Learning When to Say No∗

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Abstract

We consider boundedly-rational agents in McCall’s model of intertemporal job search. Agents update over time their perception of the value of waiting for an additional job offer using value-function learning. A first-principles argument applied to a stationary environment demonstrates asymptotic convergence to fully optimal decision-making. In environments with actual or possible structural change our agents are assumed to discount past data. Using simulations, we consider a change in unemployment benefits, and study the effect of the associated learning dynamics on unemployment and its duration. We then explore the implications of our model of bounded rationality for business cycle amplification and frictional wage dispersion.

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1 Introduction

We reconsider the labor-search framework in which a worker must decide whether to work at a given wage or to wait and search for a better wage. These models have been widely used in macroeconomics to study frictional unemployment and wage dispersion: see, for example, Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005). While these models have met with considerable

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success, several prominent studies have identified empirical puzzles associated with them: Shimer (2007) finds that when coupled with productivity shocks the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model is unable to generate sufficient volatility in unemployment, and Hornstein et al (2011) (HKV) show that a general class of labor-search models are not able to produce adequate wage dispersion. Labor search models rely heavily on optimizing agents with rational expectations (RE), and in this paper we examine what happens in these models when agents must learn over time how to optimize against unknown wage distributions.

There are a number of reasons to question the plausibility of the rational expectations hypothesis. Rational forecasting requires a full understanding of the relevant stochastic structure – a structure that is arguably out of the reach of working economists. Indeed, professional forecasters do not know and generally disagree on the correct model, and for any given specification they must estimate the model’s parameters – parameters that are assumed known under RE. Separately, rational agents are also assumed to solve complex dynamic programming problems – problems that are in reality approachable only through sophisticated computational techniques.

To examine the implications of adaptive learning in labor-search models, we follow HKV and adopt as our laboratory the canonical sequential-search model of McCall (1970). The simplicity of the model allows us to obtain analytic results. To model how agents learn over time, we adopt a bounded optimality approach along the lines of Evans and McGough (2018a) in which agents make decisions based on perceived trade-offs. This approach to boundedly optimal decision-making is particularly simple and natural in the context of labor search models with qualitative choices.

Our implementation of bounded optimality has a number of attractive features. Agents’ behaviors are at once sophisticated and simple: they are anchored to the Bellman approach and yet only require that agents makes decisions by selecting the better of two options, based on the perceived value of receiving a random wage draw. This value is revised over time as experience is gained and new data become available. Despite its simplicity, this implementation is a small deviation from fully rational decision-making in that agents can learn to optimize over time. For convenience we will refer to our framework as the bounded rationality (BR) model.

We begin by developing our version of the McCall model, based on the presentation in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), which obtains a solution under rational expectations and optimal decision-making. Then, using value-function learning as suggested in Evans and McGough (2018a), we develop a framework for boundedly rational decision-making. Under very general conditions, we show directly, using the martingale convergence theorem, that agents make fully optimal decisions asymptotically. Through numerical simulations, we study transitional dynamics under learning. These dynamics are distinct from their RE counterpart, and would plausibly arise when there are changes in policy or structure. Finally, we demonstrate the potential of our approach to address the puzzles identified above.

While the McCall model is partial equilibrium in the sense that the wage offer distribution is exogenous, this assumption, as pointed out by HKV, “is not at all restrictive.” HKV illustrate this point using the island model of Lucas and Prescott (1974) and the matching model of Pissarides (1985).
A key feature of our BR approach is that, in making their decisions, workers incorporate several structural features of the economy that they know, while learning over time about a key but unknown sufficient statistic for optimal decision-making. This unknown sufficient statistic, which we denote by $Q^*$, measures the rational agent’s expected discounted utility when they are unemployed and waiting for a random wage offer. As is well-known, optimal decision-making in this setting is characterized by a reservation wage $w^*$ that is pinned down by $Q^*$. Under boundedly rational decision-making with adaptive learning, agents use an estimate $Q$ of $Q^*$ to make decisions given their knowledge of the unemployment benefit level $b$ and the probability $\alpha$ per period of job separation when employed. Their estimate $Q$ determines their corresponding reservation wage $\bar{w}$, and thus their boundedly optimal decisions.

The estimate $Q$ of $Q^*$ is updated over time based on observed wage offers. It is natural to assume that both unemployed and employed workers observe a (possibly small) sample of wage offers; agents update their estimate $Q$ based on this sample. Our central theoretical result is that this procedure asymptotically yields fully optimal decision making: over time agents learn $Q^*$. We emphasize two distinct features of our result that are particularly attractive. First, agents do not need to have any knowledge of the distribution of wages; and second, their computations are simple as well as natural: they do not need to iterate a value function and only need to track one estimate that is updated each period.

Asymptotic optimality in stationary environments also motivates the use of closely related adaptive learning mechanisms through which agents adjust their behaviors in the presence of possible structural change. To examine the implications of possible structural change for the model’s dynamics, we turn to simulations based on constant-gain learning, i.e. agents use an estimation procedure that discounts older data. We note that constant gain is standard in applied work involving adaptive learning, and is particularly appropriate when the possibility of structural change is under consideration.

To gain insight into the behavior of BR agents in the presence of structural change, we begin with a simple policy experiment in which the unemployment benefits rate is unexpectedly and permanently changed. By embedding our framework in a model populated by many agents, the comparative statics and dynamics of aggregates like the mean unemployment rate and unemployment duration can be examined. We find that the impact response of an increase in benefits appears unrealistically large under RE, whereas it is much more muted under BR. This finding reflects a combination of direct effects, i.e. those effects induced by changes in structure holding fixed beliefs, and indirect effects resulting from the changes in beliefs induced by the structural change: both effects are simultaneously realized for the rational agent whereas the BR agent learns about the indirect effect only gradually over time.

The distinct responses of rational and BR agents to structural change suggests the possibility for the BR approach to be a simple and parsimonious way to address puzzles in the labor-search literature, and to demonstrate this potential we consider two applications. We begin by considering the Shimer puzzle. We modify our model to allow for time-varying aggregate productivity shocks to impact realized wages. Using a calibrated model, we find
that the variation in unemployment induced by the productivity shocks is minimal when
agents are rational, just as the Shimer puzzle predicts; however, under a natural implement-
ation of boundedly rationality, the implied business-cycle dynamics are greatly magnified.
These findings reflect the tension induced by the direct and indirect effects, which, in the
case of productivity shocks, work in opposite directions, and thus serve to mute the rational
agent’s response.

Then we turn to the frictional-wage distribution puzzle identified by HKV, who find
that calibrated search models fail to generate significant cross-sectional variation in wages.
That the agents have rational expectations, and therefore fully incorporate the value of
search into their decisions, is a foundational assumption of their analysis. Under rational
expectations, the short unemployment durations observed in the US imply a low value to
searching and, hence, require a small dispersion of wages generated by search frictions.
Introducing boundedly rational decision makers is a natural way to resolve this puzzle.
Indeed, using a calibrated model in line with that of HKV, we show that when agents are
fully rational the spread in observed wages is minimal, while the spread is much larger when
agents are boundedly rational.

Labor search models in which agents have incomplete knowledge about the wage dis-
tribution have been considered by a variety of authors. In an early contribution, Burdett
and Vishwanath (1988) examine the time-series behavior of reservation wages in a modeling
environment similar to ours, in which agents do know fully the understand the distribution
of wage offers, and act as Bayesian decision makers that fully solve their dynamic optimiza-
tion problems. While their main result is that, under certain assumptions, reservation wages
are declining in the length of unemployment spells, they also find it is not trivial even to
establish that a reservation-wage strategy is optimal. An advantage of our approach is that
BR agents employ a reservation-wage strategy that is natural, asymptotically optimal and
easy to implement.

More recently, Rotemberg (2017) uses the HKV version of the McCall model to analyze
the potential for group learning to explain wage dispersion. In his setup the distribution
of wage offers is unknown and is misperceived to be stationary. Conditional on their mis-
perceptions, agents make fully optimal decisions using the observed means of their group’s
realized wages and the durations of their unemployment spells. He shows that if the wage-
offer distribution is non-stationary in the sense that later wage offers have a higher mean,
then the stationary perceptions held by agents can lead to self-confirming equilibria with in-
creased wage-dispersion and even to equilibrium multiplicity. Like Burdett and Vishwanath
(1988), Rotemberg (2017) adopts the assumption that agents can fully solve their dynamic
programming problem given their potentially misspecified beliefs.

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2We note that Rotemberg (2017) is focused on equilibrium outcomes, and in particular does not explicitly
include consideration of learning dynamics.

3Using a different labor-search model that includes Nash bargaining, Damdinsuren and Zaharieva (2018)
assume boundedly rational agents use (misspecified) linear forecasting models based on economy-wide data to
form expectations of future wages. The dynamics of the model with adaptive learning are studied numerically
in an agent-based version of the model. Among their findings is that higher bargaining power is associated
with higher wages and larger wage dispersion.
The approach presented in this paper is related to several approaches in the macroeconomics and machine-learning literature. Like the adaptive least-squares learning approach in macroeconomics, e.g. Bray and Savin (1986), Marcit and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), which focuses on least-squares learning, we consider decision-making procedures that, while not fully rational, have the potential to converge to rational expectations. Like Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent (1990), Preston (2005) and Cogley and Sargent (2008), our framework has long-lived agents that must solve a challenging dynamic stochastic optimization problem. In these settings two issues are of concern: (i) there are parameters that govern the state dynamics that may not be known; and (ii) the assumption that agents know how to solve dynamic stochastic programming problems is implausibly strong.

Cogley and Sargent (2008) examine the first issue in a permanent-income model in which income follows a two-state Markov process with unknown transition probabilities, taking the agent’s problem outside the usual dynamic programming framework. Two approaches to decision making are considered. Bayesian decision-makers follow a fully optimal decision rule within an expanded state space, which requires considerable sophistication and expertise for the agent. The second approach employs the “anticipated utility” model of Kreps (1998), in which agents make decisions each period by solving their dynamic programming problem going forward based on current estimates of the transition probabilities. This procedure is boundedly rational, since agents ignore that their estimates will be revised in the future, but is computationally simpler and performs almost as well as optimal decision-making.

Bayesian decision-making has also been used in boundedly-rational settings. Adam, Marcit and Beutel (2017) have shown how to implement this approach in an asset-pricing environment. In their set-up agents are “internally rational,” in the sense that they have a prior over variables exogenous to their decision-making, which they update over time using Bayes Law. These beliefs may not be externally rational in the sense of fully agreeing with the actual law of motion for these variables. By imposing simple natural forms of beliefs, it is possible to solve the agents’ dynamic programming problem.

The anticipated utility framework has also been employed in adaptive learning set-ups in which long-lived agents use least-squares learning. Preston (2005) developed an approach in which agents estimate and update over time the forecasting models for relevant variables exogenous to the agents’ decision-making. For given forecasts of these variables over an infinite horizon, agents make decisions based on the solution to their dynamic optimization problem. Again, these decisions are boundedly optimal in the sense that the procedure does not take account of the fact that their estimates of the parameters will change over time.

