Rules:
Open Books; Open Notes; Turned off ALL (!) electronic devices.
Exam will consist of a Theoretical Part, and a “Context” Part
a. Theoretical Part: we will randomly select three questions out of twelve below, and you will need to write on any two (approx. 25 minutes on each)
b. Context Part: we will randomly select two “context” questions from additional weekly reading assignments, and you will need to write on one of your choice (approx. 20 minutes)
Good Luck!
Theoretical Part:
1) Think of a real political situation that can be modeled as an “incomplete information” game. Describe the situation, create the model and provide a sketch of how you would approach solving the game for Nash Equilibrium
2) Consider current news about US and EU dealing with Russians on the issue of Ukraine. Model this situation using whatever tools of Game Theory you think are appropriate ( hint: there is no way of doing this “right” therefore do not be afraid to think creatively). Clearly state the assumptions.. especially about utilities. What would you predict about the outcome? What are the critical assumptions that you have made the predicted outcome depends on? How would your answer change if you change some critical assumptions?
3) What is the main idea of the Bargaining and Negotiation games considered in class? What are the different types of those games? Provide examples. What does game theory predict in each case? Explain why we perceive games differently from what they are, and how it helps us achieve better outcomes? Write about the role of discount factor.
4) What is the “Principal Agent Problem”? Describe the model, show the predicted equilibrium and provide examples. How is it connected to the collective action problem? What are the implications in US politics?
5 ) Think of a political situation that can be modeled as an “signaling game” game. Describe the situation, create the model and provide a sketch of how you would approach solving the game for Nash Equilibrium
6) Compare the PD and the Stag Hunt games and their connection to the problem of collective action, and to the tragedy of commons. Provide the models and show equlibria. Explain why it is a “dilemma”. Write about the importance of PD ( and other games modelling cooperation) games for analysis of various political situations. Illustrate your answer with examples.
7) Write about “discount factor”. Why do we need it? What types of strategic situation we use the concept of discount factor for? Provide examples. How does it play out in various games?
8) Write about repeated games in general. Show how repeated games can help us analyze games involving bargaining and collective action.. How does repeatedly played PD game differ from a "one-shot" PD game? Discuss the difference between finite and infinitely repeated games. Provide examples and discuss Nash Equilibria for both games.
9) Nash Equilibrium. What is it? How does one search for it? Present and analyze strategically one of the following games: Chicken Game, Stag Hunt, Battle of Sexes. Provide a real life application of the game of your choice.
10) Agenda Setting. What is it? Using an example, show, where is the power of agenda setter? What are the lessons learned about the agenda setting power. Use any examples and approaches presented in class ( Condorcet Paradox, for example)
11) Write about Prospect Theory and its implications and importance for political analysis. Provide examples. Write about the reference point and changes in attitudes toward risk. Connect to real everyday life and political situations.
12) Using the following table calculate the winner using various voting schemes (plurality, plurality with runoff, sequential runoff, borda count, Condorcet, approval voting). Describe each method in detail.
1(2) 2(4) 3(3) 4(4) 5(2) 6(3)
C A E B C A
B B B E A D
A C A A E B
E E C C B E
D D D D D C