Congress as an Institution - The Organization of Power
Multiple forms of power intersect and mutually condition each other in Congress-the
powers of the individual officeholder; of the parties; of the committee system and other
institutional structures and rules; and of interest groups. In addition, one has to
consider the effects of two more diffuse influences-on the one hand, that of public
sentiment, and on the other, of what was earlier referred to as the privileged position of
business. The dangers of corporate disinvestment or economic disruption as unintended
consequences of political decisions make members of Congress very sensitive to the needs
of the corporate economy and the outlook of its leaders.
The individual officeholder: We've already seen how, with the decline
of the parties, individual candidates assumed control of their own campaigns, leading to
the rise of entrepreneurial and careerist politicians. This has had several consequences:
Legislators not indebted to the parties for their seats could not be dictated to by
party leaders in Congress. Leadership styles veered towards negotiation and
coalition-building. As the text notes (p289), this led to a more decentralized and
fragmented Congress where collective action was difficult. The chief legislative goal of
Newt Gingrich and the "Contract with America" group of Republican legislators in
1994 was to overcome this.
The need to please the folks back home, always a vital goal of legislators, became even
more central. On the one hand, doing so has always been essential to reelection; on the
other, the competing demands of party discipline were weaker
At the same time, party control over committee assignments has provided the parties with
continued leverage over individual legislators, who need to serve on committees that can
help them "bring home the bacon" and advance their careers.
The tensions between the demands of party and of pork were accentuated by the prolonged
crisis over budget deficits in the 1980s and early 1990s (text, 306-307). The inability of
Congress to discipline itself was at the heart of the problem. Could Dick Armey be
expected to vote against Texas oil interests, or Jesse Helms against the huge subsidies
that go to North Carolina tobacco growers? Would Newt Gingrich support reductions in the
Defense Department budget when his district is a major beneficiary of military contracts?
The parties: Parties in Congress control committee assignments and
leadership positions. In the late 19th century, during the heyday of the party
system, a succession of House Speakers exercised enormous power which they used to mold
majority party members into cohesive and energetic bodies. Chief among their powers was
that of making committee appointments, a power taken away from the Speaker during the
1910-1911 session. Today party caucuses elect each party's Congressional leadership and
make committee assignments.
See chart, "Majority Party Structure in the House" (not
available online).
See chart, "Majority Party Structure in the Senate" (not
available online).
In the 1980s and 1990s parties in Congress have become more cohesive and unified. Why?
Increased ideological homogeneity of the two parties:
The Reagan revolution drove the old liberal wing of the Republican party to its margins,
if not altogether out of it.
The Democratic party's support for the civil rights movement finally ended the power of
Southern conservatives in it. While the sixties also enabled anti-war, student, and other
social movements to gain much greater influence in the party, this influence waned after
McGovern's devastating loss in the 1972 presidential elections. The party subsequently
sought to shed its liberal image and move to the right.
The resurrection of parties in a new form-dominated by their national committees, fueled
by soft money, skilled in the coordination of national media campaigns.
Soft money ("independent expenditures") allows unlimited amounts of cash to
flow from monied interests to the national parties. Based on the dubious proposition that
money not given directly to particular candidates shouldn't be capped or regulated.
Parties can raise and spend as much as they want, so long as it is used for
"party-building" activities that "just happen" to help all of the
party's candidates.
While soft money began trickling into the parties in the 1970s, it became a flood in the
1990s, reaching 263.5 million (for both parties combined) in 1995-1996 (text, 212).
The Clinton administration's White House "coffee klatsches" and Lincoln
Bedroom sleep-overs are examples of soft money fundraising.
The "Contract with America" and GOPAC-an example of what the new kind of party
organization can do (and what it can't):
The Contract with America was both a brilliant public relations ploy and a device with
which to compel Republican candidates to adhere to ideological principles once in office.
As PR, it positioned the Republicans as revolutionary outsiders intent on eliminating
corruption from Congress, and it promised a high degree of accountability in
hopes of overcoming public distrust.
As ideological hammer, getting candidates to sign the Contract during the campaign made
it more difficult to back away from commitments later.
GOPAC broke with the pattern of self-selected candidates by recruiting many candidates.
In addition, it increased the flow of money from the party to them (text, 303).
What the Republicans under Gingrich could not overcome, however, was the
decline in turnout. The mandate the party claimed in 1994 was based on support from about
20% of the electorate. Overestimation of public support contributed to the disastrous
decision to shut-down the federal government (twice, once for 21 days) in late 1995 in a
confrontation with the White House over the budget.
Institutional structures and rules: Most work in Congress is done in
committees. Nearly every bill is referred to at least one committee after its
introduction, and very rarely does a bill ever reach the floor of either house of Congress
without first being approved by a committee. Committees also have the power to amend and
even rewrite bills.
Members are given committee assignments by party caucuses. Usually, an effort is made to
place each member in a committee of their choice.
See chart, "Majority Party Structure in the House of Representatives"
(not available online).
Seniority normally determines rank on each committee, with the most senior member of the
majority party serving as committee chair.
At the start of the 104th Congress (1994), Speaker Gingrich radically altered
the committee system:
He chose all the committee chairs, sometimes bypassing senior members in favor of
loyalists.
He controlled committee assignments.
Chairs were subjected to "term limits" - three year tenure.
Subcommittees were subjected to their parent committees.
He sometimes bypassed committees altogether, instead assigning bills to ad hoc
"task groups" chosen by himself.
The increase in regulatory government, and the growth of the Executive Office of the
President, led to an expansion of Congressional committee staff (and an increase in
committee workloads). This, in turn, subtly enhanced staff power.
Interest groups:
Organized interests, predominantly corporate but also including professional
associations, organized labor and others, lobby members of Congress, monitor the progress
of bills they favor or oppose, testify (or provide experts to testify) at public hearings,
and engage in a variety of other activities designed to attain specific, often narrowly
defined, legislative goals-tax breaks, favorable regulations, etc.
Interest group politics is facilitated by the committee structure of Congress, because
it enables each organized interest to concentrate on just those committees that deal with
matters of importance to it.
In its routine operation the system has been likened to an iron triangle. Interest groups testify on behalf of
bills or programs they favor; in exchange for support from committee members they donate
to their campaigns or invest in their district or state. Executive agencies defend
policies and regulations that regulated industries or suppliers prefer, receiving in
return political protection from those industries and their Congressional allies in budget
battles and the like.
Historically, three arguments have been made in defense of this system:
Political Pluralism: different interests counterbalance each
other. The public interest is served by virtue of the openness of the system and the rough
equality of access for groups. However, many of those who've studied the system have come
to a different conclusion-that it heavily favors monied interests while victimizing un- or
weakly organized groups with few political resources of the kind needed.
Economic rationalization: The interest group system's development owes
much to war and depression in the 20th century. World wars one and two made
unprecedented demands of the economic system, leading to government directed efforts to
achieve previously unheard of levels of productive efficiency and economic coordination.
In both wars special agencies were established with far reaching powers over production,
wages and prices, distribution, and consumption. The results were sometimes astonishing.
Corporate leaders, while naturally unwilling to accept so much governmental control once
peace returned, found the system of corporate interest groups developed during wartime
very appealing, and continued to use them voluntarily as a means of reducing competition,
bargaining with the government, and so on.
Scientific administration: Turn of the century Progressives attacked
both the unchecked power of corporations in the new industrial economy and the corruption
of the party system. Many Progressives hoped that science and management would solve the
problems of government. Conflicting interests could be harmonized through scientific
rationality, and competent administration based on the ideals of impersonality,
independence, and technical expertise would prevail over the private manipulation of
government.