The approach adopted in the current paper is closest to the general bounded-optimality framework of Evans and McGough (2018a). In their approach infinitely-lived agents optimize by solving a two-period problem in which a suitable variable in the second period encodes benefits for the entire future. While their primary focus is on shadow-price learning, in which the key second-period variables are shadow prices for the endogenous state vector, they also show how a value function learning approach can equivalently be employed in a setting with continuously measured state variables. Within a linear-quadratic (LQ) framework, Evans
and McGough (2018a) use the anticipated utility approach and obtain conditions under which an agent can learn to optimize over time.\footnote{Evans and McGough (2018b) show how to apply shadow-price learning to a wide range of DSGE macroeconomic frameworks using computational techniques.}

The current paper applies a version of value-function learning in a discrete choice setting in which a worker must choose whether or not to take a wage offer. While this a natural setting for value-function learning, the discrete choice and non-LQ features of the model take the agent’s decision problem outside the theoretical framework developed in Evans and McGough (2018a). In our McCall-type set-up, the single sufficient statistic needed is the value of the dynamic optimization problem when the agent is unemployed and facing a random wage draw. We show how, given an estimate of this value, an agent can make boundedly optimal decisions under the anticipated utility assumption, and we demonstrate that when agents in addition use a natural adaptive-learning scheme for updating their estimates over time, they will asymptotically learn with probability one how to make optimal decisions within a stationary environment.\footnote{By deriving our results from first principles we are able to obtain global stability, which is also in contrast to Evans and McGough (2018a).}

Our framework is also related to the “Q-learning” approach developed originally by Watkins (1989) and Watkins and Dayan (1992) as well its extensions to temporal difference learning from the computer science literature.\footnote{See Sutton and Barto (2011) for a detailed introduction to reinforcement learning and in particular temporal difference learning.} In that approach agents make decisions based on estimates of quality-action pairs, with the quality function updated over time. As in the current paper the Q-learning approach is motivated by the Bellman equation, but it is typically and most effectively implemented in set-ups in which the state as well as action spaces are finite. In our set-up agents make decisions facing a continuously-valued wage distribution, where the distribution is unknown to the agents; furthermore, when making their boundedly optimal choices, our agents are able to incorporate features of the transition dynamics, such as benefit levels, that are known to the agents.

Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. Section 3 presents our model of boundedly optimal decision-making. Section 4 discusses structural change and learning dynamics in the context of an unexpected benefits change. Section 5 covers the applications to the Shimer and HKV puzzles. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 The Model and Optimal Decision-making

We consider an infinitely-lived agent who receives utility from consumption via the instantaneous utility function $U$. Time is discrete, wages are paid in perishable goods, and there is no storage technology. At the beginning of a given period the agent receives a wage offer, and decides whether or not to accept it. The wage offer is drawn from a distribution that depends on whether the agent was employed or unemployed at the end of the previous period. If the agent was employed, her wage in the previous period constitutes her wage offer
in the current period. If the agent was unemployed at the end of the previous period, she receives a wage offer $w$ drawn from a time-invariant exogenous distribution $F$ (density $dF$). In either case, the agent must decide whether or not to accept the offer.

If the wage offer is not accepted the agent is unemployed in the current period, and receives an unemployment benefit $b > 0$; and, because she is unemployed at the end of the current period, she will receive a wage offer drawn from $F$ at the beginning of the next period. If the offer is accepted then the agent is employed and receives the wage $w$ in the current period. We assume exogenous job destruction parameterized by $\alpha$. At the end of the period, with probability $1 - \alpha$ the match with the firm is preserved and, because she is employed at the end of the current period, she will receive the same wage offer in the next period. With probability $\alpha$ the match is destroyed, the worker becomes unemployed at the end of the period, and at the beginning of the next period she receives a wage offer drawn from $F$. We remark that, under full rationality, an agent employed in the preceding period will always accept her wage offer in the current period; however, under bounded rationality, previously employed agents may decide to enter unemployment as their understanding of the world evolves.

We make the following assumptions to ensure the that the worker’s problem is well behaved, which we set out for future reference:

**Assumption A:**

1. $U$ is twice continuously differentiable, with $U' > 0$ and $U'' \leq 0$.
2. $F$ has support $[w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}]$, where $0 < w_{\text{min}} < w_{\text{max}}$.
3. All wage draws are independent over time and across agents.
4. $0 < \alpha < 1$.

The first two items ensure the existence and continuity of the worker’s value function, while the third item guarantees that the worker’s optimal value of search does not depend on additional state variables.

It remains to specify how agents decide whether or not to accept the wage offer. In this Section we adopt the conventional assumption that agents are fully rational and we characterize the corresponding optimal behavior. Section 3 takes up the case of boundedly rational agents, and shows, under suitable assumptions, that boundedly optimal decision-making converges to fully optimal behavior.

Assumption A implies that the fully optimal agent makes decisions by solving the following dynamic programing problem. Let $V^*(w)$ be the expected present value of utility of a fully rational worker entering the period with wage offer $w$. It follows that

\begin{equation}
V^*(w) = \max_{a \in \{0, 1\}} U(c(a, w)) + \beta E \left(V^*(w')|a, w\right)
= g(w, a, \hat{w}, s),
\end{equation}
with the expectation $E$ taken over random variables $\hat{w}$ and $s$. Here $a \in \{0,1\}$ is a control variable identifying whether the job is accepted ($a = 1$) or rejected ($a = 0$), $\hat{w}$ is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from $F$, and $s \in \{0,1\}$ is an i.i.d. random variable taking the value 0 with probability $\alpha$, thus capturing job destruction. Finally, functions $c(a, w)$ and $g(w, a, \hat{w}, s)$ are defined as follows

$$c(a, w) = \begin{cases} w & \text{if } a = 1 \\ b & \text{if } a = 0 \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad g(w, a, \hat{w}, s) = \begin{cases} w & \text{if } a = 1 \text{ and } s = 1 \\ \hat{w} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and codify how the consumption and the availability of future wage offers depend on the worker’s choice of accepting or rejecting the wage offer.

The optimal value $V^*(w)$ of having a wage offer $w$ in hand allows us to define

$$Q^* = E(V^*(\hat{w})) = \int_{w_{\min}}^{w_{\max}} V^*(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}),$$

where we note that $Q^*$ is the value, under optimal decision-making, associated with being unemployed at the start of the period, i.e. before $\hat{w}$ is realized. Moreover, as we will see in our introduction of bounded optimality, $Q^*$ encapsulates all of the complicated features of this problem: that the wage offer distribution may not be known and that, even conditional on knowing the wage offer distribution, making optimal decisions requires solving a complicated fixed point problem.

### 3 Boundedly Optimal Decision-making

In this Section we specify how boundedly optimal agents make decisions, which requires allowing for an explicit dependence of the value function on beliefs. First in Section 3.1 we show how boundedly optimal decision-making can be formulated in terms of an agent’s perception of the expected discounted utility of receiving a random wage draw, a value we denote by $Q$. We note that only unemployed agents receive random wage draws; thus, $Q$ may be interpreted as the value associated with being unemployed. In Section 3.2 we demonstrate that optimal behavior can be viewed as a special case, i.e. $Q = Q^*$. In Section 3.3 we show that under a natural updating rule the agent’s perceptions $Q$ converge over time to $Q^*$, i.e. agents learn over time to make optimal decisions. Finally, Section 3.4 discusses the implications of altering the learning rule to discount older data.

#### 3.1 Decision-making under subjective beliefs

Denote by $Q$ the agent’s current perceived (i.e. subjective) value of receiving a random wage offer drawn from $F$. Let $V(w, Q)$ denote the perceived value of a wage offer $w$. With this notation we assume that boundedly optimal agents with beliefs $Q$ make decisions by solving the following optimization problem

$$V(w, Q) = \max \{U(b) + \beta Q, U(w) + \beta(1 - \alpha)V(w, Q) + \beta \alpha Q\}.$$ (2)
The agent accepts the wage offer \( w \) if
\[
U(b) + \beta Q < U(w) + \beta (1 - \alpha) V(w, Q) + \beta \alpha Q
\]
and otherwise rejects the offer.\(^7\) Now observe that if (3) holds then
\[
V(w, Q) = U(w) + \beta (1 - \alpha) V(w, Q) + \beta \alpha Q,
\]
which implies
\[
V(w, Q) = \phi U(w) + \beta \alpha \phi Q,
\]
where \( \phi = (1 - \beta (1 - \alpha))^{-1} \), and we note that \( 0 < \alpha \phi < 1 \).

We think of the optimal belief \( Q^* \) as difficult to determine, requiring as it does, a complete understanding of the wage distribution as well as the ability to compute fixed points. In contrast, given \( Q \), the determination of \( V(w, Q) \) is relatively straightforward: if (3) holds then \( V(w, Q) \) is given by (5). The intuition for this equation can be given by rearranging (4) as
\[
V(w, Q) = U(w) + \beta (V(w, Q) + \alpha (Q - V(w, Q))).
\]
This says that if accepting a job at \( w \) is optimal then its value is equal to \( U(w) \) plus the discounted expected value in the coming period, which is again \( V(w, Q) \) if employment continues, but must be adjusted for the “capital loss” \( Q - V(w, Q) \) in value that arises if the agent becomes unemployed, which occurs with probability \( \alpha \).

If instead (3) does not hold, the wage offer is rejected and the agent’s present value of utility is simply \( U(b) + \beta Q \). We conclude that
\[
V(w, Q) = \max \{ U(b) + \beta Q, \phi U(w) + \beta \alpha \phi Q \}.
\]
Thus, given perceived \( Q \), decision-making is straightforward based on (6). We now obtain results that characterize the properties of boundedly optimal decision-making based on \( Q \), and in the next Section we relate these results to fully optimal decision-making.

Our first result establishes the existence of a “reservation wage” \( \bar{w} \) that depend on beliefs \( Q \). Because this dependency is piece-wise it is useful to define
\[
Q_* = \frac{\phi U(w_*) - U(b)}{\beta (1 - \alpha \phi)}, \text{ where } * \in \{ \min, \max \}.
\]

**Lemma 1.** There is a continuous, non-decreasing function \( \bar{w} : \mathbb{R} \to [w_{\min}, w_{\max}] \), which is differentiable on \( (Q_{\min}, Q_{\max}) \), such that \( \bar{w}(Q_*) = w_* \) for \( * \in \{ \min, \max \} \), and such that
\[
V(w, Q) = \begin{cases} 
U(b) + \beta Q & \text{if } Q > Q_{\max} \text{ or if } Q \in [Q_{\min}, Q_{\max}] \text{ and } w \leq \bar{w}(Q) \\
\phi U(w) + \beta \alpha \phi Q & \text{if } Q < Q_{\min} \text{ or if } Q \in [Q_{\min}, Q_{\max}] \text{ and } w > \bar{w}(Q)
\end{cases}.
\]

The proof of this and all results in this Section are in Appendix A. This lemma immediately implies the following proposition characterizing boundedly optimal behavior.

