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Tradition and Gender in Modernization Theory

There does not seem to be much more to write about modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s. Numerous critics have taken early modernization theorists such as Rostow (1960), Parsons (1960), and Inkeles (1969) to task for their ethnocentrism, naive optimism, and "failure to recognize the political implications of economic dependency upon the West" (Randall and Theobald 1985: 33). Other critics pointed to modernization theory's reliance upon evolutionary and linear notions of social and political change and its reductionism and oversimplification of the development process (e.g., Portes 1976; Tipps 1976).[1] However, upon closer inspection it is evident that modernization theory was mainly criticized for its empirical content, lack of predictive ability, definitional shortcomings, and Western bias. Virtually no questions were asked about the way in which challenges to modernization were framed, and the extent to which the dichotomies of traditional and modern depended upon conceptions of gender, gender differences, and the devaluation of "the feminine."

Embedded within constructions of traditional society are ideas about women, family, and community that function as points of contrast for modernization theorists' idealization of a rational, forward-looking, male-dominated public sphere. Conceptions of linear time also play an important role for modernization theorists, with tradition and the feminine viewed as part of the past. As Inkeles and Smith (1974: 3–4) put it, "Mounting evidence suggests that it is impossible for a state to move into the twentieth century if its people continue to live in an earlier era." For development theorists seeking to construct the antinomy of tradition and modernity, it is important to distance one from the other and stress the importance of autonomy and separation of men from the household and the feminine traits associated with it.

There are three major themes evident in the work of theorists as diverse as Alex Inkeles and W. W. Rostow. The first is an unconscious

and pervasive psychological preoccupation with separation and differentiation from the household. This distancing is accomplished by the presentation of tradition as a bundle of characteristics that also have historically been used to subordinate women and denigrate the social relations associated with females, especially mothers. It is interesting to note that some early critics of modernization theory argued that it undertheorized tradition and presented it as a static and "residual concept" (Randall and Theobald 1985: 35). This chapter will argue that the powerful imagery and the descriptions of idealized modernity provided by early modernization theorists were laden with such significant demarcations of constructed gender differences that explicit explorations of tradition were unnecessary.

A second theme evident in early modernization theory is the reliance on the public/private distinction in discussions of modernity and tradition. Modernity, rationality, technological progress, and good government are achieved in a public realm inhabited by autonomous men. With the exception of the Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), which displayed some ambivalence toward tradition and called for more exploration of the content of traditional societies, early modernization theorists viewed tradition, and the values associated with tradition and women, as absolutely incompatible with modern institutions.

Finally, early modernization theorists rely, implicitly or explicitly, upon evolutionary models of social and political change, which provide an important lens for viewing their ideas about development, modernization, and gender. In their reliance upon an evolutionary model, they inevitably portray development as a struggle for dominance over nature, and implicitly, over women. Moreover, in using an evolutionary model, they portray development as the ever-widening ability of men to create and transform their environment. Within this linear framework of evolutionary social and political change, women are "left behind," confined to the household and denied citizenship. Women's continued subordination in fact defines male citizenship.

▲ Sexism and Modernization Theory

The argument here is that modernization theorists brought deeply held masculinist and dualistic views of the world of tradition and modernity that relied upon configurations of the public and private spheres, the household, and evolutionary progress. It is important and useful also to note that this literature consistently purported to present a universal model of the modernization process that was, in

fact, partial and based on an (often idealized) version of masculine modernity. Women are either invisible, treated paternalistically, or used as a litmus test for determining the degree of "backwardness" of a particular Third World country. A startling example of invisibility is the project that interviewed six thousand men in Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan (Bangladesh), India, Israel, and Nigeria in order to examine the effects of factory life on modern attitudes (Inkeles 1969; Inkeles and Smith 1974). They report that budget limitations and the concentration of men in industrial jobs explain the gender of the sample (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 311). But, surely, would not women be included in the cultivator and nonindustrial worker category, two other categories of respondents interviewed in each of the countries? The authors never explain why only men were included in these categories as well. They also make the interesting assertion, "We are firmly convinced that the overwhelming majority of the psychosocial indicators we used to identify the modern man would also discriminate effectively among women" (Inkeles, Smith, et al. 1983: 123). This directly contradicts their reporting on the low correlations concerning modern attitudes about political life and attitudes about the family.

