (American University of Ras Al Khaimah)
TITLE: “Ordinality and the Theory of Poetry: Justus Buchler and The Main of Light”

In honor of the 100 anniversary of Justus Buchler's birth, the presenters will discuss the basic ideas of his relational ontology and its application in aesthetic theory and a theory of poetry. Several recent books that develop Buchler's ideas are evidence of the emerging importance of his philosophical legacy and that of the Columbia Naturalism he creatively advanced. The session will both explicate his views and explore how they may be further applied in literary and aesthetic theory.

“The Will to Believe” is supposed to have been a flashpoint in a dispute between William James and Charles Sanders Peirce over the epistemic importance of emotion (e.g., Misak 2013, 60). Peirce is supposed to have read that essay as arguing that whatever one finds personally satisfying is ipso facto true (Misak 2013, 63). Peirce allegedly renamed his own position “pragmaticism” in response, choosing a word “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers”—kidnappers like James, commentators typically assume (Howells 1977, 452, Carus 1911, 36).

Peirce did have a negative reaction to “The Will to Believe,” but it has been little noticed that his chief worry had to do with the account of hypotheses on which he thought James’s article relied. In his psychological work and in private, James had defended a broadly Comtean methodology that made a sharp distinction between considerations that go into framing a good scientific hypothesis—these can include subjective factors like emotion and sheer creativity—and those strictly dispassionate factors that go into evaluating a hypothesis in light of evidence. Peirce had devoted years of study to the logic of framing hypotheses, or what he called “abduction.” He had argued that scientific inquiry is self-correcting, and that this is among its most valuable assets; and science is only self-correcting, for Peirce, if inquirers follow a rational plan for replacing hypotheses that prove unworkable. He thought James’s frankly positivistic account of hypothesis formation was incompatible with the notion that careful logical inquiry could uncover a rational procedure for framing and replacing hypotheses (James 1992-2004, 8.244).

Attending to this debate helps clarify slow-cooked philosophical tensions between James and Peirce. But it also helps bring a new (or perhaps long-forgotten) reading of “The Will to Believe” into focus. That essay defends a right to believe in a “religious hypothesis” on the basis of one’s passional nature (my emphasis; James 1897/1979, 29). The lynchpin of James’s argument is that since passional considerations legitimately figure into framing scientific hypotheses under special conditions, consistency demands that passional considerations legitimately figure into framing a religious hypothesis under the same conditions. Like Peirce, James endorsed Alexander Bain’s account of belief, according to which a belief in some proposition amounts to a preparedness to act as though the proposition were true. Given that early testing of a hypothesis requires acting as though the hypothesis were true even in the absence of coercive evidence, James argued that in (what we now call) the context of scientific discovery belief may permissibly be based on one’s passional nature. Peirce seems (rightly) to have read “The Will to Believe” as arguing that a passional belief in the religious hypothesis is permissible on the same grounds. So Peirce did worry that “The Will to Believe” was subjectivistic, but what commentators have missed is that he was specifically worried about James’s account of the role emotional factors play in hypothetical reasoning—both in science, and in reasoning about the religious hypothesis.
This project attempts to use the work of Jane Addams to draw out a central insight of feminist care ethics concerning the role of what Addams calls sympathetic knowledge and suggest an extension of that insight to politics. Right from the start we see the role of sympathetic knowledge in care ethics, and the radical departure that it marks from traditional approaches to morality, in the stark contrast between Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg's approaches to moral development. Gilligan's attention to women's "different voice" as it is expressed in women's responses to actual moral problems that they face radically undermines Kohlberg's formalized approach of looking for principled and justificatory response to his Heinz dilemma. Consideration of context and relation shapes not only the content of care ethics as it is developed in and following Gilligan's work, but also the style—or what might be called the philosophical methodology—of care ethics as a distinctly feminist contribution to ethical theory. While consideration of human vulnerability and the caring labor that it necessitates is widely recognized as a major contribution of care ethics, we should not overlook the methodological contribution, marked in part by the pervasive use of narrative both personal and fictional in the literature on care ethics. I contend that this methodological contribution can help to inform the extension of care ethics to politics, and resists turns to abstraction, a risk in making that extension. Jane Addams is helpful here not only through her concept of sympathetic knowledge, but because she models this approach in both her writings and life's work, offering an alternative to the abstraction of a principle of care ethics for use in the political arena.

I will start by giving an account of sympathetic knowledge, following Maurice Hamington’s exposition in The Social Philosophy of Jane Addams. This will provide a frame through which to revisit early writings in care ethics by Carol Gilligan and Sara Ruddick and see the ways in which something like sympathetic knowledge is at play. We will see three ways in which this notion appears in early care ethics: continuity between ethical inquiry and the problems of everyday life, use of narrative to convey ethical knowledge, and the connection of care with labor or practice. Turning to Eva Feder Kittay, I will first explore the ways in which her approach is consistent with or furthers this aspect of care ethics. However, I will also raise a concern about her suggestion of a maxim for political thought. While “we are all some mother’s child” certainly provides a way to bring the content of care ethics into political discourse, it also suggests the possibility of separating that content from a method consistent with the insights of sympathetic knowledge. To close, I will offer an alternative model of caring politics suggested by Jane Addams’ life and work.
Lee McBride (Wooster College)
TITLE: “Insurrectionist Ethics and Deweyan Inquiry”

In this paper I assess Leonard Harris’s insurrectionist philosophy in an attempt to locate insights that will sophisticate my own radically empiricist position. I discuss Harris’s insurrectionist ethics, which outlines the types of moral intuitions, character traits (or virtues), and methods required to garner impetus for the goal of universal human liberation. I argue that insurrectionist philosophy offers a compelling view of human liberation and social amelioration, one which allows for righteous indignation and enmity in the face of systemic injustice. Even still, I remain committed to the radical empiricism and the experimental inquiry championed by John Dewey. While insurrectionist character traits may be excellent modes of drawing attention or emphasizing the gravity of the situation, they would seem to be detrimental to cooperative inquiry and shared deliberation. This does seem to raise a genuine problem. How can one person consistently bear two seemingly contrary dispositions? I argue that differing character traits are appropriate in differing situations, depending on the conditions. The virtues of cooperative inquiry should be exhibited when all interested parties have access to the dominant discourse and are afforded basic human dignities and access to sanctioned systems of justice and retribution. Insurrectionist character traits should be saved for those instances when rational discourse is not a viable option; for example, when one is brutalized, denied basic human dignity, or denied access to sanctioned systems of discourse and retribution.
This presentation will be drawn from my dissertation research, specifically the final chapter. The entire dissertation is briefly summarized below.

