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# Expressiveness Reevaluated

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Whether one envisions a socially androgynous world as an eminent disaster or a desirable long-term goal, it is clear that men and women do differ and have always differed cross-culturally and historically in their roles, attitudes, motivation, and self-conceptions.<sup>1</sup> But social scientists who try to define and measure sex differences are beset with problems.<sup>2</sup>

There are a number of male-female tests. Gough's Femininity Scale,<sup>3</sup> for example, has been widely used, but as with other such empirically derived measures, it is extremely difficult to know precisely what it measures. This is even more true of measures of so-called unconscious femininity such as the Franck Drawing Completion Test,<sup>4</sup> which, incidentally, does not correlate with the Gough test. That men and women respond differently on these tests does not help clarify the basic nature of sex differences, much less the dynamics underlying them.

There have been numerous theoretical attempts to capture the nature of the difference between masculinity and femininity. Freud used the terms "active" and "passive" to characterize the difference between the sexes but admitted his dissatisfaction with this oversimplified formulation.<sup>5</sup> Although Freud spoke of the bisexual nature of both sexes and was careful not to equate being anatomically female with "femininity," he hypothesized that female psychosexual development involved the abandonment of clitoral "masculinity" and the substitution

of the "feminine" desire for a child for the "masculine" desire for a penis. For Freud, woman's psyche was ultimately a result of her reaction to the anatomical distinction between the sexes. Erik Erikson and other neo-Freudians have tried to counteract Freud's stress on the absence of a penis by emphasizing the presence of "inner space" in women. Erikson tends to see the anatomical differences as symbolic of the psychic differences between the sexes. For Erikson the woman's enclosing and receptive psyche is symbolized by the anatomical fact of the womb while the man's external orientation is symbolized by the penis.<sup>6</sup> Both Freud and Erikson, however, are concerned with relating masculinity and femininity to male and female anatomy.

Gutmann makes a distinction which parallels and elaborates that made by Erikson. He borrows Schachtel's terms "autocentric" and "allocentric" to describe feminine and masculine ego styles. For Gutmann, the autocentric (feminine) ego "seeks out and creates relatively closed and private domains that are bounded at their perimeters but are diffuse and amorphous within," while the "allocentric (masculine) ego seeks out and

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creates open areas that permit movement, exploration and surprise."<sup>7</sup> Carlson has attempted to operationalize some of Gutmann's distinctions and concludes that, while Gutmann's formulation is clearly the better elaborated in portraying the qualities of masculine and feminine ego functioning, Bakan's formulation using the concepts of "agency" and "communion," if developed systematically, seems more capable of addressing a wide range of phenomena.<sup>8</sup>

Both Carlson and Block<sup>9</sup> have utilized Bakan's very broad behavioral distinction to characterize further aspects of masculinity and femininity. "Agency" refers to the organism acting as an individual in self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion. Communion, on the other hand, is the organism as part of a larger whole and manifests itself in the sense of being at one with other organisms. "Agency manifests itself in isolation, alienation, and aloneness; communion in contact, openness, and union. Agency manifests itself in the urge to master; communion in noncontractual cooperation."<sup>10</sup> For Bakan, if societies or individuals are to be viable, "unmitigated agency" must be combined with "communion."

Earlier than either Gutmann or Bakan, Simone de Beauvoir sensitively described "masculine" and "feminine" orientations in her essentially philosophical transcendent-immanent dichotomy. But her descriptions are always colored by her dedication to transcendence, which she sees as being the morally superior stance which involves not so much self-interest as self-determination and autonomy. Immanence is seen as being static and unfree: "The concept of harmony is one of the keys to the feminine universe. . . . The moments that women regard as revelations are those in which they discover their accord with a static and self sufficient reality. . . . The joy that lies in the free surge of liberty is reserved for man; that which woman knows is a quiet sense of smiling plenitude."<sup>11</sup> For deBeauvoir, men are "subjects" who achieve autonomy and "transcendence" through exploits or projects. Women assume the status of "the other," of "objects" who know only "immanence." This leads her to a rejection of the feminine principle as involving (we think erroneously) being an object who only reacts, not a subject who acts.

From our own point of view, the most satisfactory attempt to pinpoint the ubiquitous and multifaceted differences between "masculinity" and "femininity" is Parsons's instrumental-expressive distinction.<sup>12</sup> Parsons's definitions focus attention on the individual's orientation to interaction within social systems and thus allow linking the study of sex roles to an analysis of social system functioning. As we shall try to show, his distinction can clarify much of the confusion that has plagued analyses of sex differences in orientation to relationships with others.

Very briefly, expressive action involves an orientation toward the relations among the individuals within a social system, that is, toward the attitudes and feelings about oneself and others. Instrumental action, on the other hand, involves an orientation to goals outside the immediate relational system. In terms of functions for the system, instrumental action relates system to environment, and expressive action relates units within the system.

The instrumental-expressive distinction has been challenged almost continuously since its presentation by Parsons and his colleagues in 1954. Broderick, summarizing family studies of the 1960s, refers to it as "one casualty of the decade."<sup>13</sup> He notes that the attack began with Slater's argument that parental role differentiation in terms of instrumental and expressive behaviors is dysfunctional<sup>14</sup> and ended with a series of attacks by feminists who saw sexist implications in its use.

