PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS

290 F.3d 1058, *; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
290 F.3d 1058; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314; 2002 Cal. Daily
Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376

December 11, 2001, Argued and Submitted En Banc, Pasadena,
California
May 16, 2002,

OPINION: RYMER, Circuit Judge:
For the first time we construe what the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. @ 248, means by "threat of force."
FACE gives aggrieved persons a right of action against whoever by"threat of force . . . intentionally . . . intimidates . . . any person because t hat person is or has been . . . providing reproductive health services. " 18 U.S.C. @ 248(a)(1) and (c)(1)(A). This requires that we define "threat of force" in a way that comports with the First Amendment, and it raises the question whether the conduct that occurred here falls within the category of unprotected speech.
Four physicians, Dr. Robert Crist, Dr. Warren M. Hern, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, and Dr. James Newhall, and two health clinics that provide medical services to women including abortions, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. (PPCW) and the Portland Feminist Women's Health Center (PFWHC), brought suit under FACE n1 claiming that they were targeted with threats by the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), Advocates for Life Ministries (ALM), and numerous individuals. n2 Three threats remain at issue: the Deadly Dozen "GUILTY" poster which identifies Hern and the Newhalls among ten others; the Crist "GUILTY "poster with Crist's name, addresses and photograph; and the" Nuremberg Files," which is a compilation about those whom the ACLA anticipated one day might be put on trial for crimes against humanity. The "GUILTY" posters identifying specific physicians were circulated in the wake of a series of "WANTED" and "unWANTED" posters that had identified other doctors who performed abortions before they were murdered.
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n1 We refer collectively to the plaintiffs as "physicians" unless reference to a particular party is required. In addition to FACE, the case went to trial on claims that the same conduct violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. @ 1962 (except that ACLA was alleged to be the RICO enterprise and was not a defendant on this claim), and on claims that the defendants conspired to violate FACE and RICO. As each claim turns on whether there were true threats without constitutional protection, the appeal and our opinion focus only on FACE.
n2 Michael Bray, Andrew Burnett, David A. Crane, Timothy Paul Dreste, Joseph L. Foreman, Stephen P. Mears, Monica Migliorino Miller, Catherine Ramey, Dawn Marie Stover, Donald Treshman, and Charles Wysong. We refer to them collectively as "ACLA."

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Although the posters do not contain a threat on their face, the district court held that context could be considered. It defined a threat under FACE in accordance with our" true threat" jurisprudence, as a statement made when" a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm. "Applying this definition, the court denied ACLA's motion for summary judgment in a published opinion. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA (PPCW II ), 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). n3 The jury returned a verdict in physicians' favor, and the court enjoined ACLA from publishing the posters or providing other materials with the specific intent to threaten Crist, Hern, Elizabeth Newhall, James Newhall, PPCW, or the [**6]Health Center. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc.v . ACLA (PPCW III), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999). ACLA timely appealed.
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n3 The court had previously denied ACLA's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Planned Parenthood ofth e Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA (PPCW I), 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996).
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A panel of this court reversed. In its view, the standard adopted by the district court allowed the jury to find ACLA liable for putting the doctors in harm's way by singling them out for the attention of unrelated but violent third parties, conduct which is protected by the First Amendment, rather than for authorizing or directly threatening harm itself, which is not. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. ACLA (PPCW IV), 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001). The panel decided that it should evaluate the record independently to determine whether ACLA's statements could reasonably be construed as saying that ACLA, or its agents, would physically harm doctors who did not stop performing abortions. Having done so, the panel found that the jury's verdict could not stand.
We reheard the case en banc because these issues are obviously important. We now conclude that it was proper for the district court to adopt our long-standing law on" true threats" to define a "threat" for purposes of FACE. FACE itself requires that the threat of force be made with the intent to intimidate. Thus, the jury must have found that ACLA made statements to intimidate the physicians, reasonably foreseeing that physicians would interpret the statements as a serious expression of ACLA's intent to harm them because they provided reproductive health services. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to physicians, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. ACLA was aware that a "wanted"-type poster would likely be interpreted as a serious threat of death or bodily harm by a doctor in the reproductive health services community who was identified on one, given the previous pattern of "WANTED" posters identifying a specific physician followed by that physician's murder. The same is true of the posting about these physicians on that part of the "Nuremberg Files" where lines were drawn through the names of doctors who provided abortion services and who had been killed or wounded. We are independently satisfied that to this limited extent, ACLA's conduct amounted to a true threat and is not protected speech.
As we see no reversible error on liability or in the equitable relief that
was granted, we affirm. However, we remand for consideration of whether the
punitive damages award comports with due process.