A core assumption of political liberalism is that although reasonable people are likely to disagree deeply and indefinitely about private matters of the good life, they are nonetheless bound to agree about public matters of justice (at least in their broad outline). I contest this assumption. The basic argument of my dissertation is that reasonable people are capable of deep and persistent disagreement about justice itself, especially matters of economic justice. In the debates between reasonable right-libertarians, left-libertarians, classical liberals, left-liberals, and liberal socialists, and between sufficientarians, prioritarians, and egalitarians, the disagreements over economic justice are indeed as deep and persistent as are the disagreements we experience about matters of the good life. My project, then, is to describe the nature of our disagreements about economic justice, and suggest some ways in which political philosophy might reorient itself in the face of our condition of deep pluralism.

I explore the nature of our disagreements about economic justice on two levels. First, I look at some of the schisms within political philosophy on this issue. To show the depth of disagreement that is possible, I return to the Rawls/Nozick debate over issues of desert, entitlement, and ownership. Rawls argues that the natural assets of each individual (and the economic assets that flow from them) should be viewed as a common asset, held by the larger political community, while Nozick argues that individuals should be viewed as having full entitlement over their natural and economic assets. This debate between luck egalitarianism and self-ownership is irresolvable, but both positions are reasonable. Next, I turn to a more empirical exploration of how these debates about economic justice are taken up in real-world online deliberation. I show ways in which online deliberation often fails to be constructive. What makes economic issues unique is the degree of empirical complexity inherent in them (unlike, say, some cultural issues like gay marriage). The epistemically-closed communities of deliberation that arise on the internet tend to play down the empirical complexity of economic issues and create a false sense of expertise amongst their non-expert members. Thus, individuals fail to see the reasonableness of their opponents.

Finally, and here is where my presentation will be drawn from, I propose ways of more seriously incorporating deep value pluralism into political philosophy by drawing on the traditions of political thought that are not corrupted by the assumption of the eventuality of rational consensus: modus vivendi liberalism, agonistic democracy, and pragmatist political theory. I argue that political philosophers should not labor under the mandate of articulating a conception of justice acceptable to all. Instead, political philosophers should accept a much more modest role: above all, helping to clarify the nature of our disagreements, making explicit and coherent the values underlying the various positions at play, and exploring and suggesting hitherto unseen ways of overcoming particular disagreements (if it is even possible). Thus, I propose a vision of political philosophy that is more modest, but, limited to its proper sphere, is an enterprise that directly and productively engages with the ongoing controversies of society.
While the role pain plays in theories of justice is variable and often deemphasized in relation to notions like equality or fairness, Rorty's liberal ironist understands liberalism primarily as the aim of ameliorating pain. Following Elaine Scarry, Rorty understands pain as nonlinguistic. The ironist's clarion-call, "no metaphysics," further leads him to fire theology, science, and philosophy from the job of binding human beings with respect to the amelioration of pain and hire novels, ethnography, and journalism instead. This leads one to ask: if pain is a nonlinguistic phenomenon, how is it that linguistic practices like novels promise to do any better than other linguistic practices like philosophy in attuning us to it? I argue that because {1} pain is not nonlinguistic, {2} all linguistic practices are apt to serve liberal ends, and {3} if philosophy is thought otherwise than Rorty, it is well positioned to ameliorate suffering.

Following Pierce's tripartite division of sign, object, and interpretant, I turn in section 1 to the Greek sense of the sign as a 'throwing-together' (syn-bolē) of the human and its enviroring world. Vis-à-vis the medical-religious concept of the symptom (syn-ptōma), this is an unfortunate throwing-together. I contend that Pierce does not thematize the fact that there are symptoms that fail to enact this bolē, this throwing-together, and thereby cause one to be disoriented. It is precisely with respect to diagnoses without determinate etiologies--such as fibromyalgia or CRPS (complex regional pain syndrome)--that one can see how language does not break down in the face of pain, symptomatology does. If liberalism is interested in ameliorating pain, then perhaps it ought to reflect more on its meaning.

In Section 2, I claim that if Wittgenstein is right that verbal expressions of pain do not describe, but replace physical expressions of it (like crying), then Rorty cannot privilege certain types of linguistic practices over others in the service of liberalist aims. One of Wittgenstein's central claims about pain in the Philosophical Investigations is that the putative issue of pain's subjectivity is due to a certain type of metaphysical valorization of identity. Focusing especially upon §251-3 where he contrasts the ability to imagine otherwise with the emphasis upon deictic precision, I maintain that while any language game could privilege the deictic precision germane to narrow understandings of identity, such a privileging is not paradigmatic of philosophy as a language game, whether or not one draws upon analytic or continental traditions.