\(^7\)If \( U(b) + \beta Q = V(w, Q) \) the agent is indifferent between accepting the job or remaining unemployed. In this (probability zero) case, for convenience, we assume that the agent rejects the job.
Proposition 1. (*Boundedly optimal behavior*) Given beliefs \(Q\), there exists \(\bar{w}(Q) \geq w_{\text{min}}\) such that the policy \(a_t = 1\) if and only if \(w_t > \bar{w}\) solves the boundedly optimal agent’s problem (2).

The behavior of a boundedly rational agent with beliefs \(Q\) is characterized by a reservation wage \(\bar{w}\).

Noting from Lemma 1 that \(\bar{w}\) depends on \(Q\) and \(b\), we conclude this section with simple comparative statics results with respect to these variables that will be useful in Section 4. Provided that \(w_{\text{min}} < \bar{w}(Q, b) < w_{\text{max}}, \bar{w}\) is implicitly defined by

\[
\phi U(\bar{w}(Q, b)) + \beta \alpha \phi Q = U(b) + \beta Q. 
\] (8)

From Assumption A we have that \(u\) is \(C^1\) and thus

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial Q} = \frac{\beta (1 - \alpha \phi)}{\phi U'(\bar{w}(Q, b))} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial b} = \frac{U'(b)}{\phi U'(\bar{w}(Q, b))},
\] (9)

which are both positive provided \(U' > 0\).

Below we drop the explicit dependence of \(\bar{w}\) on \(b\) except when considering cases in which \(b\) is changed.

3.2 Optimal beliefs

We now establish a link between optimal decision-making and decisions under subjective beliefs. To this end we define a map \(T : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}\) by

\[
T(Q) = E(\hat{V}(\hat{w}, Q)) = \int_{w_{\text{min}}}^{w_{\text{max}}} V(\hat{w}, Q) dF(\hat{w}). 
\] (10)

We interpret \(T(Q)\) as the expected value today, induced by beliefs \(Q\) and the behavioral primitive, of receiving a random wage offer. Lemma A.2 in Appendix A establishes that \(T\) is continuous, and is differentiable except at finite number of points, with a positive derivative strictly less than one. As one would expect there is a tight link between the fixed point of this \(T\) map and optimal decision making by the agent.

**Theorem 1. (Optimal Behavior)** The expected discounted utility under optimal decision-making of receiving a random wage draw, \(Q^* = E(\hat{V}^*(\hat{w}))\), is the unique fixed point of the \(T\)-map (10). The policy \(a = 1\) if and only if \(w > \bar{w}(Q^*) \equiv w^*\) solves the optimal agent’s problem (1).

This is the standard “reservation wage” result of the McCall search model. However, Theorem 1 comes with the additional interpretation that there exists a belief \(Q^*\) about the value of being unemployed such that a boundedly rational agent with beliefs \(Q^*\) behaves optimally. The explicit connection between \(Q^*\) and the agent’s problem (1) arises from the observation \(V^*(w) = V(w, Q^*)\), which is established in the proof of Theorem 1. This observation may
then be coupled with Proposition 1, together with the equivalence of problems (1) and (2) when \( Q = Q^* \).

Finally, it is convenient to adopt assumptions that result in non-trivial optimal decision-making, i.e. in which some wage offers are rejected and other wage offers are accepted: \( w_{\text{min}} < w^* < w_{\text{max}} \). The following Proposition characterizes the parameter restrictions consistent with this assumption.

**Proposition 2. (Non-trivial decision-making)** If

\[
\phi \left( U(w_{\text{min}}) - \beta (1 - \alpha) \int_{w_{\text{min}}}^{w_{\text{max}}} U(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}) \right) < U(b) < \phi(1 - \beta)(1 - \alpha)U(w_{\text{max}})
\]

then \( Q_{\text{min}} < Q^* < Q_{\text{max}} \), i.e. \( w_{\text{min}} < w^* < w_{\text{max}} \).

We omit the straightforward proof. We remark that when condition (11) holds, the comparative statics result (9) applies to \( Q^* \). Henceforth we assume the following:

**Assumption B:** \( U, b, w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}, \alpha, \beta \) and \( F \) are such that Condition (11) holds.

### 3.3 Learning When to Say No

We now return to considerations involving boundedly rational agents. Recall that Proposition 1 presents a reservation-wage decision rule that is optimal for given beliefs \( Q \). For agents to learn over time in order to improve their decision-making behavior, it is necessary to update their beliefs as new data become available.\(^8\) We adopt the “anticipated utility” perspective introduced by Kreps (1998), and frequently employed in the adaptive learning literature, in which agents make decisions based on their current beliefs \( Q \), while ignoring the fact that these beliefs will evolve over time.\(^9\)

As just discussed, agents update their beliefs over time as new data become available; however, we observe that if a given agent learned only from their own experience then they would update their beliefs only when they were unemployed. Because this is an implausibly extreme assumption, we introduce a social component to the adaptive learning process: we assume that in each period each agent observes a sample of wage offers received by unemployed workers and uses this sample to revise the perceived value from being unemployed. We denote by \( \hat{w}_N^t = \{\hat{w}_t(k)\}_{k=1}^N \) the random sample of \( N \) wage realizations. For simplicity we assume that unemployed and employed agents use the same sample size.\(^10\)

Let \( Q_t \) be the value, perceived at the start of period \( t \), of being unemployed. Note that \( Q_t \) measures the agent’s perception of the value of receiving a random wage draw.\(^11\)

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\(^8\)Proposition 1 provides optimal decision-making given beliefs under the assumption that the separation rate is known. It would be straightforward to require our agents to also estimate this separation rate. We explore this further in Section 5.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 asymptotic rationality still obtains.

\(^9\)See, for example Sargent (1999), Preston (2005), Cogley and Sargent (2008).

\(^10\)We view the social component of our learning algorithm as relatively unimportant, and note that all results go through when \( N = 1 \).

\(^11\)To be entirely precise, \( \beta Q_t \) is used as the agent’s perception of the value in period \( t \) of being unemployed and therefore receiving a random wage draw in \( t + 1 \).
this perception the agent computes the sample mean of \( V(\cdot, Q_t) \) based on his sample of wage draws. Since \( Q_t \) encodes the information from all previous wage draws, the agent updates his estimate of \( Q \) using a weighted average of \( Q_t \) with this sample mean. Formally let

\[
\hat{T}(\hat{w}_t^N, Q_t) = N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{N} V(\hat{w}_t(k), Q_t)
\]  

(12)

denote the sample mean of \( V(\cdot, Q_t) \) based on the sample \( \hat{w}_t^N \). The agent is then assumed to update his beliefs at the end of period \( t \) according to the algorithm

\[
Q_{t+1} = Q_t + \gamma_{t+1} \left( \hat{T}(\hat{w}_t^N, Q_t) - Q_t \right),
\]  

(13)

where \( 0 < \gamma_{t+1} < 1 \) is specified below. Thus the revised estimate of the value of being unemployed \( Q_{t+1} \), which is carried by the agent into the next period, adjusts the previous estimate \( Q_t \) to reflect information obtained during period \( t \).

The term \( \gamma_t > 0 \), known as the gain sequence, is a deterministic sequence that measures the rate at which new information is incorporated into beliefs. Two cases are of particular interest. Constant-gain learning sets \( \gamma_t = \gamma < 1 \), which implies that agents discount past data geometrically at rate \( 1 - \gamma \). This is often used when there is the possibility of structural change, and is discussed in Section 3.4. Under decreasing-gain learning \( \gamma_t \rightarrow 0 \) at a rate typically assumed to be consistent with assumption \( C \) below. Decreasing gain is often assumed in a stationary environment, and here provides for the possibility of convergence over time to optimal beliefs. The following assumption is made when decreasing gain is employed.

**Assumption C:** The gain sequence \( \gamma_t > 0 \) satisfies

\[
\sum_{t \geq 0} \gamma_t = \infty \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{t \geq 0} \gamma_t^2 < \infty.
\]

The conditions identified in Assumption C are entirely standard in the literature: see Bray and Savin (1986), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The first condition guarantees that new information is provided sufficient weight to avoid spurious convergence and the second condition ensures appropriate convergence obtains. A natural example is \( \gamma_t = t^{-1} \) in which all observations from \( \{1, \ldots, t\} \) receive equal weight. For the case at hand this replicates a simple average.

The following theorem is the main theoretical result of our paper.

**Theorem 2. (Asymptotic rationality)** For any \( Q_0 \), under Assumptions A, B and C, \( Q_t \rightarrow Q^\ast \) almost surely.

Theorem 2 establishes that in a stationary environment boundedly optimal agents will learn over time to make fully optimal decisions. Section 4 explores the implications of learning when there are structural changes.

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12The algorithm (13), which is standard in the adaptive learning literature, can be viewed as an implementation of least-squares learning if \( \gamma_t = 1/t \). See, for example, Ljung (1977), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
A particular limiting case can help highlight the properties of this algorithm further. Consider the algorithm as $N \to \infty$. In this case, we can consider the agent as having full knowledge of the wage offer distribution. In fact, in this case we have $T(\hat{w}^{N}_t, Q_t) \to T(Q_t)$, where $T$ is the T-map defined in the previous section. The evolution of beliefs is then given by

$$Q_{t+1} = Q_t + \gamma_t (T(Q_t) - Q_t).$$

Even though the agent has full knowledge of the offer distribution, she still needs to learn how to behave optimally and she updates beliefs in a deterministic manner over time. In this case, the square summability of the gain sequence is not needed for asymptotic convergence. In fact, the algorithm with $\gamma_t = 1$ is equivalent to iterating the agent’s Bellman equation over time. We note that, in this case, convergence obtains for all $\gamma_t = \gamma \in (0, 1]$.

We view the learning rule (13) as providing a particularly appealing model of bounded rationality. Its most striking aspect is its simplicity, i.e. its low demands on agents’ cognition and memory: agents only need to store one piece of information each period, namely the current value of $Q$; and its update requires only a simple average of very simple computations based on observed current wages, i.e. the comparisons of employment and unemployment values identified in equation (6). In particular, it is not necessary for agents to track the history of wages or even perform any sophisticated statistical analysis.

The learning rule addresses several features that make dynamic optimization challenging. For finite $N$ the wage distribution can only be learned asymptotically. If $N$ is large the sample can be viewed as revealing all needed information about the wage distribution; however, computing optimal beliefs $Q^*$ still requires a great deal of sophistication, as noted above. Our learning rule does not require such sophistication; and further, it applies even in case agents receive no current information about wage distribution beyond their own offer.