Following Slater's article, several articles criticized the simplistic use of the terms to describe differences in male and female interaction in the family. Leik<sup>15</sup> and Levinger<sup>16</sup> find that both husbands and wives within the family are predominantly expressive in interaction with one another, and Rossi stresses that while the wife role may be expressive, the mother role involves considerably more instrumental activity.<sup>17</sup> These critiques importantly point to problems in utilizing the terms to analyze particular interactional systems. However, they do not challenge Parsons's fundamental assertion that the terms describe the differences between male and female orientations in broad perspective, taking all their various roles and spheres of

action into account through time. At this level, we maintain that the terms can offer a useful way of conceptualizing general orientational differences between the sexes.

Many feminist writers and social scientists have been wary of "expressiveness" because it has been employed as scientific justification for keeping women in the home and for attributing emotionality, incompetence, and dependence to women. We do not believe that these characteristics are inherent in the definition of expressiveness or that a derogatory view of women need result from its use.

Another feminist objection to the distinction is that, since greater prestige accrues to instrumental activity in this society, to call women expressive is surely a pejorative by contrast. Because the masculine virtues are more obviously rewarded in our society, however, is hardly a reason for women to give up the feminine virtues. This comes close to the oppressed adopting the standards of the oppressor. We hope to show that expressiveness by no means excludes instrumentality, that it is not a matter of either/or for women.

### Instrumental-Expressive Defined<sup>18</sup>

At the most abstract level, instrumental action is directed to goals external to interaction while expressive action is directed to the interaction itself. Instrumental action involves manipulating environmental objects and exercising control over other actors in the interest of attaining an outside goal. Because of this external focus, an instrumental action cannot involve a primary concern with the positive and negative emotional reactions of others in the immediate interactional situation. The products of instrumental activities become facilities or means for the other actors, not direct rewards. The appropriate sanctions, then, for instrumental activity are not directly emotional responses but affectively neutral attitudes such as approval, respect, and esteem. This does not mean that the latter rewards are not emotionally gratifying but rather that they are more impersonal, formal, and distant. For example, a department

head does not reward a faculty member for instrumental performance with love but with a less emotionally charged attitudinal response such as approval.

Expressive action involves an orientation to the positive and negative emotional responses of others, since it is concerned with tension management and motivational control among individuals. Expressive activities are rewarded directly by affective attitudes such as warmth and love.

In spite of the greater formal prestige accruing to instrumental action, Parsons sees the instrumental and the expressive functions as of equal importance to the social system—the instrumental one keeping the system intact in the environment and the expressive one preserving the internal equilibrium of the system. Related to the proposition that the two kinds of action are of equal importance is the idea that the two kinds of action do not involve absolute differences in power but rather different kinds of power. Expressive power is exerted through motivational control while instrumental power is exerted through formal authority or technical control.

Some analysts have tended to see expressiveness as being the reaction of the oppressed to a lack of formal power. We disagree and argue instead that, far from involving a slave mentality, expressiveness can be viewed as being more closely connected with ultimate goals (human happiness) than instrumental action, which is not in itself an ultimate end but only a means. In the last analysis, ultimate ends must always be expressive because instrumental action produces nothing but facilities or means for attaining something else, whereas expressive action produces rewards, which by definition are not means to something beyond, but the ends of action. The instrumental American's view of good life is one of striving for higher and higher goals. Such strivers, however, have no answer for the ultimate purpose of their activity but rather must conceive it in terms of an unending process. For de Beauvoir, too, the good life is one in which the individual justifies himself or herself by acting upon the world. She cannot define, however, the final purpose of these projects; one simply struggles. Both these views contrast sharply with a dominant theme in Eastern philosophies in which the ultimate goal is seen as a

merging with all there is. The mystic defines the final meaning as being an intuitively felt state of harmony and bliss, of infinite love, where the boundaries of system and nonsystem merge and environment is nonexistent. In this sense, one might well understand expressiveness to be the more ultimate and the more desirable orientation. In Western thought, however, the instrumental emphasis is so strong that "expressiveness" tends to be seen as a manifestation of "weakness."

Finally, it is of critical importance to make clear that when the instrumental-expressive distinction is used to differentiate masculine and feminine orientations, it does not imply an absolute difference. Clearly both sexes perform both types of activities and any given role has both instrumental and expressive components. Indeed, Bales found that frequently the same individual might be both the instrumental and the expressive leader. In fact, we will argue that one cannot measure instrumental and expressive orientations as if a zero sum relationship were involved. Our position is that when we characterize women as expressive, it must be understood to mean only that women are generally more expressive than men. This does not necessarily imply that women are less instrumental than men.

Perhaps the positive content of expressiveness will become clearer as we spell out how it does not imply emotionality, incompetence, or dependency.

#### *Expressiveness versus Emotionality*

Kate Millett, in her discussion of functionalism in *Sexual Politics*,<sup>19</sup> says "expressive" is a new name for "emotional." Pauline Bart says that it implies "acting out" behavior, including aggression.<sup>20</sup> While expressiveness does indeed engage socioemotional skills, it is misleading to view it as simply *being* emotional. It is true that women are less penalized for expressing emotion than are men; indeed, women are even expected to give expression to it on occasion. But more generally, women are expected to understand and deal with emotion, more than simply being subject to it. Mothers bind up emotional wounds, quiet temper tantrums, soothe babies, intuit emotional prob-

lems. But these tasks do not require that the mothers "act out," but that they resonate with, respond to, and cope with emotions. As wives, women are expected to be able to "read" their husband's feelings, to be sensitive to the emotional meaning of his reactions, and to interpret them, to make him feel better. It seems incorrect to equate these acts with *being* emotional. Men are potentially as emotional as women, but societal expectations discourage them from expressing emotion and from being sensitive to their own or others' emotions on pain of being considered "unmasculine."<sup>21</sup> Expressiveness must be understood as providing a patterned and positive outlet for emotion. It is not the same as being emotional; it is an interactive capacity, not a subjective state.