I conclude in Section 3 by arguing that the deflation of philosophy Rorty seeks—while in many respects understandable and sought for humanitarian reasons—simply does not follow if his liberalist goals are to be maintained. While my argument does not require a flat rejection of his strong private-public distinction, I claim that, in the final analysis, this distinction does far more harm than good to the liberal goal of ameliorating suffering and pain. If one seeks such a goal, perhaps one ought to think of philosophy, the public, and the private otherwise than Rorty.
In this paper I attempt to dissolve the experience-language debate which has recently surfaced in contemporary pragmatist thought. I will argue that many contemporary pragmatists, often thought to fall within either the language-centred or experience-centred camp, have either explicitly or implicitly taken a metaphilosophical stance which effectively moves them beyond the terms originally motivating the disagreement. As an entry point I will critically examine Colin Koopman’s recent transitionalist approach to pragmatism, as well as some of the objections it has received from David Hildebrand and Greggory Pappas in their review of his book. I believe that Koopman’s critics are correct in contending that the source of the experience-language divide is not, at its core, a problem of conceptual choice, but rather a metaphilosophical question about theoretical starting points. Despite glimpsing the root of the problem, I contend that the authors have chosen to turn this valuable insight into a needlessly polemical charge against language-centred pragmatism, rather than suggest a way towards eradicating the impasse. I will argue that the Hildebrand and Pappas’ favorite whipping boy—Richard Rorty—underwent an important development towards the end of his career which suggests that he too would have been committed a position identical to their own with respect to theoretical starting points. Moreover, I suggest a reading of Koopman’s project which is consistent with such commitments. In the end, I hope to show that (the later) Rorty’s remarks about ‘retail’ versus ‘wholesale’ uses of words, Hildebrand and Pappas’ well-articulated (yet on my view misplaced) discussion of metaphilosophical starting points, and Koopman’s plea for pragmatism to proceed by doing epistemology through careful description of social practice, all suggest that these thinkers agree that neither experience nor language is the sort of thing that it is appropriate for pragmatists to have a substantive theory about.
The opening chapters of the recovered manuscript, Unmodern Philosophy & Modern Philosophy (2012), mark the convergence of two parallel threads in John Dewey's work: his interest in anthropology and Greek philosophy. Dewey admires the Greeks not because they were the first to discover a set of universal and perennial conceptual problems, but because they invented the method of rational discourse as a means of coping with the problems of their particular historical context. In the manuscript, Dewey constructs a genealogy that avoids a positivistic and dualistic caricature of the Greeks by using anthropology to contextualizing how rational discourse emerges from indigenous people's transaction with their environment. According to Dewey, ancient Greek thought occupies a subtle space between Paul Radin's "primitive philosophers" of prehistory who first intellectually engaged nature and the "failure of nerve" Gilbert Murray describes at the beginning of the Hellenistic Era when philosophy and culture turned towards supernaturalism. This paper will contextualize the first chapter of the manuscript by tracing the influence of anthropology from Dewey's essay "Interpretations of the Savage Mind" (1902) through the first chapter of Dewey's manuscript, "Philosophy and the Conflict of Beliefs." These works will be oriented within turn of the century discussions in anthropology about the intellectual capabilities of indigenous peoples and the origins of religious beliefs, specifically texts from Émile Durkheim, Edward Tylor, Franz Boas, and Paul Radin. By insisting upon the continuity of the patter of inquiry and intellectual abilities across all human groups and by rejecting the dualism and positivism present in animistic accounts of religion, Dewey avoids the ethnocentrism of his contemporaries. Furthermore, this anthropological critique allows Dewey to construct an alternative genealogy of rational discourse critical enough to avoid the ethnocentrism of most histories, yet charitable enough to appreciate the novelty of Greek thought.
Dewey offers a robust conception of participatory democracy, maintaining that the “democratic way of life”—characterized by shared, public discourse by diverse and heterogeneous participants—has rich potential for both individual and social transformation and for conflict resolution. In what Dewey terms “neighborly communities,” we find immense social intelligence and creativity. We can take Dewey’s ideas seriously in the face of dire environmental problems ranging from global climate change to diminishing natural resources to rampant consumerism. Returning our focus to localized communities and actual neighbors within those communities allows us to harness the social intelligence that can emerge out of democratic deliberation, especially when that deliberation recognizes diverse stakeholders within communities.

In this paper, I examine Dewey’s conception of participatory democracy, showing how it can enrich and inform environmental education by fostering in participants an understanding of themselves as environmental citizens and as members of a given biotic community—as neighbors with nonhuman stakeholders. Following others like Andrew Dobson and Anthony Weston, I contend that promoting environmental citizenship is an excellent path toward sustainability and toward the amelioration of current environmental concerns, but recognize that developing an identity of citizenship in individuals is a challenging task. Dewey’s philosophy of education and his rich notion of democracy can be of use to those engaged in developing and improving environmental education.

I examine, by way of example, environmental education programs which have been putting Deweyan democratic ideals into practice through their curriculum by, among other things, engaging participants in problem-based inquiry, participatory research, citizen-science, and activism grounded in their local communities. Educational models such as these are an excellent way to promote Dewey’s participatory democracy within communities. By acquainting students with the environmental issues of their region by physically immersing them in the natural environment, such programs can encourage students to see their community more broadly, extending it to include the biotic community which sustains them. I look at the features of these programs that help to grow environmental citizens, suggesting that Deweyan models of environmental education can be much richer than traditional models—models which often fail to motivate students to participate in environmental problem-solving in a significant way on the local level.

An examination of certain aspects of Dewey’s work and the implementation of these themes into environmental education curricula reveals effective methods for helping to widen students’ social consciousness to include the natural world and their place in it as citizens of a biotic community.
Dissertation-In-Progress

Leamon Bazil (St. Louis University)
TITLE: “Neo Soul Politics: A Naturalistic and Critical Approach to Black Social Reform”

The aim of this dissertation is to show that a naturalistic and empirical account of justice and democracy is necessary for bringing about practical social reform. This account, which I refer to as neo-soul politics (NSP), is inspired by Deweyean naturalism, for it combines many elements of John Dewey’s epistemology, moral theory, and pragmatic social-political philosophy. NSP is process-oriented and it combines both subjective and objective features of political experience. NSP rejects the notion that fixed moral principles and theories of justice can provide adequate guidelines for making tractable the protean needs of African-Americans and other marginalized groups. NSP is a nonreductionist naturalistic approach to democracy and ethics that is experimental, experiential, and cooperative. When it is tempered by a substantive notion of non-domination, it is integral to bringing about the kinds of social and political reforms that are necessary for the emancipation of the African-American community.

