

**Lecture 13**  
**9 November 2010**  
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- I. Introduction
  - A. Feedback
    - 1. Considerable positive feedback (thanks) but...
    - 2. Talking to fast
    - 3. Getting off on tangents
    - 4. Too much reading, review more, link more to class
    - 5. More small groups, videos, alternatives to lecture
    - 6. Will do my best to be responsive to all of these
  - B. Mearsheimer article:
    - 1. This is a Realist critique of the notion that “institutions are a key means of promoting world peace” (Mearsheimer, 1995, 5). Mearsheimer contends that this rejection of standard balance of power politics is a recipe for disaster in the form of more war than would happen otherwise.
    - 2. Examines three different threads of institutionalist theory - NOT important to make these distinctions, though they may be interesting.
    - 3. Note that there is an interesting comparison of Mearsheimer’s response to that of Grieco, also a Realist, in the same year that argues that the EU really requires a re-assessment of the validity of Realist theory.
    - 4. Note that he nicely reiterates Realist theory on a single page, page 10 of the article. Good summary of institutionalism as well. Talks a lot about relative gains as well.
    - 5. Basic argument is that states are always concerned about relative gains and that the empirical record doesn’t support realist claims.
    - 6. Reading advice -- stop at p. 26 if need to. Stuff on collective security and critical theory are less important to the class. But reading the parts from 5-26 would be very helpful.
    - 7. “There is, however, a downside for policy-makers who rely on institutionalist theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail” {Mearsheimer, 1995 #2020, 49}.
  - C. Young chapter {Young, 1993 #6414}
    - 1. Example of how one does research in the social sciences: not too far off from regular “science” -- setting up hypotheses based on theory and seeing whether evidence from the real world supports or refutes it.
    - 2. Three types of hypotheses
      - a) Power-based -- institutional formation requires a single “hegemonic” power who sees it in their interest to create an institution that can promote general cooperation. But little support for this hypothesis.
      - b) Interest-based: Evidence supported the notion that leaders are necessary for institutional formation and that equity, salience, effective compliance mechanisms, integrative bargaining, uncertainty, and catalytic events/crises also contribute significantly
      - c) Knowledge-based: values and ideas matter as ways to foster common agreement, need for common understanding and consensual knowledge, and existence of epistemic community
  - D. Grieco article (for Thursday, on EU)
    - 1. First point -- intellectual honesty and willingness to examine own preferred theory carefully -- being an analyst rather than an advocate.
    - 2. Second point -- EU does not fit well with realist theory and yet still not throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
- II. Theory of international institutions
  - A. Regimes / international institutions -- a means by which states attempt to overcome collective action problems. States see suboptimal outcomes from independent decision-making and seek to develop collective decision-making and collective behavior to achieve better outcomes.
  - B. Definition: System of governance for a particular issue area.
    - 1. "International regime" / "international institution" are interchangeable terms
    - 2. "Norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate an issue area" (Haas, 1980, 397).

3. "A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other" {Mearsheimer, 1995 #2020, 8}.

C. Example of domestic "regime" / institution: drunk driving


1. Norms: vague, general SOCIAL sense of what is right and wrong
2. Rules: LEGAL proscriptions and prescriptions
3. Organizations and actors: networks of friends, MADD, general social pressure, explicit laws
4. Monitoring and enforcement: authorized and non-authorized

D. Example of international "regime" / institution: human rights

1. Norms: how government should treat its citizens generally
2. Rules: specific requirements about what can and can't do, in treaties and conventions
3. Organizations and actors: treaty secretariats, human rights organizations, individuals
4. Monitoring and enforcement: public perceptions, diplomatic pressure, economic pressure


E. Realist view: international institutions have no influence. Behaviors only reflect short-run self-interest. Power and interests cause behaviors and cause structure of international institutions:

