Sacrifice and the Semiotics of Power in *Der zerbrochene Krug*

Critics have often expressed puzzlement at the fact that Kleist's comedy *Der zerbrochene Krug* (1808) is dominated by so insignificant a prop as a ceramic pitcher decorated with scenes from Spanish imperial history.¹ This reaction is itself puzzling, given the prominence in antiquity of poetic descriptions of similar objects. Certainly Geßner's idyll of the same title (1756) locates Kleist's pitcher in the classical rhetorical tradition,² and the manner of its representation further suggests that its origins may be sought in the most revered of ekphrastic moments. When the peasant woman who owns the pitcher describes the damaged object before a court of law, her careful translation of its imagery into narrative sequence is reminiscent of Homer's verbal rendering of Achilles's shield. Yet the present relevance of the Homeric artifact is not limited to its formal aspects, for certain scenes on the shield, specifically those of a trial and a city under siege, become the setting of Kleist's play: the pitcher serves as physical evidence in a trial set in Holland at a time when the Netherlands were under blockade by the Spanish fleet.

The most specific similarity, however, is that in both legal disputes, the injured parties refuse offers of reparation. In Kleist's play, the father of the accused Ruprecht offers to replace the pitcher, but the irate Frau Marthe is unappeased, declaring that she will not be satisfied until the lad is severely disciplined ("Der Block ists, Peitschenhiebe, die es braucht, / Und auf den Scheiterhaufen das Gesindel," 494-95).³ In

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¹ This scholarly reception is documented by Ilse Graham.
² Salomon Geßner's "Der zerbrochene Krug" is an adaptation of Virgil's sixth Eclogue.
³ Quotations from *Der zerbrochene Krug* (Vol. I, pp. 173-244) are cited parenthetically by line number; other works are cited by volume and page number.

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Homer’s tale, similar implacability makes litigation necessary:

One man promised full restitution
In a public statement, but the other refused and would accept nothing.
Both then made for an arbitrator, to have a decision.

(Iliad, XVIII, 499-501)

The intransigence of the plaintiff on the shield is important not only because the disharmony it represents bodes ill for the shield’s bearer, but also, more generally, because it weighs directly on the social function of the trial. The purpose of the trial in Greece was not so much to punish a crime as to reestablish communal tranquility by enjoining the injured party to renounce vengeance. Aware that violent retribution tends to perpetuate violence by incurring reprisals, the Greeks sought ways to defuse vengeance by creating harmless outlets for the passions of the vindictive. René Girard has discussed the important role that sacrifice played in this legal system, addressing the paradox that the sacrificial rite, however bloody, was in fact a means for stemming violence—for protecting the community from its own destructive tendencies (8). Sacrifice provided the community with a means for deflecting violence away from its own members onto a substitute victim, a scapegoat whose isolation from the group enabled aggression to be channeled out of the community. The Greek version of the surrogate victim was the pharmakos, usually a slave or prisoner selected for his physical repulsiveness and either killed or, more commonly, expelled from town in a symbolic act of purgation. The most sublime of pharmakoi is Oedipus himself, a king transformed into a hideous figure and driven out of Thebes in order to rid the city of plague (Burkert 64-65).

As a judge presiding over what evolves into his own prosecution, Adam in Der zerbrochene Krug is a literary descendent of Oedipus, as many critics, taking their cue from Kleist’s Vorrede, have suggested. He is also descended from his biblical namesake, as the opening dialogue makes all too explicit, and this ancestry has likewise figured significantly in the play’s critical reception. What has not been explored with regard to Der zerbrochene Krug is the role of sacrifice, possibly the most important point of tangency between the biblical and classical traditions and, as I will suggest, the ground on which these mythical tracts intersect in Kleist’s comedy. The thesis here is that the crime on trial is tyrannicide (and, by implication, patricide)—an act not actually performed, but sublimated through the breaking of the pitcher. A symbol of the feudal structure, the pitcher is a surrogate for Adam, whose patriarchal authority is a remnant of that order. The function of the object is that of sacrificial victim, used by the community to direct aggression away

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5 See Wolfgang Schadewalt.
from their local despot. Yet in the course of the play, a second act of sacrificial substitution occurs that makes Adam the surrogate victim for authority per se. Adam, the patriarchal tyrant, is replaced by Walter, the enlightened jurist, whose feigned paternity masks a power less personal and more absolute than that of his predecessor. The outcome of the play is conciliatory, and Walter expresses the hope that there will be a place for Adam in the new order. The action moves from a vicious crossfire of threats and accusations to an atmosphere of harmony, a development facilitated by the ritual behavior. Ritual sacrifice has the function of promoting solidarity among the participants, yet the sacrifice of a tyrant does not necessarily signal the end of tyranny, but may instead represent the substitution of one kind of repression for another, i.e., the tyranny of one becomes the tyranny of the collective (Horkheimer and Adorno 28). Much as Das Erdbeben in Chili demonstrates how readily the people enable the old order to reassert itself following total upheaval, Der zerbrochene Krug explains the continuity of society before and after revolution. The common referent is neither the Santiago earthquake of 1647 nor the question of Dutch independence, but the more recent French Revolution, and Kleist’s burlesque handling of the return of tyranny after the revolution dramatizes Marx’s statement (Der achttzunte Brumaire) that whenever history repeats itself, tragedy is reincarnated as farce (115).

Der zerbrochene Krug is a comical treatment of tragic material, and not only because of Kleist’s adoption of the Oedipus myth. It may be objected that the play lacks the gravity of the aforementioned novella, which like so many of Kleist’s works is generously strewn with corpses. But this distinction draws attention to a less obvious but equally essential feature of this comedy, namely its ominous undercurrent of violence. The potential for brutality is evident from Adam’s physical wounds, the attempted suicide of another corrupt judge, and perhaps more than anything else, the unremitting ferocity of Frau Marthe’s language. The trial is in large measure a confrontation between Marthe’s savagery and the civil institution of the court, or more abstractly, between nature and civilization. This opposition is appropriate to Sophoclean tragedy, the overwhelming concern of which Charles Segal has identified as the tension between law and nature, between man’s “power to transcend the physical and biological necessities which surround his life and his immanent position within those necessities” (4). The difficult relationship between natural necessity and civil society was a matter of debate during and after the Enlightenment, and it is through this historical period that the problematic enters the play. Walter’s mission is to bring the provincial courts into consonance with principles of the Enlightenment, a trend of which Adam declares himself aware:
Die Welt, sagt unser Sprichwort, wird stets klüger,  
Und alles liest, ich weiß, den Puffendorf.  

