

Lecture 13
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- I. Introduction
 - A. Wrap up of trade lecture
 - 1. Major reason why states gain from free trade is specialization
 - 2. Effects of different protectionist policies: effects on consumers, export sector, import-competing sector, and on government revenues
 - B. Young chapter {Young, 1993 #6414}
 - 1. Example of how one does research in the social sciences: not too far off from regular “science” -- setting up hypotheses based on theory and seeing whether evidence from the real world supports or refutes it.
 - 2. Three types of hypotheses
 - a) Power-based -- institutional formation requires a single “hegemonic” power who sees it in their interest to create an institution that can promote general cooperation. But little support for this hypothesis.
 - b) Interest-based: Evidence supported the notion that leaders are necessary for institutional formation and that equity, salience, effective compliance mechanisms, integrative bargaining, uncertainty, and catalytic events/crises also contribute significantly
 - c) Knowledge-based: values and ideas matter as ways to foster common agreement, need for common understanding and consensual knowledge, and existence of epistemic community
 - C. Mearsheimer article:
 - 1. This is a Realist critique of the notion that “institutions are a key means of promoting world peace” (Mearsheimer, 1995, 5). Mearsheimer contends that this rejection of standard balance of power politics is a recipe for disaster in the form of more war than would happen otherwise.
 - 2. Examines three different threads of institutionalist theory - NOT important to make these distinctions, though they may be interesting.
 - 3. Note that there is an interesting comparison of Mearsheimer’s response to that of Grieco, also a Realist, in the same year that argues that the EU really requires a re-assessment of the validity of Realist theory.
 - 4. Note that he nicely reiterates Realist theory on a single page, page 10 of the article. Good summary of institutionalism as well. Talks a lot about relative gains as well.
 - 5. Basic argument is that states are always concerned about relative gains and that the empirical record doesn’t support realist claims.
 - 6. Reading advice -- stop at p. 26 if need to. Stuff on collective security and critical theory are less important to the class. But reading the parts from 5-26 would be very helpful.
 - 7. “There is, however, a downside for policy-makers who rely on institutionalist theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail” {Mearsheimer, 1995 #2020, 49}.
 - D. Grieco article (for Thursday, on EU)
 - 1. First point -- intellectual honesty and willingness to examine own preferred theory carefully -- being an analyst rather than an advocate.
 - 2. Second point -- EU does not fit well with realist theory and yet still not throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
- II. Theory of international institutions
 - A. Regimes / international institutions -- a means by which states attempt to overcome collective action problems. States see suboptimal outcomes from independent decision-making and seek to develop collective decision-making and collective behavior to achieve better outcomes.
 - B. Definition: System of governance for a particular issue area.
 - 1. "International regime" / "international institution" are interchangeable terms
 - 2. "Norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate an issue area" (Haas, 1980, 397).
 - 3. “A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other” {Mearsheimer, 1995 #2020, 8}.
 - C. Example of domestic "regime" / institution: drunk driving
 - 1. Norms: vague, general SOCIAL sense of what is right and wrong
 - 2. Rules: LEGAL proscriptions and prescriptions

- C. **Reduce transaction costs:** easier to negotiate single multilateral trade or environment treaty, rather than multitude of bilateral ones. One long agreement within single forum (e.g., oil pollution regulation) rather than string of separate agreements.. GATT/WTO is perfect example
- D. **Create rules:** distinguish "good" behaviors from "bad" behaviors
- E. **Increase reciprocity:** specific (arms control, tariff levels) and diffuse (human rights)
 - 1. Increase iteration: single behavior seen as part of larger game, e.g., political dissidents
 - 2. Formalize linkages: financial mechanisms in ozone treaty
 - 3. Reciprocity through operation of norms
 - 4. Receive and review reports; consider interstate complaints; Commission on Human Rights investigations or focus spotlight on certain states
- F. **Improve information:** joint information has more credibility, can't collect information individually. Reduces misperception and miscommunication. Informational - gather data on general indicators, monitor performance, exchange information, do research and publicize issues
- G. **Create/strengthen norms:** Establish normative expectations and increase costs of certain rhetorical strategies relative to others. Changes legitimacy of actions: need to justify certain actions in different ways. General declarations: Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specific resolutions about certain countries' violations: Condemned Israel re: occupied territories after 1967 war
- V. Institutional effectiveness: **some institutions succeed and others fail.** Why?
 - A. Defining effectiveness: different definitions
 - 1. Goal achievement -- Did institution lead to achievement of goals?
 - 2. Counterfactual definition of effectiveness - Did institution lead to outcomes that were different than would have been otherwise?
 - 3. Glass is half empty, Glass is half full: often institutions fail at goal achievement effectiveness but succeed at counterfactual effectiveness. E.g., whaling, endangered species, tariffs (not yet zero)
 - 4. Whaling graphic: see slide presentation during class
 - B. Strategies for altering state behavior
 - 1. "Sticks:" Punishment and deterrence. GATT reciprocity. Sanctions for violation of pollution rules. Noncompliers conceal themselves. Sanctions rarely used in international institutions.
 - 2. "Carrots:" Rewards and incentives. Ozone case and North Korea nuclear case. Noncompliers reveal themselves.
 - 3. "Locks:" Prevention and coercion. Oil pollution equipment requirements.
 - 4. "Fields of Dreams:" Opportunity creation. Swedish nuclear weapons case.
 - 5. "Labels:" Information. Acid rain case.
 - 6. "Sermons:" Normative education. Human rights and democracy. Convincing that in their interest.
 - C. Conditions for success
 - 1. Capacity of governments to implement: financial, administrative, infrastructural
 - 2. Asymmetries in power determine who's behavior is changed: strong disobey, but weak obey
 - 3. Interdependence - more is better since increases fear of disturbing web of relationships
 - 4. Knowledge creation/intellectual order - underpins institutions and needs to be consistent with institution
 - D. Why they might fail
 - 1. Aims and goals are lofty, but power and authority are modest
 - 2. Normative and rule-creating activities have no teeth
 - 3. Voluntary agreements among states - Saudi Arabians objected to clause in Universal Declaration of Human Rights calling for equal rights for women.
 - 4. Democratic deficit mentioned by Keohane -- not transparent or accountable
 - 5. Realist critique: the strong disobey, weak obey, no different than no-institution.
 - 6. Feminist theory perspective:
 - a) International institutions ignore or reinforce gendered roles in domestic & international society
 - b) But, institutions may offer ways to overcome some elements of gendered structure of society.
- VI. Conclusion
 - A. Definition: what they are
 - B. Functions - what they do
 - C. Effectiveness - definitions of success
 - D. Strategies - how they accomplish it