Appellant, The Florida Star, is a newspaper which publishes a
"Police Reports" section containing brief articles describing
local criminal incidents under police investigation. After appellee
B. J. F. reported to the Sheriff's Department (Department) that
she had been robbed and sexually assaulted, the Department prepared
a report, which identified B. J. F. by her full name, and placed
it in the Department's pressroom. The Department does not restrict
access to the room or to the reports available there. A Star
reporter-trainee sent to the pressroom copied the police report
verbatim, including B. J. F.'s full name. Consequently, her name
was included in a "Police Reports" story in the paper, in violation
of the Star's internal policy. Florida Stat. 794.03 makes it
unlawful to "print, publish, or broadcast . . . in any instrument
of mass communication" the name of the victim of a sexual offense.
B. J. F. filed suit in a Florida court alleging, inter alia,
that the Star had negligently violated 794.03. The trial court
denied the Star's motion to dismiss, which claimed, among other
things, that imposing civil sanctions on the newspaper pursuant
to 794.03 violated the First Amendment. However, it granted B.
J. F.'s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence,
finding the Star per se negligent based on its violation of 794.03.
The jury then awarded B. J. F. both compensatory and punitive
damages. The verdict was upheld on appeal.
Held:
Imposing damages on the Star for publishing B. J. F.'s name violates
the First Amendment. Pp. 530-541.
(a) The sensitivity and significance of the interests presented
in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsels
the Court to rely on limited principles that sweep no more broadly
than the appropriate context of the instant case, rather than
to accept invitations to hold broadly that truthful publication
may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment or
that publication of a rape victim's name never enjoys constitutional
protection. One such principle is that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 . [491
U.S. 524, 525] Applied to the instant case, the Daily Mail
principle commands reversal. Pp. 530-536.
(b) The Star "lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information." The
actual news article was accurate, and the Star lawfully obtained
B. J. F.'s name from the government. The fact that state officials
are not required to disclose such reports or that the Sheriff's
Department apparently failed to fulfill its 794.03 obligation
not to cause or allow B. J. F.'s name to be published does not
make it unlawful for the Star to have received the information,
and Florida has taken no steps to proscribe such receipt. The
government has ample means to safeguard the information that
are less drastic than punishing truthful publication. Furthermore,
it is clear that the news article generally, as opposed to the
specific identity contained in it, involved "a matter of public
significance": the commission, and investigation, of a violent
crime that had been reported to authorities. Pp. 536-537.
(c) Imposing liability on the Star does not serve "a need to further
a state interest of the highest order." Although the interests
in protecting the privacy and safety of sexual assault victims
and in encouraging them to report offenses without fear of exposure
are highly significant, imposing liability on the Star in this
case is too precipitous a means of advancing those interests. Since the Star obtained the information because the Sheriff's
Department failed to abide by 794.03's policy, the imposition
of damages can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means
of safeguarding anonymity. Self-censorship is especially likely
to result from imposition of liability when a newspaper gains
access to the information from a government news release. Moreover,
the negligence per se standard adopted by the courts below does
not permit case-by-case findings that the disclosure was one
a reasonable person would find offensive and does not have a
scienter requirement of any kind. In addition, 794.03's facial
underinclusiveness - which prohibits publication only by an "instrument
of mass communication" and does not prohibit the spread of victims'
names by other means - raises serious doubts about whether Florida
is serving the interests specified by B. J. F. A State must demonstrate
its commitment to the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful
publication in the name of privacy by applying its prohibition
evenhandedly to both the smalltime disseminator and the media
giant. Pp. 537-541.
499 So.2d 883, reversed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 541. [491 U.S. 524, 526] WHITE, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, J., joined,
post, p. 542. FLORIDA STAR v BJF, 109 S.Ct. 2603 (1989)