### *Expressiveness versus Incompetence*

The contention that expressiveness implies a lack of instrumental competence results in part from the unnecessary assumption that the instrumental-expressive distinction constitutes a single dimension on which the positive pole of expressiveness would be the same as the negative pole of instrumentality.<sup>22</sup> That is, if this distinction is treated as a zero-sum game, then a woman who is a pleasure to be with must be incapable of instrumental competence; and the woman who is a success in instrumental terms must be a bitch. If, however, the instrumental-expressive distinction is treated as two dimensions, each with positive and negative characteristics, it could become an empirical question whether there is a zero-sum relationship between the two. Theoretically, it would be possible to obtain high scores on both.

It is ironic that Millett chose Orville Brim to berate in her discussion, for it was he who first attempted to treat the instrumental-expressive distinction empirically as constituting separate dimensions.<sup>23</sup> He and his colleagues classified various descriptive adjectives first as to whether they pertained primarily to the instrumental or the expressive role. Then they rated the adjectives as positive or negative according to whether the behavior would be congruent or incongruent with the instru-



mental or expressive role. He found in some women both positive instrumental and positive expressive traits. Heilbrun found similar results in his research with college students in 1968.<sup>24</sup>

We also view the instrumental-expressive distinction as two separate dimensions. The relationships between the scores on the two may be ascertained empirically. We examine the hypothesis that, at least in a population that places a premium on positive instrumental traits, men and women do not differ so much with respect to these as they do with respect to positive expressive characteristics.

### *Expressiveness versus Passivity and Dependence*

The assumption that women are more passive and dependent than men is so pervasive that it has been read into the instrumental-expressive distinction explicitly or implicitly. We do not believe, however, that obtaining direct personal or affective response from others is the same as or even connected with passivity and dependence.

The tendency to view seeking affective response as dependency or lack of autonomy seems to result from the assumption that instrumental achievers are self-determining, since they do not appear to be oriented to the responses of others. De Beauvoir falls into this error because she tends to view transcendence as freedom from social constraint. But from a sociological standpoint, no one is free from social constraint. Maccoby and Jacklin report that "the two sexes are equally responsive to social reinforcement, and neither sex consistently learns better for this form of reward than for other forms."<sup>25</sup> Everyone is dependent on the responses of others; we are all ultimately seeking social rewards. In this respect men are no more autonomous than women. The instrumental-expressive difference lies not in autonomy versus dependence, but rather in the nature of the rewards sought.

Neither is there reason to assume that expressiveness is tied to passivity. Expressiveness does not mean doing what others want one to do; it may just as well involve getting others to do what one wants them to do. The critical issue here is the means

employed. The expressive person obtains interpersonal ends by means of motivational control, while the instrumental person obtains impersonal ends by means of authority or technical control.

In an empirical investigation, then, it seems vital to separate passivity and dependence from expressiveness, and activity and independence from instrumentalness. The connections between these characteristics should be a subject for empirical investigation, not a foregone conclusion.

### The Research

Our first task was to select adjectives which, when used as self-descriptions, could be employed as indices of positive instrumentalness, negative instrumentalness, positive expressiveness, negative expressiveness, traits related to activity and independence, and traits indicating passivity and dependence. We investigated the extent to which the grouping based on judges' agreement reflected configurations underlying the actual responses of male and female subjects considered separately. If we could establish congruence between empirically derived clusters and judges' theoretical assignments, we would have some assurance that our dimensions were valid. Then we would be able to construct measures of each dimension and examine male-female differences with respect to scores on these measures and with respect to the intercorrelations among them. Specific attention was given to two questions: (1) do men and women differ more with respect to positive expressive traits than for instrumental characteristics? (2) are women's feelings of independence related to an expressive-instrumental orientation, while men's feelings of independence are related to a rejection of expressiveness?

### *Sample and Data*

Approximately 400 male and female college students enrolled in introductory sociology classes at a large western univer-

sity in the academic year 1972-73 comprised the sample. They were predominantly middle-class late adolescents and young adults. The women tended to have higher-status family backgrounds and to report higher high school GPAs than did the men.

These students were asked to rate themselves on 46 adjectives selected by our judges from Gough's Adjective Check List<sup>26</sup> in terms of four possible answers: very true of me, somewhat true of me, somewhat untrue of me, and very untrue of me.<sup>27</sup>

### *Judging the Theoretical Categories*

Independently, the four authors and three male graduate students in sociology went through the adjectives in Gough's list and sorted them into six categories: positive expressive, negative expressive, positive instrumental, negative instrumental, active and/or independent, and passive and/or dependent, and a residual category for words that could not be placed in any of these six. The guiding definitions were those given here and in Johnson's earlier article.<sup>28</sup> The classifications of the seven judges were compared. If a word received the same placement by three of the four female judges and two of the three male judges (at least five out of seven in agreement), it was placed in that category. The final grouping of adjectives by judges is given in the first column of table 1.

### *An Empirical Analysis of the Theoretical Assignments*

To examine how the observed relationships among the adjectives corresponded to the theoretical categories of the judges, both factor analysis and cluster analysis were used. Only students who responded to every adjective on the list (130 men and 135 women) were included.<sup>29</sup>

The factor analysis used the principal factoring method with a varimax rotation. Data from men and women were analyzed separately. Over half of the total variance in the adjectives was

accounted for by common factors: 52.9 percent for men and 52.3 percent for women. Only six adjectives had commonalities less than .35: "suggestible," "unrealistic," and "planful" for men and "active," "excitable," and "spendthrift" for women. The results of the factor analysis are summarized in the second and fourth columns of table 1.