### 3.4 Learning with constant gain

Our central analytical result above addresses the case of decreasing gain, which can be viewed as natural if the environment is stationary and agents perceive it to be stationary. However, realistic economies are always susceptible to structural change, and thus present environments in which our results do not formally apply. We view Theorem 2 as providing credence to the use of otherwise identical algorithms in which agents discount older data in order remain alert to structural change.\(^{13}\)

Constant gain learning (CGL) algorithms are of particular interest. Analytic results for the small constant-gain limit can be developed using stochastic approximation techniques, though they are local in nature. Informally, for our model, these results imply that for large $t$ and small $\gamma$ the distribution of beliefs $Q$ is approximately normally distributed around $Q^*$ with variance proportional to $\gamma$. Since these formal results are small gain limits, in practice stochastic simulations are used to study systems under CGL.

\(^{13}\) This motivation has a venerable history in the literature on stochastic recursive algorithms: see Ljung and Söderström (1983).
Adaptive learning in applied models of macroeconomics and finance is often implemented using CGL, in part because it allows the modeler to account for structural change in a natural way, and in part because, in the absence of structural change, it provides for perpetual, stationary learning dynamics.\textsuperscript{14} The prominent, early work of Sargent (1999) emphasized the role of CGL in monetary policy issues; Bullard and Eusepi (2005) used CGL to understand how the economy reacts to unexpected changes in trend productivity growth; and Milani (2007) estimated DSGE models under the assumption that agents are constant-gain learners. These are just a few examples within a broad literatures in macroeconomics and finance.

4 Structural Change and Transition Dynamics

We now take our model as populated by many agents; this allows for analysis of interesting aggregates like the unemployment rate. Our applications in Section 5 will consider the time-series and cross-section implications of BR in our model. To prepare for this it is useful to study the implications for BR following a simple policy change, specifically an unexpected change to unemployment compensation, $b$.

We begin with the study of comparative static and dynamic responses analytically under rational expectations and optimal decision-making. We proceed by first studying these dynamics under a fixed belief, $Q$, and then setting beliefs at the rationally optimal level $Q^*$. In this manner, we decompose the responses into two terms: the direct effects hold beliefs fixed while the indirect effects come through changes in $Q^*$. We then show numerically that these two terms allow us to understand the dynamics of the BR agents. This decomposition will be central to our analysis of the applications in Section 5.

4.1 Preliminaries

We begin by defining the variables of interest. Unemployment and duration, which will be carefully defined below, depend inversely on what we call the “hazard” rate $h$ of leaving unemployment, i.e. the probability per period of an unemployed agent becoming employed. Given beliefs $Q$ and benefits level $b$ the hazard rate is

$$h = h(Q, b) = (1 - \alpha)(1 - F(\bar{w}(Q, b))).$$

For a given fixed $Q$, the perceived duration $\delta$ is defined to be the expected number of periods of consecutive unemployment conditional on being newly unemployed, and a straightforward computation provides that $\delta = h^{-1}$. Finally, we define $u$ to be the corresponding ergodic probability of ending the period unemployed; thus

$$u = u(Q, b) = \frac{\alpha}{1 - (1 - \alpha)F(\bar{w}(Q, b))} = \frac{\alpha}{h(Q, b) + \alpha}. \quad (14)$$

The variables $\delta$ and $u$ as just defined capture individual-level behavior; however, they can be connected to aggregate counterparts. If we imagine an economy with a continuum of

\textsuperscript{14}In particular, under decreasing gain the learning dynamics vanish asymptotically.
agents with homogeneous beliefs $Q$ that are held fixed for all $t$ then $u(Q, b)$ is the steady-state unemployment rate for the economy. In particular, if $Q = Q^*(b)$ then $u^* = u(Q^*(b), b)$ is the long-run employment rate in an economy populated with a continuum of rational agents.

### 4.2 Comparative statics

We now assume our McCall model is populated by a continuum of rational agents, and consider comparative statics associated with steady-state behavior. The rational counterparts $h^*, \delta^*$ (and $u^*$, as already noted above) are obtained from the above definitions by setting $Q = Q^* = Q^*(b)$. To compute our comparative statics, we continue to adopt Assumption B so that an interior solution exists; it follows from equation (9) that $\partial \bar{w} / \partial Q$ and $\partial \bar{w} / \partial b$ are positive.

In what follows we will compute several derivatives with respect to $b$. When differentiating any variable other than $Q^* = Q^*(b)$, the symbol “$\partial$” will indicate that beliefs $Q$ are taken as fixed and the symbol “$d$” will indicate that beliefs $Q$ will vary in accordance with optimality, i.e. $Q^* = Q^*(b)$. Finally, we note direct analysis provides that $\partial Q^* / \partial b$ and $\partial w^* / \partial b$ are positive.

The following Lemma decomposes the comparative statics of the hazard rate into the direct and indirect effects mentioned earlier.

**Lemma 2 (Direct and indirect effects).** Under Assumption B,

$$
\frac{dh^*}{db} \equiv \frac{\partial h}{\partial b} + \frac{\partial h}{\partial Q} \frac{\partial Q^*}{\partial b} < 0,
$$

with both $\frac{\partial h}{\partial b} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial h}{\partial Q} \frac{\partial Q^*}{\partial b} < 0$.

Lemma 2 tells us that the hazard rate of leaving unemployment is decreasing in unemployment benefits. This effect is decomposed into direct effect and indirect effects. $\frac{\partial h}{\partial b}$ captures the direct effect: even if agents do not update their beliefs they will still react to an increase in benefits by raising their reservation wage. Lemma 2 tells us that a rational agent would respond even further by taking into account that higher unemployment benefits also raise the value of $Q^*$. This is the indirect effect. While the hazard rate for the rational agents exhibits no dynamics, i.e. it jumps from the old steady-state value to the new one, under learning the hazard rate evolves over time as beliefs $Q$ are updated. For this reason, indirect effects are not initially incorporated into the boundedly rational agents’ hazard rate.

The inverse relationship between the hazard rate and both the unemployment rate and duration yields the following Proposition.

**Proposition 3 (Comparative statics).** Under Assumption B, $\frac{du^*}{db} > 0$ and $\frac{d\delta^*}{db} > 0$.

### 4.3 Comparative dynamics under rationality

With rational agents, only the unemployment rate experiences non-trivial transition dynamics; the hazard rate and duration for the newly unemployed simply jump to their new steady state levels. The same would be true for boundedly optimal agents if their beliefs $Q$
were constant over time; however, under learning the evolution over time of beliefs induces transition dynamics in the hazard rate.

To examine unemployment dynamics it is helpful to define the notion of a “quit.” We say that an agent employed in time \( t - 1 \) quits in time \( t \), and thereby becomes unemployed, if his wage in time \( t - 1 \) is less than \( w^*_t \). Here the \( t \) subscript allows for variations in the optimal reservation wage induced by structural change. We observe that quits can only occur when a structural change between periods \( t - 1 \) and \( t \) results in \( w^*_t > w^*_{t-1} \). Therefore, to simplify our analysis we will assume that a structure change at time 0 occurs only after a long period of stability so that the economy has reached a long run steady state. We focus on the dynamics of rational agents but, as in the previous section, we decompose changes in unemployment into direct and indirect effects to shed light on the unemployment dynamics with boundedly rational agents.

Let \( w_{-1} \) denote the wage of individual drawn randomly in period \(-1\) from the pool of employed individuals. The probability that this individual quits in period 0 is given by

\[
q_0 = q(w_0) = \frac{\max \{0, F(w^*_0) - F(w^*_{-1})\}}{1 - F(w^*_{-1})},
\]

where we have exploited that the long run distribution of wages will be the distribution of wage offers, \( F(\cdot) \) truncated at the reservation wage \( w^*_{-1} \).

Interpreted cross-sectionally, \( q_0 \) is the proportion of agents employed in time \(-1\) who quit in time 0. Now let \( u_t \) be the proportion of agents who are unemployed in period \( t \). Noting that \( 1 - u \) is the proportion of employed agents, and that \( 1 - h \) is the probability that an unemployed agent remains unemployed, the dynamics of \( u_t \) may be written

\[
u_t = (1 - h_t) u_{t-1} + (\alpha + (1 - \alpha)q_t)(1 - u_{t-1}). \tag{15}\]

We can use equation (15) to assess the impact response of unemployment driven by a change in \( b \), assuming that the economy is initially in steady state. Differentiation of (15) at \( t = 0 \) yields

\[
\frac{du_0}{db} = -u^* \frac{dh^*}{db} + (1 - \alpha)(1 - u^*) \frac{dq}{dw^*} \cdot \frac{dw^*}{db}. \tag{16}\]

It is important to emphasize here that we are differentiating \( q \) at the previous steady state reservation wage, and while \( q \) is not differentiable at this point it is Gateaux differentiable with

\[
dq = \begin{cases} 
\frac{dF(w^*_{-1})}{1 - F(w^*_{-1})} dw^* & \text{if } dw^* \geq 0 \\
0 & \text{if } dw^* < 0
\end{cases}.
\]

These considerations lead to the following result:

**Proposition 4 (Comparative dynamics: impact response under RE).**

\[
u_0 = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{u^*} \frac{dw^*}{db} db & \text{if } db \geq 0 \\
\frac{\alpha}{u^*} \frac{dw^*}{db} db & \text{if } db < 0.
\end{cases}
\]

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As $\frac{1}{u^*}$ is much larger than one we can conclude that an unexpected increase in unemployment benefits will result in an initial spike in unemployment many times of that of the increase in steady state unemployment. On the other hand $\alpha/u^*$ is necessarily less than one, which implies that a decrease in benefits will result in a fall in unemployment smaller than the fall in steady state.

Just as with the hazard rate, the change in steady-state unemployment can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects:

$$\frac{du^*}{db} = \frac{\partial u^*}{\partial b} + \frac{\partial u^*}{\partial Q} \frac{\partial Q^*}{\partial b}. \quad (17)$$

Further, notice that these effects are both positive. This equation may be used in conjunction with Proposition 4 to decompose the impact response $du_0$ into direct and indirect effects. With boundedly rational agents, indirect effects are not present on impact, so we can expect the impact response of the BR model to be smaller.

### 4.4 Comparative dynamics under bounded rationality

We now use numerical methods to study comparative dynamics in our model. While the direct and indirected effects of a benefits change are realized immediately and simultaneously under RE, our boundedly rational agents only learn over time the effect of the change on $Q$, leading to a delay in the realization of indirect effects.

The simulations in this Section, as well as in all subsequent sections, are based on the following specifications and calibration. Simulations are conducted with a constant gain of $\gamma = 0.1$ and with $N = 1$. The exogenous wage distribution is taken to be lognormal\(^{15}\) with parameters $\mu, s > 0$, yielding a median wage of $e^\mu$ and variance $e^{2\mu+s^2}(e^{s^2} - 1)$. We set $\mu = 11.0, s = 0.25$. The value of $\mu$ corresponds to a median household wage of approximately $60,000, close to the US value in dollars in 2016. For the choice of $s$, what is relevant for our model is the distribution of wage draws faced by the individual agent, i.e. not a measure of the population wage distribution.\(^{16}\) At our baseline value, the interquartile income range is $50,583 to $70,871. The lowest decile ends at $w = $43,460 and the highest decile begins at $w = $82,486. We interpret our calibration as capturing the experience of an individual interacting in a local labor market populated by individuals with similar characteristics.