Also, the dissertation is a critique of the modern metaphysics of the person, modern ontology, and modern epistemology. I argue that the proponents of modernity too often highlight its positive attributes while overlooking its darker aspects. It is true that modernity substituted reason for ecclesiastical doctrine, human agency for fatalism, and scientific method for superstition, but it also true that modernity led to an overly rationalistic and linear view of the world. I argue that the power of mathematics, logic, and rationality were transmuted and employed by modern philosophers in order to establish a uniform and monolithic view of man which ascribed to him unchanging qualities and motivations. Man was declared to be rational, self-interested, and egoistic. Political and economic theories were grounded upon these “facts.” But I argue that a new way of thinking is emerging and is pushing us ineluctably towards a different worldview. This revolutionary way of thinking began with the great American pragmatists, whose metaphilosophical narratives in the areas of epistemology and ontology have begun to reorder the West’s cosmological perspective.

I argue that American pragmatism is at least a quarter turn towards, if not a full one hundred and eighty degree return back to, a point of view in which the cosmos is perceived as organic rather than mechanistic; in which human beings are regarded as part of rather than distinct from the cosmos; in which human beings are seen as interrelated and symbiotically dependent upon other cosmic beings rather than independent and isolated from them; in which spirit and matter are perceived as being inextricably united rather than perceived as separate and distinct substances; and in which all things are understood to be joined together by a single unifying force rather than as multiple individual things existing on their own accord.
Huw Price takes himself to be a pragmatist opponent of modern metaphysics. Pragmatism, says Price, is out to “make mincemeat of modern metaphysics” (2008, p. 95). Price’s rejection of metaphysics can be fruitfully compared with Peirce’s reformist approach. Peirce thinks one of the tasks of pragmatism is, “instead of merely jeering at metaphysics”, to “extract from it a precious essence” (EP2:339). In this paper I articulate the commonalities between the two thinker’s orientations to philosophy and offer a Peircean challenge to Price’s rejection of metaphysics.

Price uses “pragmatism” to delineate an approach to philosophy that understands our concepts by investigating their use “in the lives of natural creatures in a natural environment” (2004, p. 82). An important consequence of his pragmatism is anti-representationalism. For instance, his account of probabilistic language in terms of the need of creatures in our circumstances to align their degrees of belief leaves no work to be done by an appeal to referents of probabilistic concepts (e.g. 2013, pp. 49-50).

Like Price, Peirce accounts for our concepts in terms of their role in our life as natural creatures. This orientation is encapsulated in the pragmatic maxim, which holds that the highest grade of conceptual clarity comes when we understand how our concepts will affect “rational conduct” (EP2:346). Like Price’s anti-representationalism, the maxim suggests that representational language can mislead. According to one formulation of the maxim, theoretical judgements in the indicative mood are “confused form[s] of thought”, which are better expressed as conditionals with imperative consequents (EP2:134-5).

Peirce and Price diverge over the compatibility of metaphysics and pragmatism. Price holds that pragmatic explanation is an alternative, and superior, project to metaphysics; we need “biology not ontology” (2008, p. 91). The metaphysics that Price opposes takes itself to be investigating mind-independent essences of concepts like “truth”. Instead, Price proposes that we stay on the “word” side of “word-world” relations (2008, p. 94). Peirce agrees that pragmatism challenges metaphysics. For instance, he claims that the maxim shows that most metaphysical propositions are “either meaningless gibberish… or else [are] downright absurd” (EP2:338). However, Peirce holds that metaphysics, in some form, is unavoidable and that we must be careful to criticise our metaphysical presuppositions (CP1.129).

A Peircean response to Price’s rejection of metaphysics can proceed by attempting a diagnosis of his metaphysical presuppositions. I argue that Price presupposes a nominalist notion of mind-independence. That is, a strong distinction between subject and object (or “word” and “world”). Price thinks that metaphysics would need to bridge such a divide, and that he can get by without doing any bridge building. Peirce argues for an alternative notion of mind-independence (c.f. de Waal 1996). The alternative notion equates reality with that which would be converged on by inquiry, were inquiry carried sufficiently far. On this view, reflection on our engagement with the world in inquiry cannot be cleanly detached from metaphysics. In Price’s language, whether or not we use substantive representational relations, conclusions on the “word” side have consequences for
our view of the “world” side. I illustrate the two views of mind-independence by contrasting Peirce and Price’s accounts of chance and probability.

Works Cited


This dissertation pursues the intersection between the implicit metaphysics of classical pragmatism and the related work of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze with specific regard to the ontological status of problems. I argue that Deleuze’s work in situating problems at an ontological level, as well as his affirmation of difference as prior to identity, can be effectively deployed in a pragmatist context to help mitigate criticisms which charge pragmatism with overly privileging a narrow instrumentalism and scientific method. This deployment therefore goes against neo-pragmatist positions such as Rorty’s which celebrate the non-metaphysical nature of pragmatist methodology.

Despite differences in inflection and emphasis, problems are central sites of generation in all classical pragmatist theories of inquiry. An encounter with a problem (whether in the form of ‘doubt’ halting activity, indeterminacy, discord, or explicit conflict) arrests or blocks the habitual flow of experience and generates modes of inquiry. Classical pragmatists are at more pronounced variance with regard to criteria of success for such inquiry, but all share a sense of the initiating problem being transformed in some manner, whether we understand this as a consummation, resolution, determination, or resumption of action. The problem with problems, however, arises insofar as problems themselves are multivalent, and what might appear a problem to one person or community may not to another. Are there criteria which we might locate for distinguishing real from pseudo-problems?