Although the factors underlying the responses of men and women are similar, the percentages of common variance which they explain are different. For women, the two largest factors, accounting for 43.5 percent of the common variance, include most of the adjectives originally judged as expressive, either congruent or incongruent. These adjectives did not appear for men until the third largest factor emerged which accounted for only 14.6 percent of the common variance, and on the seventh largest factor, which accounted for only 5.3 percent. The two largest factors for men include adjectives judged primarily instrumental, accounting for 24.2 percent of the common variance, and others judged active-independent accounting for 18.7 percent. The implications of this pattern will be discussed later in connection with our analysis of intercorrelations.

To corroborate and clarify the two factor analyses, two cluster analyses of the correlations among adjectives for men and for women were performed.<sup>30</sup> This process works by finding the pair of adjectives that have the highest correlation and computing the average correlation of every other adjective in the group with the two adjectives in this pair. Then the adjective with the highest average correlation is added to the cluster. This continues until all adjectives are connected with at least one other (third and fifth columns of table 1).

### *Constructing a Combined Index*

Although more groups of adjectives were generated by the factor and cluster analyses than were used by the judges, the placements were similar. Words grouped by judges in one category tended to have their highest loadings on the same factors and to be in the same or closely related clusters. This supports our contention that terms describing personality may

TABLE I

*Comparison of Adjective Dimensions from Groupings by Judges, and Groupings from Factor Analyses and Cluster Analyses*

THEORETICAL GROUPINGS	WOMEN		MEN	
	Factor Analysis	Cluster Analysis	Factor Analysis	Cluster Analysis
Considerate	Factor 1 (28.1%):	Cluster 1 (.26):	Factor 3 (14.6%):	Cluster 1 (.26):
Good-natured	Considerate (.590)	Considerate	Sympathetic (.396)	Considerate
Intuitive	Good-natured (.606)	Good-natured	Unfriendly (-.540)	Good-natured
Warm	Warm (.726)	Pleasant	Understanding (.520)	Pleasant
Sympathetic	Sympathetic (.640)	Warm	Unkind (-.718)	Warm
Pleasant	Pleasant (.728)	Sympathetic	Pleasant (.320)*	Obliging
Understanding	Unfriendly (-.401)	Understanding		Sympathetic
Outgoing	Understanding (.494)	Obliging	Factor 7 (4.3%):	Understanding
	Obliging (.334)*		Good-natured (.527)	Suggestible (.12)
	Outgoing (.320)***		Warm (.534)	
			Obliging (.311)	
			Suggestible (.418)	
			Pleasant (.501)	
			Outgoing (.543)	
			Excitable (.348)*	

Expressive Positive

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Expressive Negative			
Quarrelsome	Factor 2 (15.4%):	Cluster 7 (.22):	Factor 6 (4.6%):	Cluster 7 (.50):
Irritable	Quarrelsome (.788)	Fearful	Irritable (.581)	Unfriendly
Stern	Irritable (.658)	Self-pitying	Spendthrift (.331)	Unkind
Vindictive	Vindictive (.312)	Quarrelsome	Self-pitying (.440)	
Touchy	Touchy (.668)	Irritable	Touchy (.641)	Cluster 8 (.24):
Unfriendly	Reckless (.429)	Touchy	Quitting (.300)*	Dependent
Unkind	Fearful (.348)*	Reckless		Vindictive
Timid				Quarrelsome
	Factor 6 (5.8%):	Cluster 6 (.26)	Factor 10 (2.9%):	Irritable
	Fearful (.381)	Quitting	Quarrelsome (.774)	Touchy
	Submissive (.428)	Unfriendly		Spendthrift (.18)
	Outgoing (-.340)**	Unkind	Factor 9 (3.8%):	
	Unkind (.476)	Lazy	Considerate	
	Timid (.691)	Unrealistic	Obliging (.302)*	
			Factor 13 (2.4%):	
			Vindictive (.638)	
			Excitable (-.349)**	

Instrumental Positive

Analytical	Factor 3 (11.8%):	Cluster 3 (.36):	Factor 1 (24.2%):	Cluster 3 (.28):
Foresighted	Quitting (-.464)	Thorough	Active (.419)	Thorough
Rational	Thorough (.841)	Efficient	Quitting (-.536)	Industrious
Forceful	Efficient (.751)	Planful	Lazy (-.475)	Efficient
Thorough	Industrious (.477)	Industrious	Thorough (.690)	Planful
Efficient	Planful (.625)		Efficient (.604)	
Industrious		Cluster 2 (.31):	Industrious (.696)	Cluster 2 (.32):
Planful	Factor 7 (4.7%):	Analytical	Planful (.364)	Analytical
	Analytical (.557)	Foresighted	Rational (.351)*	Intuitive
	Foresighted (.575)	Rational		Assertive
	Rational (.520)			Foresighted
	Assertive (.359)*			Rational
	Unrealistic (-.353)*			
	Reckless (-.361)*			
			Factor 4 (8.0%):	
			Analytical (.613)	
			Assertive (.500)	
			Intuitive (.746)	
			Foresighted (.522)	
			Rational (.450)	
			Forceful (.330)*	
			Sympathetic (.326)*	
	Factor 10 (3.5%):			
	Intuitive (.601)			
	Analytical (.301)*			
	Fearful (-.322)**			

TABLE 1 (Continued)