I
The facts are fully set out in the district court's order granting injunctive relief,…and we shall not belabor them. In sum:
On March 10, 1993, Michael Griffin shot and killed Dr. David Gunn as he entered an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida. Before this, a "WANTED" and an "un WANTED" poster with Gunn's name, photograph, address and other personal information were published. The "WANTED "poster describes Gunn as an abortionist and invites participation by prayer and fasting, by writing and calling him and sharing a willingness to help him leave his profession, and by asking him to stop doing abortions; the "unWANTED "poster states that he kills children at designated locations and "to defenseless unborn babies Gunn in [sic] heavily armed and very dangerous." After Gunn's murder, Bray and Paul Hill (a non-party who was later convicted of murdering a different doctor) prepared a statement supporting Griffin's acquittal on a justifiable homicide theory, which ALM, Burnett, Crane, Dodds, Foreman, McMillan, Ramey and Stover joined.
On August 21, 1993, Dr. George Patterson, who operated the clinic where Gunn worked, was shot to death. A" WANTED" poster had been circulated prior to his murder, indicating where he performed abortions and that he had Gunn perform abortions for his Pensacola clinic.
In July 1994, Dr. John Bayard Britton was murdered by Paul Hill after being named on an "unWANTED" poster that Hill helped to prepare. One gives Britton's physical description together with his home and office addresses and phone numbers, and charges "crimes against humanity"; another also displays his picture and states that "he is considered armed and extremely dangerous to women and children. Pray that he is soon[**10] apprehended by the love of Jesus!!!" In addition to these items, a third version of the Britton "unWANTED" poster lists personal achievements and Britton's" crimes against humanity," also warning that "John Bayard Britton is considered armed and extremely dangerous, especialy[sic] to women and children." ALM, Bray, Burnett, Crane, McMillan, Ramey and Stover signed a petition supporting Hill.
Many pro-life activists in Operation Rescue condemned these acts of violence. As a result, ALM, Bray, Burnett, Crane, Foreman, McMillan, Ramey and Stover, who espoused a "pro-force" point of view, split off to form ACLA. Burnett observed, "if someone was to condemn any violence against abortion, they probably wouldn't have felt comfortable working with us." Organizational meetings were held in the spring of 1994, and ACLA's first event was held in August 1994. ACLA is based in Portland, Oregon, as is ALM. ALM publishes Life Advocate, a magazine that is distributed nationally and advocates the use of force to oppose the delivery of abortion services. Except for Bray, who authored A Time to Kill and served time in federal prison for conspiring to bomb ten clinics, the individual defendants were directors of ACLA and actively involved in its affairs. ALM commissioned and published Bray's book, noting that it "shows the connection between the [justifiable homicide] position and clinic destruction and the shootings of abortionists." Wysong and ACLA also drafted and circulated a "Contract on the Abortion Industry," having deliberately chosen that language to allude to mafia hit contracts.
ACLA presented the Deadly Dozen poster during a January 25, 1995 press conference at the March for Life event in Washington, D.C. Bray, Burnett, Crane, Dodds, Foreman, McMillan, Murch, Ramey, Stover, Treshman and Wysong were there; Dreste later ratified the poster's release. This poster is captioned "GUILTY" at the top (which meant the same thing to Crane, who drafted it, as "wanted"), beneath which in slightly smaller print the poster indicates" OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY." The poster continues: "Abortion was provided as a choice for East European and Jewish women by the (Nazi) National Socialist Regime, and was prosecuted during the Nuremberg Trials (1945-46) under Allied Control Order No. 10 as a 'war crime.'" Under the heading "THE DEADLY DOZEN," the poster identifies thirteen doctors of whom James Newhall, Elizabeth Newhall, [*1065]and Warren Hern are three. The poster provides Hern's residence and the home address of James Newhall and Elizabeth Newhall; it also lists the name and home address of Dr. George Kabacy, a doctor who provided abortions at PPCW. It offers a "$ 5,000 REWARD" "for information leading to arrest, conviction and revocation of license to practice medicine." At the bottom the poster bears the legend" ABORTIONIST" in large, bold typeface. The day after the Deadly Dozen poster was released, the FBI offered protection to doctors identified on it and advised them to wear bulletproof vests and take other security precautions, which they did. Knowing this, ALM reprinted the poster in the March 1995 edition of its magazine Life Advocate under a cover with the "grim reaper" holding a scythe; Murch printed it in his newsletter Salt & Light; and ACLA republished the Deadly Dozen poster at events in August 1995 and January 1996.
ACLA released the Crist poster along with five others in August 1995 at the old federal courthouse in St. Louis where the Dred Scott decision had been handed down. Burnett, Crane, Dreste, McMillan, Ramey, Stover and Wysong attended the event. Three of the posters identify doctors; the others identify reproductive health care clinics, one of which was a Planned Parenthood affiliate where Crist worked. The Crist poster has "GUILTY" in large bold letters at the top followed by "OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" in smaller font. It also gives his home and work addresses; states "Please write, leaflet or picket his neighborhood to expose his blood guilt"; offers a "$ 500 REWARD" "to any ACLA organization that successfully persuades Crist to turn from his child killing through activities within ACLA guidelines"; and has "ABORTIONIST" in large bold type at the bottom.