As an example of striking paternalism, Daniel Lerner (1958: 29) took Zilla K. along as an interviewer when he returned to the village of Balgat, Turkey, in 1954 (he had been there four years before). This is his description of her hiring:

> I had "ordered" her through a colleague, at Ankara University, "by the numbers": thirtyish, semi-trained, alert, compliant with instructions, not sexy enough to impede our relations with the men of Balgat but chic enough to provoke the women. A glance and a word showed that Zilla filled the requisition.

Rostow (1960: 91) speculated about what lies beyond the state of high mass-consumption reached by societies such as the United States and worried about the onset of pervasive boredom—for men. Women, on the other hand, "will not recognize the reality of the problem" because of their involvement in childrearing: "The problem of boredom is a man's problem, at least until the children have grown up."

The comparison of the liberated and independent woman of the West with the tradition-bound woman of the Third World also informs many accounts of the psychosocial requisites of modernity. When women are discussed by the modernization theorists in any specific way they are presented in remarkably flat terms, and often uniformly oppressed by men and family structures. Lerner (1958: 199) notes that "traditional women are content to accept the role

and status assigned them," as the "stolid guardians of custom and routine." Women who represent modern values in Middle Eastern societies such as Lebanon yearn for the greater educational and career opportunities available to women in the West. The Western media provides a constant reminder to Middle Eastern women of their restricted opportunities. In a puzzling analogy, Lerner (1958: 204) notes that "as the American housewife uses soap operas to fill her day and satisfy her needs, so this young Lebanese woman finds gratification through borrowed experiences." While implicitly acknowledging that viewing soap operas might represent frustration and denied opportunities for middle-class U.S. women, Lerner never explicitly challenges the media's juxtaposition of the "enlightened and independent woman" of the West with the backward and traditional woman of the Middle East. McClelland (1976: 399–400) makes a similar contrast:

> A crucial way to break with tradition and introduce new norms is via the emancipation of women. . . . The most general explanation lies in the fact that women are the most conservative members of a culture. They are less subject to influences outside the home than the men and yet they are the ones who rear the next generation and give it the traditional values of the culture.

Inkeles and Smith, et al. describe "most of the traditional societies and communities of the world" as "if not strictly patriarchal, at least vigorously male dominated" (Inkeles and Smith, et al. 1983: 26). While traditional man is reluctant to accept women's freedom, modern man is willing to "allow women to take advantage of opportunities outside the confines of the household" (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 77, 291). In a later work they predicted that "the liberating forces of modernization would act on men's attitudes and incline them to accord to women status and rights more nearly equal to those enjoyed by men" (Inkeles, Smith, et al. 1983: 42). Such contrasts not only serve to establish a Western sense of difference and superiority (and complacency about women's rights in the West); they also mark women, in Mohanty's (1991b: 56) terms, as "third world (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.)." As the most "backward" group in society, women serve as an implicit contrast between Western modernity and non-Western tradition.

▲ "Becoming Modern": The Syndrome of Modern Male Citizenship

Randall and Theobald (1985: 15) place early modernization theories into one of two categories: psychocultural or structural-functional.

Psychocultural approaches examine the attitudinal prerequisites of modernity, while structural-functional approaches focus on the institutional changes needed for modernity. Inkeles (1969), Inkeles and Smith (1974), and Inkeles, Smith, et al. (1983) adopt a psychocultural approach to modernization. In the study of six thousand men in the six countries listed above, Inkeles and Smith locate a syndrome of participant citizenship, "attitudes and capacities" necessary to realize "nation-building and institution-building" in the Third World (1974: 3).

Inkeles and Smith (1974: 19–24) argue that twelve traits define modern man (sic). In addition, they argue that modernity is also characterized by a host of other orientations toward religion, the family, and social stratification (1974: 25). Their analytic and topical characteristics of the modern man are summarized in Table 2.1. Feminist critics of the Western philosophical tradition have noted the persistent denigration of the feminine within that tradition. Lloyd (1984: 2–3), for example, notes that in the triumph of reason over darkness, the early Greeks used symbolic associations of the female as what needed "to be shed in developing culturally prized rationality." Rooney (1991: 91) and Jordanova (1980) have noted the images of battle or struggle that are common in discussions of reason and unreason. Jordanova's (1980: 44) presentation of the dichotomies that emerged in the biomedical sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showed similarities with the contrasts between traditional and modern man presented by Inkeles and Smith (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Dichotomies

Traditional	Modern
Nature	Culture
Woman	Man
Physical	Mental
Mothering	Thinking
Feeling and superstition	Abstract knowledge and thought
Country	City
Darkness	Light
Nature	Science and civilization

Source: Jordanova 1980: 44

Jordanova (1980: 44) suggests that the oppositions contain an important gender dimension and connotations of battle: the struggle between the forces of tradition and modernity was also a struggle between the sexes, with the increasing assertion of masculinity over

"irrational, backward-looking women" applauded as inevitable. Furthermore, she shows how science and medicine used sexual metaphors that portrayed nature as a woman to be penetrated, unclothed, and unveiled by masculine science (Jordanova 1980: 45).