		Instrumental Negative			
Fearful	Factor 9 (3.8%):	Cluster 8 (.18):	Factor 12 (2.7%):	Cluster 6 (.20):	
Quitting	Lazy (.635)	Shiftless	Unrealistic (.418)	Quitting	
Shiftless	Unrealistic (.435)	Suggestible	Spendthrift (.327)*	Self-pitying	
Slipshod*		Spendthrift (.29)	Planful (-.364)*	Fearful	
Spendthrift	Factor 8 (4.1%):	Cluster 6 (.26):	Assertive (-.326)**	Lazy	
Unrealistic	Shiftless (.386)	Quitting		Unrealistic	
Reckless	Suggestible (.604)	Unfriendly			
Excitable	Spendthrift (.391)	Unkind			
Lazy	Submissive (.427)*	Lazy			
		Unrealistic			
		Active Independent			
Active	Factor 4 (10.2%):	Cluster 4 (.22):	Factor 2 (18.7%):	Cluster 4 (.26):	
Assertive	Assertive (.480)	Active	Aggressive (.717)	Active	
Daring	Aggressive (.751)	Assertive	Forceful (.648)	Outgoing	
Aggressive	Forceful (.817)	Outgoing	Stern (.563)	Aggressive	
Adventurous	Excitable	Aggressive	Independent (.481)	Forceful	
Independent	Stern (.354)	Forceful	Assertive (.368)*	Independent	
Robust*	Outgoing (.423)	Excitable	Outgoing (.322)**	Stern	
		Stern			
	Factor 5 (7.1%):	Cluster 5 (.26):	Factor 5 (7.6%):	Cluster 5 (.28):	
	Active (.383)	Intuitive	Daring (.777)	Daring	
	Daring (.661)	Daring	Adventurous (.637)	Adventurous	
	Adventurous (.822)	Adventurous	Excitable (.462)	Excitable	
	Self-pitying (-.474)	Independent	Reckless (.466)	Shiftless	
	Independent (.336)*			Reckless	
	Outgoing (.373)*				



Passive Dependent

Dependent	Factor 11 (2.9%):	Cluster 9 (.24):	Factor 11 (2.8%):	Cluster 9 (.30):
Submissive	Dependent (.640)	Dependent	Submissive (.486)	Submissive
Self-pitying	Independent (-.359)	Vindictive	Timid (.570)	Timid
Suggestible	Rational (-.354)*		Outgoing (-.392)*	
Obliging			Self-pitying (.341)*	
	Factor 12 (2.7%):	Cluster 10 (.50):	Factor 8 (3.8%):	
	Obliging (.542)	Submissive	Dependent (.412)	
	Assertive (.345)**	Timid	Fearful (.564)	

NOTE.—The percentage of common variance that each factor accounts for is given in parentheses following the factor number. The loading of an adjective on a factor is given in parentheses following the adjective. Only adjectives with loadings greater than .30 are listed. Adjectives listed under a given cluster are grouped at the level of average correlation at which the last member of the group joined the cluster, unless a different correlation level is given in parentheses after that adjective.

\*Second highest loading of this variable.

\*\*Third highest loading of this variable.

\*\*\*Fourth highest loading of this variable.

be grouped into categories reflecting positive and negative expressiveness, positive and negative instrumentality, and which are separable from passive-dependent and active-independent traits. But the placements of individual adjectives were not identical, either between sexes or between methods of analysis. No arrangement for either sex or either method was precisely identical with the judges' groupings. We therefore decided to develop an "empirical" grouping on the basis of maximum agreement between the sexes and between the two methods of analysis. The final empirical groups and subgroups are:

Positive expressive:

Sympathetic, understanding, pleasant, considerate, good-natured, warm, obliging.

Negative expressive:

Quarrelsome, irritable, touchy, unfriendly, unkind.

Positive instrumental:

a) Thorough, efficient, industrious, planful.

b) Analytical, foresighted, rational.

Negative instrumental:

Lazy, unrealistic, quitting.

Active independent:

a) Stern, forceful, aggressive, outgoing, assertive.

b) Independent, active.

c) Daring, adventurous.

Passive dependent:

Timid, dependent, submissive.

The first subgroup of positive instrumental adjectives ("thorough," "efficient," "industrious," "planful") involves traits appropriate to carrying out an instrumental task. The second ("analytical," "foresighted," "rational") describes an instrumental "way of thinking." The first subgroup of active independent adjectives ("stern," "forceful," "aggressive," "outgoing," "assertive") comes closest to the instrumental dimension. It describes aggressiveness and forcefulness. The second subgroup ("independent," "active") comes closest to representing psychological independence. The third subgroup ("daring," "adventurous") implies an inclination to engage in activities that are out of the ordinary. Each of these subgroups is both

theoretical and empirically separate from the instrumental adjectives.

Comparing the empirical with our theoretical groupings, it was apparent that the greatest differences were between the negative instrumental and the dependent lists. Nine words that the judges placed in each of these theoretical categories were unclassifiable in our empirical analyses. Five of these had been grouped as negative instrumental by the judges ("fearful," "shiftless," "spendthrift," "excitable," "reckless"), two as passive dependent ("self-pitying," "suggestible"), one ("intuitive") as positive expressive, and one ("vindictive") as negative expressive. Nevertheless, since the two groupings bear such fundamental similarity in implication and share many common adjectives, we will focus the rest of our analysis on the "empirical" set.

### The Expressive-Instrumental Distinction as a Measure of Sex Differences: Results from the Analysis of Data

We examined the differences between men and women in two ways. First, we compared them with respect to relative size of their scores on each dimension (table 2). Scores were obtained by summing an individual's self-ratings in each dimension. The self-ratings were coded from 1 for "very true" to 4 for "very untrue." Thus, a higher score indicates less possession of that trait. Second, to help us understand how these dimensions could be interrelated differently for men and women, we compared the intercorrelations obtained between the dimensions for each sex (table 3). Finally, we returned to the cluster and factor analyses to see how those results clarified some of the findings in this analysis.