The time unit is months and the discount rate is $\beta = 0.996$, in accordance with an annual interest rate of 5.0%. The monthly separation rate, $\alpha$, is set to be 3% to match the rate computed by Shimer (2007). In addition we set $b = $31,200 to target a replacement rate

---

\(^{15}\)Although lognormal does not impose $w_{\text{min}} > 0$ or $w_{\text{max}} < \infty$, this is numerically indistinguishable from setting $w_{\text{min}}$ small and $w_{\text{max}}$ large.

\(^{16}\)Our value for $s$ is broadly consistent with the literature. For example, p. 576 of Greene (2012) using a pooled LS estimate of a log wage equation controlling for a number of individual specific characteristics, obtains a residual variance of 0.146, i.e. $s = 0.382$. Krueger et al. (2016), estimate a log-labor earnings process with persistent and transitory shock. They find that the variance of the transitory shocks, which are the shocks more relevant for our model, is 0.0522, i.e. $s = 0.23$. The qualitative features of the simulations are robust to values of $s$ across this range.
of 41%, as in Hornstein et al (2011). Finally, utility is \( CRRA \) with risk aversion parameter \( \sigma > 0 \), and we set \( \sigma \) to 3.25 to match a job-finding rate of 43%, as computed by Shimer (2007) under RE.

Figure 1: Simulations of the RE and BR models given a 10% increase in benefits in period 50. Dotted and dashed lines indicate pre- and post-shock steady states. The top panels show exaggerated impact responses of unemployment and duration under RE relative to BR. The bottom panels provide the trajectories of mean, quartile, and outer-decile values of agents’ beliefs and associated reservation wages.

Figure 1 presents a simulation of an economy with 100,000 agents who experience an unexpected 10% increase in benefits in period 50. The horizontal (red) dotted lines represent the pre-shock steady-state values values and the horizontal (blue) dashed lines represent post-shock steady-state values.\(^\text{17}\)

For fixed beliefs \( Q \), an increase in benefits \( db \) results in an increase in the instantaneous return \( U'(b) \) \( db \) to being unemployed, thereby raising the reservation wage. This the direct effect emphasized in the previous Section. The corresponding indirect effect of a rise in benefits is that it also raises the optimal present value \( Q^* \) of being unemployed. For the

\(^{17}\)All simulations are initialized by providing boundedly rational agents with beliefs in a small neighborhood of the optimal value of \( Q \), and with the percent of agents identified as unemployed corresponding to the rational model’s steady-state unemployment rate. To eliminate transient dynamics the model is run for a large number of periods before our simulation begins.
rational agents both effects are instantaneous, whereas for the boundedly optimal agents, the initial impact on the reservation wage is only through the increase in the instantaneous return, with the impact from changes in $Q$ developing over time.\textsuperscript{18}

The decomposition into direct and indirect effects is evidenced in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1. The dark thicker line represents the cross-sectional mean reservation wage, with the thinner lines identifying quartile and outer-decile values. For the first 50 periods reservation wages are distributed around the pre-shock RE value – the distribution reflects the evolving beliefs of different agents as determined by their idiosyncratic sample draws. At time $t = 50$ there is a sharp increase in the distribution of reservation wages due to the rise in $b$. Subsequently over time, as evidenced in the bottom-left panel, agents’ beliefs converge to a distribution around the new optimal value of $Q$, and the distribution of corresponding reservation wages evolves to a distribution around the new RE value.

Turning to unemployment duration, the time series presented in the top-right panel gives, at each point in time, the realized cross-agent average, conditional on being newly unemployed, of the number of periods until the agent is next employed. For rational agents the expected unemployment duration for the newly unemployed jumps to the new steady-state duration level, whereas, because their $\bar{w}$ does not fully adjust immediately, boundedly rational agents are initially more likely than their rational counterparts to take jobs, leading to a more gradual adjustment of the duration.

Finally, we consider the unemployment time series, in the top-left panel, which dramatically illustrates the discrepancy in behavior of the optimal and boundedly optimal agents at the time of the policy change. As noted in the previous Section, an increase in benefits leads to an increase in the rational-agent steady-state unemployment rate. The translucent (blue) path identifies the unemployment rate associated with rational model. This time series exhibits a very large spike at the time of the shock, which reflects the impact response identified in the discussion following Proposition 4. This spike can be explained by the behavior of the associated reservation wage: because optimal agents experience both the direct and indirect effects at the instant of the change in $b$, their reservation wage rises immediately to the new optimal level, which causes a dramatic rise in unemployment resulting from previously employed agents not accepting their wage offers. The behavior of the boundedly optimal agents is similarly explained, but is muted by the failure of the indirect effect to materialize immediately.

A decrease in the benefit rate induces less drama, thus we dispense with the figure: the unemployment rate falls, as one would expect, but there is no overshooting spike in either the rational or boundedly rational case. This is easily understood: when benefit rates rise, employed agents with low wages immediately quit their jobs to capture the increased benefit of being unemployed; however, when benefits fall, all employed agents have increased incentives to retain their jobs and unemployed agents are willing to accept lower wages, but not to the extent that overshooting is implied.

\textsuperscript{18}The delayed onset of the indirect effect reflects in part the simplicity of our learning rule. A more sophisticated agent who has available the history of wage offers could, in principle, learn more quickly.
5 Applications

To illustrate the potential of our approach to address some labor market phenomena that are not easily explained by standard models, we consider two prominent empirical puzzles in the labor-search literature.

5.1 Application 1: unemployment and the business cycle

Shimer (2005) emphasized the inability of labor-search models to adequately amplify and propagate productivity shocks. The failure of productivity shocks to generate realistic unemployment dynamics reflects, in part, the sophisticated decision-making behavior of the model’s rational agents: a negative shock to serially-correlated productivity raises the relative value of unemployment benefits (the direct effect) and lowers the expected value of random job offers (the indirect effect). These effects countervail, mitigating the overall impact of the shock.

In this section we investigate the potential for bounded rationality to move the needle on the Shimer puzzle. We begin by noting that a random wage draw can be interpreted as the realization of idiosyncratic match productivity. With this in mind, we consider an extension of the model in which the realized wage $W$ is the product of the idiosyncratic component $w$ and a time-varying aggregate productivity shock, $z$; thus $W = z \cdot w$. First we develop the model under rational expectations, taking $z$ as observable; then we turn to an implementation of bounded rationality centered on the assumption that agents only observe their realized wage $W$, and are either unaware of, or for whatever reason fail to account for the stochastic variation induced by the aggregate shock.$^{19}$

An implication of our modeling assumptions is that agents have a misspecified forecast model in the sense that a superior model conditioning on the realized productivity shock is available. By inducing overly optimistic and pessimistic decision-making, this misspecification exaggerates the effects of productivity shocks: it amplifies the impact response of a change in productivity and magnifies the medium run “boom-bust” discrepancy between the high and low unemployment rates. We find that the boom-bust discrepancy is much higher under bounded rationality: in the medium run the BR model has higher highs and lower lows. Couple this finding with the amplification, under BR, of the impact response, and we conclude that bounded rationality provides a simple mechanism for moving the Shimer puzzle’s needle.

5.1.1 Productivity shocks with rational agents

As indicated above, we assume that an agent’s realized wage has two (stochastically orthogonal) components: idiosyncratic match productivity, $w$, and aggregate productivity, $z$. Job offers, which we now think of as indexed by $w$, are realized just as in the earlier model, i.e.

$^{19}$An alternative approach is through the information frictions literature: see Kenman (2010) and Morales-Jimenez (2017). Comparing the implications of this approach with ours would be of considerable interest.
as random draws from the distribution $F$, and the wage $W$ associated with job-offer $w$ is $W = z \cdot w$.

The fully rational agent is assumed to observe the aggregate state, and to understand and account for its stochastic structure; thus the principal conceptual variables used to understand the rational agent’s behavior are state dependent: $V(w, z)$ is the perceived value of holding job-offer $w$; $Q^*_{RE}(z) = E_w V(w, z)$ is the expected value of receiving a random job offer; and $w^*_{RE}(z)$ is the reservation wage.$^{20}$ The rational agent’s program may be written as follows:

$$V(w, z) = \max \{U(b) + \beta E_z' (Q^*_{RE}(z') | z), U(z \cdot w) + \alpha \beta E_z' (Q^*_{RE}(z') | z) + (1 - \alpha) \beta E_z' (V(w, z') | z)\}.$$ 

The solution to this program can be analyzed using standard recursive techniques.

For the simple assessment of this section we assume $z$ follows a 2-state Markov process, with states $z_L < z < z_H$, transition matrix $P$ such that $P_{ij} > 0$, and stationary distribution $\pi = \{\pi_L, \pi_H\}$; whence $Q^*_{RE}$ and $w^*_{RE}$ are also 2-state. Unemployment dynamics are given by equation (15), though computation of the quit rate is somewhat more involved.

### 5.1.2 Productivity shocks with boundedly rational agents

The boundedly rational agent is assumed to observe the realized wage $W$ associated with his job offer; however, when making forecasts and deciding whether to accept a job offer, the agent is either unaware of, or anyway fails to account for the impact of aggregate productivity on his future realized wages. An implication of this assumption is that agents are restricted to making decisions based on perceptions $Q$ that do not condition on $z$.

In more detail, for given perceptions, $Q$, the agent’s behavior is characterized by his reservation wage $W_{RE}(Q)$, as determined by $\phi U(W_{RE}(Q)) = U(b) + \beta(1 - \alpha \phi)Q$. Let $V(W, Q)$ be the perceived value of holding a job offer with realized wage $W$, and define

$$T(Q) = \pi_{zL} \int V(z_L \cdot w, Q) dF(w) + \pi_{zH} \int V(z_H \cdot w, Q) dF(w).$$

The unique fixed point of $T$, denoted by $Q^*_{BR}$, identifies self-fulfilling beliefs on the part of agents.

As usual, the BR agent’s reservation wage $W_{RE}$ experiences both direct and indirect effects. Consider, for example, the onset of a bust in period $t$. Because beliefs $Q_t$ are slow to adjust, the fall in productivity induces no change in $W_{RE}(Q_t)$; however, an employed agent’s wage offer, which was $W_{t-1} = z_H \cdot w_{t-1}$ and is now $W_t = z_L \cdot w_{t-1}$, falls sharply. Those agents with $W_t < \bar{W}$ quit, inducing a spike in unemployment: this is the direct effect. Importantly, the

$^{20}$Note that in the modified model the reservation wage might more aptly be named “the reservation wage-index.” Also, the subscript “RE” on $Q^*$ and $w^*$ is needed to distinguish the rational values from the boundedly-rational counterparts, which are discussed in the next section. Finally, here and throughout this section a subscript on the expectations term indicates the random variable against which the expectation is taken.

