Pursuant to a Wisconsin statute, respondent Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced because
he intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim's
race. The State Court of Appeals rejected his challenge to the law's
constitutionality, but the State Supreme Court reversed. Relying
on R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , it held that the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing
what the legislature has deemed to be offensive thought and rejected
the State's contention that the law punishes only the conduct
of intentional victim selection. It also found that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad because the evidentiary use
of a defendant's prior speech would have a chilling effect on
those who fear they may be prosecuted for offenses subject to
penalty enhancement. Finally, it distinguished antidiscrimination
laws, which have long been held constitutional, on the ground
that they prohibit objective acts of discrimination, whereas
the state statute punishes the subjective mental process.
Held:
Mitchell's First Amendment rights were not violated by the application
of the penalty-enhancement provision in sentencing him. Pp. 483-490.
(a) While Mitchell correctly notes that this Court is bound by
a state court's interpretation of a state statute, the State
Supreme Court did not construe the instant statute in the sense
of defining the meaning of a particular word or phrase. Rather,
it characterized the statute's practical effect for First Amendment
purposes. Thus, after resolving any ambiguities in the statute's
meaning, this Court may form its own judgment about the law's
operative effect. The State's argument that the statute punishes only conduct does
not dispose of Mitchell's claim, since the fact remains that
the same criminal conduct is more heavily punished if the victim
is selected because of his protected status than if no such motive
obtains. Pp. 483-485.
(b) In determining what sentence to impose, sentencing judges
have traditionally considered a wide variety of factors in addition
to evidence bearing on guilt, including a defendant's motive
for committing the offense. While it is equally true that a sentencing
judge may not take into consideration a defendant's abstract
beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission
of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing
simply because they are protected by the First Amendment. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 ; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939 (plurality opinion). That Dawson and Barclay did not involve
the application of a penalty-enhancement provision does not make
them inapposite. Barclay involved the consideration of racial
animus in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death,
the most severe "enhancement" of all; and the state legislature
has the primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties. Motive plays the same role under the state statute as it does
under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which have been
upheld against constitutional challenge. Nothing in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, supra, compels a different result here. The ordinance at issue
there was explicitly directed at speech, while the one here is
aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. Moreover,
the State's desire to redress what it sees as the greater individual
and societal harm inflicted by bias-inspired conduct provides
an adequate explanation for the provision over and above mere
disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases. Pp. 485-488.
(c) Because the statute has no "chilling effect" on free speech,
it is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for
fear that evidence of those beliefs will be introduced against
him at trial if he commits a serious offense against person or
property is too speculative a hypothesis to support this claim.
Moreover, the First Amendment permits the admission of previous
declarations or statements to establish the elements of a crime
or to prove motive or intent, subject to evidentiary rules dealing
with relevancy, reliability, and the like. Haupt v. United States,
330 U.S. 631 . Pp. 488-490.
169 Wis.2d 153, 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992), reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J,, delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
School of Journalism and Communication