Deleuze’s ontology locates ‘problems’ as necessary features at a metaphysical level (his ‘virtual’) which are fundamentally generative of novelty. Following Bergson, he offers an account of the generation of meaning in relation to problems which is in many respects isomorphic to classical pragmatism. However, Deleuze’s admittedly speculative metaphysical project pushes against accounts which would locate problems as straight-forwardly given in primary experience, since his entire ontology rests on on-going series of problematic differentials which are constitutive of all actualized identities, situations, and events. As such, Deleuze’s work offers additional, if challenging, resources for thinking the complex relationship between indeterminate situations, inquiry, and determination or resolution, since problems can’t ever be eradicated or fully resolved.

Rather than claiming that we can simply graft Deleuze’s work whole-sale onto classical pragmatism, I will argue that both sides are transformed by a thoroughly considered philosophical encounter and that the influence is neither uni-directional nor wholly harmonious. Pragmatism contributes a sense of purposive direction which one might argue is missing in the Deleuzean account and the challenge is to understand the role of purpose in clarifying or posing problems and directing inquiry while neither reducing the scope of the problem or relying upon an appeal to a pre-unified situation. Tracing this intersection helps intensify two central philosophical questions for both traditions: how can pragmatism work to ameliorate destructive conflicts without assimilating or reducing difference?; and, for Deleuze, how can we effectively undo an image of thought which falsely rests on the primacy of identity without collapsing into nihilistic relativism?
Which deliberative democratic theory best justifies democratic legitimacy on both epistemic and procedural grounds? This question can best be answered by examining one of the most enduring debates in the early phase of deliberative democracy: the procedural and epistemic dimensions of deliberation as a decision-making procedure. In its initial debate deliberative democrats focused solely on the procedural – i.e., conditions for the possibility of deliberation – aspects of deliberation. According to Joshua Cohen’s (1989) influential formulation, “Outcomes are legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals.” However, deliberative democrats came to see that the substantive correctness of outcomes is also important. In other words, democracy has an epistemic dimension. The “standard” interpretation of the epistemic dimensions is that democracy is desirable insofar as it tracks truth better than non-democratic alternatives (List and Goodin 2001). Tracking truth means that a democratic decision-making procedure generates correct decisions from a procedure-independent standard of correctness or justice.

David Estlund (2008) makes a substantial contribution to the debate between proceduralists and epistemic democrats by arguing that democratic legitimacy requires both procedural fairness and substantive qualities of decisions. His theory claims that democracy has the tendency to produce correct or just decisions better than random, and it is better than non-democratic alternatives acceptable from the standpoint of public reason. Estlund’s attempt at grounding legitimacy, partly on its epistemic merits, is novel.

Building on the groundbreaking theory of Estlund, this dissertation advances an alternative epistemic theory of deliberative democracy that conceptually separates legitimacy from the epistemic values of tracking truth. In particular, this dissertation argues that the legitimacy of laws at enactment is primarily a function of what survives a robust deliberative process, but substantively correct decisions are essential in thinking about legitimacy of laws in the long run. Central to my defense is the distinction between the strong and weak conceptions of epistemic values of deliberation. On the one hand, the strong epistemic values of deliberation derive its validity from the procedural tendency to generate substantively good decisions. The weak epistemic values of deliberation, on the other hand, arise out of the public understanding of shared reasons for endorsing a policy.

The weak epistemic value is normatively related to the legitimate law-making at the enactment of law. Legitimacy of laws at the moment of enactment is primarily a function of what survives a robust deliberative process. Fabienne Peter (2010) has recently advances a similar argument, arguing that legitimacy is a function of satisfying the conditions of procedural and epistemic fairness. Expanding on Peter’s conception of legitimacy, I argue that democratic legitimacy is primarily a function of satisfying the procedural condition of political and epistemic inclusion of all citizens (or their representatives) in a discussion before reaching the decisions.

In the long run of laws, however, any given law or policy should be evaluated on whether it actually has strong epistemic values. Drawing on the pragmatism of John Dewey, I argue that the strong epistemic values of deliberation are useful in judging the long-term efficacy of law; that is, it helps citizens to choose laws that are just, serve the common good, or solve complex
political problems affecting all citizens. In other words, the legitimacy of laws in the \textit{long run} depends on reaching substantively good decisions.

The central contribution of this dissertation is in the twofold distinction between the strong and the epistemic values of democratic deliberation and their conceptual relationship with democratic legitimacy.
While 20th century political science was mostly quiet on the issue of animal politics, the new century and particularly the new decade bring with them a diverse range of political theories about human-animal relations: the pragmatic (McKenna and Light 2004); the citizen-oriented (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011); the liberal and interest-based (Goodin et al 1997, Cochrane 2012, Smith 2012); the sentientist (Garner 2013); the virtue ethical (Nussbaum 2007); and of course the utilitarian and deontological of Peter Singer and Tom Regan. No prominent political theorists, however, have begun to work through the ramifications of Uexküllian biosemiotics as applied to political theory. This paper begins to address this question.

Emphasizing Aristotelean telos, MacIntyre's (1999) conceptions of narrative co-creation and embodiment, and Uexküllian (1934) biosemiotics on umwelt and the semiotic web, my project collapses the Cartesian dichotomy of animal objects and thinking subjects into a single set of embodied living subjects each with their own perceptual worlds and species-specific attributes and teloi. Doing so begins to trace out the contours of a pragmatic alternative approach to both the stale and acrimonious debate between animal liberation and animal welfarism and the divide between liberal and continental political theory.

I see this approach as serving four primary functions within political theory, three corrective and one generative: first, it presents an alternative to the liberal humanist tradition from Kant through Rawls and beyond; second, it sounds a cautionary note on the potential humanist myopia of the ordinary language philosophy tradition in political theory; third, it problematizes the metaphysical foundations of human (and animal) rights discourses; and fourth, it opens a new path for dialogue between the broadly analytic and continental discourses on “the question of the animal” by emphasizing instead a biosemiotic politics of interspecies symbiosis that takes both species telos and the emergentist properties of language, rationality, and diverse sense perceptions seriously.