1. E.g., membership in UN Security Council and decisions reflect power and interests.



F. Institutionalist view: international institutions matter. Outcomes can reflect long-run self-interest.

1. First, what are the causes of institutional formation? Second, what are the effects of institutions?



2. International institutions lead to outcomes that differ from what power and interests dictate
3. But institutions do NOT lead actors to do things against their interests!!
  - a) Influence evident when states do things that are contrary to their SHORT-RUN interests
  - b) Over long term, institutions lead states to view interests differently, to include long-term and interdependent (not just short-term and independent) concerns in their rational calculus

III. Problems international institutions arise to resolve

A. General: one or more states see status quo as suboptimal and believe that contingent behavior coordinated with other states will leave them better off

B. At least three basic types of problems international institutions arise to address:

1. Coordination:
  - a) Show Berlitz video on disk at: BerlitzWeAreSinkingVideo.mov
  - b) All states view themselves as worse off if they do not make their behavior contingent on that of others. But, once rules agreed to, no reason to cheat.
  - c) Some involve few distributional problems; others involve major distributional problems
  - d) Distributional issues may exist but enforcement issues don't exist
2. Collaboration: Standard PD game and Tragedy of the Commons
  - a) All states view themselves as worse off if they do not make their behavior contingent on that of others. But, once rules agreed to, still reasons to cheat.
  - b) Fear of cheating raises distributional issues as well as enforcement issues
3. Upstream-downstream problems
  - a) Some states prefer the status quo while others prefer a change. The latter have to convince the former to change their behavior.
  - b) Distributional issues are explicit & must be addressed either with sanctions or rewards.
  - c) Enforcement issues remain for both sides
4. Normative problems
  - a) One/more states seeks to get other states to adopt/accept their views of right/wrong
  - b) E.g., human rights agreements

IV. Functions of institutions: because they offer states ways of achieving better outcomes than could accomplish independently, states may invest in them (if they can get out of relative gains perspective!)

- A. Generally, attempt to make it more likely that others behave as you desire and less likely that they don't.
    - 1. Increase costs of noncompliance
    - 2. Increase benefits of compliance
    - 3. Clarify what is expected.
  - B. **Manage complexity:** reduce decisions to be made, e.g., tariff levels, environmental legislation
  - C. **Reduce transaction costs:** easier to negotiate single multilateral trade or environment treaty, rather than multitude of bilateral ones. One long agreement within single forum (e.g., oil pollution regulation) rather than string of separate agreements.. GATT/WTO is perfect example
  - D. **Create rules:** distinguish "good" behaviors from "bad" behaviors
  - E. **Increase reciprocity:** specific (arms control, tariff levels) and diffuse (human rights)
    - 1. Increase iteration: single behavior seen as part of larger game, e.g., political dissidents
    - 2. Formalize linkages: financial mechanisms in ozone treaty
    - 3. Reciprocity through operation of norms
    - 4. Receive and review reports; consider interstate complaints; Commission on Human Rights investigations or focus spotlight on certain states
  - F. **Improve information:** joint information has more credibility, can't collect information individually. Reduces misperception and miscommunication. Informational - gather data on general indicators, monitor performance, exchange information, do research and publicize issues
  - G. **Create/strengthen norms:** Establish normative expectations and increase costs of certain rhetorical strategies relative to others. Changes legitimacy of actions: need to justify certain actions in different ways. General declarations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specific resolutions about certain countries' violations: Condemned Israel re: occupied territories after 1967 war
- V. Institutional effectiveness: **some institutions succeed and others fail**. Why?
- A. Defining effectiveness: different definitions
    - 1. Goal achievement -- Did institution lead to achievement of goals?
    - 2. Counterfactual definition of effectiveness - Did institution lead to outcomes that were different than would have been otherwise?
    - 3. Glass is half empty, Glass is half full: often institutions fail at goal achievement effectiveness but succeed at counterfactual effectiveness. E.g., whaling, endangered species, tariffs (not yet zero)
    - 4. Whaling graphic: see slide presentation during class
  - B. Strategies for altering state behavior
    - 1. "Sticks:" Punishment and deterrence. GATT reciprocity. Sanctions for violation of pollution rules. Noncompliers conceal themselves. Sanctions rarely used in international institutions.
    - 2. "Carrots:" Rewards and incentives. Ozone case and North Korea nuclear case. Noncompliers reveal themselves.
    - 3. "Locks:" Prevention and coercion. Oil pollution equipment requirements.
    - 4. "Fields of Dreams:" Opportunity creation. Swedish nuclear weapons case.
    - 5. "Labels:" Information. Acid rain case.
    - 6. "Sermons:" Normative education. Human rights and democracy. Convincing that in their interest.
  - C. Conditions for success
    - 1. Capacity of governments to implement: financial, administrative, infrastructural
    - 2. Asymmetries in power determine who's behavior is changed: strong disobey, but weak obey
    - 3. Interdependence - more is better since increases fear of disturbing web of relationships
    - 4. Knowledge creation/intellectual order - underpins institutions and needs to be consistent with institution
  - D. Why they might fail
    - 1. Aims and goals are lofty, but power and authority are modest
    - 2. Normative and rule-creating activities have no teeth
    - 3. Voluntary agreements among states - Saudi Arabians objected to clause in Universal Declaration of Human Rights calling for equal rights for women.
    - 4. Democratic deficit mentioned by Keohane -- not transparent or accountable
    - 5. Realist critique: the strong disobey, weak obey, no different than no-institution.
    - 6. Feminist theory perspective:
      - a) International institutions ignore or reinforce gendered roles in domestic & international society
      - b) But, institutions may offer ways to overcome some elements of gendered structure of society.
- VI. Thoughts on European Union for next lecture (this section from Craig Parsons)