(311-12)

The reference to Puffendorf, one of the first to advance a concept of nature which subsumed law and necessity, provides a point of contrast: whereas the Greeks of Sophocles’s time understood civilization as the fruit of an ongoing struggle against man’s bestial origins, Puffendorf saw human society as a provision of nature. The idea that nature was the author of social order enjoyed much currency during the Enlightenment, and it was only in the context of the French Revolution, which many defended as the inevitable eruption of long-repressed nature, that the antinomy of nature and society was revived. The post-Enlightenment view resembles the proto-anthropology of fifth-century Greece in that nature is granted a liberating potential in the face of social repression (Segal 5).

It is nature that threatens society in *Der zerbrochene Krug*. The animal origins of Frau Marthe’s violent passions are clearly exposed in a Medea-like threat to Eve in which she represents herself as a beast of prey:

> Dir weis ich noch einmal, wenn wir allein sind,  
> Die Zähne! Wart! Du weißt noch nicht, wo mir  
> Die Haare wachsen!  

(951-53)

This bestiality is one component of Adam’s dual character, who as half-man and half-beast embodies both the state and its object. His lack of self-restraint engenders the chaos, and the rule of reason that brings it under control simply represents a more efficient means of bridling natural impulses. The *telos* of the play is the scene in which the townspeople, now reconciled, gather at the window collectively to mock Adam as he flees the community. By expelling the beast among them, they exorcise their own animal natures, thereby purging themselves of the liberating force within them. Their surrender of power to an outsider conforms to the conservative notion of the voluntary alienation of natural right, and Adam’s expulsion is emblematic of what Edmund Burke held to be one of the fundamental rules of civil society, namely “*that no man should be judge in his own cause*” (15).

The functional counterpart to myth in the play is the superstition of the local peasants, exemplified by Frau Brigitte’s testimony that she saw Satan fleeing the scene of the scuffle. Her account demonstrates how certain traditional societies attribute man’s animalistic behavior

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6 Compare Fichte: “… der zurückgehaltene Gang der Natur bricht gewaltsam durch und vernichtet alles, was ihm im Wege steht, die Menschheit rächt sich auf das grausamste an ihren Unterdrückern, Revolutionen werden notwendig” (163-64).
to outside, sometimes supernatural powers. Adam, a lusty type with a marked predilection for wine, is a truly Bacchic figure, and Brigitte's tale serves to highlight his animal traits further. Finding the print of his club foot in the snow, she takes it to be a horse's hoof and thus a sign of the devil, thought to have one human foot and one animal hoof. In addition, she has discovered a "monument" ("Denkmal") beneath a tree where Adam had stopped to defecate. These characteristics—the horse's hoof and lack of control over the bodily functions—link Adam to the mythical figure of the satyr, that hybrid of man and beast employed in Greek drama to represent the conflict between nature and society, between human savagery and rational self-control. That Adam is conscious of his own dual nature is suggested when, after being reminded that he had succumbed to "nature's call" the previous night, he decries the beast within, cursing that part of his body which, in satyrs, is that of a goat or horse: "Verflucht mein Unterleib" (1774).

Der zerbrochene Krug is a veritable satyr-play, not only because Adam himself has the characteristics of a satyr, but also in the play's comic embedding of tragic potential. Adam's club foot symbolizes his ambivalent nature as man and beast and thus reveals the origin of his transgression. This kind of deformity is a common motif in tragedy and is often an instrument of anagnorisis, the discovery of one's own identity. Writing on baroque martyr-drama, Walter Benjamin states that in tragedy, shame and physical deformity are of the same origin: "die Schmach entdeckt, indem sie zur Abstrafung des Geschmachten herausfordert, ihren Ursprung in einem physischen Defekt" (83). Benjamin makes no reference, but he could well be alluding to Oedipus, whose own shame is disclosed in the etymology of his name, which means "Swell-foot." Segal writes: "To learn the truth of his name is, as he says in the end, to pronounce 'the names of all the evils there are'" (243). This could just as well be said of Adam, who is aware from the outset of the truth of his name, a truth borne in his foot which, as Licht notes, "ohnehin schwer den Weg zur Sünde wandelt" (24). It is important that Ruprecht, to whom Adam successfully transfers his guilt, and in whom the Oedipal conflict is played out, assumes the physical stigmata, not only verbally reenacting Oedipus's self-blinding ("Ich hätte meine Augen hingegen," 1032), but also calling the curse of the deformed foot upon himself: "Daß mir der Fuß erlahmte!" (2253). It is Ruprecht, after all, who discovers that his rival in love, a man he has struck with a dagger-like object (984 fl.), is a father-figure. Eve is, by virtue of her name, Adam's symbolic wife and Ruprecht's symbolic mother. The breaking of the pitcher marks the assault on the father and the symbolic destruction of the feudal order depicted on it, representing the coincidence of patricide and regicide. The same conflict is
realized in the actual defacement of the pitcher, which results in political emasculation ("Die Schwerter unten sind jetzt weggeschlagen," 665), and the emperor himself becomes the substitute victim for one of his knights who retains his phallic instrument, if only briefly:

Hier im Gefolge stützt sich Philipp,
Für den den Stoß der Kaiser aufgefangen,
Noch auf das Schwert; doch jetzt muß er fallen.

(661-63)

Licht, the court scribe, serves as the interpreter of myth while Walter, emissary of reason that he is, finds the superstition of the local people appalling ("Blödsinnig Volk, das!" 1700). Licht then redeems Brigitte’s story by suggesting that it is based on fact, even though her interpretation of the facts is far-fetched:

Daß es der Teufel war, behaupt ich nicht;
Jedoch mit Pferdefuß, und kahler Glätze
Und hinten Dampf, wenn ich nicht sehr mich irre,
Hats seine völlige Richtigkeit! —Fahrt fort!