Inkeles and Smith replicate these Enlightenment dichotomies in their comparison of traditional and modern men (see Table 2.2). In the larger study, they present case studies from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) of a traditional man and a modern one (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 73–80). Ahmadullah, the traditional man, "was relatively passive, even fatalistic, and very much dependent on outside forces, above all on the intervention of God." He said he could do nothing in the face of an unjust law, and he preferred living in the "closed and unchanging world" of the village. Nuril, on the other hand, had lived in the city for ten years, approved of women acquiring more education, was open to meeting new people and having new experiences, and believed that "the outcome of things depended very much on himself, and [that] others bore responsibility for their individual actions." As Inkeles noted in his earlier study (1969: 1122–1123), the modern man possesses an orientation toward politics that recognizes the necessity and desirability of a "rational structure of rules and regulations."

Juxtaposed with the village, family, and kinship structures stands the factory, a "school in rationality" (Inkeles 1969: 1140). The factory is an exemplar of efficiency, innovation, planning, punctuality, rules and formal procedures, and objective standards for assessing skills and output (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 158–163). City life, they argued, also has a powerful indirect effect on creating modern attitudes because cities have greater concentrations of schools, factories, and mass media (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 228).

In addition to an uncritical perspective on the nature of factory work in both the First and Third Worlds, the description by Inkeles and Smith of the benefits of factory work rely upon a liberal framework of contractual obligation and individualism that reflects a masculinist standpoint and preoccupation with autonomy. Hirschmann (1989: 1237) argues that this is especially evident in symbolic language that reflects desires for dominance and nonreciprocal recognition. In describing modern man's experiences as a "shift from the more traditional settings of village, farm, and tribe to city residence, industrial employment, and national citizenship" (Inkeles and Smith 1974: 156), psychocultural theorists of modernization juxtapose community, family, and kinship with the modern, and it is women who stand at the center of the traditional community. The factory serves as the emblem of scientific progress and technological prowess that promises to shatter any resistance to rationalized

relationships in the public realm. This liberal and masculinist conception of freedom entails nonrecognition of the female and the relationships she represents. Freedom requires not only moving beyond the household: subordination of the household becomes the means of achieving freedom (Hirschmann 1989: 1235). Women were not only excluded from the samples because they worked in factories, but because they resided in the very location that undermines the institutions that "train men in active citizenship" (Inkeles 1969: 1141).

Table 2.2 Traditional Man and Modern Man

Traditional	Modern
Not receptive to new ideas	Open to new experience
Rooted in tradition	Change orientation
Only interested in things that touch him immediately	Interested in outside world
Denial of different opinions	Acknowledges different opinions
Uninterested in new information	Eager to seek out new information
Oriented toward the past	Punctual; oriented toward the present
Concerned with the short term	Values planning
Distrustful of people beyond the family	Calculability; trust in people to meet obligations
Suspicious of technology	Values technical skills
High value placed on religion and the sacred	High value placed on formal education and science
Traditional patron-client relations prevail	Respect for the dignity of others; belief that rewards should be distributed according to rules
Particularistic	Universalistic
Fatalistic	Optimistic

Source: Inkeles and Smith 1974: 19–34.

Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958) is another representative of the psychocultural approach. Lerner presents the parable of modern Turkey through the story of the Grocer and the Chief, two men interviewed in the village of Balgat, near Ankara, in 1950 and 1954. The Chief "was a man of few words on many subjects," who "audits his life placidly, makes no comparisons, thanks God." The Grocer, on the other hand, perceived his story as "a drama of self versus village," a man whose "psychic antennae were endlessly seeking the new future here and now" (Lerner 1958: 22, 24).