Against the Kantian tradition, the analysis shifts from autonomous and atomized individuals to intersubjective and embodied co-perceivers. This element of the analysis has two branches, one focused on embodiment and the other on the difficulties of applying agent-centric political theory to nonhuman animals. While the post-Kantian centrality of autonomous liberal human agent forestalls discussions of animality and politics almost axiomatically, the late-Wittgensteinian tradition emphasizing the primacy of irreducible language games in human life has also led political theorists to think about the human animal in problematically exceptionalist ways. My biosemiotic approach interrogates the role of language and rationality relative to sense perception and emotion in shaping the human human umwelt. In both cases, the perennial quest for an essence of humanness is abandoned in favor of an emergentist mapping of different animals' perspectival worlds, opening the space for a “positive biopolitics” to be put in discussion with the predominantly “negative” biopolitical literature in continental philosophy.
This dissertation explores the philosophical and educational dimensions of John Dewey's philosophy of growth. One of the most famous Dewey's motto “Education as growth” is widely known not only to philosophy academics, but also education practitioners. In Dewey’s philosophy, the notion of growth is central, and that in the process of growth, experimental knowledge develops. The organic relationship between experience and intelligence is nurtured by the theory of inquiry. This activity is guided by creative intelligence. This argument is a permanent tenet for Dewey’s Philosophy. A number of texts have examined Dewey's idea of growth by identifying these two dimensions as key notion of Dewey’s philosophy. However, no study has systematically and consistently studied their interrelationship.

I thus examine how Dewey tried to advance the philosophy of growth in his early works and how Dewey reconstructed that as the theory of inquiry, through his middle and late works. By tracing Dewey’s development of philosophy of growth, not only provides a good insight to education, but also illustrates Dewey’s unique philosophical standpoint throughout his intellectual development. My investigation of Dewey’s intellectual development focuses on these three interrelated goals:

First, I identify why Dewey developed his notion of growth in his early career. What was his awareness of the issue that originated his philosophy? In the first chapter, I examine Dewey's negation of Kant’s “self-consciousness” and “thing-in-itself” from his first reconstruction of Kant in “Kant and Philosophic Method (1884)” and describe his distinction between “self” and “self-consciousness”. I point out that from these ideas of distinction makes the foundation of Dewey’s successive organization of experience. I take up in the second chapter Dewey’s argument about the relationship between knowledge and experience, perception and mind, and the theory of habits as growth of experience in his early writings.

Second, I describe the development of Dewey’s philosophy of education. I start in chapter three by describing how Dewey developed his argument from psychology to education field by reviewing his article about reflex arc. I then compare this idea of human growth with his contemporaries like G.S.Hall, and J.M.Baldwin. Based on this idea of human growth, I inquire into his practice at the Chicago Laboratory Schools in chapter four.

Third, I trace philosophical transformation from the educational to logical issues as the problem of human conduct and experience. After he published Democracy and Education, his main argument shifted towards the theory of conduct and inquiry instead of the philosophy of growth. In Chapter 5, I claim that his trip to Japan and China (1919-21), where he gave a lecture about “Reconstruction of Philosophy” is a turning point of his intellectual development toward the logical problem of human conduct. In addition, I evaluate Japanese understanding of Dewey’s philosophy, by comparing Dewey’s influence in China at that time. Then I explore his theory of conduct, inquiry, and philosophy of science by taking up his late writings in Chapter 6.
In the literature surrounding just war theory, Brian Orend’s description of a Kantian just war theory is particularly successful. His work focuses on the works of Kant regarding war, and applying them to modern warfare. This results in an incomplete picture. In this work I will explore a wider view of international relations within Kant’s writings and, through contrast with other modern theories, describe a modern application of Kantian international relations.

To do this I will begin with an exposition of some current theories of international relations, starting with Brian Orend’s description of a Kantian Just war in his book in War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, and also including offensive realism as described in John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, defensive realism and socialism as described in Michael Doyle’s Ways of War and Peace, and liberalism as described in John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples. I will then continue the exposition by relating the established theories of international relations with their entailed theories of just war, including the recourse to war, the appropriate methods of waging war, and the aftermath of a just war.

Having established in the first chapter a baseline for reflection and comparison, I will then demonstrate in the second chapter the agreement between Kant’s three statements of the categorical imperative and Waltz’s three images of understanding international relations, with particular focus on the third statement of the categorical imperative and the third image of understanding international relations. This will form the basis for a new reading of Kant’s political writings.

Next, in the third chapter, I will investigate Kant’s writings on international relations, assisted by Orend’s scholarly investigation in War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective, and arrive at a historical understanding of Kant’s views on international relations. This view develops a modern international relations and just war theory that is pedagogically similar to, but theoretically distinct from, Orend’s Kantian theory of international relations.

With this historical perspective in hand, I will, in the fourth chapter, analyze the expository sections of modern theories of international relations and their theories of a just war. These will serve to showcase the various ways a theory of international relations can fail, and demonstrate the soundness of the proposed understanding of a descriptive Kantian international relations and just war theory.

In the fifth chapter, I will conclude with the results of this analysis, distilling a modern picture of international relations, as they are and as they ought to be, informed by an Kantian perspective, and briefly describe a just war theory, including the recourse to war, acceptable methods of waging war, and the aftermath of a just war.
Experiments-In-Progress

Paul Femenia and Graciela Colomé (National University of San Juan)
TITLE: "Electrical Engineering and Peircean Abduction"

This work is part of a research project of the Institute of Electric Power under the Faculty of Engineering of the National University of San Juan; the project is called “test methodologies and performance verification of measuring equipment PMU".

The training of human resources is one of the greatest strengths of this project due to three PhD students in Electrical Engineering are developing his thesis in it. In this context it is proposed the D specific objective of this research project to define and develop a conceptual and procedural tool to help engineering doctoral students in the process of generation and development of his doctoral thesis. The development objective of this work is a novel interdisciplinary research that addresses engineering from epistemology in the context of graduate studies in electrical engineering.

For the training of scientists is essential that there be specific training regarding of generating hypothesis, since this is one of the most difficult points along with the posing of the problem situation.