(1705-08)

Licht’s role is one of demystification. He accepts Brigitte’s story as an etiological myth, an attempt to explain natural phenomena in supernatural terms. His collaboration with Brigitte, the myth-maker, demonstrates how the Enlightenment incorporated myth rather than abolishing it. As the custodian of the written word, Licht functions allegorically to illustrate how writing works to undermine patriarchal authority and relocate power in a less visible—and hence more effective—structure, namely bureaucracy. At the close of the play, Adam has been suspended, Walter is about to leave, and Licht, the sycophantic functionary, is left to administer a now pacified community. The fact that power has come to reside with such an innocuous and unimposing figure illustrates how writing cannot be an effective tool of state unless it is relatively invisible. This is where Adam fails and Walter succeeds. Adam’s fall is precipitated by his attempt to use writing to deceive the illiterate, an act that draws attention to the arbitrary authority underlying all signification. His action leads directly to the breaking of the pitcher, an icon of the feudal order of which he is thought to be a personal extension. The ruined vessel marks the absence of the social structure Adam signifies, and the net result of his failed attempt at deception is to publicize the fact that his deeds are sanctioned by no other authority than his own. As long as faith in that order is intact, Adam is, to use the vocabulary of eighteenth-century semiotics, a “natural sign,” a figure that, like the jug, creates the illusion of presence—in this case the presence of a social structure long since vanished. His loss of power derives from his inability to sustain that illusion, and the reestablishment of order will depend on the restoration of a visual iconography that convincingly represents
some transcendent principle. This is accomplished by Walter’s gift of the gold coins, which are received not merely as signs, but as embodiments of divine truth. Walter uses the coins to displace authority away from himself and onto the highest power of all, namely God, thereby strengthening a power he pretends not to have. This renewed faith in the presence of ultimate authority in all of its intermediaries enables Walter to delegate that power to Licht and thus to govern by proxy.

Licht’s own machinations become apparent in the opening scene when he finds the battered Adam sitting on the floor and presents him with a mirror to examine his head wounds. This constitutes the first accusation, for the mirror represents Adam’s peculiar double role as judge and wrongdoer. The possibility that Adam himself could become the object of vengeance is suggested when Licht compares him to the most common of biblical sacrificial animals:

Ein Schaf, das, eingehetzt von Hunden, sich
Durch Dornen drängt, läßt nicht mehr Wolle sitzen,
Als Ihr, Gott weiß wo? Fleisch habt sitzen lassen.

(39-41)

The course of the play sees Adam at pains to resist the self-reference of the mirror by projecting the blame for his transgressions onto surrogate victims. When Licht insinuates that Adam has been wounded in a duel, the scapegoat Adam finds is a literal one, as he insists that he hurt himself falling against a stove-ornament shaped like a goatshead:

Gefecht! Was! — Mit dem verfluchten Ziegenbock.
Am Ofen focht ich, wenn Ihr wollt. Jetzt weiß ichs.

(50-51)

Adam repeatedly, though unwittingly, reestablishes the connection between the sacrificial animal and himself. He refers to Walter, whose arrival he is nervously anticipating, as “der wackre Mann, der selbst / Sein Schäfchen schiert” (79-80), implicating himself as the sheep. Later, in what seems an allusion by Kleist to the Greek bouphonia, Adam bemoans his own carelessness with the exclamation: “Ich . . . müßt ein Ochs gewesen sein” (548-49). But when it becomes apparent that Ruprecht is a suitable surrogate, Adam casts him in the role of the ox: “Steht nicht der Esel, wie ein Ochse, da?” (865). And when the blame is displaced further onto Lebrecht, he becomes the “scapegoat,” as Adam asks Ruprecht: “Wie oft traßt du den Sündenbock?” (1538). Since it was actually Adam whom Ruprecht struck, “Sündenbock” is self-referential, indicating that this chain of substitutions will ultimately lead back to the judge.

The interchangeability of the sacrificial animal, which suggests a fusion of mythical traditions, finds comic treatment when Adam, forced to explain why his wig is missing, tells Licht that his cat had a litter of kittens in it:

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In meine [Perücke] hätt die Katze heute morgen
Gejungt, das Schwein!
(242-43)

His subsequent promise to drown the black kittens ("Die schwarzen will ich in der Vecht ersäufen," 247) suggests a sacrificial rite grounded in popular superstition, and the whole episode creates a contiguity between wig and victim. This metonymy is crucial to the understanding of the play, for if Adam is a sacrificial lamb, then the wig acts as his sheepskin. It is one of the means by which physical characteristics are transferred from Adam to his substitute victims and as such serves as a comical version of a biblical motif. Girard discusses the passage in Genesis where Jacob, in order to receive Isaac's blessing, dons goatskins to deceive his blind father into believing that he is his hairier brother Esau, who has actually been designated for the blessing. The goats, which have been slaughtered and eaten in a reenactment of the animal sacrifice that saved Isaac's life as a boy, are the victims of the violence which would have befallen Jacob had his trickery been uncovered. This episode illustrates what Girard identifies as the requisite misunderstanding involved in the sacrificial rite: if the sacrifice is to fulfill its purpose, a degree of confusion must exist between the original object and its surrogate (Girard 5ff). In Kleist's play, it is Adam himself who suggests the possibility of such confusion. When he expresses doubt that a local farmer has actually seen Walter approaching, he notes the anonymity his own baldness affords him:

Wer weiß, wen der trieflugige Schuft gescha.
Die Kerle unterscheiden ein Gesicht
Von einem Hinterkopf nicht, wenn er kahl ist.
Setzt einen Hut dreieckig auf mein Rohr,
Hängt ihm den Mantel um, zwei Stiefeln drunter,
So hätt so'n Schubäck ihn für wen Ihr wollt.
(85-90)

Yet Adam's baldness is a mixed blessing, for while the absence of his wig may efface his own identity, it makes him the likely recipient of the identities of others, meaning that he himself is the ideal scapegoat. The implication is that Adam and Walter are interchangeable, i.e., that the farmer could have seen Adam and mistaken him for Walter, and indeed Walter assumes Adam's patriarchal role in the end.

