The Military Revolution
The siege of Bautzen in 1620 illustrates the effect of canon on old-fashioned fortifications, characterized by high and thin walls. For one thing, the old-style walls permit the besieging forces to fire at the city from close proximity (notice the arcs of mortar shot raining down on Bautzen). As a result, the city suffered one of the worst fires in its history. In addition, the walls themselves were highly vulnerable to canon fire: high, thin walls were no match for the destructive velocity of an iron canonball, hitting at right angles from relatively close range.
The siege of Breisach in 1638 shows what was invovled in defending siegeworks from attack by a relief expedition. First, the siegeworks had to placed at great enough distance from the besieged town that they would not be exposed to contant artillery barrage from the town's fortifications. Beyond the siegeworks, however, an outward facing ring of fortifications was needed to prevent the siegeworks from coming under attack from behind. Every well-planned siege therefore faced two directions, both toward the besieged city and away from it.
The Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 illustrates the consequences of a failure to protect siegeworks against attacks by armies sent to relieve the beleaguered fortress or town. In July 1683, a force of 150,000 Ottoman troops under the command of the Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, laid siege to the Austrian capital and succeeded in capturing its outer fortifications. But a joint diplomatic campaign by the Emperor, Leopold I, and Pope Innocent XI succeeded in raising an army of relief, consisting of 80,000 troops from Poland, Lorraine, Bavaria, and numerous smaller German principalities. On the morning of September 12, the relief army attack the unprotected siegeworks, and after fifteen hours' fighting the Turkish siege army disintegrated. The Grand Vizier's failure to defend his siegeworks had caused a rout of staggering proportions. The defeat was exacerbated by the Turks' over-reliance on heavy artillery. Kara Mustafa had directed all his big cannons against the city, but they were too heavy to maneuver and were easily captured when the relief army charged.
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Image: The Siege of Vienna, 1683, Source: Atlas
van der Hagen, Koninklijke Bibliotheek.
Countermarch was first suggested by William Louis of Nassau in a letter to his cousin Maurice, written in Groningen on 8 December 1594. The Count, who had just read an account of the drill practised by the Roman army, argued that six rotating ranks of musketeers could replace the continuous hail of fire achieved by the javelin and sling-shot throwers of the Roman legions. In the event, ten ranks were needed at first to maintain constant fire, but musketry volleys soon became the standard battle tactic of European armies.
As a result of countermarch tactics, battlefields became much longer and the opposing armies more spread out. One of the first battles fought in the new manner was the Battle of Lützen in 1632. Before 1632, only the Swedish army under Gustavus Adolphus had perfected the new tactics, with spectacular victories against Imperial forces the typical result. At Lützen, however, both armies were arrayed in the new fashion, and the result was a draw. By coincidence, contemporary sketches of the battle lines at Lützen have survived. In this one, the Protestant (Swedish) side is at the top; two wagons are identified as the "munitions train of the enemy" (munitionswagen vom feind).
This battlefield illustration by Matthias Merian (1593-1650) depicts beautifully the new shape of the battlefield in the Thirty Years' War: a long, thin battle front, with the opposing armies stretched out for miles on end. It shows the Battle of Jankow, fought on 24 February 1645 in southern Bohemia, about 30 miles southeast of Prague, the capital city. The battle was a decisive victory for the Swedes.
