the closest analogue formulable in current philosophical jargon. We have to say that the concern with skepticism that loomed up in the seventeenth century was even more overdetermined than we had realized: that some permanent problem about representation was being shadowed forth by the transitory intellectual crises of those times.

The reason why skepticism is so hard to formulate for language is that asking how languages manage to represent reality seems a bit like asking how it is possible for wrenches to wrench. That is what we made them to do, we are tempted to answer. So it is easier to understand biological or sociological questions about how we managed to make the particular language we have made, or how we teach it to our young, than transcendental questions about how what could do what we have made language do. That is why Davidsonian questions about the logical form of action sentences do not have the resonance of Tractarian questions about the logical forms of any possible sentence. We know what would count as answering Davidson’s questions, and we do not feel in suspense about our activity of attributing responsibility for actions until the question is answered. Nor are we tempted to wonder whether the “ontology of English” gradually disclosed by successive answers to Davidsonian questions is the right ontology. Wittgenstein came to think the former sort of resonance a result of hollowness rather than depth. If we want to use Hacking’s parallel quadrilateral structures to illuminate the contemporary philosophical scene, we shall have to give Tractatus-like questions a new depth.

Hacking ends by wavering between two answers to his title question—the one in which sentences are construed as the interface between knower and known, and a more daring Hegelian conception in which discourse becomes “autonomous,” constitutes human knowledge rather than serves as an interface for it, and in which we think of human inquiry as “a process without a subject.” (This last phrase is Althusser’s description of Hegel’s contribution to philosophy, quoted approvingly by Hacking.) If we adopt the second sort of answer, in which the various quadrilateral diagrams Hacking offers are replaced by a simple confrontation of a squirming mass of sentences with the world they are about, then we certainly have a reason for thinking language important, but not a reason for thinking it important to philosophy. Or, to put it another way, we have a reason for thinking that philosophy is going to have to be something very different from anything we have known since Descartes. We also have reason for doubting that we know enough about what will be like to be confident about what will matter to it. If the notion of representation goes, as philosophers like Derrida want it to, then philosophy cannot be conceived of as centering around the study of representation. What it might be, and what else it might center around, are hardly clear. But it is possible that it might not have a center, that it might not have an architectonic structure at all. It may be that what Hacking calls the death of meaning at the hands of Quine, Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Feyerabend brings with it the death of philosophy as a discipline with a method of its own. If there are no meanings to analyze, if there is just a wriggling mass of intertwined sentences, if there are no reductions to advocate as the result of analyzing meanings, then perhaps there are no central or foundational questions in philosophy. There may remain only philosophy as kibitzing—philosophy in the style of Aristotle, Dewey, and the later Wittgenstein. If we make a virtue of necessity by embracing this alternative, we can answer the question “Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?” by saying “because everything does, but it does not matter more than anything else.”

—Richard M. Rorty

I wrote “Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy” in 1965. In 1975 I took up some of the same topics in a review of Ian Hacking’s Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?—the piece which is translated above under the title “Twenty-Five Years After.” It is now 1990, and I have taken the occasion of the translation of these two earlier essays into Spanish to reread them.

What I find most striking about my 1965 essay is how seriously I took the phenomenon of the “linguistic turn,” how earnestly I then seemed to me. I am startled, embarrassed, and amused to reread the following passage:

Linguistic philosophy, over the last thirty years, has succeeded in putting the entire philosophical tradition, from Parmenides through Descartes and Hume to Bradley and Whitehead, on the defensive. It has done so by a careful and thorough scrutiny of the ways in which traditional philosophers have used language in the formulation of their problems. This achievement is sufficient to place this period among the great ages of the history of philosophy.

That last sentence now strikes me as merely the attempt of a thirty-three-year-old philosopher to convince himself that he had had the luck to be born at the right time—to persuade himself that the disciplinary matrix in which he happened to find himself (philosophy as taught in most English-speaking universities in the 1960s) was more than just one more philosophical school, one more tempest in an academic teapot.

It now seems to me to have been little more than that. The controversies which I discussed with such earnestness in 1965 already seemed quaint in 1975. By now they seem positively antique. The most eminent of the philosophers now teaching at Oxford, Bernard Williams, writes of “linguistic analysis,” that now distant philosophical style . . . .! The slogan that “the problems of philosophy are problems of language” now strikes me as confused, for two reasons. The first is that I am no longer inclined to view “the problems of philosophy” as naming a natural kind—no longer inclined to think of “philosophy” as (in the words I quoted from Stuart Hampshire at the end of my 1965 essay) “one of man’s recognizable activities.” The second is that I am no longer inclined to think that there is such a thing as “language” in any sense which makes it possible to speak of “problems of language.” In what follows, I shall briefly discuss each of these two reasons.

The only natural kind which might usefully be designated by the term “the problems of philosophy” is, I think, the set of interlinked problems posed by representationalist theories of knowledge—the problems connected with what Hacking called “interfacing.” These are problems about the relation between mind and reality, or language and reality, viewed as the relation between a medium of representation and what is purportedly represented. In my review of Hacking, I suggested that the Quine-Davidson assault on the distinctions between analytic and synthetic judgments, conceptual questions and empirical questions, language and fact, had made it difficult to formulate such problems—difficult to think of the relation be-

Davidson shows us how to give up the notion of "truth-makers" as well as the notion of representation. He has shown how to escape from one of the pictures which, as Wittgenstein put it, "hold us captive"—where "us" means "most philosophers from Descartes to the present." But the problems produced by the notion that true sentences are representations of reality and are made true by reality cannot be identified with "the problems of philosophy." They are, at best, the majority of the problems of philosophy discussed by the nineteenth-century philosophy textbooks. There are lots of thinkers—e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger—who have discussed lots of problems which can be only tenuously and tangentially connected with representationalist problems. There is, I think, no way to bring all these thinkers together with Descartes, Kant, and Frege into a common enterprise called "philosophy"—a recognizable human activity—with a continuous history.