The wig is Adam's device for causing his surrogate victims to be mistaken for him. He uses it to implicate Ruprecht, whom he had employed to take the wig to Utrecht for refurbishing, and eventually Saan himself. Adam is already disposed to convict "Beelzebub" (1752), and, in one of the play's funniest moments, he defends his view that the devil occasionally wears a wig for purposes of disguise:

Wir wissen hierzuland nur unvollkommen,
Was in der Hölle Mod ist, Frau Brigitte!

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Man sagt, gewöhnlich trägt er eignes Haar.
Doch auf der Erde, bin ich überzeugt,
Wirft er in die Perücke sich, um sich
Den Honoratioren beizumischen.

(1833-38)

The wig is the means by which guilt is transferred from Adam to his scapegoats, and it is also the vehicle through which his own guilt is returned to him. The action culminates when Licht places the wig on Adam's head, exclaiming that it fits as if it were his own hair, thus in effect reuniting the sheep with its skin. The accusatory motif of the mirror reappears, and once again, Adam stands before himself, the accused before the judge:

LICHT. Hm! Die Perücke paßt Euch doch, mein Seel,
Als wär auf Euren Scheiteln sie gewachsen.

Er setzt sie ihm auf.

ADAM. Verleumdung!

LICHT. Nicht?

ADAM. Als Mantel um die Schultern
Mir noch zu weit, wie viel mehr um den Kopf.

Er bezieht sich im Spiegel.

(1859-62)

Yet while Adam's wig may be a figure of culpability, it is debatable whether it represents Adam's guilt alone. His claim to Walter that the hairpiece had gone up in flames "wie Sodom und Gomorrha" (1497), suggests that it is a carrier of collective guilt, and it seems possible that Adam has become the scapegoat for evils that transcend his own crimes, much as the biblical Adam embodies the sins of humanity. The Christian overtones of Licht's comparison of Adam to "Ein Schaf, das ... sich / Durch Dornen drängt" (39-40) also suggest that Adam is to suffer for the sins of others. In this vein, it is significant that Frau Marthe's initial accusation is not aimed solely at Ruprecht, but collectively at Ruprecht, Eve, and Veit, as indicated by her emphatic use of the plural: "Ihr krugzertrümmmerndes Gesindel, ihr!" (413). Thus in her first utterance of the play, Marthe describes the pitcher as a victim of communal violence.

Marthe's relationship to the pitcher is discussed by Ilse Graham (1977), who observes her tendency to confuse the pitcher with what it represents, i.e., with what it is not. Graham interprets this as a sign of Frau Marthe's inability to distinguish between material objects and ethical or spiritual concerns, contending that the literal-minded Marthe does not know that greater things are at issue than a broken jug (29). Yet when Graham and other critics see this absorption in a trivial object as grounds for impugning either Marthe's conceptual sophistication or Kleist's skill as a dramatist, they ignore an ancient sacrificial tradition in which even the most insignificant article often substitutes
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for something sacred. In his account of the Athenian ritual of the dipolieia, the Greek geographer Pausanias describes how an inanimate object functions to deflect vengeance away from its appropriate human victim:

The Athenians place on the altar of Zeus Polieus barley mixed with wheat, and then leave the food unguarded. The ox, which they prepare and guard for the sacrifice, approaches the altar and eats some of the cereals. They call one of the priests ox-slayer [bouphinos], who after killing the ox and throwing the axe beside the altar—for this is the tradition—flees the country. And as though they did not know who committed the deed, they bring the axe to trial.2

This passage illustrates—indeed the last sentence articulates—what Walter Burkert has called the “as if” element in ritual (Burkert 45ff.) The primary purpose of the ensuing trial is not to find a victim, but to enhance communication among the participants: the axe succeeds as a substitute for the ox-slayer because the community, in imitation of an established pattern, agrees to accept it as such. Girard too posits a certain willful misunderstanding involved in sacrificial substitution: while the original victim and its surrogate must resemble each other in some way (in the above example the connection is made through metonymy), the confusion of the two objects must never be total; if the community forgets completely that the scapegoat is different from the original victim, then the ritual will not serve its function of protecting the latter (10).

Just as the Athenians behave “as though they did not know who committed the deed,” so does Frau Marthe act as if she believed that the breaking of the pitcher were of central importance. I contend, contrary to Graham, that Marthe knows precisely what is at issue here, and that by investing the whole of her anger in the object, she manages to insulate herself from crises with which she could not otherwise cope. She herself indicates that there is a mechanism of concealment at work when she declares “Die Nacht von gestern birgt ein anderes / Verbrechen noch, als bloß die Krugverwüstung” (1305-06). She knows full well that the real issue is her daughter’s honor, as she herself says (“Dein guter Name lag in diesem Topfe,” 490). The pitcher is the only thing that stands between Marthe and her daughter, who would otherwise be subject to the brunt of her mother’s anger. Its function as surrogate victim is most evident in Marthe’s verbal and physical reaction to Eve’s denial that Ruprecht broke the vessel:

Hör, dir zerschlag ich alle Knochen!
Sis setzt den Krug nieder.
(1199)

2 Quoted in Stamatis Philippides 73, Philippides’s translation. The relevance of Philippides’s important study for my essay is by no means limited to this quotation.
We see that the pitcher enables Marthe to sublimate her anger, as well as the potential danger presented by the absence of the scapegoat. Once the pitcher has been set aside, all that can protect Eve is Walter’s stern admonition “Frau Marthe!,” which he delivers threateningly (“drohend,” 1201). His constant efforts to redirect the attention of the court to the pitcher (“Zur Sache hier. Vom Krug ist die Rede,” 1320) not only represent his own desire to protect the honor of the court, but are commensurate as well with the social function of the trial: to avert chaos. Others join him in this effort, and everyone seems to have a vested interest in keeping the pitcher at the center of attention. Prior to the trial, Adam persistently queries Eve if anything other than the pitcher is to be adjudicated:

| ADAM. Ists nur der Krug dort, den die Mutter hält, |
| Den ich, soviel—? |
| EVE. Ja, der zerbrochne Krug nur. |
| ADAM. Und weiter nichts? |
| EVE. Nichts weiter. |
| ADAM. Nichts? Gewiß nicht? |