At its January 1996 conference, ACLA displayed the Deadly Dozen poster, held a "White Rose Banquet "to honor prisoners convicted of anti-abortion violence, and introduced ALM's Paul deParrie to unveil the "Nuremberg Files." ACLA sent a hard copy of some of the Files to Neal Horsley (a nonparty) to post on the internet, and ACLA's name appeared on the Nuremberg Files website opened in January 1997. Approximately 200 people are listed under the label" ABORTIONISTS: the shooters," and 200 more are listed under Files for judges, politicians, law enforcement, spouses, and abortion rights supporters. Crist, Hern and the Newhalls are listed in the "abortionists" section, which bears the legend: "Black font (working); Greyed-out Name (wounded); Strikethrough (fatality)." The names of Gunn, Patterson and Britton are struck through.
By January 1995 ACLA knew the effect that "WANTED," "unWANTED," or "GUILTY" posters had on doctors named in them. For example, in a September 1993 issue of Life Advocate which reported that an "unwanted "poster was being prepared for Britton, ALM remarked of the Gunn murder that it "sent shock waves of fear through the ranks of abortion providers across the country. As a result, many more doctors quit out of fear for their lives, and the ones who are left are scared stiff." Of another doctor who decided to quit performing abortions after circulation of a "Not Wanted" poster, Bray wrote that "it is clear to all who possess faculties capable of inductive analysis: he was bothered and afraid." Wysong also stated: "Listening to what abortionists said, abortionists who have quit the practice who are no longer killing babies but are now pro-life. They said the two things they feared the most were being sued for malpractice and having their picture put on a poster." And Burnett testified with respect to the danger that "wanted" or "guilty" posters pose to the lives of those who provide abortions: "I mean, if I was an abortionist, I would be afraid."
By January 1995 the physicians knew about the Gunn, Patterson and Britton murders and the posters that preceded each. Hern was terrified when his name appeared on the Deadly Dozen poster; as he put it: "The fact that wanted posters about these doctors had been circulated, prior to their assassination, and that the -- that the posters, then, were followed by the doctor's assassination, emphasized for me the danger posed by this document, the Deadly Dozen List, which meant to me that -- that, as night follows day, that my name was on this wanted poster . . . and that I would be assassinated, as had the other doctors been assassinated." Hern interpreted the poster as meaning "Do what we tell you to do, or we will kill you. And they do." Crist was "truly frightened, "and stopped practicing medicine for a while out of fear for his life. Dr. Elizabeth Newhall interpreted the Deadly Dozen poster as saying that if she didn't stop [**16]doing abortions, her life was at risk. Dr. James Newhall was "severely frightened" in light of the "clear pattern" of a wanted poster and a murder when there was "another wanted poster with my name on it."
The jury found for plaintiffs on all claims except for Bray and Treshman on the RICO claims. n4 The district court then considered equitable relief. It found that each defendant used intimidation as a means of interfering with the provision of reproductive health services; that each independently and as a co-conspirator published and distributed the Deadly Dozen poster, the Crist poster, and the Nuremberg Files; and that each acted with malice and specific intent in communicating true threats to kill, assault or do bodily harm to each of the plaintiffs to intimidate them from engaging in legal medical practices and procedures. The court found that the balance of hardships weighed "overwhelmingly" in plaintiffs' favor. It also found that the defendants' actions were not protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, it issued a permanent injunction restraining defendants from threatening, with the specific intent to do so, any of the plaintiffs in violation of FACE; from[**17] publishing or distributing the Deadly Dozen poster and the Crist poster with specific intent to threaten the plaintiffs; from providing additional material concerning plaintiffs, with a specific intent to threaten, to the Nuremberg Files or similar web site; and from publishing or distributing the personally identifying information about the plaintiffs in the Files with a specific intent to threaten…
II
… .[Discussion of standard of review]….
We conclude that the proper definition of a "threat" for purposes of FACE is a question of law that we review de novo. If it were clear that neither the Deadly Dozen nor the Crist poster, or the Nuremberg Files, was a threat as properly defined, the case should not have gone to the jury and summary judgment should have been granted in ACLA's favor. If there were material facts in dispute or it was not clear that the posters were protected expression instead of true threats, the question whether the posters and the Files amount to a "threat of force" for purposes of the statute was for the trier of fact. Assuming that the district court correctly defined "threat" and properly instructed the jury on the elements of liability pursuant to the statute, our review is for substantial evidence supporting the historical facts (including credibility determinations) and the elements of statutory liability (including intent). We review the district court's findings with respect to injunctive relief for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. However, while we normally review the scope of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, we will scrutinize the relief granted in this case to determine whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to achieve its goals. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 129 L. Ed. 2d 593, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
Given that the verdict for physicians and the injunctive relief granted in their favor restrict speech, we review the record independently in order to satisfy ourselves that the posters and the Files constitute a "true threat "such that they lack First Amendment protection. We will consider the undisputed facts as true, and construe the historical facts, the findings on the statutory elements, and all credibility determinations in favor of the prevailing party. In this way we give appropriate deference to the trier of fact, here both the jury and the district judge, yet assure that evidence of the core constitutional fact -- a true threat -- falls within the unprotected category and is narrowly enough bounded as a matter of constitutional law.