If there was ever any truth in the slogan "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" it was that the particular problems about representation which philosophers have discussed were pseudo-problems, created by a bad description of human knowledge, one that turned out to be optional and replaceable. I argued in my Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that these problems were characteristic of post-Cartesian rather than of pre-Cartesian philosophy, and that it was only after Kant that they achieved sufficient prominence to be taken as central to an autonomous academic discipline called "philosophy." Though Heidegger is certainly right that the Greeks paved the way for Descartes, nevertheless what Heidegger calls "the transformation of man into a subject" is a distinctively Cartesian accomplishment, and only with that transformation do problems of representation come to seem central.

I should now want to argue that the philosophy of the twentieth century—Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Davidson show us how to give up the notion of "truth-makers" as well as the notion of representation. But the problems produced by the notion that true sentences are representations of reality and are made true by reality cannot be identified with "the problems of philosophy." They are, at best, the majority of the problems of philosophy discussed by the nineteenth-century philosophy textbooks. There are lots of thinkers—e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger—who have discussed lots of problems which can be only tenuously and tangentially connected with representationalist problems. There is, I think, no way to bring all these thinkers together with Descartes, Kant, and Frege into a common enterprise called "philosophy"—a recognizable human activity—with a continuous history.

If there was ever any truth in the slogan "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" it was that the particular problems about representation which philosophers have discussed were pseudo-problems, created by a bad description of human knowledge, one that turned out to be optional and replaceable. I argued in my Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that these problems were characteristic of post-Cartesian rather than of pre-Cartesian philosophy, and that it was only after Kant that they achieved sufficient prominence to be taken as central to an autonomous academic discipline called "philosophy." Though Heidegger is certainly right that the Greeks paved the way for Descartes, nevertheless what Heidegger calls "the transformation of man into a subject" is a distinctively Cartesian accomplishment, and only with that transformation do problems of representation come to seem central.

I should now want to argue that the philosophy of the twentieth century—Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Davidson show us how to give up the notion of "truth-makers" as well as the notion of representation. But the problems produced by the notion that true sentences are representations of reality and are made true by reality cannot be identified with "the problems of philosophy." They are, at best, the majority of the problems of philosophy discussed by the nineteenth-century philosophy textbooks. There are lots of thinkers—e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger—who have discussed lots of problems which can be only tenuously and tangentially connected with representationalist problems. There is, I think, no way to bring all these thinkers together with Descartes, Kant, and Frege into a common enterprise called "philosophy"—a recognizable human activity—with a continuous history.

If there was ever any truth in the slogan "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" it was that the particular problems about representation which philosophers have discussed were pseudo-problems, created by a bad description of human knowledge, one that turned out to be optional and replaceable. I argued in my Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that these problems were characteristic of post-Cartesian rather than of pre-Cartesian philosophy, and that it was only after Kant that they achieved sufficient prominence to be taken as central to an autonomous academic discipline called "philosophy." Though Heidegger is certainly right that the Greeks paved the way for Descartes, nevertheless what Heidegger calls "the transformation of man into a subject" is a distinctively Cartesian accomplishment, and only with that transformation do problems of representation come to seem central.

I should now want to argue that the philosophy of the twentieth century—Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Davidson show us how to give up the notion of "truth-makers" as well as the notion of representation. But the problems produced by the notion that true sentences are representations of reality and are made true by reality cannot be identified with "the problems of philosophy." They are, at best, the majority of the problems of philosophy discussed by the nineteenth-century philosophy textbooks. There are lots of thinkers—e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger—who have discussed lots of problems which can be only tenuously and tangentially connected with representationalist problems. There is, I think, no way to bring all these thinkers together with Descartes, Kant, and Frege into a common enterprise called "philosophy"—a recognizable human activity—with a continuous history.

If there was ever any truth in the slogan "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" it was that the particular problems about representation which philosophers have discussed were pseudo-problems, created by a bad description of human knowledge, one that turned out to be optional and replaceable. I argued in my Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that these problems were characteristic of post-Cartesian rather than of pre-Cartesian philosophy, and that it was only after Kant that they achieved sufficient prominence to be taken as central to an autonomous academic discipline called "philosophy." Though Heidegger is certainly right that the Greeks paved the way for Descartes, nevertheless what Heidegger calls "the transformation of man into a subject" is a distinctively Cartesian accomplishment, and only with that transformation do problems of representation come to seem central.

I should now want to argue that the philosophy of the twentieth century—Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Davidson show us how to give up the notion of "truth-makers" as well as the notion of representation. But the problems produced by the notion that true sentences are representations of reality and are made true by reality cannot be identified with "the problems of philosophy." They are, at best, the majority of the problems of philosophy discussed by the nineteenth-century philosophy textbooks. There are lots of thinkers—e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger—who have discussed lots of problems which can be only tenuously and tangentially connected with representationalist problems. There is, I think, no way to bring all these thinkers together with Descartes, Kant, and Frege into a common enterprise called "philosophy"—a recognizable human activity—with a continuous history.

If there was ever any truth in the slogan "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" it was that the particular problems about representation which philosophers have discussed were pseudo-problems, created by a bad description of human knowledge, one that turned out to be optional and replaceable. I argued in my Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that these problems were characteristic of post-Cartesian rather than of pre-Cartesian philosophy, and that it was only after Kant that they achieved sufficient prominence to be taken as central to an autonomous academic discipline called "philosophy." Though Heidegger is certainly right that the Greeks paved the way for Descartes, nevertheless what Heidegger calls "the transformation of man into a subject" is a distinctively Cartesian accomplishment, and only with that transformation do problems of representation come to seem central.
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER

called "the world." He thereby shows that the basic idea of linguistic philosophy as I defined it in 1965—the idea that philosophy could be advanced by studying a topic called "language" or "our language"—was deeply flawed, deeply implicated in a non-naturalistic picture of human knowledge and inquiry, one which still incorporated a "scheme-content" distinction, the distinction which Davidson calls the "third, and perhaps the last, dogma of empiricism."

This completes my sketch of my reasons for believing that neither "philosophy" nor "language" names anything unified, continuous, or structured, and thus of why I should now resist talk of "the problems of philosophy" or of "linguistic problems." I am often accused of being an "end of philosophy" thinker, and I should like to take this occasion to reemphasize (as I tried to do on the final page of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) that philosophy is just not the sort of thing that can have an end—it is too vague and amorphous a term to bear the weight of predications like "beginning" or "end." What does have a beginning, and may now be coming to an end, is three hundred years' worth of attempts to bridge the gap which the Cartesian, representationalist picture of knowledge and inquiry led us to imagine existed.