(523-25)

When Walter instructs Adam to inquire as to the “Gegenstand” of the complaint, by which he means the “subject” in question, Adam identifies the “object” instead: “Das ist gleichfalls ein Krug, verzeiht” (395). The subject/object connection he is bent on obscuring is of course that between himself and the pitcher, and his strategy is to treat it as an object unto itself. He is not alone in this. When Marthe describes the images on the pitcher, she imputes to it a certain self-consciousness; she describes one of King Philip’s aunts, of whom nothing remains but a raised handkerchief, as if she were crying for herself (“So ists, als weinete sie über sich,” 660). Eve is equally reluctant to turn her attention away from the pitcher, insisting that to tell who broke it would require her to touch on secrets “dem Kruge völlig fremd” (1270). This merging of subject and object receives its finest formulation in Veit’s use of the reflexive form when he declares, “Ich war daheim, als sich der Krug zerschlug” (1378), as if the pitcher had broken itself.

What has been described so far is a communal effort to resist the symbolic nature of the pitcher. Like the surrogate victim of sacrifice, the pitcher can function effectively only if the signifying role it performs is concealed. As long as Marthe does not distinguish between the object and the order depicted on it, that order is not threatened. But as a ruin, the political icon no longer manifests that order, but announces its demise instead. It has become an allegory, a sign that marks not the presence but the absence of whatever it represents. The pitcher’s

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8 Compare Adam: “auf der Flucht zerschlagen sich die Krüge” (1350).
allegorical function is underscored by the tendency of the characters to emphasize the nothingness of the object. When Adam asks Licht what all the uproar is about, he replies “Lärm um nichts; Lappalien. / Es ist ein Krug zerbrochen worden, hör ich” (504-05). When Adam assures Marthe that he and Walter indeed behold the pitcher, she retorts: “Nichts seh ihr, mit Verlaub, die Scherben seh ihr” (646). But Adam, against his own intention, articulates the allegorical nature of the object when he rebukes Marthe for describing the various scenes depicted on the jug:

Uns geht das Loch — nichts die Provinzen an,
Die darauf übergeben worden sind.

(677-78)

The word “Loch” is multi-referential, and through it Kleist links the object to the two individuals for whom it is substituting, Adam and Eve. “Loch” denotes not only the hole in the pitcher, but also the wound in Adam’s head (“ein böses Loch . . . im Kopf, das!” 1458). And since Eve’s maidenly virtue is in question, “Loch” has a strong erotic connotation as well.

But the pitcher also represents something else, namely the feudal order depicted on it, an order of which Adam is a vestige. Both he and Marthe have a stake in protecting that order, and she demands the kind of swift and harsh justice that only such a tyrant can mete out. The breaking of the pitcher represents the destruction of feudal society, and Marthe’s appeal to absolute justice for reparation constitutes a desire to restore that order. Since the pitcher also depicted the transfer among Spanish rulers of the Dutch provinces, the desire for an unbroken pitcher amounts to nostalgia for Spanish dominance. The parallel between the broken pitcher and the fragmented empire is voiced by Eve in her explanation of Spain’s attempt to reestablish tyranny:³

Dena der Hispanier

Versöhnt sich mit dem Niederländer nicht,
Und die Tyrannenrute will er wieder
Sich, die zerbrochene, zusammenbinden.

(Variant, 1962-63)

By creating an apposition between the jug and the kind of physical punishment Marthe so fervently advocates, Eve’s whip-metaphor makes explicit the object’s function as an instrument of tyranny and demonstrates the sort of brutality that effective political symbolism renders unnecessary.

The connection between the feudal order on the pitcher and Adam’s local authority is made through the figure of the Holy Roman Emperor

³ See Wolfgang Wittkowski.
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himself. Marthe describes his shattered image:

Hier im Ornat stand Kaiser Karl der fünfte:
Von dem seht ihr nur noch die Beine stehn.

(651-32)

That Adam's authority derives from that same order is apparent when Adam speaks to Walter about provincial legal practices which, he notes, have been customary since the reign of the same emperor portrayed on the jug ("Seit Kaiser Karl dem fünften," 310). A more substantial reference to an absolute ruler comes just prior to Walter's arrival when Adam entreats the opportunistic Licht not to seek advancement by exposing the judge's minor corruptions:

Zu seiner Zeit, Ihr wisst, schwieg auch der große
Demosthenes. Folgt hierin seinem Muster.
Und bin ich König nicht von Mazedonien,
Kann ich auf meine Art doch dankbar sein.

(142-43)

Adam's comparison of himself to Philip of Macedonia is significant because like Adam, Philip was lame, and also because he died at the hands of an assassin (cf. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars). The similarity highlights the difference (and thus the suppressed potential of the situation), namely that Adam is never assassinated. Instead, that act is sublimated through the breaking of the jug, in which another Philip—King of Spain and ruler of the Dutch provinces—has been symbolically deposed. The analogy between Licht and Demosthenes is of further significance in that the Athenian rhetorician was himself not wholly free of corruption, hence the noted silence. The association of Licht with Demosthenes and Kreon tarnishes the scribe, and Wittkowsk's suggestion that his name echoes that of Lucifer provides an intriguing counterpoint to the more obvious affinity between "Licht" and Enlightenment (117). Licht shows his daemonic side when he encourages Brigitte in her pursuit of the devil, nurturing popular superstition as part of his bid for power. The successful transition from feudal to "enlightened" rule will require that the shattered pitcher be replaced by an icon of equal mythic force.