III
ACLA n5 argues that the First Amendment requires reversal because liability was based on political speech that constituted neither an incitement to imminent lawless action nor a true threat. It suggests that the key question for us to consider is whether these posters can be considered "true threats" when, in fact, the posters on their face contain no explicitly threatening language. Further, ACLA submits that classic political speech cannot be converted into non-protected speech by a context of violence that includes the independent action of others.
Physicians n6 counter that this threats case must be analyzed under the settled threats law of this circuit. Following precedent, it was proper for the jury to take context into account. They point out that the district court limited evidence of antiabortion violence to evidence tending to show knowledge of a particular defendant, and maintain that the objective standard on which the jury was instructed comports both with Ninth Circuit law and congressional intent. As the First Amendment does not protect true threats of force, physicians conclude, ACLA's speech was not protected.
We start with the statute under which this action arises. Section 248(c)(1)(A) gives a private right of action to any person aggrieved by reason of the conduct prohibited by subsection (a). Subsection (a)(1) provides:

(a) . . . Whoever-- (1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services . . .shall be subject to the . . . civil remedies provided in subsection (c) . . . .
18 U.S.C. @ 248(a)(1). The statute also provides that [HN7] "nothing in this section shall be construed . . . to prohibit any expressive conduct (including peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration) protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment to the Constitution." 18 U.S.C. @ 248(d)(1).
[HN8] FACE does not define "threat," although it does provide that "the term 'intimidate' means to place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him-or herself or to another." 18 U.S.C. @ 248(e)(3). Thus, the first task is to define "threat" for purposes of the Act. This requires a definition that comports with the First Amendment, that is, a "true threat."
The Supreme Court has provided benchmarks, but no definition.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1 827, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 320 (1969), makes it clear that the First Amendment protects speech that advocates violence, so long as the speech is not directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is not likely to incite or produce such action. So do Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 38 L. Ed. 2d 303, 94 S. Ct. 326 (1973) (overturning disorderly conduct conviction of antiwar protestor who yelled "We'll take [*1072] the fucking street later (or again)"), and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982). If ACLA had merely endorsed or encouraged the violent actions of others, its speech would be protected.
However, while advocating violence is protected, threatening a person with violence is not. In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Court explicitly distinguished between political hyperbole, which is protected, and true threats, which are not. Considering how to construe a statute which prohibited "knowingly and willfully . . . (making) any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President," the Court admonished that any statute which criminalizes a form of pure speech "must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 705, 707. In that case, an 18-year old war protester told a discussion group of other young people at a public rally on the Washington Monument grounds: "They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. at 706. His audience laughed. Taken in context, and given the conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, the Court concluded that the speech could not be interpreted other than as "a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President." Id. at 708. Accordingly, it ordered judgment entered for Watts.
ACLA's position is that the posters, including the Nuremberg Files, are protected political speech under Watts, and cannot lose this character by context. But this is not correct. The Court itself considered context and determined that Watts's statement was political hyperbole instead of a true threat because of context. Id. at 708. Beyond this, ACLA points out that the posters contain no language that is a threat. We agree that this is literally true. Therefore, ACLA submits, this case is really an incitement case in disguise. So viewed, the posters are protected speech under Brandenburg and Claiborne, which ACLA suggests is the closest analogue. We disagree that Claiborne is closely analogous.
In March 1966 black citizens in Claiborne County made a list of demands for racial equality and integration. Unsatisfied by the response, several hundred black persons at a meeting of the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) voted to place a boycott on white merchants in the area. The boycott continued until October 1969. During this period, stores were watched and the names of persons who violated the boycott were read at meetings of the NAACP at the First Baptist Church, and published in a local paper called "Black-Times." These persons were branded as traitors to the black cause, were called demeaning names, and were socially ostracized. A few incidents of violence occurred. Birdshot was fired at the houses of two boycott violators; a brick was thrown through a windshield; and a flower garden was damaged. None of the victims ceased trading with white merchants. Six other incidents of arguably unlawful conduct occurred. White business owners brought suit against the NAACP and Charles Evers, its field secretary, along with other individuals who had participated in the boycott, for violating Mississippi state laws on malicious interference with a business, antitrust, and illegal
boycott….
The Court held that there could be no recovery based on intimidation by threats of social ostracism, because offensive and coercive speech is protected by the First Amendment. "The use of speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism cannot provide the basis for a damages award. But violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitutional protection." 458 U.S. at 933. There was some evidence of violence, but the violence was not pervasive as it had been in Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 85 L. Ed. 836, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941). Accordingly, the Court made clear that only losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct could be recovered. Further, civil liability could not be imposed consistent with the First Amendment solely on account of an individual's association with others who have committed acts of violence; he must have incited or authorized them himself.