I said in my review of Hacking:

It may be that what Hacking calls the death of meaning at the hands of Quine, Wittgenstein, Davidson and Peyerabend brings with it the death of philosophy as a discipline with a method of its own.

I still believe something like this. Though I do not think that philosophy can end, centuries-old philosophical research programs can end, and have in the past. (Think of Thomism.) So might the idea that philosophy is a special field of inquiry distinguished by a special method. The end of this latter idea would, as far as I can see, do culture no harm. If "philosophy" comes to be viewed as continuous with science (as Quine wishes it to be) on the one hand and as continuous with poetry (as Heidegger and Derrida often suggest it is) on the other, then our descendants will be less concerned with questions about "the method of philosophy" or about "the nature of philosophical problems." The fifty-year history of linguistic philosophy, a history which is now behind us, suggests that such questions are likely to prove unprofitable.

—Richard M. Rorty

9 To say that linguistic philosophy is now behind us is of course not to say that analytic philosophy is behind us, but only to say that most of those who call themselves "analytic philosophers" would now reject the epithet "linguistic philosophers" and would not describe themselves as "applying linguistic methods." Analytic philosophy is now the name not of the application of such methods to philosophical problems, but simply of the particular set of problems being discussed by philosophy professors in certain parts of the world. These problems, at the moment, center around problems of "realism" and "anti-idealism"—a fact which we Davidsonians, of course, deplore. What they will center around a decade from now, I should not wish to predict. Since analytic philosophers are typically trained to pay little attention to the history of thought, and since their own sense of the function and cultural role of their discipline therefore lacks an anchor to windward, the direction of their inquiries tends to shift from decade to decade.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF WRITINGS IN ENGLISH ON LINGUISTIC
METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELATED ISSUES
1930–1965

COMPILED BY JEROME NEU AND RICHARD RORTY

The title of this bibliography is not an exact description. A few items published earlier than 1930, and a few items in languages other than English, are included. Furthermore, the phrase "related issues" has been broadly construed, in order to include important discussions of, for example, analyticity and ontological commitment, even when these discussions do not explicitly bear on problems of philosophical method. Discussions of phenomenological and other philosophical methods have been included in cases in which useful comparisons with linguistic methods are made. No attempt has been made to include items which provide case studies of the practice of linguistic methods.

The compilers have attempted to provide sufficient cross-references to enable the user of the bibliography to work his way down the chain of reply, rebuttal, surrebuttal, etc., which make up some of the debates on the more important issues. It is not pretended, however, that every appropriate cross-reference has been included. Where a cross-reference contains "etc." (as in See: Langford [3], etc.), the "etc." refers to the cross-references listed under the item in question.

It may be helpful to list here certain entries which provide rather full cross-referencing, and which may be used as capsule bibliographies of certain topics. The reader interested in the "paradox of analysis" should consult the entry for Langford [3]; in the "paradigm-case argument," Watkins [3]; in the slogan that "ordinary language is correct language," Malcolm [5]; in the notion of "categories," Ryle [1]; in the problem of analyticity, Quine [7]; in the verifiability criterion of empirical meaningfulness, Hempel [1]; in Austin's metaphilosophical views, Austin [1]; in Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical views, Wittgenstein [1].

An asterisk indicates items which are reprinted, in whole or in part, in this volume.


ABBREVIATIONS

Periodicals

A Analysis
AJ Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (sometimes
TEN YEARS AFTER*

The title of Ian Hacking’s *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* raises a good question. The question would have found prompt and pat answers thirty, or even ten, years ago. But there has been little consideration of it recently; no one likes any of the old answers, and nobody has thought of any new ones. In the course of the last decade, people who used to accept the description “linguistic philosopher” with equanimity have become inclined to resent and reject it. There is, it is now said, no particular philosophical method called “linguistic”—but it is often added that philosophy of language is at the center of philosophy. In explanation, some view like this of Michael Dummett’s is offered:

Because philosophy has, as its first if not its only task, the analysis of meanings, and because, the deeper such analysis goes, the more it is dependent upon a correct general account of meaning, a model for what the understanding of an expression consists in, the theory of meaning, which is the search for such a model, is the foundation of all philosophy, and not epistemology as Descartes misled us into believing. ¹

This explanation, however, raises more questions than it answers. It is true that a couple of generations of Anglo-American philosophers, when asked what they did for a living, might have replied “We analyze meanings.” But, since Quine’s “Two Dogmas” and Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*, philosophers have been increasingly hesitant even to mention meanings, much less formulate a job description in terms of them. Work in philosophy of language in recent years has produced little that helps the metaphilosophically puzzled analyst of meanings to know when he has done his job properly. Indeed, the vigor of that field seems due in some measure to its new-found freedom from such metaphilosophical concerns.

However, this freedom from metaphilosophy has not clarified the objectives of philosophy of language. Back in 1962, Jerry Fodor and Jerrold Katz were already suggesting that philosophy of language had suffered too long from the metaphilosophical presuppositions of positivism and Oxford analysis. Their solution was that it should hereafter conceive of itself as “the philosophy of linguistics, a discipline analogous in every respect to the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of psychology, and the like.”² Such a conception seems to offer no support of Dummett’s claim that philosophy of language is “first philosophy.” Yet the seeming modesty of their claim is misleading. It did not prevent Fodor and Katz from thinking that the philosophy of language

¹ “Ten Years After” was first published as a review of Ian Hacking’s *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* in *The Journal of Philosophy*, lxxiv, No. 7 (1977), 416–32. (© Copyright 1977 by The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.) Reprinted by permission.

