

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Prof. Ronald Mitchell

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PS 420/520: International Organization

Goals of course

This course asks three main questions. What types of problems do governments face in the international realm? What sorts of solutions do they devise to address those problems? What determines why some of those solutions are effective and some are not? While examining these questions through the study of security, trade, human rights, environment and other international issues, it will also touch on questions regarding the roles that non-state actors play, the role of information, and the roles that norms play in international life. The course focuses on questions of the causes and effects of efforts at international organization. It is definitely NOT a course describing the United Nations system or the bureaucratic structure of other international bureaucracies. It is not a course on international organizations but on international organization. The course will study various theories purporting to explain why states succeed or fail at creating institutions for international governance and what effects, if any, those institutions have. Students will develop a theoretical perspective on these questions, learning to examine and evaluate trends across different and disparate issue areas, with the goal being to improve your ability to analyze how well theories do at explaining particular patterns of facts rather than learning the facts themselves. The course will seek to show how states and non-state actors create institutions that help them surmount the obstacles that anarchy poses to achieving their goals and clarify why they so often fail.

Readings and required books

Young, Oran R. 1999. *Governance in world affairs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Online readings: all readings besides those in Young will be available via Blackboard. These readings have [E-Reserves] at the end of their entry in syllabus.

Daily reading of the *New York Times* is required. A relatively cheap subscription is available through the UO Bookstore. You can also read the *New York Times* online for free or read it at the library. But you must read it daily!

Requirements and grading

The reading load is rather heavy in this class. If you do not plan on doing the reading prior to each class, I would suggest that you not take the course. While the class size is big, I hope to make discussion a valuable part of most class sessions. Having done the reading will be essential to classes being interesting and enlightening.

FOR UNDERGRADUATES, GRADING WILL BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- Identify New York Times article for use in class lecture - students will be assigned topics and must find a relevant article and post a link to it on the class website - 2% (this is the *only* extra credit I will offer in the class)
- Two treaty-related assignments – 5% and 10% (15% total)
- Two in-class midterms - 20% each (40% total)
- In-class final - 40%. Will be at time and date noted in Schedule of Classes.
- Participation - 5%

FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS, GRADING WILL BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- Same as undergraduate requirements but grad students must write a research paper *instead of* a final exam.
- Research paper (25-30 pages) - 40% (see fuller description provided). Additional, intermediate deadlines are identified in the syllabus below. Your research paper must carefully and rigorously evaluate whether a particular environmental treaty succeeded at improving the problem that motivated its creation. The paper must include a thoughtful and theoretical literature review that includes citations to at least 10 references as well as a careful delineation of specific hypotheses and their evaluation against the empirical evidence collected for the case. The level of quality of this paper should be at the level corresponding to a first draft of a Masters thesis. Details in assignment pack.

POLICY ON LATE ASSIGNMENTS

Late assignments will lose 2 points per day. Thus, an assignment that arrives the day after it is due will lose 2 of 100 points, one that arrives the 2nd day after it was due will lose 4 of 100 points, etc.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY, PLAGIARISM, FABRICATION, CHEATING, AND MISCONDUCT:

By enrolling in this course, you agree to abide by the University's Student Conduct Code. You must read the web links on Blackboard for the Academic Integrity Assignment. Understanding these documents is a REQUIREMENT that you MUST complete by the end of week 1. Everything in your assignments must be your own work. Neither ignorance of these policies nor the lack of an intention to cheat or plagiarize will be considered a legitimate defense. Raise questions you have with the professor before problems arise. *I will flunk all students who plagiarize and will report them to University authorities. Unfortunately, I have done so two or three times in the past few years.*

STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES

The University of Oregon is working to create inclusive learning environments. Please notify me if aspects of the instruction or course design result in barriers to your participation. You are also encouraged to contact Disability Services in 164 Oregon Hall at 346-1155 or disabsrv@uoregon.edu. If you have already been in contact with Disability Services and have a notification letter, *please provide me with a statement from Disability Services during the first week of class* so that we can make appropriate arrangements. University policy requires that "students MUST present a notification letter from DS to receive testing accommodations" (see http://ds.uoregon.edu/DS_Pages/DS_Responsibilities.html).