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boundedly rational agent fails to recognize that his low wage offer reflects declining economic conditions, and thus he views his wage offer with excess pessimism relative to the rational agent. In this way, the magnitude of the direct effect is amplified in the BR economy. The indirect effect via changing beliefs is amplified analogously.

The dynamics of an economy populated by boundedly rational agents is recursively assessed exactly as in our earlier model. Figure 2 provides the unemployment paths of a simulated economy, for the rational (left panel) and boundedly rational (right panel) populations. The calibration used here is the same as in Section 4, and the time scale is in months. The BR simulation includes 100,000 agents. Following Krusell and Smith (1998), the productivity shocks are ±1.0%, and the transition matrix is tuned to accord with median cyclic durations in the post-war era: a median boom length of 58 months and a median bust length of 10 months. Gray regions correspond to (simulated) recessions, and simulations were initialized in a bust.

![Figure 2](image)

Figure 2: Unemployment dynamics with aggregate productivity shocks. Shaded strips indicate recessions and horizontal lines identify medium-run unemployment levels. The left panel demonstrates the Shimer puzzle, the muted unemployment response of the RE model to productivity shocks, and the right panel shows the potential for BR to resolve the puzzle.

### 5.1.3 Business cycle amplification

Figure 2 provides evidence for the amplification of business cycles induced by bounded rationality. While the unconditional mean unemployment rates for the rational and boundedly rational economies are the same, at 6.67%, the simulated productivity shocks induce much more volatility in the BR economy. Two features of the BR model’s unemployment dynamics distinguish it from its RE counterpart: an amplified impact response in case of negative shocks, and a more persistent phenomenon referred to earlier as the boom-bust discrepancy.

To understand the amplified response on impact, consider a fall in productivity. Because the direct effect dominates, the fall causes a rise in the unemployment rate in both the

---

rational and BR economies. However, as discussed above, due to model misspecification, the magnitude of the direct effect is larger in the BR economy. Also, in the rational model, the rise unemployment is mitigated by the indirect effect, whereas no such mitigation is present in the BR model – agents have to learn about the effect of the shock on $Q$ – and so the impact response is much larger. This is evident in Figure 2, where we see that the maximum unemployment rate is well over 11.0% in the BR case, while not even reaching 8.0% in the rational case.

Turning to the boom-bust discrepancy, let $u_{RE}(z)$ and $u_{BR}(z)$ be the medium-run unemployment levels, i.e. the levels corresponding to holding $z_t = z$ indefinitely and with beliefs held at $Q_{BR}$ in the BR case. For the calibration under consideration, we have

$$u_{BR}(z_H) < u_{RE}(z_H) < u_{RE}(z_L) < u_{BR}(z_L).$$ (18)

The middle inequality captures the dominance of the direct effect. That the unemployment levels under bounded rationality are more extreme reflects the pessimism of BR agents induced by model misspecification: even after the impact response has unwound BR agents remain excessively pessimistic about their wage offers $W$, resulting in an amplification of the boom-bust discrepancy relative to the rational model.

In Figure 2, the upper horizontal dashed, respectively dotted, lines corresponds to $u_{RE}(z_L)$, respectively $u_{BR}(z_L)$ and the lower ones to $u_{RE}(z_H)$ and $u_{BR}(z_H)$. The boom-bust discrepancy is measured as the distance between these lines, and we observe that for the BR model it is much larger than for the rational model – nearly an order of magnitude larger.\footnote{u_{RE}(z_H) = 6.60\%, \ u_{RE}(z_L) = 6.68\%, \ u_{BR}(z_H) = 6.57\%, \ u_{BR}(z_L) = 7.04\%.}

Bounded rationality introduces two mechanisms through which the impact of productivity shocks on unemployment can be magnified. Due to forecast-model misspecification, the boom-bust discrepancy is much higher in the BR model; and due also to short-run absence of the indirect effects, the amplitudes of the unemployment spikes resulting from a fall in productivity are much more pronounced in the BR model. Admittedly, these results are only suggestive in nature: ours is a highly-stylized partial equilibrium environment only modestly calibrated to the data. However, the potential for BR to enrich unemployment dynamics in labor search models, and gain ground on the Shimer puzzle, appears incontrovertible.

5.2 Application 2: frictional wage dispersion

As noted in the Introduction, a puzzling result in search theory concerns the size of the frictional wage dispersions generated by search models. HKV illustrate this by constructing a measure of frictional wage dispersion: the mean-min (Mm) ratio, defined as the ratio of the ergodic mean of accepted wages relative to the ergodic minimum of accepted wage offers. HKV document how standard search models fail to generate the Mm ratios observed in the data. This feature is also present in our model. Under rational expectations, our calibration presented in Section 4 yields an Mm ratio of 1.22, which is well short of the empirical range of 1.5 to 2 documented by HKV. HKV highlight that this low Mm ratio produced by their
calibrated search model is a result of matching the short unemployment durations observed in the US.

Intuitively, a high frictional wage dispersion would imply a high option value of search which would then imply longer unemployment durations. The fact that we observe short unemployment durations in the US data implies that workers do not find it worthwhile to wait which, in turn, implies that there must be little frictional wage dispersion. This logic relies on rational expectations and, specifically, the ability of agents to fully incorporate the value of search in their decision making. The presence of bounded rationality makes it possible for agents to have incorrect beliefs regarding the value of search and, as a result, for there to be additional variation in accepted wage offers.

Our learning framework allows us to evaluate the plausibility of this mechanism. Since job separation rates vary significantly over time and the business cycle, we extend our baseline model to allow for agents also to form beliefs about the separation probability $\alpha$. The agents treat $\alpha$ as unknown and learn about it, from their own observations, using a constant gain algorithm in order to be robust to possible structural changes. The learning dynamics of $Q_t$ are otherwise the same as described in Section 3. Given a wage offer $\hat{w}_t$, and given beliefs about the value of unemployment $Q_t$ and about the job separation rate $\alpha_t$, the value of a wage offer is given by

$$V(\hat{w}_t, Q_t, \alpha_t) = \max\{U(b) + \beta Q_t, \phi_t U(\hat{w}_t) + \beta \alpha_t \phi_t Q_t\},$$

where $\phi_t = (1 - \beta(1 - \alpha_t))^{-1}$. All the calibration parameters are the same as the previous section.

To evaluate the Mm ratio in the boundedly rational model we first simulate the stationary joint distribution of beliefs, wages and unemployment, and then compute the ratio of the mean wage to the minimum wage within the ergodic distribution. For our baseline calibration we find an Mm ratio of 1.9, which is significantly higher that the value of 1.2 observed in the RE model and is on the high end of the 1.5 - 2 range found by HKV. To gain an intuition for this result, observe that the solid black line in the left panel of Figure 3 plots the density of the ergodic distribution of reservation wages for our standard calibration of the gain at $\gamma = 0.1$. The distribution of reservation wages in the rational expectations equilibrium is a mass point represented by the red line. The learning behavior of the agents induces a non-trivial distribution of beliefs around the rational exceptions value and, whence, a corresponding distribution of reservation wages. A direct consequence of this is a larger Mm ratio relative to rational expectations. In line with the learning literature, larger gains result in greater variation in beliefs, which explains why we see larger values of the Mm ratio as we increase the gain parameter in the right panel of Figure 3.

$^{23}$We note that while agents are concerned about, and alert to the possibility of structure change, for our analysis here $\alpha$ is kept fixed.
Figure 3: The left panels plot the stationary distribution of reservation wages under BR for different gains $\gamma$, i.e. different rates of data discounting, and also provides the (degenerate) distribution of reservation wages under RE (red vertical line). The non-trivial distributions under BR lead to increased wage dispersion relative to RE. The right panel plots the mean/min measure of wage dispersion for varying gain (black) and the measure for RE (red). BR with gains larger than 0.03 are consistent with the range found by HKV.

6 Conclusions

We consider boundedly optimal behavior in a well known partial-equilibrium model of job search. Boundedly optimal decision-making depends on a univariate sufficient statistic that summarizes the perceived value to the job-seeker of receiving a random wage draw. Following the adaptive learning literature, agents update their perceived values over time based on their current perceptions and observed wage draws. We show that, in a stationary environment and under natural assumptions, this learning algorithm is globally stable: given any initial perception, our boundedly optimal agents learn over time to make optimal decisions.

In application our bounded rationality approach shows promise to resolve several empirical puzzles. While our results were applied in partial equilibrium setting, embedding this learning behavior in a general equilibrium environment would be feasible, and is an important direction for future research.
Appendix A: Proofs of results in Section 3

Proof of Lemma 1. First, observe that the agent rejects the wage offer \( w \) if and only if
\[
\phi U(w) \leq U(b) + \beta(1 - \alpha \phi)Q. \tag{19}
\]
The argument is completed by addressing the following three cases:

1. If \( Q > Q_{\text{max}} \) then condition (19) always holds; thus \( \bar{w}(Q) = w_{\text{max}} \), the agent rejects any offer and receives \( U(b) + \beta Q \).

2. If \( Q < Q_{\text{min}} \) then condition (19) never holds; thus \( \bar{w}(Q) = w_{\text{min}} \), the agent accepts any offer \( w \) and receives \( \phi U(w) + \beta \alpha \phi Q \).

3. Finally, if \( Q_{\text{min}} \leq Q \leq Q_{\text{max}} \) then
\[
\phi U(w_{\text{min}}) \leq U(b) + \beta(1 - \alpha \phi)Q \leq \phi U(w_{\text{max}}). \tag{20}
\]
Since \( U'(w) > 0 \) it follows that for each \( Q \in [Q_{\text{min}}, Q_{\text{max}}] \) there is a unique \( \bar{w}(Q) \in [w_{\text{min}}, w_{\text{max}}] \) such that
\[
\phi U(\bar{w}(Q)) = U(b) + \beta(1 - \alpha \phi)Q,
\]
and further that, in this case, condition (19) holds if and only if \( w \leq \bar{w}(Q) \).

To establish Theorem 1 we need the following technical result:

Lemma A.1. If \( f : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \) is continuous, if \( f \) is differentiable except at perhaps a finite number of points, and if the derivative of \( f \), when it exists, is positive except at perhaps a finite number of points, then \( f \) is strictly increasing.

Proof: In the context of this proof, we say that \( x_0 \) is anomalous if either \( f'(x_0) \) does not exist or \( f'(x_0) \leq 0 \). We begin by assuming \( f \) has only one anomalous point \( x_0 \). Because the derivative is positive for \( x \neq x_0 \), it suffices to show that if \( x < x_0 \) then \( f(x) < f(x_0) \) and if \( x > x_0 \) then \( f(x) > f(x_0) \). Suppose \( x < x_0 \). By the mean value theorem applied to \( [x, x_0] \), which requires that \( f \) be continuous on \( [x, x_0] \) and differentiable on \( (x, x_0) \), there exists \( x^* \in (x, x_0) \) such that
\[
\frac{f(x_0) - f(x)}{x_0 - x} = f'(x^*), \text{ or } f(x_0) - f(x) = f'(x^*)(x_0 - x) > 0.
\]

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An analogous argument holds if \( x > x_0 \). Finally, this argument is easily generalized to account for a finite number of anomalous points.