² “Introduction” to *The Structure of Language* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 18. This piece is a revised version of their “What’s Wrong with the Philosophy of Language?,” *Inquiry*, v. 3 (Autumn 1962): 197–217. For Katz’s later repudiation of this view, see his *The Philosophy of Language* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 4. Chapter 1 of that book develops a view of philosophy of language as First Philosophy which, as Hugh Wilder has pointed out to me, has difficulty reconciling its priority and universality with its empirical character.
could do a lot toward clearing up traditional philosophical problems. They thought this because they thought that Chomskian linguistics had light to shed on these problems; had they not had this confident view they might have been less ready to assign the philosophy of language a parochial role. In the intervening years, however, skepticism about the relevance of linguistics to traditional philosophical problems has increased. Many of the leading research programs in the philosophy of language (e.g., those of Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and Dummett himself) have come to have less and less to do with the details of work in linguistics. For better or worse, Fodor and Katz’s modest proposal did not prosper.

In this situation, philosophers who sympathize with Quine’s attack on the notion of meaning and who suspect that the notion of “analysis” is as disreputable as that of “analyticity” have tried to find a Quincean way of stating the importance of language for philosophy without resorting to the notion of the “philosophy of linguistics.” Quine himself, in the section on “Semantic Ascent in Word and Object,” made a halfhearted stab at this. He said there that one could still put forward the Carnapian claim that philosophical questions were questions of language and that one treated language not as a matter of meanings but just as a part of the world in which agreement was more likely to be obtained than elsewhere:

The strategy of semantic ascent (i.e., “moving from talking in certain terms to talking about them”) is that it carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz., words) and on the main terms concerning them. Words, or their inscriptions, unlike points, miles, classes, and the rest, are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men of unlike conceptual schemes communicate best. The strategy is one of ascending to a common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, the better to discuss the disparate foundations. No wonder it helps in philosophy.

This claim that words, or their inscriptions, are tangible objects about which men of different philosophical persuasions can fairly readily agree seems trivial when one thinks of inscriptions and dubious when one thinks of the use of inscriptions. Only the inscriptions themselves are tangible, and it is doubtful whether agreement on the identification and explanation of inscriptions has ever offered any aid to philosophers. As for the uses of those inscriptions, they are not only intangible but presumably not a “common part of . . . disparate conceptual schemes.” Rather, they are just where disparity comes to a head.

Presumably what Quine has in mind as examples of the success of semantic ascent are the discovery that we need not ask what a sake is because the transcription of “He did it for the sake of his wife” into canonical notation need not include anything like “There is an x such that x is a sake and is his wife’s and he did it for x,” and, more significant, the discovery that we need not have intensional contexts in canonical notation because (e.g.) we can construe “S believes that p” as “S is in the believing that-p state” where “believing-that-p” is a single unanalyzable predicate. But this last example, and the principled rejection of this treatment of opacity by such philosophers as Davidson, shows that the criteria for taking a notation as canonical are at least as obscure as the criteria for deciding issues in the philosophy of mind—and one cannot get much more obscure than that. Quine’s own refusal to countenance a distinction between languages and theories helps one see why suggestions in the formal mode of speech about how to talk will rarely be less controversial than suggestions in the material mode about what to say. Only an ordinary-language philosopher, who had no canonical notation to recommend, would be in a position to say that language (as the study of “what we would say”) was less controversial than metaphorics. But such a philosopher would be in no better a position than Quine to recommend semantic ascent, for inspection of what we would say about X’s is no more about the use of the word ‘X’ than it is about X’s themselves. There is point in putting philosophical theses in the form of linguistic recommendations only if one intends to suggest changing what we would say; if one wants to leave what we say alone, then there is no reason to be self-consciously linguistic and no reason to distinguish between the essence of X, the concept of X, and the use of the term “X.” In sum: on an ideal-language view, semantic ascent does not help in reaching agreement, whereas on an ordinary-language view it is a pointless detour.

Despite all this, I think we all have some inclination to agree with Quine that semantic ascent does, somehow, “help in philosophy.” There is a general belief that philosophers have gained more insight into what they are doing since they have “linguistic turn.” So even if Quine has not explained why the turn was worth taking, it does seem that there is a real phenomenon that does need explaining. Hilary Putnam, who shares Quine’s distrust of the notion that philosophers “analyze meanings,” has attempted to show that although both positivists and Oxonians have exaggerated the successes produced by the use of linguistic methods, nevertheless “even if we have not discovered ‘linguistic solutions’ to these problems, we have . . . acquired a great deal of new knowledge about them.” He offers two grounds for this opinion. The first is an improved version of Dummett’s claim that philosophy’s primary job is the analysis of meanings. Putnam says that the discovery by Wittgenstein and others that “concepts cannot be identical with mental objects of any kind” (7) was a consideration which “led naturally to the idea that a great deal of philosophy should be reconstructed as about language, even if the authors in question did not think they were talking about language” (9). So, he says, “one reason for upgrading the importance of language in philosophy” was that

concepts and ideas were always thought important; language was unimportant, because it was considered to be merely a system of conventional signs for concepts and ideas (considered as mental entities of some kind . . . ). But if having a concept is being able to use signs in particular ways, or if this is even a major part of the story, then all the attention that was traditionally accorded to matters of introspective psychology more properly belongs to the ways in which we use signs. (14)

This first reason for upgrading language is certainly an accurate description of the rationale with which many linguistic philosophers have provided themselves. But, put thus baldly, it is not obviously a good reason. It would be a good reason only if (a) we agree that concepts and ideas are important to philosophy, and if (b) the importance attached to concepts can survive the realization that concepts are not things which stand behind the use of words but are reducible to those uses, and if (c) the constellation of metapsychological strategies that revolved around introspectionist psychology could be transferred more or less whole to a study of the use of signs. Unless these lemmata hold, Putnam’s argument is as shaky as the following parody of it: “Gods were always thought to be of importance to theology; now that we have discovered that beliefs in gods are internalizations of images of parents, we can see that depth psychology becomes central to theology and that much traditional theology should be reconstructed as about child development.”