For the same reasons the Court held that liability could not be imposed on Evers for his participation in the boycott itself, or for his threats of vilification or ostracism. However, the merchants also sought damages from Evers for his speeches. He gave one in April 1966, and two others in April 1969. In the first, he told his audience that they would be watched and that blacks who traded with white merchants would be answerable to him; he also said that any "uncle toms" who broke the boycott would "have their necks broken "by their own people. In his April 19, 1969 speech, Evers stated that boycott violators would be "disciplined" by their own people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night. And on April 21, Evers gave another speech to several hundred people calling for a total boycott of white-owned businesses and saying: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." The Court concluded that the "emotionally charged rhetoric" of Evers's speeches was within the bounds of Brandenberg. It was not followed by violence, and there was no evidence -- apart from the speeches themselves -- that Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened violence. "If there were other evidence of his authorization of wrongful conduct, the references to discipline in the speeches could be used to corroborate that evidence." Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 929. As there was not, the findings were constitutionally inadequate to support the damages judgment against him and, in turn, the NAACP.
Claiborne, of course, did not arise under a threats statute. The Court had no need to consider whether Evers's statements were true threats of force within the meaning of a threats statute; it held only that his speeches did not incite illegal activity, thus could not have caused business losses and could not be the basis for liability to white merchants. As the opinion points out, there was no context to give the speeches (including the expression "break your neck") the implication of authorizing or directly threatening unlawful conduct. To the extent there was any intimidating overtone, Evers's rhetoric was extemporaneous, surrounded by statements supporting non-violent action, and primarily of the social ostracism sort. No specific individuals were targeted. For all that appears, "the break your neck" comments were hyperbolic [*1074] vernacular. Certainly[**40] there was no history that Evers or anyone else associated with the NAACP had broken anyone's neck who did not participate in, or opposed, this boycott or any others. Nor is there any indication that Evers's listeners took his statement that boycott breakers' "necks would be broken" as a serious threat that their necks would be broken; they kept on shopping at boycotted stores.
Thus, Watts was the only Supreme Court case that discussed the First Amendment in relation to true threats before we first confronted the issue. Apart from holding that Watts's crack about L.B.J. was not a true threat, the Court set out no standard for determining when a statement is a true threat that is unprotected speech under the First Amendment. Shortly after Watts was rendered, we had to decide in Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969), whether a Marine Corps private made a true threat for purposes of 18 U.S.C. @ 871 against the President, who was coming to his base the next day, by saying: "I am going to get him." We adopted a "reasonable speaker" test. As it has come to be articulated, the test is:
Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by an objective standard -- whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.
…… .
Although all now apply an objective standard, several circuits have a "reasonable listener" test while others have a" reasonable speaker" test as we do. The difference does not appear to matter much because all consider context, including the effect of an allegedly threatening statement on the listener.
…" 'The fact that a threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat.'" Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Gilbert II, 884 F.2d at 457). A true threat, that is one "where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will be subjected to physical violence upon his person, is unprotected by the first amendment." Id. (citing Merrill, 746 F.2d at 462).
It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265 n.3; Gilbert II, 884 F.2d at 456-57; Mitchell, 812 F.2d at 1256 (upholding @ 871 conviction of defendant with no capacity to carry out threat); Roy, 416 F.2d at 877. n9 Other circuits are in accord. n10 Nevertheless, we are urged to adopt a subjective intent requirement for FACE. In particular, amicus ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc., advocates a subjective intent component to "require evidence, albeit circumstantial or inferential in many cases, that the speaker actually intended to induce fear, intimidation, or terror; namely, that the speaker intended to threaten. If a person did not intend to threaten or intimidate (i.e., did not intend that his or her statement be understood as a threat), then the speech should not be considered to be a 'true threat,' unprotected by the First Amendment." However, this much is subsumed within [HN15] the statutory standard of FACE itself, which requires that the threat of force be made with the intent to intimidate. The" requirement of intent to intimidate serves to insulate the statute from unconstitutional application to protected speech. " Gilbert I, 813 F.2d at 1529 (construing the Fair Housing Act's threat provision, 42 U.S.C. @ 3631, which is essentially the same as FACE's). No reason appears to engraft another intent requirement onto the statute, because whether or not the maker of the threat has an actual intention to carry it out," an apparently serious threat may cause the mischief or evil toward which the statute was in part directed." Gilbert II, 884 F.2d at4 58 (quoting Roy, 416 F.2d at 877).
The dissents would change the test, either to require that the speaker actually intend to carry out the threat or be in control of those who will, or to make it inapplicable when the speech is public rather than private. However, for years our test has focused on what a reasonable speaker would foresee the listener's reaction to be under the circumstances, and that is where we believe it should remain….