The following Lemma, which is referenced in the main text, establishes important properties of the T-map, including an upper bound on its derivative.

**Lemma A.2.** The map given by (10) is continuous on \( \mathbb{R} \), differentiable everywhere except possibly \( Q_{\text{min}} \) and \( Q_{\text{max}} \), and \( 0 < DT \leq \beta < 1 \) whenever it exists.

**Proof.** Using Lemma 1, direct computation yields the following formulation of the T-map:

\[
T(Q) = \begin{cases} 
\alpha \beta \phi Q + \phi \int_{w_{\text{min}}}^{w_{\text{max}}} U(w)dF(w) & \text{if } Q < Q_{\text{min}} \\
(U(b) + \beta Q) F(\bar{w}(Q)) + (1 - F(\bar{w}(Q))) \beta \alpha \phi Q + \phi \int_{\bar{w}(Q)}^{w_{\text{max}}} U(w)dF(w) & \text{if } Q_{\text{min}} \leq Q \leq Q_{\text{max}} \\
(U(b) + \beta Q) & \text{if } Q > Q_{\text{max}}
\end{cases}
\]

Clearly \( DT(Q) > 0 \). It further follows from Lemma 1 that the map \( T \) is continuous on \( \mathbb{R} \) and differentiable everywhere except possibly \( Q_{\text{min}} \) and \( Q_{\text{max}} \). Next we compute an upper bound on \( DT \). If \( Q < Q_{\text{min}} \) then \( DT(Q) = \beta \alpha \phi < \beta \), where the inequality follows from \( \alpha \phi \in (0, 1) \). If \( Q > Q_{\text{max}} \) then \( DT(Q) = \beta \). Finally, if \( Q_{\text{min}} < Q < Q_{\text{max}} \) we may compute

\[
DT(Q) = (U(b) + \beta Q) \frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial Q} + \beta F(\bar{w}) - (\phi U(\bar{w}) + \beta \alpha \phi Q)dF(\bar{w}) \frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial Q} \\
+ (1 - F(\bar{w})) \beta \alpha \phi \\
= \beta (F(\bar{w}(Q)) + (1 - F(\bar{w}(Q))) \alpha \phi) < \beta,
\]

where the second equality exploits the definition of \( \bar{w} \).

**Proof of Theorem 1.** We begin the proof by establishing that the T-map has a unique fixed point. Let

\[
\hat{Q} = \min \left\{ \frac{\phi U(w_{\text{min}})}{1 - \alpha \beta \phi}, Q_{\text{min}} \right\}.
\]

We claim that \( T(\hat{Q}) > \hat{Q} \). Indeed,

\[
T(\hat{Q}) = \alpha \beta \phi \hat{Q} + \phi \int_{w_{\text{min}}}^{w_{\text{max}}} U(w)dF(w) > \alpha \beta \phi \hat{Q} + \phi U(w_{\text{min}}) \geq \hat{Q}.
\]

Next, let \( h : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \) be defined as

\[
h(Q) = T(\hat{Q}) + \beta (Q - \hat{Q}).
\]

We claim \( Q \geq \hat{Q} \) implies \( h(Q) \geq T(Q) \). Indeed let \( H(Q) = h(Q) - T(Q) \). Then \( H \) is continuous and \( H'(Q) > 0 \) except perhaps at \( Q_{\text{min}} \) and \( Q_{\text{max}} \). Thus by Lemma A.1, \( H \) is strictly increasing. The claim follows from the fact that \( H(\hat{Q}) = 0 \).

Finally let \( \bar{Q} \equiv (1 - \beta)^{-1} \left( T(\hat{Q}) - \beta \hat{Q} \right) \). Then

\[
Q \geq \bar{Q} \Rightarrow h(Q) < Q \Rightarrow T(Q) < Q.
\]
Thus we have $T(\hat{Q}) > \hat{Q}$ and $T(\check{Q}) < \check{Q}$. Since $T$ is continuous, the existence of a fixed point $Q^*$ is guaranteed by the intermediate value theorem. Finally, let $S(Q) = Q - T(Q)$. Then $S$ is continuous and $S'(Q) > 0$ except perhaps at $Q_{\min}$ and $Q_{\max}$. Thus by Lemma A.1, $S$ is strictly increasing, from which it follows that the fixed point of $T$ is unique.

Now we turn to connecting $Q^*$ to the Bellman functional equation (1), which we repeat here for convenience:

$$V(w) = \max_{a \in \{0, 1\}} U(c(a, w)) + \beta E(V(w')|a, w)$$

$$w' = g(w, a, \hat{w}, s).$$

The binary nature of the choice variable makes this problem accessible. Specifically,

$$E(V(w')|0, w) = \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w})$$

$$E(V(w')|1, w) = (1 - \alpha)V(w) + \alpha \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}).$$

It follows that

$$a = 0 \implies V(w) = U(b) + \beta \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}) \quad (21)$$

$$a = 1 \implies V(w) = U(w) + \beta(1 - \alpha)V(w) + \alpha\beta \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}), \text{ or}$$

$$a = 1 \implies V(w) = \phi U(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}), \quad (22)$$

where $\phi = (1 - \beta(1 - \alpha))^{-1}$. We conclude that the Bellman functional equation may be rewritten as

$$V(w) = \max \left\{ U(b) + \beta \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}), \phi U(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w}) \right\}. \quad (23)$$

Now define $\tilde{Q} = \int V(\hat{w})dF(\hat{w})$, which may be interpreted as the value of having a random draw from the exogenous wage distribution. Then equation (23) becomes

$$V(w) = \max \left\{ U(b) + \beta \tilde{Q}, \phi U(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \tilde{Q} \right\}, \quad (24)$$

from which it follows that

$$\tilde{Q} = \int V(w)dF(w) = \int \left( \max \left\{ U(b) + \beta \tilde{Q}, \phi U(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \tilde{Q} \right\} \right) dF(w). \quad (25)$$

Using Lemma 1 we may write

$$\int \left( \max \left\{ U(b) + \beta \tilde{Q}, \phi U(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \tilde{Q} \right\} \right) dF(w) = (U(b) + \beta \tilde{Q})F(\bar{w}(\tilde{Q})) + \phi \int_{\bar{w}(\tilde{Q})}^{w_{\max}} U(w)dF(w) + \phi\alpha\beta \tilde{Q} \left( 1 - F(\bar{w}(\tilde{Q})) \right).$$

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We conclude that equation (25) can be written
\[
\tilde{Q} = (U(b) + \beta \tilde{Q})F\left(\tilde{w}\left(\tilde{Q}\right)\right) + \phi \int_{\tilde{w}(\tilde{Q})}^{w_{\text{max}}} U(w)dF(w) + \phi \alpha \beta \tilde{Q}\left(1 - F\left(\tilde{w}\left(\tilde{Q}\right)\right)\right) = T(\tilde{Q}),
\]
where the last equality follows from the definition of $T$. Since the T-map has a unique fixed point $Q^*$, we conclude that $\tilde{Q} = Q^*$. By equation (24) $\tilde{Q}$, and hence $Q^*$, uniquely identifies $V$, the solution to the Bellman system. It follows from equation (6) that $V(w) = V(w, Q^*)$. Finally, Proposition 1 implies $w^* = \tilde{w}(Q^*)$.

To prove Theorem 2, we require the following technical Lemma:

**Lemma A.3.** Suppose that $\gamma_n$ is a sequence of positive numbers satisfying $\sum_n \gamma_n^2 < \infty$. The following are equivalent:

- **a.** $\sum_n \gamma_n = \infty$.
- **b.** There exists $\lambda > 0$ such that $\prod_n (1 - \lambda \gamma_n) = 0$.
- **c.** $\prod_n (1 - \lambda \gamma_n) = 0$ for all $\lambda > 0$.

**Proof.** Denote by $\{\gamma_n^N\}$ the $N$-tail of $\{\gamma_n\}$, that is, $\gamma_n^N = \gamma_{n+N}$. It will be helpful to observe that since $\gamma_n \to 0$, given $\varepsilon > 0$ there is an $N > 0$ so that $\gamma_n^N < \varepsilon$ for all $n > 0$.

(a $\Rightarrow$ c). Let $\lambda > 0$ and choose $N_2(\lambda) > 0$ so that $\lambda \gamma_n^{N_2} < 1$ for all $n > 0$. By the concavity of the logarithm, we have that
\[
\log (1 - \lambda \gamma_n^{N_2}) < -\lambda \gamma_n^{N_2}.
\]

Now define
\[
P_M^{N_2}(\lambda) = \prod_{n=1}^{M} (1 - \lambda \gamma_n^{N_2}),
\]
and observe that
\[
\log P_M^{N_2}(\lambda) < -\sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_2}.
\]

Since by assumption $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \gamma_n^{N_2} = \infty$, it follows that $\log P_M^{N_2}(\lambda) \to -\infty$, or $P_M^{N_2}(\lambda) \to 0$ as $M \to \infty$. Finally, notice that
\[
\prod_{n} (1 - \lambda \gamma_n) = \prod_{n=1}^{N_1-1} (1 - \lambda \gamma_n) \lim_{M \to \infty} P_M^{N_2}(\lambda) = 0,
\]
establishing item c.

(b $\Rightarrow$ a). Suppose $\lambda > 0$ is so that $\prod_n (1 - \lambda \gamma_n) = 0$. Choose $N_1 > 0$ so that $\lambda \gamma_n^{N_1} < 1$ for all $n > 0$. Let $\lambda = \sup_n \gamma_n^{N_1} < \lambda^{-1}$, and write
\[
\log (1 - \lambda \gamma_n^{N_1}) = -\lambda \gamma_n^{N_1} + (\lambda \gamma_n^{N_1})^2 F(\lambda \gamma_n^{N_1}),
\]

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where \( F \) is a continuous function on \([0, \hat{\gamma}]\). Define
\[
P_M^{N_1}(\lambda) = \prod_{n=1}^{M}(1 - \lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}),
\]
and observe that
\[
\log P_M^{N_1}(\lambda) = -\lambda \sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_1} + \sum_{n=1}^{M} \left(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}\right)^2 F(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}).
\]
Let
\[
\hat{F} = \sup_{\gamma \in [0, \hat{\gamma}]} |F(\lambda\gamma)| < \infty.
\]
It follows that
\[
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}\right)^2 |F(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1})| \leq \hat{F} \lambda^2 \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} (\gamma_n^{N_1})^2 < \infty,
\]
and thus there exists \( \delta \in \mathbb{R} \) so that
\[
\sum_{n=1}^{M} \left(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}\right)^2 F(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}) \to \delta \text{ as } M \to \infty.
\]
By assumption, \( P_M^{N_1}(\lambda) \to 0 \) and thus \( \log P_M^{N_1}(\lambda) \to -\infty \) as \( M \to \infty \). Thus
\[
-\infty = \lim_{M \to \infty} \log P_M^{N_1}(\lambda) = \lim_{M \to \infty} \left(-\lambda \sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_1} + \sum_{n=1}^{M} \left(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}\right)^2 F(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1})\right)
\]
\[
= -\lambda \lim_{M \to \infty} \sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_1} + \lim_{M \to \infty} \sum_{n=1}^{M} \left(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1}\right)^2 F(\lambda\gamma_n^{N_1})
\]
\[
= -\lambda \lim_{M \to \infty} \sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_1} + \delta.
\]
It follows that
\[
\infty = \lim_{M \to \infty} \sum_{n=1}^{M} \gamma_n^{N_1} < \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \gamma_n,
\]
thus establishing item \( a \).