Lerner's contrasts between traditional and modern society (1958: 44) echo Enlightenment thinkers and Inkeles and Smith: "village versus town, land versus cash, illiteracy versus enlightenment,

resignation versus ambition, piety versus excitement." In modern societies, personal mobility is a "first-order value," and a modern society "has to encourage rationality, for the calculus of choice shapes individual behavior and conditions its reward" (Lerner 1958: 48). Empathy is the mechanism that accompanies the transformation of traditional man, i.e., "the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation" (Lerner 1958: 50). Empathy takes place through both projection ("assigning the object certain preferred attributes of the self") and introjection ("attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object") (Lerner 1958: 49). Identification with others is a key component of modern man's personality.

Chodorow has noted the importance of negative identification, differentiation, and nonrecognition in human development, and these themes recur in Lerner's definition of modern man's development and "maturation." Differentiation is defined relationally, and because men have "conflictual core gender identity problems," it is important to maintain a rigid boundary between the masculine and feminine: "Boys and men come to deny the feminine identification within themselves and those feelings they experience as feminine; feelings of dependence, relational needs, emotions generally" (1989: 109–110). The development of masculine identity as outlined by object relations theory resonates in Lerner's (1958: 410) definition of modern man's solitary struggle against forces represented by the village, "the passive, destitute, illiterate and altogether 'submerged' mass which looms so large in its [the Middle East's] sociological landscape."

McClelland's (1976: 107) chief goal was to determine the extent to which a "culture or nation has adapted more or less rapidly to modern civilization, with its stress on technology, the specialization of labor, and the factory system." McClelland and his colleagues developed a measure of "n achievement" (shorthand for need achievement) through content analysis of achievement-related stories written by male college students, folk tales from various cultures, and children's stories. He explicitly links high n achievement with boys who had mothers who encouraged independence yet at the same time provided warmth and affection. Reporting on earlier findings that attempted to demonstrate a link between socialization and the propensity for high achievement, McClelland (1976: 46) summarized: "The mothers of the sons with high n-achievement have set higher standards for their sons; they expect self-mastery at an early age." Thus he not only touches on themes within object relations theory, he literally claims that characteristics of mothering (along with other factors) are influential in determining whether a society develops. McClelland (1976: 404–495) also warns about father-dominance in producing low achievement, because "the boy is more likely

to get his conception of the male role from his relationship with the father rather than his mother and therefore, to conceive of himself as a dependent, obedient sort of person if his father is strong and dominating" (McClelland 1976: 353). It is in his relationship with the mother that the boy obtains a sense of independence and autonomy, but only from mothers who are "controlled and moderate in warmth and affection" (McClelland 1976: 405).

From these observations, McClelland hypothesizes about how to bring about development. First, "other-directedness" is essential (McClelland 1976: 192). The "authority of tradition" must be replaced and men must learn to pay attention to newspapers, local political parties, and the radio, a "new voice of authority." Development, in other words, requires a shift in allegiance from the private to the public realm. Second, n achievement needs to be increased, and McClelland speculates about the prospects for decreasing father-dominance, protestant conversion, and a reorganization of fantasy life (McClelland 1976: 406–418). Finally, McClelland suggests that existing n achievement resources could be used more efficiently to encourage "young men with high n achievement to turn their talents to business or productive enterprise" (McClelland 1976: 418).

Rostow's (1960) *Stages of Economic Growth* introduces both the concept of evolutionary stages of societal development and attitudinal prerequisites as crucial for understanding political development. He conceptualizes the evolutionary path of development as composed of five stages: tradition, societies poised to "take-off," the "take-off" into modernity itself, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption. Traditional societies are characterized by Rostow (1960: 4) as "pre-Newtonian" because they are located on the other side of "that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws and was capable of productive manipulation." The "frame of mind" conducive to modern science was nonexistent in these pre-Newtonian societies, which possessed a "long-term fatalism" and a "ceiling on the productivity of their economic techniques" (Rostow 1960: 5). During the time before take-off, "limited bursts" of entrepreneurial activity and "enclaves of modernity" emerge, spurred by "enterprising men" who are willing to "take risks in pursuit of profit or modernization" (Rostow 1960: 6–7). Rostow presents us with the image of energetic men emerging from rural backwardness and leaving the bonds of tradition to transform and manipulate the forces of nature:

> Man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a given factor by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield

> productive change and, in one dimension at least, progress (1960: 19).

Rostow contrasts the world of family, mother, and household with the modern world of markets, technology, and science. In fact, traditional societies become eligible for take-off when "men come to be valued in society not with their connection with clan or class . . . but for their individual ability to perform certain specific, increasingly specialized functions" (Rostow 1960: 19). This requires attitudinal changes toward science, propensities to calculate and take risks, and a willingness to work (Rostow 1960: 20). Rostow appeals to male heroic leadership in his analysis of the key take-off from tradition to modernity. He juxtaposes this new elite with "the old land-based elite" which is mired in agrarian practices and worldviews that do not regard "modernization as a possible task" (Rostow 1960: 26).