The function of the pitcher is totemic, both in the social order it guarantees and in the disorientation caused by its loss. The destruction of its imagery, as the effacement of the sign, is the essence of the Enlightenment, for myth owed its power to the convergence of sign and image. The separation of sign and image makes explicit the role of language as an instrument of domination, and truth, now wholly disembodied, becomes the privileged charge of its managers and an object of faith for everyone else: the naked sign requires naked power
(Horkheimer and Adorno 23-26). In Der zerbrochene Krug, language is at once a tool of power and the instrument of its own undoing. Eve’s illiteracy enables Adam to deceive her regarding the contents of a conscription order, as she later testifies (“Wenn er log, ihr Herrn, konnt ichs nicht prüfen, / Ich müßte seinem Wort vertraun,” 2151-52). He fortifies her trust, however, by exploiting the physical qualities of the written document—the crinkling of the paper (“Hörst du es knackern, Evchen?” 531) and the official style of the lettering (“Frakturschrift” 529). Faith in official language is the one thing Marthe lacks, as is made clear in her dialogue with Veit at the beginning of Scene 6. Here she voices great skepticism towards the words “entscheiden,” “ersetzen,” and “entschädigen,” legal abstractions that become meaningless when measured against their concrete lexical components. For example, “Entscheiden” (“to decide”), disintegrates into “un-divide,” which, as far as her jug is concerned, is impossible:

Hier wird entschieden werden, daß geschieden
Der Krug mir bleiben soll.

(420-21)

Graham reads this as simple-minded reductionism, a further indication of Marthe’s inability to understand abstract concepts (29). However, this view would tend to grant legitimacy to bureaucratic language and thus to the power it exercises over people like Marthe. Would it not be more plausible to reverse the terms of the argument and see in Marthe’s attitude a critique of such language? Because the authority that discursive language implies depends on trust, it is more absolute, yet at the same time also more precarious. Marthe’s distrust of the language of power means that the authorities are in danger of losing their grip.

It is Adam, then, who undermines his own authority by using writing as a means of dominating the illiterate. The very etymology of “conscription,” a word introduced in France at a time when tyranny was being revived (1798), suggests a special cooperation between writing and domination. Adam gains entry to Eve’s bedroom under the pretext of having to complete a medical statement that would free Ruprecht from military service, though sex is what he has in mind. The ostensible task at hand, filling in a blank space on a page, becomes a metaphor for intercourse, and Adam’s conversation with Eve in the garden, which

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9 Claude Lévi-Strauss describes an Indian tribal chief who, though himself illiterate, imitates writing because he is aware of the power it implies and the awe it inspires in his people. The ultimate result, however, is that the people abandon their chief once they are aware of the deceit (339-39). See also Jacques Derrida’s criticism of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of the incident, 101 ff.

she later narrates, reads like a seduction scene:

"Der Schein ist fertig, ge- und unterschrieben,
Datiert, besiegelt auch, und in der Mitte
Ein Platz, so groß just, wie ein Tümpel, offen;
Den füll ich jetzt mit Dinte aus, so ists
Ein Schein, nach allen Regeln, wie du brauchst."—
Doch ich: wo will Er in der Nacht, Herr Richter,
Hier untern Birnbaum auch den Platz erfüllen?—
"Gotts Menschenkind auch, unvernünftiges!"
Spricht er; "du hast ja in der Kammer Licht,
Und Dint und Feder führ ich in der Tasche.
Fort! Zwei Minuten brauchts, so ists geschehn."

( VARIANT, 2176-86)

Adam succeeds because the figural meaning of his words, as he well knows, is lost on Eve. But his manipulation of her through language soon works to his disadvantage. It is he, after all, who breaks the pitcher, an event that allegorizes the supersession of the visual icon by the written word.\(^\text{12}\)

Walter repairs the damage Adam has done by reuniting the image with the sign. In order to convince the now skeptical Eve that the militia into which Ruprecht has been drafted is not bound for Asia, he gives her twenty gold pieces to foster her confidence in his word. The coins bear the image of the King of Spain, the patron of Walter’s honor, the same monarch whose image on the pitcher had been broken:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Vollwichtig, neugeprägte Gulden sind}, \\
\text{Sieh her, das Anilz hier des Spanierkönigs:} \\
\text{Meinst du, daß dich der König wird betrügen?}
\end{align*}\]

( VARIANT, 2369-71)

One suspects here an allusion to the French Revolution, specifically to the controversy surrounding the paper money \textit{(assignat)} introduced in

\(^{12}\) The form of the imagery on the pitcher is as important as its historical content and identifies the object as a political icon of the kind ancient regimes used to communicate with their illiterate populations. The structure of the jug’s iconography resembles that of Roman monuments erected to publicize the acquisition of new territories; the most famous of these is perhaps Trajan’s column, whose pictorial relief proclaims the emperor’s conquest of the province of Dacia. Like this and similar monuments, the pitcher represents not only the central event, but also groups of acclaiming observers, their numbers increasing and their rank diminishing the farther they stand from the celebrated figure. The object of acclaim is the transfer of the Dutch provinces by Charles V to his son Philip on the occasion of the latter’s coronation. Marthe’s narration moves from the central event to Philip’s two aunts, both of them queens, and then to an entourage ("Gefolge") of dignitaries, including Philipbert, Maximilian II, and the archbishop. They are followed by a crowd of bodyguards amassed in the background ("im Grunde . . . dicht gedrängt"). The whole scene is surrounded by the houses of Brussels (from which only one curious onlooker is still visible), the anonymous abodes of the subordinate populace. Her telling of the pitcher’s history is a continuation of her description of its imagery, and the series of owners she describes are extensions of the figures on it—one last file of celebrants at Philip’s coronation. Cf. Brilliant 90 ff.

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1789 by the Jacobins to replace the *louis d’or*. The new scrip was meant to symbolize the gold it did not contain, and as such, the symbol of a symbol.\footnote{The common habit of confusing gold for that which it “signifies” had been discussed by Adam Smith 406,418.} The *assignat* created general distrust, partly because of the missing gold and partly because the notes could be so easily counterfeited (an especially common practice among the royalists).\footnote{Cf. Goethe’s observations on the *assignat* in his *Campagne in Frankreich*, entry of October 13, 1792 (278-89).} Through his forgery of the conscription notice Adam erodes public confidence (“Ein Wisch, / Den er mit eignen Händen aufgesetzt!” 1930-31); Walter restores that trust with the gold, which Eve accepts not as a sign of truth but as truth itself:

\begin{quote}
Ob Ihr mir die Wahrheit gäbt? O scharffeprägte,
Und Gottes leuchtend Anditz drauf. O Jesus!
Dass ich nicht solche Münze mehr erkenne!
\end{quote}

(Variant, 2375-77)

In substituting the twenty guilders for the conscription order, Walter has replaced the written word with a form of representation that creates the illusion of presence and thus conceals its reliance on authority.