Neither do we agree that threatening speech made in public is entitled to heightened constitutional protection just because it is communicated publically rather than privately. As Madsen indicates, [HN17] threats are unprotected by the First Amendment "however communicated." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753. n11
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n11 Judge Reinhardt chides us for failing to accord public speech more protection than private speech. He misses the point. Threats, in whatever forum, may be independently proscribed without implicating the First Amendment. See e.g., Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 5 19 U.S. 357, 373, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) (so indicating in casei nvolving public protest against abortion providers); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (same); Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (JDL press conference in connection with public demonstration about the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leader); Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (public protest against abortion providers).
Nor does Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001), turn on a public/private distinction, as Judge Kozinski's dissent suggests. No heightened scrutiny was given to the professor's speech on account of the fact that it had to do with a campus debate. Rather, the Orozco-Santillan test was applied, and we concluded that even though there was some violent content to his writings and cartoons, in the context of the underground campus newspaper in which they appeared, they would be perceived as hyperbole instead of as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm.
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Therefore, we hold that "threat of force" in FACE means what our settled threats law says a true threat is: a statement which, in the entire context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person. So defined, a threatening statement that violates FACE is unprotected under the First Amendment.
B
Although ACLA does not believe we should reach this point, if we do it submits that no claim was made out even under "true threats" cases. First, it argues that other threats cases were criminal actions against someone who made a real threat directly to others, not political speech as is the case here. It contrasts what it calls "a threat plus context" present in United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996), and in other out-of-circuit cases, n12 with the absence of a direct threat in this case. However, our cases do not require that the maker of the threat personally cause physical harm to the listener…. It is the making of the threat with intent to intimidate -- not the implementation of it -- that violates FACE.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Nor does consideration of context amount to viewpoint discrimination, as ACLA contends. ACLA's theory appears to be that because the posters did not contain any threat on their face, the views of abortion foes are chilled more than the views of abortion-right proponents because of the random acts of violence committed by some people against abortion providers. However, [HN23] FACE itself is viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 6 58, 663 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The Act punishes anyone who engages in the prohibitedc onduct, irrespective of the person's viewpoint and does not target any message b ased on content. 'The Access Act thus does not play favorites: it protects fromv iolent or obstructive activity not only abortion clinics, but facilities
providing pre-pregnancy and pregnancy counseling services, as well as facilities counseling alternatives to abortion.'") (quoting Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Moreover, ACLA could not be liable under FACE unless it made a true threat with the intent to intimidate physicians. Thus [**58]it is making a threat to intimidate that makes ACLA's conduct unlawful, not its viewpoint.
Because of context, we conclude that the Crist and Deadly Dozen posters are not just a political statement. Even if the Gunn poster, which was the first "WANTED "poster, was a purely political message when originally issued, and even if the Britton poster were too, by the time of the Crist poster, the poster format itself had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers. Gunn was killed after his poster was released; Britton was killed after his poster was released; and Patterson was killed after his poster was released. Knowing this, and knowing the fear generated among those in the reproductive health services community who were singled out for identification on a "wanted"-type poster, ACLA deliberately identified Crist on a" GUILTY" poster and intentionally put the names of Hern and the Newhalls on the Deadly Dozen "GUILTY" poster to intimidate them. This goes well beyond the political message (regardless of what one thinks of it) that abortionists are killers who deserve death too.
The Nuremberg Files are somewhat different. Although they name individuals, they name hundreds[**59] of them. The avowed intent is "collecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipation that one day we may be able to hold them on trial for crimes against humanity." The web page states:" One of the great tragedies of the Nuremberg trials of Nazis after WWII was that complete information and documented evidence had not been collected so many war criminals went free or were only found guilty of minor crimes. We do not want the same thing to happen when the day comes to charge abortionists with their crimes. We anticipate the day when these people will be charged in PERFECTLY LEGAL COURTS once the tide of this nation's opinion turns against child-killing (as it surely will)." However offensive or disturbing this might be to those listed in the Files, being offensive and provocative is protected under the First Amendment. But, in two critical respects, the Files go further. In addition to listing judges, politicians and law enforcement personnel, the Files separately categorize "Abortionists" and list the names of individuals who provide abortion services, including, specifically, Crist, Hern, and both Newhalls. Also, names of abortion providers who have been murdered because of their activities[**60] are lined through in black, while names of those who have been wounded are highlighted in grey. As a result, we cannot say that it is clear as a matter of law that listing Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls on both the Nuremberg Files and the GUILTY posters is purely protected, political expression.