▲ Equality, Capacity, and Differentiation: Structural Explanations of Modernity

Structural-functional frameworks for explaining modernization and development share the dualistic and gendered framework employed by psychocultural approaches. Parsons' pattern-variables of universal social roles represent the most famous structural-functional approach (Parsons 1960). Parsons makes distinctions between affectively neutral and affective actions, universal and particular orientations, specific and diffuse obligations, self-oriented rather than collectively oriented behavior, and achievement and ascriptive criteria for recognizing performance, with modernity characterizing the first category in each paired concept. In addition to opposing tradition and modernity in this way, Parsons also unconsciously "feminizes" traditional society in that the terms he uses to define "traditional" Third World societies have also been used to juxtapose male rationality and inherent superiority with "lower order" female passions and instincts.

One of Parsons's most interesting distinctions is between universal and particular modes of categorizing social objects. While modern man is able to use a set of norms and standards that apply to all objects in a particular class, traditional man treats them in terms of their standing in some particular relationship to him (Bluh 1982: 88–90). As Devereaux (1961: 41) explains it,

> Whether someone is a good doctor, a competent secretary, or a beautiful woman are presumably matters to be determined on universalistic grounds. But while certain modes of behavior might be evoked toward beautiful women or deserving children in general, where one's own wife or child is involved, one is committed in many special ways, regardless of beauty or desert.

Parsons (1960: 119) identifies the major obstacles to economic development as a "combination of 'traditionalism' and a strong pressure to reproduce the existing pattern of economic organization wherever opportunity exists for its expansion." Developed societies, on the other hand, have legal systems that embody principles of universalism and specificity, contracts and property, and occupational roles that free individuals "from ties and imperatives which would interfere seriously with economic production" (Parsons 1960: 147).

While Parsons is obviously enumerating the values and institutions compatible with capitalist development, he is also denigrating characteristics of traditional societies that have historically been associated with women and devalued in the Western tradition. The individual's quest for modernity is a battle against the village, family, and "tribe." These communities are not only averse to economic productivity and the capitalist work ethic; they represent, symbolically, female attributes and the relationships and structures historically associated with them.

Parsons (1964: 356) also relied explicitly upon an evolutionary model of development. He argued that certain "organizational complexes" were necessary for societies to emerge from "primitiveness." In order to evolve along the scale of development, societies require stratification, necessary to emerge from the "seamless web" of relationships that characterize societies governed by strong kinship and family ties (Parsons 1964: 342). Stratification is necessary in order to create avenues of upward mobility for leaders who wish to marshal the resources for development (Parsons 1964: 34). Extending this functionalist and evolutionary framework even further, Parsons argues that legitimation is necessary in order to justify hierarchy; bureaucracy is necessary in order to develop enhanced capacity for change; money and markets are necessary as "the great mediator of the instrumental use of goods and services" (Parsons 1964: 349).

Parsons makes a number of key assumptions in this presentation of evolutionary development. He assumes that power must be concentrated in hierarchies of stratification in order for political development to occur. Kinship and family ties, on the other hand, are clearly "rigid" and incapable of generating power to effect change. Second, Parsons assumes that development will be a divisive process, as one group will inevitably seek power and try to achieve dominance over another. He never doubts that struggles and drives for dominance

will increase the "long-run adaptive capacity" of societies evolving toward the development ideal (Parsons 1964: 340). He assumes that despite "severe dislocations" resulting from such struggles, the societies undergoing evolutionary development are experiencing an inevitable and "natural" process. Why is stratification necessary in order to marshal resources? Why is a concentration of power necessary for productive change to take place? While Parsons produces a legitimation of capitalism and markets, he also implicitly presents male/culture triumphant over female/nature. The evolutionary universals considered fundamental for understanding development are also justifications for male dominance and denigration of traits historically associated with women. Liberal ideology and evolutionary functionalism join together to legitimate masculinist individualism and domination and exclusionary practices with regard to the household.

The SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics also worked with a structural-functional framework. They located a "development syndrome" as increasing equality, capacity, and differentiation, the evolution of which produces inevitable strains and tensions in traditional and transitional societies. They defined the obstacles to the achievement of development as "crises" of identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution, faced by every society in "building both state and nation" (Pye 1971a: viii). Coleman (1971: 73) pointed out that the SSRC participants chose to view development as an evolutionary process—as an

> open-ended increase in the capacity of political man to initiate and institutionalize new structures and supporting cultures, to cope with or resolve problems, to absorb and adapt to continuous change, and to strive purposively and creatively for the attainment of new goals.

The SSRC committee characterized development and modernization as conflictual processes laden with the potential for setbacks. While a "complete reversion to a traditional pre-modern system" had not yet occurred, there had been "abortive developments" in many Third World countries (Coleman 1971: 84). In fact, Coleman (1971: 100) argued that "arrested development" may begin to affect an increasing number of Third World countries as they became stalled at a certain level of differentiation, equality, and capacity.

Abortive or arrested development occurs as a result of conflicts in the resolution of the five "crises" listed above. For example, fragmentation challenges state capacity for integration; demands for equality challenge the state's ability to solve the participation crisis; challenges to state capacity create legitimacy and identity crises, and

so forth. As Pye (1971b: 106) notes, these crises, if unresolved, create difficulties in achieving a "higher level of performance" on the part of Third World leaders. Pye's (1971b: 110) discussion of the identity crisis is especially worth noting. He argues that identity crises take place over four different issues: territory, class, ethnicity, and social change. In a revealing discussion of the legacy of colonialism, Pye (1971b: 122) discusses the ambivalence these leaders feel toward colonial relationships of dependence:

> All humans must experience complete and protracted dependency, for it is the very mark of human-ness. . . . With development people have ambivalent feelings toward their sentiments related to dependency, and the search for individual identity inevitably involves an assertion for independence in which any continuing cravings for dependence must be veiled.

These themes, which resemble theories of male psychological development, recur throughout the SSRC committee's discussion of modernization and development. Anxiety, crises, capacity, performance, individual identity, and overcoming the challenges posed by tradition represent the "syndrome" of development in both becoming a mature male adult and a mature, national society.

Furthermore, modernization is conceived as a masculine triumph, the result of enhanced capacity, improved performance, and effective penetration. La Palombara (1971: 206) conceives of the crisis of penetration as a "test" of the "organizational, technological, and/or diplomatic capabilities of an existing governing elite." It refers to "whether [leaders] can get what they want from people over whom they seek to exercise power" (La Palombara 1971: 209). Gaining compliance, creating new organizations, and breaking down old loyalties are all aspects of the penetration challenge.

Reliance on an evolutionary model of modernization is also evident in the SSRC committee's work (Coleman 1971: 75). Images of struggle are deeply embedded in evolutionary models of society that emerged in the nineteenth century. Gross and Averill (1983: 81) note that the importance of competition in evolutionary theory was used by men in the twentieth century to impose order on the perceived chaos associated with reproduction:

> Evolution and natural selection, as products of nineteenth century thought, coincide with other reflections of men's anxiety about women, most plainly displayed in their preoccupation with her reproductive ability: her uncontrolled sexuality, her ("pathological") reproductive physiology, even her (hysterical) psychology. The nineteenth century medicalization of women's reproductive capacities . . . parallels the emphasis on domination and competition in

> nature as the main restraints over unbridled chaos in the orderly evolution of species.

Structural-functional theories of evolutionary development can also be viewed as expressing masculine concern and preoccupation with the fragmentation, particularism, and even chaos of traditional society. The modernization process is laden with conflict, a "ceaseless straining and tugging between the development processes and the requirement that the political system maintain itself" (Pye 1971b: 101). Assumptions that "abortive" or "arrested" development are inevitable and demand specialization, hierarchy, and enhanced capacity in order for progress to take place, constitute a masculinist version of modernity and development.

The view of development as an evolutionary struggle to achieve greater capacity to dominate nature coincides with the liberal underpinnings of modernization theory, which also relies upon assumptions of scarcity. In Macpherson's phrase, liberalism makes a "maximizing claim" (1973: 4) in that it provides a framework for realizing individual desires. Modernization theory shares this view of humans as "essentially a bundle of appetites demanding satisfaction." Macpherson (1973: 18–19) argues that liberal theory pits unlimited desire against scarcity, with unlimited desire conceived of as rational and morally acceptable rather than deplored as greed: "the chief purpose of man is an endless battle against scarcity" (Macpherson 1973: 18). Evolutionary paradigms of development also assume that "scarcity is inevitable and in turn demands competition, which is expressed in dominance relationships that make for evolutionary 'progress'" (Gross and Averill 1983: 82).