Power, then, is maintained by means of a symbolic iconography, the effectiveness of which depends upon a certain transparency. Just as Eve fails to see the symbolic nature of the gold (i.e., its exchange value), so, too, she is blind to the fact that Adam is but a representative of the institutional order—an insight that would endanger the institution itself. Before the gift of the coins, however, there is a moment when Eve’s distrust of Adam translates into a general diffidence towards all authorities. The following bit of dialogue, initiated by Eve’s claim that Ruprecht’s militia is destined for some disease-ridden corner of Asia Minor, makes clear that her distrust of Walter is tantamount to a suspicion of language, the function of which is to conceal:

\begin{quote}
WALTER. Davon weiß ich kein Wort.
EVE. Gestrenger Herr,
Ich weiß, Ihr seid verbunden, so zu reden.
WALTER. Auf meine Pflicht!
EVE. Gut, gut. Auf Eure Pflicht.
Und die ist, uns, was wahr ist, zu verbergen.
\end{quote}

(Variant, 2063-66)

This precedes the revelation that Adam has deceived her, and her distrust is born of the awareness that writing has a capacity for secrecy: “Ich sah den Brief . . ., die geheime Instruktion” (2067-69).

Walter endears himself to the people by creating the illusion that he is more than just a representative of the regime, and this he accomplishes
by appealing to the feudalistic frame of mind according to which power resides in the individual personality of the ruler. From this perspective, to change the leader is to change the order. This is the age of absolutism, however, and while the people think they are replacing a corrupt judge with an honest one, they are in fact substituting one sign of power for another. The ideology of absolutism held that authority rested with the institution, viewing the head of state as replaceable. The gift of the coins is a ploy that serves to "humanize" Walter (the visage of the king vouchsafes his own "menschliche Züge"), hiding the fact that he is but a mediator of abstract power (Wittkowski 121). The masquerade is complete when Walter, promising to return in a year for Eve's wedding, gives her a fatherly kiss while Ruprecht cheers him on: "Und einen tichtig [Kuß]. So. Das ist brav." (2379). Walter replaces Adam, to whose rivalry Ruprecht had reacted with murderous zeal, and the youth's approving response to the kiss suggests that the aforementioned Oedipal conflict has been resolved through the formation of a superego, that is, through the internalization of alien constraints. The result is that the two things which once seemed indispensable, Adam and the pitcher, have become replaceable. The play closes with Marthe expressing her intention to go to Utrecht, the seat of central power, to seek a replacement for her jug.

The club-foot and the wig collaborate in Adam's betrayal and mark him as a sacrificial victim. One of these two objects is natural, the other cultural. Whereas Adam's deformed foot associates him with physical necessity, the wig indicates his rank within the social hierarchy. It is the wig that establishes a tangible connection between Adam and the pitcher, which already symbolizes his authority. His visit to Eve's bedroom seems a demonstration of that authority, an exercise of the patriarchal prerogative of *primae noctis*. As Eve narrates later, Adam removes his wig, and as if to sanction that feudal rite, places it directly upon the jug, establishing a contiguity between himself and the icon of the old order.  

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13 Similar objects played an iconic role in a sacrificial tradition described by Robert Graves in which kings were artificially lamed at their coronations. In a ceremony conceived as a mock assassination, the hair of the king-to-be was tied to a tree branch, and one foot was fastened to a beast while the other was held stationary. The animal was then led a short distance, causing the hip to dislocate in such a way that the king could never again place his heel on the ground. Among the lame sacrificial kings Graves places in this tradition are Jacob (lamed while wrestling with the angel), Absalom, Hephaestus (the smith-god who fashioned Achilles's shield), Tantalus, and even Jesus, who Graves believes was lame. The heel was thought to be the seat of divine authority and thus forbidden to touch the ground. Kings wore special shoes to this end, and one of the earliest myths Graves recounts is that of Llew Llaw, a martyred shoemaker (332-34). In *Der zerbrochene König*, Lebrecht is a cobbler.

16 While it may be argued that this occurs only in the Variant, Adam refers obliquely to the same event in Scene 7: "für sich. Verflucht! Ich kann mich nicht dazu entschließen—! / —Es klirrte etwas, da ich Abschied nahm — . . . Ich hatte sie behutsam draufgehängt" (543-46, 548).
SEMiotics of POWER in KLEIST

Er... nimmt sich die Perücke färmlieh ab,
Und hängt, weil der Perückenstock ihm fehlt,
Sie auf den Krug dort.

(Variant, 2209-11)

The symbolic is hereby augmented by the metonymic. Much as in sacrifice animal skins create confusion between the original victim and its surrogate, the common feature of the wig renders Adam and the pitcher interchangeable. Adam and the pitcher alternate as objects of Ruprecht's aggression; at one point he wishes he had in fact smashed the jug (“Solch ein Krug—/Ich wollt ich hätt ihn nur entzwei geschlagen,” 1160-61), and shortly thereafter he says the same about the anonymous interloper (“Hätt ich ihn erschlagen,/So hätt ich ihn. Es wär mir gerade recht,” 1544-45). And when Ruprecht admits to having broken the pitcher in a metaphorical sense, the destruction of the object and the wounding of Adam (who is still passing for the cobbler Lebrecht) are consolidated into a single violent gesture:

Der Krug, den sie zu Wasser trug, zerschlug ich,
Und der Fleckschuster hat im Kopf ein Loch.

(1044-45)

Ruprecht's aggression towards Adam is acted out again at the end of the play when Adam flees the courtroom after his guilt has been revealed. Ruprecht tries to restrain him, but Adam escapes by slipping out of his coat, which remains in Ruprecht's hands. In the absence of the judge, Ruprecht vents his anger on the coat, beating Adam in effigy. The result is a stern warning from Walter:

RUPRECHT. (schlägt den Mantel)
Und noch eins! In Ermangelung des Buckels.
WALTER. Er ungezogener Mensch—Schaft hier mir Ordnung!
—An Ihm, wenn Er sogleich nicht ruhig ist,
Ihm wird der Spruch vom Eisen heute noch wahr.