……
F
Having concluded that "threat of force" was properly defined and that no trial error requires reversal, we consider whether the core constitutional fact --a true threat -- exists such that the Crist and Deadly Dozen Posters, and the Nuremberg Files as to Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls, are without First Amendment protection…
The true threats analysis turns on the poster pattern. Neither the Crist poster nor the Deadly Dozen poster contains any language that is overtly threatening. Both differ from prior posters in that the prior posters were captioned "WANTED" while these are captioned "GUILTY." The text also differs somewhat, but differences in caption or words are immaterial because the language itself is not what is threatening. Rather, it is use of the "wanted"-type format in the context of the poster pattern -- poster followed by murder -- that constitutes the threat. Because of the pattern, a" wanted"-type poster naming a specific doctor who provides abortions was perceived by physicians, who are providers of reproductive health services, as a serious threat of death or bodily harm. After a "WANTED" poster on Dr. David Gunn appeared, he was shot and killed. After a "WANTED" poster on Dr. George Patterson appeared, he was shot and killed. After a "WANTED" poster on Dr. John Britton appeared, he was shot and killed. None of these "WANTED" posters contained threatening language, either. Neither did they identify who would pull the trigger. But knowing this pattern, knowing that unlawful action had followed "WANTED" posters on Gunn, Patterson and Britton, and knowing that "wanted"-type posters were intimidating and caused fear of serious harm to those named on them, ACLA published a "GUILTY" poster in essentially the same format on Dr. Crist and a Deadly Dozen "GUILTY" poster in similar format naming Dr. Hern, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. James Newhall because they perform abortions. Physicians could well believe that ACLA would make good on the threat. One of the other doctors on the Deadly Dozen poster had in fact been shot before the poster was published. This is not political hyperbole. Nor is it merely "vituperative, abusive, and inexact. " Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (comparing language used in political arena to language used in labor disputes). In the context of the poster pattern, the posters were precise in their meaning to those in the relevant community of reproductive health service providers. They were a true threat.
The posters are a true threat because, like Ryder trucks or burning crosses, they connote something they do not literally say, yet both the actor and the recipient get the message. To the doctor who performs abortions, these posters meant "You're Wanted or You're Guilty; You'll be shot or killed." This was reinforced by the scorecard in the Nuremberg Files. The communication was not conditional or casual. It was specifically targeted. Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls, who performed abortions, were not amused. Cf. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (no true threat in political speech that was conditional, extemporaneous, and met with laughter); Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928 (spontaneous and emotional appeal in extemporaneous speech protected when lawless action not incited).
The "GUILTY" posters were publicly distributed, but personally targeted. While a privately communicated threat is generally more likely to be taken seriously than a diffuse public one, this cannot be said of a threat that[**77] is made publicly but is about a specifically identified doctor and is in the same format that had previously resulted in the death of three doctors who had also been publicly, yet specifically, targeted. There were no individualized threats in Brandenberg, Watts or Claiborne. However, no one putting Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls on a "wanted"-type poster, or participating in selecting these particular abortion providers for such a poster or publishing it, could possibly believe anything other than that each would be seriously worried about being next in line to be shot and killed. And they were seriously worried.
As a direct result of having a "GUILTY" poster out on them, physicians wore bullet-proof vests and took other extraordinary security measures to protect themselves and their families. ACLA had every reason to foresee that its expression of intent to harm (the "GUILTY" poster identifying Crist, Hern, Elizabeth Newhall and James Newhall by name and putting them in the File that tracks hits and misses) would elicit this reaction. Physicians' fear did not simply happen; ACLA intended to intimidate them from doing what they do.
This is the point of the statute and is conduct that we are satisfied lacks any protection under the First Amendment. Violence is not a protected value. Nor is a true threat of violence with intent to intimidate. ACLA may have been staking out a position for debate when it merely advocated violence as in Bray's A Time to Kill, or applauded it, as in the Defense Action petitions. Likewise, when it created the Nuremberg Files in the abstract, because [HN32] the First Amendment does not preclude calling people demeaning or inflammatory names, or threatening social ostracism or vilification to advocate a political position. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 903, 909-12. But, after being on "wanted"-type posters, Dr. Gunn, Dr. Patterson, and Dr. Britton can no longer participate in the debate. By replicating the poster pattern that preceded the elimination of Gunn, Patterson and Britton, and by putting Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls in an abortionists' File that scores fatalities, ACLA was not staking out a position of debate but of threatened demise. This turns the First Amendment on its head.
Like "fighting words," true threats are proscribable. We therefore conclude that the judgment of liability in physicians' [**79] favor is constitutionally permissible.
IV
ACLA submits that the damage award must be reversed or limited to the
compensatory damages because the punitive award amounts to judgment without
notice contrary to BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
134 L. Ed. 2d 809, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). We have since discussed the subject
in depth in In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
[HN33] Although our review is de novo, the district court should be
given the opportunity to evaluate the punitive damages award and to make
findings with respect to its propriety. Therefore, we vacate the award of
punitive damages and remand for the district court to consider in the first
instance whether the award is appropriate in light of Exxon Valdez.