That \((c \Rightarrow b)\) is trivial and the proof is complete. \( \blacksquare \)

**Proof of Theorem 2.** Define
\[
\overline{Q} = \max \left\{ \frac{\phi U(w_{\max})}{1 - \beta \alpha \phi}, \frac{U(b)}{1 - \beta} \right\} \text{ and } Q = \max \left\{ \frac{\phi U(w_{\min})}{1 - \beta \alpha \phi}, \frac{U(b)}{1 - \beta} \right\},
\]
where we note that by Assumption B \( Q < \overline{Q} \). It is clear from equation (7) of Lemma 1 that \( \hat{T}(\overline{Q}, \hat{w}^N_t) < \overline{Q} \) and \( \hat{T}(Q, \hat{w}^N_t) > Q \) for all samples \( \hat{w}^N_t \). It follows that for any initial \( Q \)
the sequence is eventually in \([Q, \overline{Q}]\). Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that \(Q_0 \in [Q, \overline{Q}]\) and therefore that \(Q_t \in [Q, \overline{Q}]\) for all \(t \geq 1\).

From equation (12) we have that

\[
Q_{t+1} - Q^* = Q_t - Q^* + \gamma_{t+1} \left( \hat{T}(Q_t, \hat{w}_t^N) - Q_t \right)
\]

Denote by \(E_t(\cdot)\) the expectations operator conditional on all information available before the time \(t\) wage sample is drawn. Observe that

\[
E_t \left( \hat{T}(Q_t, \hat{w}_t^N) \right) = N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{N} E_t \max \left\{ \phi U(\hat{w}_t(k)) + \beta \alpha \phi Q_t \right\}
\]

\[
= N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{N} E_t V(\hat{w}_t(k), Q_t) = N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{N} T(Q_t) = T(Q_t).
\]

The second equality follows from (6) and the third equality follows from (10) and the random sample assumption. Using this observation we may compute

\[
E_t [(Q_{t+1} - Q^*)^2] = (Q_t - Q^*)^2 + 2 \gamma_{t+1} (Q_t - Q^*) (T(Q_t) - Q_t) + \gamma_{t+1}^2 E_t \left( \left( \hat{T}(Q_t, \hat{w}_t^N) - Q_t \right)^2 \right).
\]

As \([Q, \overline{Q}]\) is compact and \(\hat{T}\) is continuous in \(Q\) there exists \(M > 0\) such that

\[
E_t \left[ \left( \hat{T}(Q_t, w_{t+1}) - Q_t \right)^2 \right] \leq M
\]

for all \(Q_t \in [Q, \overline{Q}]\).

Note that if \(f : [a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) is continuous and is differentiable everywhere except at a finite number of points \(a < x_1 < \cdots < x_n < b\), and, where defined, if \(f'(x) < \beta\) then for all \(a < x < y < b\) we have that

\[
\frac{f(y) - f(x)}{y - x} \leq \beta.
\]

To see this, suppose, for example, that \(a < x < x_1 < y < x_2\). Then

\[
\frac{f(y) - f(x)}{y - x} = \frac{f(y) - f(x_1) + f(x_1) - f(x)}{y - x} \leq \frac{\beta(y - x_1) + \beta(x_1 - x)}{y - x} = \beta.
\]

The general result is then easily verified.

Applying this observation to \(T\), and using the facts that \(T'(Q) \leq \beta\) for all \(Q\) except possibly at \(Q_{\max}\) and \(Q_{\min}\), and that \(T(Q^*) = Q^*\), it follows that

\[
\frac{T(Q) - Q}{Q - Q^*} \leq \beta - 1
\]
for all $Q$. Define $\lambda = -2(\beta - 1) > 0$. Then
\[
E_t[(Q_{t+1} - Q^*)^2] \leq (Q_t - Q^*)^2 + 2\gamma_{t+1}(Q_t - Q^*)(T(Q_t) - Q_t) + \gamma_{t+1}^2M
\]
\[
\leq \left(1 + 2\gamma_{t+1}\frac{T(Q_t)}{Q_t - Q^*}\right)(Q_t - Q^*)^2 + \gamma_{t+1}^2M
\]
\[
\leq (1 - \lambda\gamma_{t+1})(Q_t - Q^*)^2 + \gamma_{t+1}^2M.
\]
(26)

Following the proof strategy of Bray and Savin (1986), define
\[
c_t = (Q_t - Q^*)^2 + \left(\sum_{k=t}^{\infty} \gamma_{t+1}^2\right)M.
\]
From Equation (26) we know that $c_t$ is a sub-martingale since
\[
E_t(c_{t+1}) = E_t[(Q_{t+1} - Q^*)^2] + \left(\sum_{k=t+1}^{\infty} \gamma_{t+1}^2\right)M
\]
\[
\leq (1 - \lambda\gamma_{t+1})(Q_t - Q^*)^2 + \gamma_{t+1}^2M + \left(\sum_{k=t+1}^{\infty} \gamma_{t+1}^2\right)M
\]
\[
\leq (Q_t - Q^*)^2 + \left(\sum_{k=t}^{\infty} \gamma_{t+1}^2\right)M = c_t.
\]
As $c_t$ is bounded from below by 0, we apply the Martingale Convergence Theorem to conclude that $c_t$ converges to some random variable $\tilde{c}$ almost surely. This immediately implies that $(Q_t - Q^*)^2$ converges to some random variable $\tilde{D}$ almost surely. It remains to be shown that $\tilde{D} = 0$ almost everywhere, and thus $Q_t \to Q^*$ almost surely.

Suppose not, then $E(\tilde{D}) > 0$. Convergence almost surely then implies that there exists $L > 0$ and $t^* > 0$ such that $E(Q_t - Q^*)^2 \geq L$ for all $t \geq t^*$. Taking expectations of Equation (26) we have that
\[
E[(Q_{t+1} - Q^*)^2] \leq (1 - \lambda\gamma_{t+1})E[(Q_t - Q^*)^2] + \gamma_{t+1}^2M.
\]
Since $\gamma_t \to 0$, we can choose any $N > t^*$ such that $\gamma_{t+1} \leq \frac{L}{2M}$ for all $t \geq N$. It follows that
\[
E[(Q_{t+1} - Q^*)^2] \leq \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{2}\gamma_{t+1}\right)E[(Q_t - Q^*)^2]
\]
for all $t \geq N$. We therefore conclude that
\[
E[(Q_t - Q^*)^2] \leq E[(Q_N - Q^*)^2] \prod_{k=N}^{t-1} \left(1 - \frac{\lambda}{2}\gamma_{k+1}\right)
\]
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for all $t \geq N$. By Lemma A.3, Assumption C implies that $\prod_{k=N}^{\infty} (1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma_{k+1}) = 0$ and thus

$$E(\tilde{D}) = \lim_{t \to \infty} E[(Q_t - Q^*)_2] = 0,$$

which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that $Q_t \to Q^*$ almost surely. ■

Appendix B: Proofs of results in Section 4

Computation of $\delta(Q,b)$. Let

$$\psi = \psi(Q,b) \equiv F(\bar{w}(Q,b)) + \alpha (1 - F(\bar{w}(Q,b))),$$

which is the probability of being unemployed at the end of the current period conditional on being unemployed at end of the previous period. Then

$$\delta(Q,b) = 1 \cdot (1 - \psi) + 2 \cdot \psi \cdot (1 - \psi) + 3 \cdot \psi^2 \cdot (1 - \psi) + \ldots$$

$$= (1 - \psi) \sum_{n \geq 0} (n + 1) \psi^n = \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - F(\bar{w}(Q,b)u))}. \blacksquare$$

Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by showing that $Q^*_b > 0$. Implicit differentiation yields

$$Q^*_b = (1 - DT(Q^*))^{-1}T_b(Q^*) > 0.$$

As shown in the proof of Lemma A.2, $DT(Q) \in (0,1)$. Also, since $Q^*$ is in the interior, the T-map is given locally by

$$T(Q) = (U(b) + \beta Q) F(\bar{w}) + \beta \alpha \phi Q (1 - F(\bar{w})) + \phi \int_{\bar{w}(Q)}^{u_{\text{max}}} U(w) dF(w). \ (27)$$

Direct computation yields

$$T_b(Q^*) = F(w^*) U'(b) + (U(b) + \beta Q^* - \beta \alpha \phi Q^*) dF(w^*) w^*_b - \phi U(w^*) dF(w^*) w^*_b$$

$$= F(w^*) U'(b) + \{ U(b) + \beta Q^* - (\phi U(w^*) + \beta \alpha \phi Q^*) \} dF(w^*) w^*_b = F(w^*) U'(b) > 0,$$

where the term in square brackets equals zero by (8). It follows that $Q^*_b > 0$

To conclude, we need only establish that $\frac{\partial h}{\partial b} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial h}{\partial Q} < 0$. Since $h = (1 - \alpha)(1 - F)$, we may compute

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial b} = -(1 - \alpha)dF(w^*) \frac{\partial}{\partial b} \bar{w}(Q^*,b) < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial h}{\partial Q} = -(1 - \alpha)dF(w^*) \frac{\partial}{\partial Q} \bar{w}(Q^*,b) < 0,$$

where the inequalities follow from equation (9).■

Proof of Proposition 4. First observe that

$$du_0 = -u^* dh + (1 - \alpha)(1 - u^*) q_w dw. \ (28)$$
Next, notice that
\[ u^* = \frac{\alpha}{h + \alpha} \implies -u^* dh = \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*}. \]  
\[ (29) \]

If \( db < 0 \) then \( dq = q_w dw = 0 \). It follows from equations (28)-(29) that
\[ du_0 = \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*}. \]

Turning now to the case \( db \geq 0 \), and using the definition of \( h \) to get \( dh = -(1 - \alpha)dF \) and that \( dq = (1 - F)^{-1}dF \), we have that
\[ dh = -(1 - \alpha)(1 - F)dq = -hdq. \]

Plugging into equation (28) we find
\[
\begin{align*}
du_0 & = \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*} - \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - u^*)}{h} dh \\
& = \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*} - \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) u^* dh \\
& = \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*} + \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \alpha \frac{du^*}{u^*} \\
& = \frac{du^*}{u^*}
\end{align*}
\]
as desired.■
References