Many positions argue that what happens in the context of discovery is not a logical and demonstrable process but is psychological and therefore there are no way to generate a logical and even less a possible process of be taught.

But coinciding with Peirce and with the abduction theory; specifically with the use of the categories of Firstness, secondness and thirdness, we believe that is possible to establish general guidelines about how generate hypotheses without resorting to the moment of geniality or the creative jump where from the problem and data the researcher can generate the hypothesis.

Methodology
• Analysis of the thesis projects of postgraduate students to approach to their thinking
• Interviews with doctorate student to determinate how they believe his hypothesis has been generated
• Open interview for determinate the real process that the doctorate student have made his hypothesis

As a result of research in this objective is proposed:
• Provide a method for analyzing the thematic area and detect valid problems to generate a thesis proposal.
• Provide a method for analyzing the state of the art of a specific problem and propose possible solutions.
• Provide conceptual and procedural tools to enable at doctoral candidates generate the central assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses and simplifying assumptions necessary to the thesis project.

Background related to the project and group's contributions to the study of the problem:
Paul Femenia, a member of the previous investigation project, under the PIC- UNSJ No. 21/I928 has made progress in its investigations to establish general guidelines for hypothesis generation in the field of engineering in particular and applied sciences in general. In this sense, a paper called "Peirce secondness and "teaching by example" of Kuhn in teaching engineering" has been accepted in the Peirce Centennial Congress.
The intellectual development of young William James provides a key for understanding the thematic relations of his wide-ranging work. For almost two decades before his first published article in 1878, he worked as a scientist, moving toward the fledgling field of psychology, while maintaining philosophical and religious reflections, and eclectic humanistic interests.

I follow my earlier work on contexts in science and religion as they appeared in James's circles. The forthcoming book on Young William James goes to the center of those circles, with James himself responding to the naturalistic and spiritual fields of science and religion.

James extended his education into fields displaying kindred relations of material and immaterial parts of life, which he persistently understood in terms of their simultaneous interaction. This book presents biography in the service of theory, with the use of life stories and preliminary ideas to explain the formation of his commitment to these themes.

The James of Chapter 1 shared the scientific expectation that science could explain ever-more workings of the world, and developed an alternative “program of the future of science” with a thorough commitment to natural facts, but without assuming materialism. Chapter 2 shows James studying scientific medicine while he also used alternative practices for his own health, and came to appreciate contrasting views of mind-body interaction. Chapter 3 finds James escaping from his scientific studies into the humanistic art and philosophy of the ancient world, with special interest in Greek worldviews and Stoic philosophy, outlooks that included serene acceptance of nature’s ways with spirituality emerging within worldly experience. Chapter 4 shows young James suffering from tensions over familial expectations, vocational indecision, uncertainty of philosophical commitment, frequent ill health, awkwardness with women, and clouds of depression. However, just as sectarian medicine welcomed crises as stages toward healing, James's troubled times encouraged his insights into the depths of human consciousness and the bodily dimensions of thought.

While most studies of the mature James emphasize his theories in psychology, philosophy, religion, and social thought with little attention to his youth, and most evaluations of his youth offer little explanation about how a troubled youth could have emerged as a productive theorist, this developmental biography shows James constructing the first steps of his later theories. From his roots, with intermingled material and immaterial interests, he would construct his more elaborated branches across disciplines. While the range of his work has encouraged his reputation for inconsistency, an understanding of his youth shows how he developed a facility, from that range, to appreciate the relation of contrasts.

Before James’s contributions to different disciplines, his thinking was still an undifferentiated mass—a version of what he would call “pure experience,” not yet conceptually parsed into disciplines—sometimes even laced with forlorn worry that he would not ever find any vocational direction, even as he was fortified by persistent learning from experience. And the connections more readily apparent in his early development suggest possibilities for further research from looking at the many parts of his life in relation.
My book-in-progress, Epistemologies of Public Policy, constructs a new epistemic frame for public policy decision-making and implementation using resources from pragmatist and feminist epistemologies.

Aside from a few notable exceptions, philosophers have largely ignored the domain of public policy decision-making and implementation. Indeed, most philosophers have chosen to focus instead on political questions relevant to the state such as legitimacy and human rights, or on specific public policy issues like environmental or health care policy. Yet there are myriad reasons for philosophers to explore processes and structures of public policy itself, and there are many tools and resources philosophers can bring to the table. Epistemologies of Public Policy is therefore a ground-breaking text that will fill this gap in the literature by undertaking two specific tasks. The first is to identify and evaluate the epistemological assumptions that have shaped the public policy context from the origins of the administrative state to today. The second is to recommend a new epistemic frame that is capable of responding to the many tensions currently shaping the public policy context in North America. This new frame will borrow resources from feminist and pragmatist epistemologies, which are uniquely-well-suited to understanding and resolving the tensions between democracy and expertise and between positivism and pluralism that tend to frustrate contemporary public policy efforts.

The manuscript is tentatively divided into two sections, the first descriptive, and the second normative (see tentative table of contents below). Section I provides an overview of the dominant epistemic frames that have shaped public policy decision-making and implementation over the past 150 years, from the Civil Service Reformers of the late 19th century to contemporary innovation models. Section II constructs a feminist-pragmatist epistemic frame that emphasises a "pluralistic, fallibilistic, and democratic administration."