#### *Comparison of Male and Female Scores on Each Dimension*

When we compared the scores of men and women, we found that women rate themselves as both more positive expressive

TABLE 2  
*Mean Scores of Men and Women*

EMPIRICAL DIMENSION	MEN			WOMEN			t*	df	<i>a</i> (TWO- TAIL)
	$\bar{X}$	SD	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	N			
Pos. expressive	12.21	2.41	195	11.53	2.54	215	2.75	407	0.006
Neg. expressive	14.30	2.69	196	14.89	2.73	217	-2.23	408	0.026
Pos. instrumental:									
<i>a</i>	7.79	1.84	194	7.55	2.12	213	1.22	404	0.224
<i>b</i>	5.53	1.45	192	5.89	1.64	209	-2.34	399	0.020
Neg. instrumental	8.53	1.94	197	8.68	1.88	219	-0.76	406	0.447
Active independent:									
<i>a</i>	11.31	2.73	196	11.79	2.84	215	-1.72	408	0.086
<i>b</i>	3.38	1.05	197	3.36	1.05	216	0.17	408	0.866
<i>c</i>	4.24	1.24	195	4.21	1.40	219	0.24	412	0.810
Passive dependent	7.64	1.76	197	7.75	1.89	217	-0.65	412	0.517

NOTE.—Lower score indicates higher self-rating on trait.

\*Positive *t* means women more. Negative *t* means men more.

TABLE 3

*Intercorrelations of Empirical Dimensions*

	POS. EXPRES- SIVE		NEG. EXPRES- SIVE		POS. INSTRUMENTAL			NEG. INSTRU- MENTAL			ACTIVE INDEPENDENT			PASSIVE DEPENDENT		
	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>c</i>
Men ( <i>N</i> = 195)																
Pos. expressive	1.00															
Neg. expressive	-.418	1.00														
Pos. instrumental:																
<i>a</i>	.228	-.133	1.00													
<i>b</i>	.241	-.016	.433	1.00												
Neg. instrumental	-.257	.335	-.536	-.242	1.00											
Active independent:																
<i>a</i>	.095	.183	.238	.231	-.174	1.00										
<i>b</i>	.109	.004	.350	.259	-.320	.550	1.00									
<i>c</i>	.193	.046	.046	.094	-.134	.377	.335	1.00								
Passive dependent	-.064	.148	-.029	-.140	.181	-.150	-.217	-.010	1.00							
Women ( <i>N</i> = 210)																
Pos. expressive	1.00															
Neg. expressive	-.353	1.00														
Pos. instrumental:																
<i>a</i>	.311	-.240	1.00													
<i>b</i>	.156	-.124	.298	1.00												
Neg. instrumental	-.151	.444	-.386	-.214	1.00											
Active independent:																
<i>a</i>	.175	-.015	.178	.175	-.319	1.00										
<i>b</i>	.176	-.218	.215	.244	-.122	.317	1.00									
<i>c</i>	.126	-.012	-.051	.076	-.276	.401	.401	1.00								
Passive dependent	.062	.187	.141	-.022	.143	-.139	-.253	-.259	1.00							

and less negative expressive than do men. In spite of the relatively large sample, there is only one other significant difference, namely, a tendency for men to rate themselves as more analytical, rational, and foresighted than women rate themselves. There is no sex difference on the other group of positive instrumental words: "thorough," "efficient," "industrious," "planful." While women see themselves as capable of instrumental activity, they do not define their basic approach as instrumental as strongly as men do. There was also a tendency for men to rate themselves slightly higher than women on active independent (*a*): "stern," "forceful," "aggressive," "outgoing." These words suggest not so much psychological independence as an external orientation, which is, of course, involved in the definition of instrumentality. There was no difference between men's and women's self-ratings on dependency or on negative instrumental traits. Thus, in this college sample, women see themselves as more expressive than men, but *not* as possessing more dependent or negative instrumental traits.

#### *Intercorrelations*

We first examined the correlations in table 3 for basic patterns and then compared the interrelationships for men and for women. By and large, positive expressive and positive instrumental traits and active independence are similarly valued by both men and women, and the positive and negative poles of the dimensions are negatively correlated.

The one exception indicates an important difference between men and women. For women but not for men, "daring" and "adventurous" are negatively associated with passive dependent. All of the other cases where the correlations between two dimensions are different for men and women involve active independence and negative expressiveness or passive dependence and instrumentality.

Negative expressive traits are either negatively associated with active independence (*b*) ("active," "independent") among women and have no association among men or have no association with active independence (*a*) ("stern," "forceful," etc.)

among women and are positively associated among men. More important, positive expressiveness is more highly correlated with active independence among women than among men. Thus, women see themselves as aggressive, forceful, and stern, as well as considerate, good-natured, and sympathetic, while men do not combine these traits. Similarly, women see themselves as active and independent (psychologically independent), as well as positively expressive, whereas men do not.

These data support our hypothesis that women associate positive expressiveness with independence (including assertiveness and aggressiveness), while men associate activity and independence with negative expressive traits ("quarrelsome," "touchy," "irritable"). This suggests that, for men, becoming independent from the primary mother attachment necessarily involves some rejection of the "femininity" in themselves. The "immature" male may assert his masculinity by negative expressive behavior—trying to be a man by *not* being a woman. Perhaps the frequent confusion of dependence (lack of independence) with expressiveness represents a "masculine bias." Women do not see active independent traits as contradicting expressive traits, but men may.<sup>31</sup>

Men relate only active independence (daring, adventurous) to expressiveness. Furthermore, in the cluster and factor analyses, "daring" and "adventurous" are always grouped together, but women combine them with independence while men combine them with "excitable" and "reckless." Women group "excitable" and "reckless" with negative instrumental terms while men view "excitable" as positive expressive.