▲ Modernization Revisionists

The initial criticisms of modernization theory came from theorists who continued to characterize modernity and tradition in dualistic terms, but who insisted on the recognition of the continuing salience of caste, ethnicity, and other "particularistic" characteristics of traditional societies. Rudolph and Rudolph, for example, pointed to the resilience of caste organizations in Indian politics, adhered to the meaning of tradition and modernity held by earlier theorists:

> Modernity assumes that local ties and parochial perspectives give way to universal commitments and cosmopolitan attitudes; the truths of utility, calculation, and science take precedence over those of the emotions, the sacred, and the non-rational . . . that mastery rather than fatalism orient their attitude toward the material and human environment (1967: 3–4).

In addition, theories about patrimonialism and the "soft state" reinforced the appreciation of traditional institutions and represented a departure from early modernization theory because they challenged the assumption that Western institutions could be duplicated in postcolonial societies. Samuel Huntington also challenged the naive optimism of modernization theorists.

▲ Creating a (Gendered) Political Order

Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) attempted to temper the optimism of modernization theorists by pointing to the potential problems that could occur during the modernization process. *Political Order* opens with a Manichaean vision of international politics (1968: 1). On one side of the divide are modern polities such as the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, with their "effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties . . . and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict." On the other side there are the governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where "increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coup d'état . . . the loss of authority by legislatures and courts" constitute the norms of public life. Modernization theory, Huntington argues, could not anticipate this outcome because it assumed that economic development and social mobilization would lead to political development. Huntington (1968: 41) argued that the very process of modernization threatened the political order. Thus the task of developing countries should be to create political institutions that "derive their interests not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or any other group but the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from other groups" (1968: 27). Like modernization theorists, Huntington argues that political institutions must attain autonomy, but he presents the achievement of autonomy as a struggle that must be waged against the confusion, chaos, and alienation that accompany modernization (1968: 30–31). Order must be created: "Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order" (1968: 7–8).

Huntington takes a grim view of the world of politics. In defending his calls for order in societies with weak institutions, he writes that "politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition of social forces—between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class—a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations" (1968: 24). He implies that modernizing societies lack the kind of rationality required to

create political institutions to regulate conflict and that a government ordered along the lines of the military is most likely to create viable political institutions:

> Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as regiments. . . . The problems of creating coherent political organizations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organizations. . . . Discipline and development go hand in hand (1968: 33–34).

Huntington's dualistic brand of thinking, his endorsement of authoritarian government, and his praise for the coherence and discipline of military modes of governance make his work one of the most remarkable and striking in development theory and perhaps suggest a reason for the wide appeal and readership of the book. His formulation of the challenges of development also have a distinctively masculinist tenor. For Huntington, the ends of politics should be toward creating political institutions that, once in place, are capable of regulating political conflicts that arise (1968: 9, 11). In proposing his well-run polity with coherent, adaptable, autonomous, and complex political institutions, he explicitly contrasts the world of "natural" communities, "the isolated clan, family, or tribe," with political institutions and organizations that are consciously created through "political action" and "political labor" (1968: 10–11). "Natural" communities are simple, spontaneous, and less diverse; political communities are man-made political structures that do not depend upon the obligations and relationships that exist in "natural" communities. They are based on purely instrumental and calculating imperatives. Furthermore, Huntington's emphasis upon teamwork, command, and discipline, and his analogy between creating coherent political organizations and coherent military structures reflect a distinctly heroic, atomistic, and individualistic approach to governance. While earlier modernization theorists conceived of tradition and the socially constructed feminine values associated with it as something to be transcended, Huntington views it as a dangerous force to be tamed and disciplined.

Huntington is a transitional figure in development theory. He made his case for a politics of order by challenging the naïve belief in evolutionary progress exhibited by many earlier modernization theorists of the early 1960s. Dependency theorists reacted against Huntington's call for order and his neglect of international politics and economics in affecting political stability in the Third World. The continuing power of modernization theory's frame of reference (including Huntington) in contemporary theorizing about African politics is explored in the next chapter.

▲ Conclusion

Early modernization theory has been discredited for being unscientific and sexist in its focus on male heads of households. While these are valid criticisms, it is also important to examine the implicit assumptions, concerns, unstated preoccupations, and avoidances of these early theorists. Despite its official demise, early modernization theory's conceptual foundations continue to have pervasive power. This power helps explain the difficulty encountered by those who seek to challenge its masculinist worldview.