290 F.3d 1058, *1086; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314, **79; LEXSEE
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376
V
After trial, the district court found that each defendant used intimidation
as a means of interfering with the provision of reproductive health services and
acted [*1087] with malice and with specific intent in threatening physicians. It
found that physicians remain threatened by ACLA's threats, and have no adequate
remedy at law. The court concluded that physicians had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that each defendant acting independently[**80] and as a
co-conspirator prepared and published the Deadly Dozen Poster, the Crist Poster,
and the Nuremberg Files with specific intent to make true threats to kill or do
bodily harm to physicians, and to intimidate them from engaging in legal medical
practices. It "totally rejected the defendants' attempts to justify their
actions as an expression of opinion or as a legitimate and lawful exercise of
free speech in order to dissuade the plaintiffs from providing abortion
services." PPCW III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1154. Applying Madsen's
standard, the court found that ACLA's actions were not protected under the First
Amendment. Accordingly, it permanently enjoined each of the defendants, their
agents, and all persons in active concert with any of them who receive actual
notice, from threatening, with the specific intent to do so, Crist, Hern, Dr.
Elizabeth Newhall, Dr. James Newhall, PPCW and PFWHC in violation of FACE;
publishing, republishing, reproducing or distributing the Deadly Dozen Poster,
or the Crist poster, or their equivalent, with specific intent to threaten
290 F.3d 1058, *1087; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314, **80; LEXSEE
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376
physicians, PPCW or PFWHC; and from providing additional material concerning
Crist, Hern, either[**81] Newhall, PPCW or PFWHC to the Nuremberg Files or any
mirror web site with a specific intent to threaten, as well as from publishing
the personally identifying information about them in the Nuremberg Files with a
specific intent to threaten. The court also ordered ACLA to turn over possession
of materials that are not in compliance with the injunction.
ACLA complains principally about the restraint on possessing the posters.
Pointing to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89S
. Ct. 1243 (1969), where the Court observed that "the State may no more
prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits, "ACLA contends
that the injunction treats the posters worse than obscenity. However, the
posters in this case are quite different from a book; the "wanted"-type posters
themselves -- not their ideological content -- are the tool for threatening
physicians. In this sense the posters' status is more like conduct than speech.
Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S
. Ct. 1673-82 (1968) (explaining distinction[**82] between speech and conduct, a
nd holding that expressive aspect of conduct does not exempt it from warranted r
egulation). The First Amendment interest in retaining possession of the
threatening posters is de minimis, while ACLA's continued possession of them
290 F.3d 1058, *1087; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314, **82; LEXSEE
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376
constitutes part of the threat. The court heard all the evidence, which included
testimony that some defendants obstructed justice and ignored injunctions.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the turn-over order was broader than necessary
to assure that this particular threat will not be used again.
ACLA also suggests that the injunction is an improper prior restraint on
speech because it prohibits dissemination of the posters. It is not.
[HN34] The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that all injunctions which
incidentally affect expression are prior restraints. Madsen, 512 U.S. a
t 764 n.2; Schenck v. Pro- Choice Network of Western New York, 519
U.S. 357, 374 n.6 (1997). Like Madsen and Schenck, the injunction here was not
issued because of the content of ACLA's [*1088] expression, but because of prior
unlawful conduct.
The terms of the injunction are finely tuned and exceedingly narrow. Only
threats[**83] or use of the posters or their equivalent with the specific intent
to threaten Crist, Hern, either Newhall, PPCW or PFWHC are prohibited. Only
personal information about these particular persons may not be used in the
Nuremberg Files with the specific intent to threaten them. This leaves huge room
for ACLA to express its views. n19 290 F.3d 1058, *1088; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314, **83; LEXSEE
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376
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n19 Assuming that he has standing, deParrie's challenges fail for most of the
same reasons. The district court found that he was an employee and agent of ALM
and it is proper for the injunction to apply to him as well. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65.

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CONCLUSION
A "threat of force" for purposes of FACE is properly defined in accordance
with our long-standing test on" true threats," as "whether a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or
assault." This, coupled with the statute's requirement of intent to intimidate,
comports with the First Amendment.
We have reviewed[**84] the record and are satisfied that use of the Crist
Poster, the Deadly Dozen Poster, and the individual plaintiffs' listing in the
Nuremberg Files constitute a true threat. In three prior incidents, a
290 F.3d 1058, *1088; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9314, **84; LEXSEE
2002 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4198; 2002 Daily Journal DAR 5376
" wanted"-type poster identifying a specific doctor who provided abortion
services was circulated, and the doctor named on the poster was killed. ACLA and
physicians knew of this, and both understood the significance of the particular
posters specifically identifying each of them. ACLA realized that "wanted" or"
guilty" posters had a threatening meaning that physicians would take seriously.
In conjunction with the "guilty" posters, being listed on a Nuremberg Files
scorecard for abortion providers impliedly threatened physicians with being next
on a hit list. To this extent only, the Files are also a true threat. However,
the Nuremberg Files are protected speech.
There is substantial evidence that these posters were prepared and
disseminated to intimidate physicians from providing reproductive health
services. Thus, ACLA was appropriately found liable for a true threat to
intimidate under FACE.
Holding ACLA accountable for this conduct does not impinge on legitimate
protest or advocacy.[**85] Restraining it from continuing to threaten these
physicians burdens speech no more than necessary.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment in all respects but for punitive damages,
as to which we remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.