This further leads us to believe that masculinity involves the rejection of femininity. Our findings suggest that as men reach for masculinity they see such traits as excitability and recklessness as incongruent with that role, and project them onto the expressive orientation they are rejecting. Women do not need to reject expressiveness as they reach for independence and instrumentality. While they need not equate excitability and recklessness with warmth, sympathy, and considerateness, they can nevertheless reject those traits as incongruent with instrumental effectiveness.

Women associate dependency with thoroughness and

efficiency, but not with rationality and foresightedness. They negatively associate dependency with daringness and adventurousness. This suggests that for women "being good"—not daring and adventurous and not analytical, foresighted, and rational, but efficient and industrious—is associated with feelings of dependency. Since expressiveness was not correlated with dependency in either sex, it seems that the conservative, efficient young woman is more likely to be dependent than the expressive one.

Men negatively associate "analytical," "foresighted," and "rational" (positive instrumental [*b*]) with passive dependency, while for women this relationship is near zero. Similarly, the correlations between active independent (*a*) and (*b*) and the two positive instrumental subgroups are always higher for men than for women. In the factor and cluster analyses of men's responses, the terms "active" and "assertive" were included in primarily instrumental groupings. These instrumental and independent factors also accounted for the largest percentage of common variance for the men. That correlations between positive expressiveness and the first two subgroups of active independence are relatively low among men suggests that independence is more related to instrumentalness than to expressiveness for them, and that the two former sets of traits are more basic to men's self-views. Among women, while expressiveness accounts for the most variance in their self-ratings, independence is related to positive expressive and positive instrumental traits about equally. Thus women, while perhaps seeing expressiveness as most basic to their self-picture, are, unlike men, able to incorporate independence, instrumentalness, and expressiveness in their self-views.

### Summary and Discussion

We have argued for reinstating Parsons's instrumental-expressive distinction as a viable alternative to discarding discussion of nonbiological sex differences because they appear to involve hidden pejoratives against women. We have tried to show that the concept of positive expressiveness can be used to express feminine virtues without involving a derogatory view of



women. By assuming that instrumentality is a separate dimension from expressiveness, we were able to show that, in this college student population, the largest difference between men and women was not that women see themselves as less positively instrumental but rather that women see themselves as *more* positively expressive than men. This finding may be compared to Bennett and Cohen's somewhat similar analysis of sex differences in self-attribution of traits. They state that "the major difference in the self-concepts of the sexes is that women conceive of themselves as being much richer in the positive qualities of social warmth and empathy."<sup>32</sup> These authors go on, however, to say that women secondarily see themselves as more helpless, timid, and fearful than men, and suggest that women's kindness may be developed out of fear of attack. That is, they offer the "psychology of the oppressed" explanation. Our findings suggest, however, that traits connoting dependency do not necessarily correlate with positive expressiveness in women.<sup>33</sup> This led us to suggest that it is the "good girl" syndrome that is correlated with dependency rather than expressive traits.

Moreover, we found that men associate independence with negative expressiveness. While the women in our sample were able to incorporate positive expressiveness, positive instrumentality, and independence in their self-pictures, the men in our sample could not include expressiveness with independence and instrumentality. This supports the theory that development of masculinity involves the rejection of femininity. The young boy becomes a man not by accepting masculine traits but by rejecting feminine ones.<sup>34</sup>

This appears to us to be an insight with considerable explanatory power. Men's need to repress their femininity easily feeds their devaluation of women. A man may put another man down by calling him "a woman" or "a girl." The need *not* to be feminine in order to be masculine may also explain why men must define certain activities as that which women are incapable of doing. Thus, men reinforce their "masculinity" by defining women as being incapable of doing certain things, and this feeds the discriminatory practices with which women are faced.

The recognition that men put down "femininity" has led women to question themselves and their own worth and con-

comitantly to question the value of expressiveness. But expressiveness is a common human orientation that one might hope could be fostered in both sexes. Certainly, the fact that men are under pressure to eschew positive expressiveness in order to "prove" their masculinity is no reason for women also to devalue it.

The instrumental-expressive distinction properly defined provides social scientists with a theoretically useful and empirically valid distinction between the sexes that is not pejorative to women and has a theoretical basis in our knowledge of sex role socialization. Much further work can be done in understanding the genesis of these self-views and their relation to behavior, as well as the nature of sex differences in other age and social-economic groups than those studied here.

Women in the feminist movement are beginning to focus not only on the extent to which they are excluded from high-level instrumental activity, but also on the idea that there are feminine characteristics of which they should be proud. Many feminists fear that if women lay claim to expressiveness, it will be used against them in the job market to justify assigning women "helping" and other low-level jobs. To some extent these fears have been justified, but the answer for women is not to deny expressiveness in their fight for inclusion but rather to insist that expressive traits should not militate against participation in instrumental activities and that indeed expressiveness might enrich these activities.

This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the August 1974 meetings of the American Sociological Association in Montreal. While the last two authors did not participate in the actual writing of this paper, their contribution to it was considerable. They were active participants in the preliminary discussions out of which this and other papers were developed. They also participated equally with the first two authors in constructing the large questionnaire from which the data used here were derived. A methodological appendix is available for \$0.50, to cover handling and mailing, from the Center for the Sociological Study of Women, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403.