Putnam’s claim that a set of problems which revolved around concepts and ideas can be made to revolve around the use of signs requires something stronger than the discovery that having a concept is being able to use a word. It requires the notion that one can do something to words—analyze them, perhaps—like what we thought we used to do to concepts. When we thought of “meanings” as what replaced concepts, the historical continuity between pre-Kantian essences, Kantian concepts, and the positivists’ meanings seemed clear enough. In all three cases, philosophers attempted to separate the necessary truths found by looking to essence, concept, or meaning from the contingent truths that scientists found by looking to the contexts in which instantiations of these essences, concepts, or meanings were embedded. But once we become dubious about the necessary/contingent and structure/content distinctions, it becomes hard to say what methodological continuity links Kant to Wittgenstein or Davidson. To complicate things further, the turn away from mental entities as philosophical data produces doubt about whether Cartesian subjectivism—the turn toward ideas and concepts—was a good


5 The second, which I shall not discuss, is that linguistic philosophy has cut off phenomenalism and thus idealism. I think this claim is misleading; but explaining why would require a full-scale alternative account of the role of idealism in recent philosophy.
European philosophy in terms of various confused theories about meaning. That attempt was one more instance of the phenomenon of philosophers rewriting history so as to make all their predecessors hold half-baked theories about topics of current interest. (Thus, for example, we get a lot of writing these days about Aristotle's views on reference, just as we used to get a lot, a hundred years ago, on Aristotle's treatment of the concrete universals.) It is refreshing to find Hacking saying:

There is a proper sense of "theory of meaning", which I shall now elucidate, in which none of our early empiricists undertook to provide well-worked-out theories of meaning at all. They did make many remarks which can variously be construed as supporting, denigrating, or behavioural theories of meaning. But what modern philosophers call the theory of meaning did not matter much to them. Language did, adventitiously, matter, but not necessarily in the ways that it has mattered of late. (43)

He elucidates the "proper sense" in question as explaining "the essentially public features of language, with whatever it is that is common to you and me, in respect of the word 'violet', which makes it possible for us to talk about the flowers in Knappwell wood" (50). The difference between Locke as paradigmatic philosopher centering philosophy in the theory of ideas and Frege as paradigmatic philosopher centering philosophy in the theory of meaning is explained by Hacking as follows:

Frege, like all his contemporaries, saw that public communication cannot be well explained by what he called private associated ideas. Locke, and his contemporaries, did not see this at all clearly. Nor did Locke and his friends care. . . . Locke did not have a theory of public discourse. He had a theory of ideas. That is a theory of mental discourse. . . . When mental discourse was taken for granted, ideas were the interface between the Cartesian ego and reality. We have displaced mental discourse by public discourse, and "ideas" have become intelligible. Something in the domain of public discourse now serves as the interface between the knowing subject and the world. Thus in my opinion the seventeenth-century writers do not help us answer the question "Why does language matter to philosophy?" by what they say about theory of meaning. On the contrary, I shall take the absence of a theory of meaning as part of the data for understanding why language matters to philosophers today. (52–53)

Thinking of the matter in this way should, it seems to me, suggest the following sort of question: "Given that we no longer take the 'idea' seriously, why need we assume that there is any 'interface' between the knowing subject and the world?" Why not say that the relation between the two is as unproblematic as that between the ball and the socket, the dove and the light it cleaves? Why must there be something "in the domain of public discourse" for philosophers to vex themselves over as they once vexed themselves over "private associated ideas?" Hacking, however, does not raise such doubts. Instead, after the passage just cited, he drops his title question almost completely from sight and gives us five chapters covering "The Heyday of Meanings." These chapters (on Chomsky, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer, and Malcolm) run through various of the difficulties encountered when one substitutes meanings for ideas and lead one toward Quinean doubts about the myth of meaning, but offer no clear pointers toward an answer to the title question. We find such pointers only when we reach the final section ("The Heyday of Sentences") and find chapters on Feyerabend and Davidson, whose place in the story is described as follows:

In Part B of this book, which I have called "The Heyday of Meanings," there was always some theory of meaning in the offing. It was regularly assumed that there was something below the level of what is said: there is, in addition, what is meant. Feyerabend is one representative of a new and braining positivism. There is nothing to language over and above what is said. Here comes the death of meaning. As is often the case when assassins have a common object, they have different motives and different styles. If Feyerabend is the Cassius of the present plot, then Davidson of the next chapter is Brutus. (128)

The view that "there is nothing to language over and above what is said" suggests once again that we might answer the title question by saying that language doesn't particularly matter to philosophy. Reading these two chapters on the death of meaning leads one to think that Hacking's final chapter (which bears the same title as the book itself) will conclude that although language was bound to matter to philosophy once ideas began to look bad, it now doesn't have to matter anymore. This is not what happens. The final chapter of the book says something much odder and more complicated. Having said in his first chapter that language has always mattered to philosophy, even though the theory of meaning has not, and having promised that he will tell us at the end of the book "why there will be a philosophical labyrinth with language at its center," Hacking starts his reader by beginning his last chapter with the remark "there need not be any true and interesting general answer to my [title] question" (157). He does, however, offer an answer to a more limited question. Here is the final paragraph of the book:

At any rate, I have one answer to the question of why language matters to philosophy now. It matters for the reason that ideas mattered in seventeenth-century philosophy; because ideas then, and sentences now, serve as the interface between the knowing subject and what is known. The sentence matters even more if we begin to dispense with the fiction of a knowing subject and regard "discourse" as autonomous. Language matters to philosophy because of what knowledge has become. The topics of this or that school, of "linguistic philosophy," "structuralism," or whatever, will prove ephemeral and will appear as some of the brief recent episodes by which discourse itself has tried to recognize the historical situation in which it finds itself, no longer merely a tool by which experiences are shared, no longer even the interface between the knower and the known, but as that which constitutes human knowledge. (187)

The point seems to be that philosophy will always circle around the question "What is human knowledge?" or "How is human knowledge possible?" and thus will always be asking about either an "interface" or something enough like an interface that it can be recognized as "constituting" knowledge. To draw his conclusion Hacking needs both the claim that "knowledge has become" something different from what it was in the heyday of ideas and some further metaphilosophical premises—premises which would explain why knowledge should be of
central philosophical interest even after the veil of ideas has been rent.