PS 420/520: International Organization

Introduction

WEEK 1: TUESDAY

Introduction:

No readings. First day of class

WEEK 1: THURSDAY

Global Governance and International Organization: an introduction

Academic Integrity Assignment: Absolutely required reading. By enrolling in this course, you agree to abide by the University's Student Conduct Code. You must read the websites linked via the course Blackboard site. Make sure you read these by this day and understand what they imply about your conduct in this class, including both plagiarism and cheating. Raise any questions you have with the professor. You will be assumed to have read and fully understood what plagiarism is and how to avoid it from this point on.

Young, Ch. 1

Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson and Jeffrey H. Kaplan. 1996. Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations: 1981-1992. *International Organization*. 50 (4): 593-627. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 2: TUESDAY

Theories of International Organization

Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables.

International Organization. 36 (1): 1-21. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [E-Reserves]

Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International institutions: two approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*. 32 (4): 379-396. [E-Reserves]

The Structure of International Problems

WEEK 2: THURSDAY

Problem Structure

Young, Ch. 3

Rittberger, Volker and Michael Zürn. 1990. Towards regulated anarchy in East-West relations: causes and consequences of East-West regimes (read only 29-46). *International regimes in East-West politics*. 9-63. London: Pinter. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 3: TUESDAY

Incentive Structures

Assignment #1 due beginning of class: "Reading and Understanding a Treaty"

Grad students only: 1st assignment PLUS one paragraph description of paper topic also due.

Stein, Arthur A. 1982. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. *International regimes*. 36 (2): 299-324. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [E-Reserves]

Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. Global communications and national power: life on the Pareto frontier. *World Politics*. 43 (3): 336-66. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 3: THURSDAY

Number of Actors, Transparency, Capacity, Norms, and other factors

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions (read only 761-780). *International Organization*. 55 (4): 761-799. read only 761-780 [E-Reserves]

Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. Reciprocity, coercion, or exchange: symmetry, asymmetry and power in institutional design. *International Organization*. 55 (4): 891-917. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 4: TUESDAY

Midterm Exam #1 in class

Formation of International Institutions

WEEK 4: THURSDAY

Theories of Institutional Formation

Young, Ch. 2

- Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko. 1993. Testing theories of regime formation: findings from a large collaborative research project (read only pp. 223-238). *Regime theory and international relations*. 223-251. New York: Oxford University Press. [E-Reserves]
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. Rational design: looking back to move forward. *International Organization*. 55 (4): 1051-1082. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 5: TUESDAY

The International Organization of Security

- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1997. International control of nuclear proliferation: beyond carrots and sticks. *The Nonproliferation Review*. 5 (1): 40-52. [E-Reserves]
- Duffield, John S. 1992. International regimes and alliance behavior: explaining NATO conventional force levels. *International Organization*. 46 (4): 819-856. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 5: THURSDAY

Regional Regimes

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2005. The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change, and economic growth. *American Economic Review*. 95 (3): 546-579. [E-Reserves]
- Hemmer, Christopher and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2002. Why is there no NATO in Asia? collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism. *International Organization*. 56 (3): 575-607. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 6: TUESDAY

Nonstate Actors

- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal*. 51 (159): 89-101. [E-Reserves]
- Betsill, Michele M. and Elisabeth Corell. 2001. NGO influence in international environmental negotiations: a framework for analysis. *Global Environmental Politics*. 1 (4): 65-85. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 6: THURSDAY

The International Organization of Trade

- Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for sale. *American Economic Review*. 84 (4): 833-850. [E-Reserves]
- Gawande, Kishore and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States. *International Organization*. 60 (3): 527-561. [E-Reserves]

The Effects of International Institutions

WEEK 7: TUESDAY

Institutional Effects: Enforcement or Management?

Grad students only: Five page draft of final paper due.

- Young, Ch. 4 AND Ch. 5
- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? *International Organization*. 50 (3): 379-406. [E-Reserves]
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. Is enforcement necessary for effectiveness? a model of the international criminal regime. *International Organization*. 60 (4): 935-967. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 7: THURSDAY

Midterm Exam #2 in class

WEEK 8: TUESDAY

The International Organization of Human Rights

- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do human rights treaties make a difference? *Yale Law Journal*. 111 1935-2041. [E-Reserves]
- Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 49 (6): 1-29. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 8: THURSDAY

The International Organization of Gender

Assignment #2 due beginning of class: "Comparing Treaty Texts: Predict which SHOULD work better".