Introduction
I: Public Policy's Epistemic Frames
   1: The (Civil Service) Reformers (1870-1900)
   2: The Progressives (1900-1926)
   3: The Orthodoxy (1927-1945)
   6: Free Trade in a Knowledge Economy (2000-today)

II: A Pragmatist-Feminist Epistemic Frame for Public Policy
   7: Democracy and Expertise
   8: Positivism and Pluralism
   9: A Pragmatist-Feminist Epistemic Frame
  10: A Pluralistic, Fallibilistic, and Democratic Administration
  11: Conclusion

The Presentation:

My (2-hr) SIAP session will begin with a presentation and question period of approximately 60 minutes to introduce both the present gap in the literature, as well as the manuscript as a response to
that gap. Following the presentation, there will be approximately 30 minutes for break-out groups to consider the following three questions: (1) what epistemic assumptions do you think have guided public policy historically? (2) what are some epistemic problems with contemporary policy decision-making? (3) what tools or resources do pragmatism/feminism provide for a new epistemic frame for public policy decision-making and implementation? The session will end with approximately 30 minutes to discuss groups' answers to these questions, and to wrap up the session.
There is an interesting debate underway in contemporary cognitive science that was inaugurated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ 1998 essay “The Extended Mind.” In that article Clark and Chalmers argue that the boundaries of cognition exceed the boundaries of the brain. This article has played an important role in the development of cognitive science insofar as it shifts the focus away from the mind as the locus of belief formation towards features of the environment that are integrally involved in the process of forming beliefs. Their position has been characterized as a type of externalism. Internalists and certain philosophers of language have said that externalists have gone too far in ascribing belief formation to anything but the conscious operations of the mind.

In this manuscript, I argue that externalists have not gone far enough. We need to begin thinking again that objects of cognition are not constituted by activities of consciousness, but that are instead giving themselves to consciousness in how they regularly relate to their environment. The move that I am making here in saying that the externalists have not gone far enough is the same move that Fichte and Hegel made against Kant and also the same move that Scheler, Reinach, and Ingarden made against Husserl: objects of experience are not constituted by acts of consciousness; they are given to consciousness in their habitual modes of being.

Kant internalized the structure of the a priori because he thought it was the only way to reappropriate necessity from Hume’s critique of induction. Similarly Husserl thought that necessity could only be reached by grounding the natural sciences in noetic acts of consciousness. In an attempt to gain certainty, they have given up the world. In like manner, contemporary cognitive scientists have internalized structures of consciousness because of a reductivist materialism that begins with a third-party epistemology that seeks to describe the activities of the intellect from a position outside of the knower and the known.

In opposition to this position, Jeff Mitscherling argues that what we need is a new Copernican Revolution that does not begin with intentional a priori structures as emanating from the mind but rather re-places intentionality in subsistent structures outside the mind. It is intentionality that gives rise to the mind rather than the mind giving rise to intentionality.

Mitscherling’s position has deep roots within the pragmatist tradition. In particular, Peirce’s work in phaneroscopy has a lot to offer here. Peirce’s rather bizarre sounding claims that thought is not in the mind but that mind is in thought, that all thought is in terms of signs, and that metaphysics is intimately related to logic all begin to make more sense when framed within Mitscherling’s new Copernican Revolution. Peirce’s work in semiotics is absolutely essential for an adequate understanding the relationship between mind and intentionality.

This connection between Peirce and contemporary cognitive science via realist phenomenology is made all the stronger when the work of Gibson, Johnson, Lakoff, and Schulkin are brought into the picture. These thinkers, along with Clark and Chalmers, are all pushing cognition outside the cerebral cortex; however, they are either stopping at the body or failing to see the importance of latent cognition in our environment that was prefigured by Peirce and the other
realist phenomenologists. This book will enliven discussions in contemporary cognitive science discussions by bringing Peirce into contemporary debates about the internal/external mind.

For the presentation, first I intend to outline the structure and main arguments of the book. Second, because of the broad reach of this book, I will solicit alternative lines of thought that the book fails to take into consideration.
The book presents a new account of intentionality that I call "bifurcated intentionality": a distinction between discursive intentionality and somatic intentionality. The former is the intentionality of propositionally contentful states and statuses; the latter is the intentionality of perceptual and practical, embodied coping. My account of the former draws extensively on Sellars, Brandom, and Price; my account of the latter draws on Merleau-Ponty and subsequent phenomenologists. I provide an account of how to think of both discursive and somatic intentionality without falling into the Myth of the Given about either.

In my book, I show that Sellars' account of discursive intentionality and his account of non-conceptual content are helpfully illuminated by reading Sellars as a sophisticated critic of C. I. Lewis. (For these purposes, Lewis and Sellars are "transitional pragmatists", neither "classical pragmatists" nor "neo-pragmatists"). I give a detailed account of how Lewis' pragmatist distinction between conceptual interpretation and the given does (and does not) commit him to the Myth of the Given.

Central to this account is a new interpretation of the Myth as a mistake of cognitive semantics. Properly carried out, cognitive semantics undermines the very idea of a Given, that is, that anything which plays a cognitive-semantic role can be understood as playing that role independently of its relations with any other cognitive-semantic role-players. I use this interpretation of the Myth of the Given to explicate both Lewis' criticisms of rationalism and empiricism as well as Sellars' criticisms of Lewis. I situate Sellars and post-Sellarsian philosophers (esp. Brandom and McDowell) against that background, stressing Sellars' insistence that we need a theory of non-conceptual mental content in order to avoid the dialectic that runs from Hegel to Royce.

However, I argue that neither transitional pragmatism nor neo-pragmatism share the flawed assumption that only the discursive or conceptual can be genuinely intentional. To clarify this point, I turn to Merleau-Ponty's account of motor intentionality and show that a satisfying explanation of empirical content requires recognizing that somatic intentionality is a distinct kind of intentionality. I conclude by arguing that discursive intentionality and somatic intentionality are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the cognitive semantics of empirical content.

Content and Format of Presentation:

In the presentation, I'll briefly describe the general context of the book - how it relates to classical pragmatism, neopragmatism, and existential phenomenology - and then discuss the specific claims advanced and the arguments for them. However, I am most interested in talking with scholars of classical pragmatism about how I can connect my claims with resources elsewhere in the tradition. I would like to understand better (a) the extent to which bifurcated intentionality is anticipated in Peirce, James, and Dewey and (b) the extent to which they might call into question this distinction. My goal is to understand how classical pragmatism, neopragmatism, and phenomenology illuminate each other in productive ways.