- A. MAIN reason that European Union process was started by Frenchmen Schumann and Monnet in the 1950s to increase the chances for peace by increasing interdependence.
  - B. The EU and IR theories
    - 1. Realism: huh?
      - a) Why does the EU seem to challenge realism?
        - (1) Basically the opposite of realism: voluntary transfers of major sovereignty to institutions with explicit autonomous power
        - (2) Realist John Mearsheimer predicted intra-European conflict would grow after 1990...
    - 2. Do you buy Grieco's argument that realism still has something to say here??
      - a) Sure, power still matters...
      - b) But do responses of other Europeans to German power—binding them in supranational institutions—make any sense for realists?
  - C. The EU and institutionalism
    - 1. IR institutionalism: fits fairly well
      - a) Not surprising: EU case has been prominent in emergence of this school of thought
      - b) EU is indeed set of institutional tools created by states to manage their interdependence
    - 2. But this school too has problems...
      - a) If EU just states' tool to manage interdependence, why give away so much power?
      - b) Shouldn't states be more jealous about their sovereignty—find ways to collaborate that aren't so supranational?
        - (1) For ex., most economists didn't think monetary union was necessary—or even good—for solving many econ problems
        - (2) And political arg for monetary union weak too: if France sees it, why doesn't Britain?
  - D. The EU and norms/ideas
    - 1. Basic notion of these approaches: that action reflects certain ideas, norms, ideologies
    - 2. In EU context, raises new possibility
      - a) Realists only think states would give up sovereignty if forced to
        - (1) And they weren't.
      - b) Institutionalists only think states would give up sovereignty if absolutely necessary to manage interdependence
        - (1) And this is unclear: much disagreement among Europeans themselves about how necessary...
      - c) But norms/ideas approaches suggest we might take the ideology of "Europeanism" seriously:
        - (1) Supranationality as desirable (for some!)
        - (2) EU as elite ideological project to bind all Europeans into a new anti-nationalist arena
- VII. Conclusion
- A. Definition: what they are
  - B. Functions - what they do
  - C. Effectiveness - definitions of success
  - D. Strategies - how they accomplish it