- Joachim, Jutta. 2003. Framing issues and seizing opportunities: the UN, NGOs, and women's rights. *International Studies Quarterly*. 47 (2): 247-274. [E-Reserves]
- Carpenter, R. Charli. 2003. 'Women and children first': gender, norms, and humanitarian evacuation in the Balkans 1991-95. *International Organization*. 57 (4): 661-694. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 9: TUESDAY

The International Organization of Health

Garrett. Challenge of Global Health. *Foreign Affairs*. 86 (1): 14-38. [E-Reserves]

Daes, Erica-Irene A., Adib Daoudy and Joint Inspection Unit. 1993. Decentralization of organizations within the United Nations system (Part III: the World Health Organization). Geneva: United Nations. [E-Reserves] -- Skim this whole report to get a sense of how the performance of international organizations is evaluated within the UN system.

WEEK 9: THURSDAY

Thanksgiving Break -- No Class

WEEK 10: TUESDAY

The International Organization of Environmental Protection

Lidskog, Rolf and Goran Sundqvist. 2002. The role of science in international regimes: the case of LRTAP.

European Journal of International Relations. 8 (1): 77-101. [E-Reserves]

Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization*. 48 (3): 425-458. [E-Reserves]

WEEK 10: TUESDAY

Institutional Change and Institutional Interplay

Young, Ch. 6 AND 7

Conclusions

WEEK 10: THURSDAY

The Future of Global Governance

FINAL PAPER (grads) DUE at beginning of class. NO LATE PAPERS ACCEPTED!

Young, Ch. 8

Gallarotti, Giulio M. 1991. The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international relations. *International Organization*. 45 (2): 183-220. [E-Reserves]

FINAL exam will be in class on the date and at the time marked in the Schedule of classes!!!!

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Below are additional readings that I have not assigned for the class but that interested students may want to read.

- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 42 (1): 3-32 (read pages 3-23 only). [E-Reserves]
- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization*. 54 (3): 421-456. [E-Reserves]
- Alter, Karen J. 1998. Who are the “masters of the treaty?” European governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization*. 52 (1): 121-147. [E-Reserves]
- Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization*. 53 (4): 699-732. [E-Reserves]
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? the domestic constituency mechanism. *International Organization*. 59 (2): 363-398 (read only 363-366 and 374-389). [E-Reserves]
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? *International Organization*. 58 (3): 459-484. [E-Reserves]
- Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions in international relations: understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade. *International Organization*. 61 (1): 37-67 (read only 37-47 and 63-64). [E-Reserves]
- Grieco, Joseph M. 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research programme. *Review of International Studies*. 21 (1): 21-40. [E-Reserves]
- Hawkins, Darren. 2004. Explaining costly international institutions: persuasion and enforceable human rights norms. *International Studies Quarterly*. 48 (4): 779-804. [E-Reserves]
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*. 36 (1): 1-21. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [E-Reserves]
- Kratochwil, Friedrich and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. International organization: a state of the art on the art of the state. *International Organization*. 40 (4): 753-775. [E-Reserves]
- Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. Reciprocity, coercion, or exchange: symmetry, asymmetry and power in institutional design. *International Organization*. 55 (4): 891-917. [E-Reserves]
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization*. 54 (2): 217-252. [E-Reserves]
- Morrow, James D. 1994. Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information. *International Organization*. 48 (3): 387-423. [E-Reserves]
- Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. *International Organization*. 57 (2): 241-276. [E-Reserves]
- Pace, John. 1998. The development of human rights law in the United Nations: its control and monitoring machinery. *International Social Science Journal*. 158 499-511. [E-Reserves]
- Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. Paths to compliance: enforcement, management, and the European Union. *International Organization*. 56 (3): 609-643. [E-Reserves]
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion through IOs: the Security Council and the logic of information transmission. *International Organization*. 60 (1): 1-34. [E-Reserves]

PS 420/520: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
PROF. RONALD MITCHELL

Two Treaty Assignments

To help you understand how international organization actually works, you will have to complete two assignments examining treaties on one of the four main issue areas covered in the course: international security, international political economy, human rights, or environmental protection (communication/corruption will not be covered in this assignment). Treaties (also known as conventions, agreements, accords, protocols, or amendments) are agreements that countries sign with the intention of legally binding themselves to take the actions laid down in the agreement. At the time you do your first assignment, you choose which of these four issue areas you want to work on. You do NOT get to choose which treaties to examine – only which issue area. *For each issue area, you must study the assigned treaties.* All the material needed for this assignment will be available on the course website.