I. Nancy Chodorow, "Being and Doing: A Cross Cultural Examination of the Socialization of Males and Females," in *Women in Sexist Society*, ed. Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Inge K. Broverman et al., "Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal," *Journal of Social Issues* 28, no. 2 (1972): 59-78.

2. For a general summary, see Edwin C. Lewis, *Developing Women's Potential* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1968).
3. Harrison G. Gough, "Identifying Psychological Femininity," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 12 (1952): 427-39.
4. Kate Franck and E. Rosen, "A Projective Test of Masculinity-Femininity," *Journal of Consulting Psychology* 13 (1949): 247-56.
5. Sigmund Freud, "Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between Sexes," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 8 (1927): 133-42.
6. Erik Erikson, "Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on Womanhood," in *The Woman in America*, ed. Robert J. Lifton (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964).
7. David Gutmann, "Female Ego Styles and Generational Conflict," in *Feminine Personality and Conflict*, ed. Judith Bardwick et al. (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1970), p. 84.
8. Rae Carlson, "Understanding Women: Implications for Personality Theory and Research," *Journal of Social Issues* 28, no. 2 (1972): 17-32.
9. Jeanne Humphrey Block, "Conceptions of Sex Role: Some Cross-cultural and Longitudinal Perspectives," *American Psychologist* (June 1973), pp. 512-26.
10. David Bakan, *The Quality of Human Existence* (Chicago: Rand-McNally & Co., 1966), p. 15.
11. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 620.
12. Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales, and Edward Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); Miriam M. Johnson, "Instrumental and Expressive Components in the Personalities of Women" (Ph.D. diss., Radcliffe College, 1955).
13. Carlfred B. Broderick, "Beyond the Five Conceptual Frameworks: A Decade of Development in Family Theory," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 33 (February 1971): 148.
14. Philip E. Slater, "Parental Role Differentiation," *American Journal of Sociology* 67 (November 1961): 296-308.
15. Robert K. Leik, "Instrumentality and Emotionality in Family Interaction," *Sociometry* 26 (1963): 131-45.
16. George Levinger, "Task and Social Behavior in Marriage," *Sociometry* 27 (1964): 433-48.
17. Alice Rossi, "Transition to Parenthood," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 30 (1968): 26-39.
18. The instrumental-expressive distinction was first explicitly formulated by Talcott Parsons in *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951) and by Parsons and Edward Shils in *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pt. 2. Partially because of Bales's work on interactional processes in small groups and Parsons's work on socialization and the family and their theoretical convergence on a four-dimensional conception of action space, the definitions of instrumental and expressive were somewhat altered in Parsons et al.'s *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (n. 12 above). Throughout all these works the definitional problem was tackled only indirectly through efforts to link the concepts with other elements in the scheme. The definition of the instrumental-expressive distinction presented here is essentially that of the senior author based on

distinctions running throughout Parsons's works. It is similar in certain key respects to the conception of masculine-feminine differences proposed by William Bezdek and Fred Strodbeck ("Sex Role Identity and Pragmatic Action," *American Sociological Review* 35 [1970]: 491-502), which is also based on Parsons but eschews the term "instrumental-expressive."

19. Kate Millett, "The Influence of Functionalism," in *Sexual Politics* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970).

20. Pauline Bart, "Sexism and Social Science: From the Gilded Cage to the Iron Cage, or the Perils of Pauline," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 33 (1971): 734-45.

21. Jack Balswick and Charles Peek, "The Inexpressive Male: A Tragedy of American Society," *Family Coordinator* 20 (October 1971): 363-68.

22. Parsons himself does not make this assumption (see Parsons et al. [n. 12 above], p. 26). For example, he discusses how American women, although specializing in the expressive direction, do not thereby sacrifice the values of rationality in child rearing.

23. Orville Brim, "Family Structure and Sex Role Learning by Children," *Sociometry* 21 (March 1958): 1-16.

24. Alfred B. Heilbrun, Jr., "Sex Role, Instrumental-Expressive Behavior and Psychopathology in Females," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 72 (1968): 131-36.

25. Eleanor E. Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, *The Psychology of Sex Differences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 349.

26. Harrison G. Gough and A. B. Heilbrun, *Joint Manual for the Adjective Check List and the Need Scales for the ACL* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1965).

27. The subjects merely provided self-ratings on individual adjectives. They were not required to utilize or understand the categories we used in the analysis.

28. Miriam M. Johnson, "Sex Role Learning in the Nuclear Family," *Child Development* 34 (Summer 1963): 319-33.

29. Two terms originally included, "robust" and "slipshod," were eliminated from this part of the analysis, since a large number of students apparently did not know their meaning. "Curious," a word judged neutral, was also eliminated.

30. R. R. Sokal and P. H. Sneath, *Principles of Numerical Taxonomy* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1963); Kenneth D. Bailey, "Cluster Analysis," in *Sociological Methodology*, ed. David R. Heise (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1974).

31. This latter interpretation was suggested by Linda Peterson, a graduate student in sociology at the University of Oregon.

32. Edward M. Bennett and Larry R. Cohen, "Men and Women: Personality Patterns and Contrasts," *Genetic Psychology Monographs* 59 (1959): 125.

33. For further discussion of the relationship between independence and femininity, see Miriam Johnson, "Fathers, Mothers, and Sex Typing," *Sociological Inquiry*, vol. 45 (1975), in press.

34. Chodorow (n. 1 above). For further development of this theme, see Jean Stockard, Miriam Johnson, Marion Goldman, and Joan Acker, "Sex Role Development and Sex Discrimination: A Theoretical Perspective" (paper delivered at the meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, 1975).