I shall first say something about Hacking’s claim that knowledge itself has changed since the seventeenth century and then suggest some candidates for the implicit premises he needs to justify the passage I just cited. Hacking wants to say that the period of philosophizing of which Locke and Berkeley were typical, as compared with that represented by Feyerabend or Davidson, has “the same structure but different content” (189). The content has changed because ideas were once the objects of all philosophizing, and were the link between the Cartesian ego and the world external to it.... In today’s discussions, public discourse has replaced mental discourse. An unquestioned ingredient of all public discourse is a sentence. Quine has said that “the lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences.” The sentences in this fabric of public discourse are an artifact of the knowing subject. Perhaps, as I shall soon suggest, they actually constitute this “knowing subject.” At any rate, they are responsible for the representation of reality in a body of knowledge. So sentences appear to have replaced ideas. The very nature of knowledge has changed. Our present situation in philosophy is a consequence of what knowledge has become. A Descartes would no more have thought a theory to be a system of statements than a Quine would acknowledge that a theory is a scheme of seventeenth-century ideas. (159–60)

Hacking represents the structure within which this change has occurred in a pair of diagrams, showing a quadrilateral of “nodes” connected by arrows: Two of the nodes—“experience” and “reality”—stay the same, but the “Cartesian ego” of the diagram representing seventeenth-century philosophizing is replaced by “the knowing subject” (surmounted with a question mark), and “ideas” (mental discourse) is replaced by “sentences (public discourse).” In the diagrams for both periods, the arrows running from “ideas” and “sentences” to “reality” are marked with a question mark, as is that running from “reality” to “experience.” The point seems to be that a continuing structure of philosophizing is given by “the relation between knowledge and reality,” so that, though knowledge may have changed, it still raises problems about “interfacing.” Hacking speculates that his second diagram is probably an anachronism... shared by Strawson, Quine, and other individualists, in which our state of knowledge is still mapped on to the philosophical position of the nascent bourgeoisie of the seventeenth century. Knowledge, once possessed by individuals, is now the property of corporations. And he directs our attention, in his closing pages, to Popper, Althusser, Hegel, and Foucault. But this suggestion of an improved diagram in which the knowing subject is dropped, or replaced by something more Hegelian, does not, he thinks, matter for his answer to his title question. For “the sentence matters even more... if we regard discourse as autonomous.” (187)

We can get a better sense of what Hacking is up to here if we consider his The Emergence of Probability, in which he shows us how even so basic a philosophical notion as that of “evidence” has a datable beginning, emerging out of a period of intellectual ferment. He gives us reason in that book for thinking that it is probably pointless to try to talk about conceptions of the relation between theory and evidence prior to 1600, just as it is pointless to talk about theories of meaning circa 1300 or 1800. The point is that what you can have philosophical views about depends upon what is going on in the rest of the culture. There is no way to isolate topics of such generality (“evidence,” “meaning,” “truth,” “society,” “virtue,” “science”) that reflective intellects of all ages must necessarily have had theories about them. This Foucault-like point can be accepted in full, however, while still leaving one dubious about the claim that knowledge has recently changed in such a way that notions that were applicable once are no longer applicable. We tend to think that Quine’s way of looking at knowledge is less problematic than Descartes’s, but I do not know how to decide between saying this and saying that they were talking about different phenomena. One can agree that if Descartes were confronted by our culture rather than his own he might see less use for the notion of cogitation than he did, and that if Quine had lived earlier he would have been bothered less by singular terms and more by secondary qualities. But it would be hard to argue that scientific inquiry (or culture generally) is so different from what it was in the days of Kant, or even of Russell, that philosophers are confronted by different data (as a philosopher who took Galileo as a paradigm of our knowledge of nature might be said to be confronted by a different datum for epistemological reflection from that faced by one who took Paracelsus as a model).

However that may be, unless we can get some better way of distinguishing between philosophers’ descriptions of what scientists do and what scientists actually do than we have now—a way which will give us a clear-cut distinction between philosophical data and philosophical theories—I think we should not adopt Hacking’s “knowledge has changed” formulation. Hacking writes as if philosophical revolutions must be seen as responses to what is going on in some less dubious area of culture, now that Foucault-like considerations have shown that philosophy is not a self-sustaining discipline with a permanent and autonomous problematic. But these are not the only alternatives. Some philosophical revolutions (Hegel’s, for example) originate primarily within philosophy and spread to the rest of culture. Other philosophical revolutions are primarily reactive—as Hacking thinks the rise of empiricism was, or as the secularization of moral philosophy was a reaction to the intellectuals’ reading novels rather than sermons. The notion of philosophy as “an ‘under-labourer’ to the best speculative and creative thought of the time” (a phrase which Hacking uses at page 162) needs to make room for the possibility that the best speculative and creative thought is sometimes done by philosophers themselves (as in early nineteenth-century Germany). Foucault’s and Hacking’s demonstrations of the historical character of philosophical problems need to be complemented by Dewey’s and Oakeshott’s picture of philosophy as an intermittent voice in a complicated conversation, rather than a discipline that stands in determinate relationships to other disciplines.

Turning now from the questions of whether knowledge has changed to the question of why we should think that philosophy has something special to do with knowledge, we may get some light on Hacking’s attitude toward the latter issue by noting a remark in The Emergence of Probability. He said there (47) that “the discovery that all names are conventional thunders us into modern philosophy.” I take Hacking to be saying here that the discovery that there are no true signs (in the sense in which he describes Paracelsus as thinking that the [true] names of stars are signs in exactly the way in which the points on a stag’s antlers signify the animals’ age”) gives rise to a set of questions about the truth of statements which make epistemology of interest. This discovery creates an intellectual climate in which the notion of “evidence” both makes sense and is puzzling, and thus one in which (given Descartes’s novel use of cogitation to develop a special philosophical notion of “experience”) we can make sense of the quadrilaterals that Hacking draws to portray the modern philosophical problematic. But these quadrilaterals are not (as Hacking would agree) particularly useful for understanding what Plato and Aristotle, or the Church Fathers, or the Stoics, were worried about. Nor, as far as I can see, are they of help for performing what philosophers have been worrying about lately (with the exception of a few thousand of us parochial and hidebound Anglo-Saxons). So, to return to the queries I raised earlier, Hacking will be in a position to say that the quadrilateral that portrays “public discourse” or “the fabric of sentences” as interface is a description of what philosophy is about now only if he explains why we should still be concerned about skepticism, the gap between theory and evidence, and the like.