Assignment #1: Reading a Treaty (length: no more than 1000 words) - 5% of grade

Choose one of the four issue areas in the table below. Read the text of the first treaty and answer the following questions. **Do NOT analyze both treaties for your issue area yet**, only analyze the one designated for assignment #1. **I encourage you to use these questions as the headers for the six parts of your paper.**

- **Membership:** What countries may become a member of this treaty? [Do NOT identify which countries ARE members, only which countries are allowed to become members.]
- **Goals:** What are the objectives or goals of this treaty?
- **Requirements:** What are the major requirements that this treaty makes of countries that become members? Although treaties often make many requirements, here you should focus on the core requirements that are the behaviors that countries commit to performing in order to achieve the objectives or goals of the treaty.
- **Monitoring:** What provisions in the treaty, if any, deal with monitoring whether countries comply with the major requirements of the treaty?
- **Responses:** What provisions in the treaty, if any, are intended to reward or encourage those who comply or sanction, punish, or prevent violations of the major requirements of the treaty?
- **Evidence of success:** What evidence would we expect to see in the world if this agreement had its intended effect (i.e., "succeeded")? What should we collect data on to know whether the treaty "worked" or not?

Choose among these issue areas:	Once you choose your issue area, you must work on the treaties listed below - do NOT go out and select some other treaty to read:
International Security	Treaty for assignment 1 : 1987: Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles Analyze this one for assignment 2 : 1991: Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms
International Political Economy	Treaty for assignment 1 : 1991: Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Agreement Analyze this one for assignment 2 : 1992: Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation
Social Welfare and Human Rights	Treaty for assignment 1 : 1979: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Analyze this one for assignment 2 : 1989: Convention on the Rights of the Child
Environmental protection	Treaty for assignment 1 : 1985: Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent Analyze this one for assignment 2 : 1988: Sofia Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes

Assignment #2: Comparing Treaty Texts: Predict which *SHOULD* work better (length: no more than 1500 words) - 10% of grade

READ the following two readings via Library E-Reserves. These are essential reading for doing the assignments well!

- Jacobson, Harold K. and Edith Brown Weiss. 1998. A framework for analysis. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. 1-18. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [E-Reserves]
- Jacobson, Harold K. and Edith Brown Weiss. 1998. Assessing the record and designing strategies to engage countries. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*. 511-554. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [E-Reserves]

For this assignment, you must use the two treaties in the table for the issue area you chose for assignment #1.

Re-read the treaty from Assignment #1 and read the second treaty for your issue area. Examine the requirements and structure of the treaty (membership, type of requirements, monitoring, enforcement) to make a prediction of how much you expect each treaty to change the behavior of member countries. Then, write a short paper (less than 1500 words, use word-count on your computer) that compares your *predictions* about the two treaties' effects. Use the questions from Assignment #1 to guide your thinking in writing this comparison (you should NOT simply answer these questions about the second treaty but use the questions to compare the first and second treaty as a means of predicting which you would expect to work better).

For this assignment, you **SHOULD NOT** do any research on what effects the treaty actually had. This assignment requires only that you read the treaties and make **PREDICTIONS** about which treaty is likely to be more effective. For example, you might argue that one treaty had better monitoring provisions than the other but had worse enforcement provisions and you think that enforcement is unlikely in international affairs anyway, so you predict that the one with better monitoring will be more effective. Or you might argue that one agreement is between European countries and the other between Southeast Asian countries and that the fact that the latter countries have fewer resources would prevent them from complying and so the latter one would be less effective.

In this assignment, you will **NOT** be graded on whether your prediction is accurate or not. Rather you will be graded on how thoughtful and logical your prediction about the effects of the two treaties are, and which one is more effective, based on the theoretical insights you have learned to date in the class and based on real differences between the texts of the two treaties.