There is no need to speculate about the early upbringing of these male theorists to recognize the links they make between traditional society, on the one hand, and the denial of power and autonomy for the household and women, on the other. As Hirschmann (1989: 1232) notes, if self-conceptions are gender-related, accompanying worldviews will also differ by gender. And as Flax (1983: 246) contends, "patriarchy by definition imputes political, moral, and social *meanings* to sexual differentiation." Object relations theory provides a powerful means for understanding the themes of differentiation, autonomy, identity, and suppression of the household's characteristics that play so heavily in modernization theory. For these theorists, modernization requires self-propelled men to leave the household, abandon tradition, and assume their rightful place among other rational men. Women and the household are conceived of as part of the past that contains the dangerous worldview that nature is unalterable and that man is powerless in his efforts to control it. Only the SSRC committee displayed a hint of ambivalence about the compatibility of traditional and modern institutions. Coleman (171: 86–89) argued that, at times, traditional institutions can facilitate modernization, but only to the extent that traditional society has some characteristics that resemble the modern one! This is rarely the case, according to modernization theory, as traditional societies are composed of "highly pluralistic traditions that reflect very different, frequently conflicting or incongruent cultural patterns" (Coleman 1971: 87). Societies are modern to the extent that they overcome tradition, but abortive or arrested development are constant possibilities. Being "stuck" on the evolutionary scale toward national maturity reflects anxiety over the ability of state leaders to resolve their ambivalence toward dependence. Modernization is the triumph of penetration, identity, and legitimation, and the subordination of tradition, nature, and the "feminine."

Theories of modernization also replicate the public/private split that has occupied such a prominent place in Western political thought. It is a complicated tradition that at times has treated the private sphere and females as inferior and derivative and at other

times complementary to the "male paradigm of excellence" (Lloyd 1984: 75). Modernization theory does not present tradition and the household as a different type of rationality that possesses its own form of excellence. Inkeles and Smith and others judge all traditional societies against the idealized standard of (male) rationality, universal norms, and achievement criteria. Tradition always fails to meet these standards and in fact its persistence threatens the public life of male citizenship. The dichotomous comparisons of traditional and modern man made by Inkeles and Smith are almost a caricature of Enlightenment dichotomies that portrayed tradition as embodying ignorant peasant women tenaciously clinging to kin and family in the face of the benevolent progress offered by technology and science.

Finally, it is important to note that the themes of struggle and mastery over idealized and feminized tradition dovetail with a liberal conception of society, functionalism, evolutionary metaphors, and the possibility of human engineering in development. Haraway (1978: 26) defines human engineering as "the project of design and management of human material for efficient, rational functioning in a scientifically organized society." Parsons' audacious attempt to pinpoint the necessary societal functions for the emergence from "primitiveness," the "seamless web" of kinship and clan, is a classic example of the wholesale adoption of a Darwinian framework of social change to human societies. Images of struggle and surging toward the achievement of a "break through" (Parsons 1964: 357) from the morass of tradition and the chaos of the household permeate Parsons' theory and modernization theory generally. The only way to achieve "adaptive capacity" is to deny tradition. Evolution as a cultural product serves to justify industrial capitalism and the subordination of women. It serves a similar function in theories of modernization.

There has been a resurgence of interest in the study of tradition in development theory, for a number of reasons. In general, assertion of ethnic and "primordial" sentiments and the role of culture and values in the East Asian "economic miracles" has led to an appreciation of the continuing importance of tradition as both obstacle and facilitator of development (Banuazizi 1987: 284). In African studies, the failure of Afro-Marxist regimes and the reign of structural adjustment programs from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have led to a "profound period of revisionism" (Shaw 1991: 193). Africa's continued marginal position in the international division of labor has led to a search for explanations that ostensibly go beyond theories of modernization and dependence. However, a significant body of this theory constitutes an attempt to revive modernization theory's gendered dichotomies. The next chapter will show how theories of the African "soft state" seek to demonstrate the

extent to which the characteristics of traditional/feminine society have become predominant in state practices. For theorists of the "soft state," the task of modernization is not only that of ridding society of its tradition, softness, and "femininity," but also that of similarly changing the state: the modern state is the hardened, masculine state.

▲ Note

1. The role of the Cold War in shaping U.S. development theory and practice is explored in different ways by Packenham (1973) and Gendzier (1985).