The puzzling thing is that Hacking does not attempt an explanation of why philosophy-as-study-of-interfacing should survive the heyday of meanings. His claim that “the sentence matters even more... if we regard discourse as autonomous” sidesteps the issue, since sentences do not matter in the way in which meanings were thought to matter—that is, they do not matter as problematic interfaces. To say that they matter more because they now constitute human knowledge either means that the objects the sentences are about are now deemed inexistant (which Hacking certainly does not intend) or that the relation between sentence and...
object is not subject to the puzzles to which the relations between ideas and meanings and their objects were subject. The latter seems to me the right move for Hacking to make, but making it would lead him to deny that language does matter to philosophy. He is not willing to do this, and so he is forced to fall between two stools—saying on the one hand that epistemology is pretty well over with and urging on the other that something like epistemology ("philosophy of language")? will remain central to philosophy.

To see this ambivalence from another perspective, consider Hacking's attitude toward Dummett. He views Dummett's book on Frege's philosophy of language as an attempt to revivify meaning after the friends of sentences have killed it off (cf. 180), and he might well view Dummett's premise, that philosophy's "first task" is "analysis of meanings," as just a ritual incantation for raising the dead. Still, he seems to want to adopt Dummett's conclusion—that at the middle of the philosophical labyrinth there will be questions about "what the understanding of an expression consists in." It is difficult, however, to feel that we need such a model when the expression in question is a sentence. We may, for Davidsonian reasons, want an account of how we manage to understand indirect quotations, sentences with adverbs, and a lot of other cases in which we do not see how the mastery of parts of the sentence can produce a mastery of the sentence as a whole. But this is not a question about the relation between language and the world, nor does it call for a general model of "understanding expressions." To have such a general model we should have to have something that answered the question "How does 'Snow is white' manage to represent the fact that snow is white?"—something more enlightening than simply correlating "snow" with snow and "white" with white. A truth theory for English would indeed be enlightening about more complex sentences, but it is hard to see how it could be enlightening about representation in general—the "tie between language and the world" as opposed to the tie between small bits of language and larger bits of language. A Davidsonian truth theory can answer the questions "How can we get from knowledge of how to use a small number of short strings of phonemes to a knowledge of how to construct a potentially infinite number of such strings of a potentially infinite length?" and "What must we quantify over to understand the inferential relationships of English?" But these questions are, respectively, parallel to "How can we get from simple to complex ideas?" and "What kinds of ideas do we have?" Nothing in Davidson looks much like a parallel to "How do we know that any of our ideas have anything to do with reality?" It was the latter question, and the epistemological skepticism made possible by thinking of ideas as a veil between the subject and the object, which made ideas-as-interface a topic for philosophical reflection in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But unless we can come to see sentences as a veil, and thus raise the question "How do we know that any sentence can represent anything?" it will be hard to get exercised about sentences-as-interface.

To sum up this point, one cannot be Davidsonian about language and still think of language as an interface, nor as itself having an interface with what it "represents." For the behaviorism that Davidson shares with Quine, with or without the Hegelian modifications that Hacking suggests (some of which Sellars and Rosenberg have already acknowledged), makes language into something people do, rather than something standing between them and something else. It can, to be sure, also be viewed as a system of representations—but then so can

See Davidson's distinction between "uncovering the logical grammar or form of sentences (which is in the province of a theory of meaning as I construe it) and the analysis of individual words or expressions (which are treated as primitive by the theory)." "Truth and Meaning," p. 316. The latter task is the one which inspired most of the philosophers who took the linguistic turn. 8

Note Davidson's rejection of "the third, and perhaps the last, dogma of empiricism"—the distinction between scheme and content—in "The Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Language, vol. viii (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 3–25, and Robert Brandom, "Truth and Assertibility," Journal of Philosophy, lxxiii, 6 (March 25, 1976): 137–49. The latter paper, it seems to me, effectively dissolves the issue that Dummett (op. cit., p. 671) calls "the fundamental issue of the relationship between the central roles, as in Fregie's theory, and one in which these roles are taken by the quite different notions of verification and falsification." anything—the rings in trees or the grooves on phonograph records. We cannot see representation and knowledge as posing philosophical problems unless we can reinvent something like the seventeenth-century gap between two kinds of reality, and thus reinvent an interface. Hacking's own suggestion in the last words of his book is that we do it even the interface between the knower and that known, but "... constitutes human knowledge" throws away the ladder he has climbed up. If there is no longer an interface, then, if language now matters to philosophy, is not "for the reason that ideas mattered in seventeenth-century philosophy," for ideas were an interface. I would suggest, therefore, that Hacking is not being historically enough and thus not being radical enough. There are all sorts of reasons (connected with the Reformation, the New Science, and various other overdetermining factors) which could have motivated the concern with epistemological skepticism and the problem of justifying our beliefs which is characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the methods and results of modern science have come to replace the religious outlook in the common consciousness, skepticism has become more and more the parochial concern of the professional philosopher. Hacking's picture of the philosophical problematic that survives the heyday of ideas suggests that skepticism is a permanent and important possibility for thought, and that there is a permanent problem of how to cross some interface or other—if not the veil of ideas, then something else which gives the skeptic a chance to suggest that we don't know as much as we think. But once we adopt something like the Neurath–Quine picture of knowledge, something which leads pretty shortly to Feyerabend's "brazen pluralism," we are not going to make sense of epistemological skepticism. Unless we can develop some new form of skepticism, problems about the relation between language and reality are not going to seem particularly philosophical, or, at least, will not seem continuous with the old epistemological problematic. If one is to see sentences as filling a place once filled by ideas, then one has to explain why it is representation in general, not just the representation of the physical by the mental or the public by the private, which is philosophically problematic.

