Social Conflict: Escalation

1. Prototypical Scenario
   1. Light tactics build to heavy tactics
   2. Number of issues increase
   3. Generality of issues increases
   4. Goals change from doing well to winning to hurting the other party
   5. Number of people and groups involved increase
2. Models
   1. Aggressor-Defender: one party sees the opportunity to change status quo, other resists
   2. Conflict Spiral:
      1. Use of heavier tactics by one party leads to heavier tactics by other in defensive spiral
      2. Use of heavier tactics by one party leads to structural changes in other that leads to use of heavier tactics in an aggressive spiral.
      3. In-group/out-group effects: e.g., devalue other group, enhance own group, decrease contact between groups
      4. Deindividuation
      5. Biased searches for information about the other party lead to self-fulfilling prophecies
      6. Overcommitment
3. Forces resisting escalation
   1. Conflict-resolution norms
   2. Social bonds
   3. Cross-cutting group membership
   4. Dependence
   5. Threats and balance of power
4. De-escalation Strategies
   1. Inaction
   2. Yielding
   3. Withdrawing
   4. Bargaining & Negotiation
   5. Factors
      1. unidimensional or multidimensional conflict
      2. handle multiple issues at once or in isolation
      3. negotiators represent self or others
   6. Strategies
      1. Tit-for-tat
      2. GRIT
      3. Research suggests more favorable outcomes if bargain tough unless deadlocked in which case concession must be made.
5. Problem Solving Techniques
   1. Compromise
   2. Agree on procedure for deciding conflict
   3. Search for integrative solution; non-integrative solutions often lead to reenactment of conflict in long run. If aspirations are high and there is resistance to yielding, it may be impossible to find a solution without linking both party's interests.
   4. Expand the pie
      1. Offer non-specific compensation: compensation to one party that is not directly linked to cost incurred by yielding on an issue (cf. Foa & Foa, 1975 for a model of types of compensation likely to be exchanged).
      2. Log-roll: each party concedes on an issue
      3. Reduce the other party's costs: one party gets what they want, the other's costs are reduced or eliminated.
      4. "Bridge" - i.e., underlying demands are satisfied by not overt demands. Note that there may be other interests underlying obvious demands and the same issue may have a different meaning to each party.
   5. General strategy for encouraging problem solving
      1. Determine whether conflict exists and whether it is a value or cognitive conflict.
      2. Set reasonably high aspirations and stick to them
      3. Seek integrative solution
      4. Lower aspirations and search some more
      5. Specific Techniques
         1. Be firm yet conciliatory
         2. Structure the agenda
         3. Search for integrative formula
         4. Break linkages between issues
6. Third Party Intervention
   1. Intervention by third party frequently successful in resolving conflict than apparently cannot be resolved by parties. Third parties facilitate concessions by allowing them to be made without either combatant losing face, thereby promoting more rapid and effective conflict resolution.
   2. Research
      1. Podell & Knapp (1969) After a deadlock, a concession from an opponent is often interpreted as weakness. Parties are more likely to expect further concessions than if the same offer came from a third party.
      2. Pruitt & Johnson (1970). Observe effect of concessions made by a programmed opponent at slow/fast rate over a long/short period of time. No outside intervention; third party is only recorder. Results: more concessions made in presence of third party. Mediation most effective under high time pressure with an adversary who is slow to concede.
      3. Meeker & Shure (1969). Using Acme-Bolt game. When behavior is monitored by an outside observer there is more cooperation.
   3. Prototypical Roles
      1. "Judge": Both sides present cases, judge picks winning side (not actually what judges usually do).
      2. Arbitrator: Arbitrator is informed about conflict and either suggests or imposes (binding arbitration) a solution.
      3. Mediator: Mediator helps the parties to the dispute structure their interactions so that the parties will find an acceptable resolution.
      4. Coalition Partner: Third party joins one side.
   4. Factors
      1. Communication
         1. With low intensity conflict, direct communication is most effective.
         2. With high intensity conflict, indirect/controlled communication is better.
      2. Site characteristics
         1. Privacy better at beginning of negotiations
         2. Public commitments to solutions better for ensuring implementation
         3. Neutral site better
      3. Time limits
         1. Frequently tend to discourage negotiation in favor of arbitration.
      4. Issue identification
         1. Useful only in cognitive conflicts, or misperceptions of conflict.
      5. Issue sequencing
         1. Easy first, then hard.
      6. Issue packaging
         1. Considering multiple issues simultaneously may encourage resolution.