(1903-07)

Walter establishes himself as an absolute, external authority, creating a situation that stands in opposition to a society in which civil institutions, sacrifice among them, maintain order. Through this exercise of naked power, he succeeds in gaining control, failing, however, to win the trust of the people, as we have seen. At this point, he is in the same precarious position as Adam was earlier. His threat to impose Adam's sentence identifies him as a substitute for the judge, and his reason for doing so differs little from that given by Adam for passing the sentence: "weil er ungebührlich / Sich gegen seinen Richter hat betragen" (1877-78).

Before the play ends, such authoritarian measures, even the presence
of the authority himself, will become superfluous—a process represented
by the replacement of the stern Walter by the unimposing Licht. The
penultimate scene shows Licht to be Walter’s political equal through
what amounts to a deft administration of ritual sacrifice. In response
to Walter’s inquiry as to Adam’s whereabouts, Licht feigns ignorance
and refuses to identify the delinquent judge, simply describing the now
distant figure:

Der Richter? Hm! Ich weiß nicht, Euer Gnaden—
Ich steh hier schon geraume Zeit am Fenster
Und einen Flüchtling seh ich, schwarz ornier,
Das aufgepfögte Winterfeld durchstampfen,
Alz ob er Rad und Galgen flöhe.

(Variant, 2402-06)

By leaving Adam anonymous, Licht empowers the assembled peasants
to identify him collectively. This is in accordance with ritual practice,
in which the whole community participates; the function of ritual is to
foster solidarity. It is important that Adam is recognized not by his
face, but by his club-foot and wig, those characteristics that link him
to other figures and thus qualify him as a scapegoat:

RUPRECHT. Er ists!
Ich sehs an seinem hinkenden Galopp.
VEIT. Der dort den Fichtengrund heruntertrabt,
Der Richter?
FRAU MARTHE. So wahr ich ehrlich bin. Seht nur,
Wie die Perücke ihm den Rücken peitscht.

(Variant, 2410-14)

The sight of Adam treading the barren fields reflects the legacy of
the original Adam, whose primal transgression placed man in perpetual
toil on the earth ("Cursed is the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt
thou eat of it," Genesis 3:17). Kleist’s preoccupation with the
biblical Fall may have less to do with the reputed “Kant-crisis” and
the problem of knowledge than with the inimical relationship between
man and nature that the expulsion from Eden represents. Ritual is
often the attempt to impose order on the natural world, and this scene
is no exception. Adam’s flight across plowed fields functions as a fertility
rite; it fosters the reconciliation that is to culminate in Eve’s wedding,
scheduled for Whitsuntide ("Pfingsten"), a time of Christian rebirth
and natural regeneration ("...mit den nächsten Mai’n blüht unser
Glück,” 2395).

Part and parcel of this ordering of nature is the taming of Marthe.
The ritual character of this scene is evident in the explicit “as if” element
of Adam’s escape; he absconds “als ob er Rad und Galgen flöhe,” that

17 See Hansgerd Delbrück.
is, as if he had to fear the kind of harsh medieval justice that the Enlightenment has rendered obsolete, but that Marthe has been demanding all along. Marthe has since abandoned these demands, as her faith in the government and its legal system has been restored, and the curtain falls after she has told Walter, whom she addresses as “ge- strenger Herr” (2423), of her wish to seek restitution for her jug in Utrecht. The destruction of the pitcher symbolizes the end of the patriarchal order represented both by the royal lineage depicted on the artifact and by the succession of men who had previously owned it. Yet Marthe’s call for justice runs contrary to this matrilinear recoding, and when she insists that Ruprecht be punished, she in effect makes this a condition for her resumption of the traditional female receiving position: “Aufs Rad will ich ihn sehen, oder mich / Nicht mehr geduldig auf den Rücken legen” (767-68). The stilling of Marthe’s desire for vengeance does not mark the weakening of authority, but rather its utter consolidation.

This view of Der zerbrochene Krug is enhanced by a comparison with Das Erdbeben in Chili; though the outcome of the novella is far from comical, its ending is quite similar in structure to that of the play. In the novella, too, the people collectively participate in a sacrifice, in this case to avert divine wrath of biblical proportions (“Grecul, wie Sodom und Gomorrha sic nicht sahen,” II, 135). In order to put an end to the ensuing slaughter, Josephe sacrifices herself, crying, “hier mordet mich, ihr blutdürstenden Tiger!” (158). But Pedrillo strikes her dead only to press on “mit noch ungesättigter Mordlust,” eventually killing Don Fernando’s tiny son Juan—an act that brings the violence to an instant halt: “hierauf ward es still, und alles entfernte sich” (158). What distinguishes Juan from Josephe and makes him an effective scapegoat is that he is untainted by the “original sin” of Josephe and Roderigo. He is a complete surrogate, dying in place of their illegitimate child, whose name happens to be Philipp.

An equally intriguing coincidence is that both Don Pedrillo, the leader of the murderous horde, and Lebrecht, the innocent and altogether innocuous figure in the comedy, are cobblers (see Note 15). This points to a deeper kinship, for while they may be polar opposites, their polarity encompasses a common function: Pedrillo represents the brutal tyranny of natural law, Lebrecht the gentle yet insidious repression exercised by the people over themselves when that law is internalized. It is precisely his absence from the court that marks Lebrecht as the guarantor of its authority. He embodies the “silent majority,” which tyrannizes through mute obedience not to an alien power but to its own sense of propriety; his very name bespeaks bourgeois self-

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12 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
righteousness. At the opening of the trial, Frau Marthe has the makings of a Pedrillo, but she ends by looking more like Lebrecht. Her previous lack of freedom in nature is replicated when she surrenders her freedom to the court. One is tempted to summarize the new situation by quoting the words of Horkheimer and Adorno: “Die Binde über den Augen der Justitia bedeutet nicht bloß, daß ins Recht nicht eingegriffen werden soll, sondern daß es nicht aus Freiheit stammt” (23).

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