Despite Hacking's recognition that representation became crucial to philosophy only a few hundred years back, the final pages of his book seem to depend on the tacit assumption that philosophy just is the "study of representing." This premise seems to me widely shared, though rarely articulated. In the heyday of meanings it did seem as if we could be skeptical about how language got in contact with the world, and could produce plausible answers. The Tractatus, for example, is dominated by the conviction that, if one can only explain how language manages to represent, then "all the problems of philosophy are solved." In the light of the Investigations, however, it is hard to reconstruct the problems that Wittgenstein thought he had solved in the Tractatus, and it is significant that Wittgenstein diagnosed the source of his earlier concerns as the same picture that had held philosophers captive in the heyday of ideas: the picture of certain privileged representations having a natural, rather than a conventional, relation to what they represent. If philosophy of language as foundational philosophy is to make sense, then we have to reconstruct the problematic of the Tractatus in a way that disproves Wittgenstein's diagnosis. We have to show that some question of the form "How is it possible that language should represent?" makes as much sense as the seventeenth-century question "How is it possible that the contents of my mind should be known by me to represent something outside my mind?", not just that it is
the closest analogue formuable in current philosophical jargon. We have to say that the concern with skepticism that loomed up in the seventeenth century was even more overdetermined than we had realized: that some permanent problem about representation was being shadowed forth by the transitory intellectual crises of those times.

The reason why skepticism is so hard to formulate for language is that asking how languages manage to represent reality seems a bit like asking how it is possible for wrenches to wrench. That is what we made them to do, we are tempted to answer. So it is easier to understand biological or sociological questions about how we managed to make the particular language we have made, or how we teach it to our young, than transcendental questions about how anything could do what we have made language do. That is why Davidsonian questions about the formal logic of action sentences do not have the resonance of Tractarian questions about the logical forms of any possible sentence. We know what would count as answering Davidson's questions, and we do not feel in suspense about our activity of attributing responsibility for actions until the question is answered. Nor are we tempted to wonder whether the "ontology of English" gradually disclosed by successive answers to Davidsonian questions is the right ontology. Wittgenstein came to think the former sort of resonance a result of hollowness rather than depth. If we want to use Hacking's parallel quadrilateral structures to illuminate the contemporary philosophical scene, we shall have to give Tractatus-like questions a new depth.

Hacking ends by waverering between two answers to his title question—the one in which sentences are construed as the interface between knower and known, and a more daring Hegelian conception in which discourse becomes "autonomous," constitutes human knowledge rather than serves as an interface for it, and in which we think of human inquiry as "a process without a subject." (This last phrase is Althusser's description of Hegel's contribution to philosophy, quoted approvingly by Hacking.) If we adopt the second sort of answer, in which the various quadrilateral diagrams Hacking offers are replaced by a simple confrontation of a sputtering mass of sentences with the world they are about, then we certainly have a reason for thinking language important, but not a reason for thinking it important to philosophy. Or, to put it another way, we have a reason for thinking that philosophy is going to have to be something very different from anything we have known since Descartes. We also have reason for doubting that we know enough about what it will be like to be confident about what will matter to it. If the notion of representation goes, as philosophers like Derrida want it to, then philosophy cannot be conceived of as centering around the study of representation. What it might be, and what else it might center around, are hardly clear. But it is possible that it might not have a center, that it might not have an architectonic structure at all. It may be that what Hacking calls the death of meaning at the hands of Quine, Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Feyerabend brings with it the death of philosophy as a discipline with a method of its own. If there are no meanings to analyze, if there is just a wriggling mass of intertwined sentences, if there are no reductions to advocate as the result of analyzing meanings, then perhaps there are no central or foundational questions in philosophy. There may remain only philosophy as kibitzing—philosophy in the style of Aristotle, Dewey, and the later Wittgenstein. If we make a virtue of necessity by embracing this alternative, we can answer the question "Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?" by saying "because everything does, but it does not matter more than anything else."

—Richard M. Rorty

I wrote "Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy" in 1965. In 1975 I took up some of the same topics in a review of Ian Hacking's Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?—the piece which is translated above under the title "Ten Years After." It is now 1990, and I have taken the occasion of the translation of these two earlier essays into Spanish to reread them.

What I find most striking about my 1965 essay is how seriously I took the phenomenon of the "linguistic turn," how portentous it then seemed to me. I am startled, embarrassed, and amused to reread the following passage:

Linguistic philosophy, over the last thirty years, has succeeded in putting the entire philosophical tradition, from Parmenides through Descartes and Hume to Bradley and Whitehead, on the defensive. It has done so by a careful and thorough scrutiny of the ways in which traditional philosophers have used language in the formulation of their problems. This achievement is sufficient to place this period among the great ages of the history of philosophy.

That last sentence now strikes me as merely the attempt of a thirty-three-year-old philosopher to convince himself that he had had the luck to be born at the right time—to persuade himself that the disciplinary matrix in which he happened to find himself (philosophy as taught in most English-speaking universities in the 1960s) was more than just one more philosophical school, one more tempest in an academic teapot.

It now seems to me to have been little more than that. The controversies which I discussed with such earnestness in 1965 already seemed quaint in 1975. By now they seem positively antique. The most eminent of the philosophers now teaching at Oxford, Bernard Williams, writes of "linguistic analysis," that now distant philosophical style. The slogan that "the problems of philosophy are problems of language" now strikes me as confused, for two reasons. The first is that I am no longer inclined to view "the problems of philosophy" as naming a natural kind—no longer inclined to think of "philosophy" as (in the words I quoted from Stuart Hampshire at the end of my 1965 essay) "one of man's recognizable activities." The second is that I am no longer inclined to think that there is such a thing as "language" in any sense which makes it possible to speak of "problems of language." In what follows, I shall briefly discuss each of these two reasons.

The only natural kind which might usefully be designated by the term "the problems of philosophy" is, I think, the set of interlinked problems posed by representationalist theories of knowledge—the problems connected with what Hacking called "interfacing." These are problems about the relation between mind and reality, or language and reality, viewed as the relation between a medium of representation and what is purportedly represented. In my review of Hacking, I suggested that the Quine-Davidson assault on the distinctions between analytic and synthetic judgments, conceptual questions and empirical questions, language and fact, had made it difficult to formulate such problems—difficult to think of the relation be...
