A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL “BONEYARD”
Concentrating on the History of Russian Political Culture
[The metaphor "BONEYARD" comes from the game dominoes in which players
select pipped tiles from a shuffled and face-down array called the boneyard. The embedded
reference to the graveyard might also be agreeable to the historian]
Entries here are either
(1) augmentations of entries found on the matrix pedagogical
bibliography [bbl.plt.clt] or
(2) additional biographical and bibliographical material not found at bbl.plt.clt
Table of Contents
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
National minorities
Academic Theories of Political Culture (Revolution, Democracy,
etc.)
Additional, Still Unincorporated Bibliography
Introductory Explanations
The entries are generally in English but some entries include transliterated Russian text. Often the system of transliteration employed for extended quotation is one unique to KIMBALL FILES. However, to avoid confusion and harmonize with standard bibliographical practice, titles of publications, personal and formal institutional names are transliterated in the standard "Library of Congress" system. Those who know Russian will quickly accommodate themselves to the peculiar KIMBALL-FILES transliteration of certain texts [EG]
Here is a page devoted to the complexities of transliteration.
Most annoyingly, the entries that follow are full of three-stroke coded tags, usually placed in template fields so as to separate them from the bibliographical entries and other pedagogically important information. These are nonetheless a constant mystery to the uninitiated. For definitions, G/KIMBALL FILES codes.
Many entries here -- particularly entries of primary
documentation -- follow a datafile or biofile
template which sometimes
supplies information about the "author" in addition to bibliographical references.
That template might include all or some of the following fields =
<>FamilyName,GivenName SecondGivenName (or patronymic
for Russians)|>Coded Abbreviation for names
|
a{BirthDate, often with the year indicated by the last three numbers, EG= 1862
becomes 862. Months = ja fe mr ap my je jy au se oc no de. Days always in two
strokes, EG= je02
}b{BirthPlace
}c{DeathPlace
}d{DeathCause
}e{DeathDate
}n{ETC| Here certain categorical or subject codes are used to identify major
concerns of the "author", EG= the three-stroke coded tags above
}o{Major brief ID
}f{Parents
}g{Siblings
}h{Nationality (IE=ethnicity)
}i{Religion
}j{EconomicStatus
}k{Social estate [soslovie]= dxv (clergy) dvr (aristocracy) kpq (merchantry)
mww (petty urbanites) krx (peasantry)
}l{Education
}m{Career
}p{Voluntary Associations
}q{Chronology
}r{Bibliography of titles by "FamilyName"
}s{Bibliography of titles about "FamilyName"
}t{Places searched with no results
}8{ETC}
Here is a more complete explanation of the KIMBALL FILES biographical/bibliographical data template
<>Amalrik,Andrei| a{}n{CWX dsn R&A}o{
}r{
*1970: Will the
Soviet Union Survive until 1984
*1978:LND,Overseas Publication Interchange|_SSSR i zapad v odnoi lodke|
*1982:NYC|_Notes of a Revolutionary| hv8959.s65a4513
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Andreevskii,Ivan Efim|>AniIE| a{
}r{
*1853:AIS#6| “Russkii narod i gosudarstvo” [rvw of Leshkov kng stt&pbl]
*1872:SPB|_Politseiskoe
pravo??| 2vv| ((prm plc.lwx| (74:2nd ed) freedom of qastnoi iniciativy
[cvc.rgt] sodeistvo stt&pbl when prv.pzn’s strength not sufficient))
*1880:RSt#27:403-422| “Khod rasprostraneniia
politicheskikh znanii v Rossii v 1855-1880 gg”| ((65:GU.cnp new powers, now
existed 15y, & here are results =
*1881:RSt#31:?? [source sd #2]| “Khod
rasprostraneniia v russkom obshchestve politicheskikh znanii,1855-1880”
[re.A-2’s Silver jubilee]
*1882:RSt#34:525-42| “Kniaz’ Aleksandr Arkadievich Suvorov”| ((prm vsp unv.rbx SvrAA))
pst re.edc,prz pbl.hlt to help others,particularly the bdn [less self]
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Anet,Claude| a{}n{}o{Anet=pseudonym
}r{
*1917:LND|_Through the Russian revolution: Notes
of an eyewitness, from 12th March-30th May [1917] ((252pp| 34 pix!))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Arbatov,Georgii A| a{}n{CWX irx R&A}o{
}r{
--|The Soviet Viewpoint| Dodd,Mead. Hamilton bks|
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Bakunin,Mikhail|>BknM| a{}n{
}o{LOOP
}r{
Comprehensive index
*1867de:“Federalism, Socialism, and Anti-theologism”
[TXT
|_VSB,3:643-4]
*1868se01:Narodnoe delo#1 [People's Cause], “Our Program” [VSB,3:644] Excerpt =
We desire the complete intellectual, socioeconomic, and political emancipation of the people.
I. Intellectual freedom, because without it political and social freedom cannot be complete or lasting. Belief in God, belief in the immortality of the soul, and all kinds of idealism in general . . . on the one hand serve as an indispensable mainstay and justification for despotism, for all kinds of privilege, and for the exploitation of the people and on the other hand demoralize the people themselves, dividing them into two groups with mutually opposed aspirations and thereby depriving them of the energy required to win their natural rights and to build a fully free and happy life. From this it clearly follows that we are advocates of atheism and materialism.
II. The socioeconomic freedom of the people, without which any freedom would be a detestable and meaningless lie. The economic life of a people has always provided the cornerstone and true explanation of its political existence. All previous or currently existing political and civil organizations in the world have been maintained upon the following basic foundations: conquest, the right of property inheritance, the family rights of father and husband, and the sanctification of all these principles by religion; and all this taken together constitutes the essence of the state. The inevitable result of the entire state system has been and had to be the slavish subordination of the unskilled and ignorant majority to the so-called educated, exploiting minority. A state without political and legal privileges based upon economic privileges is unthinkable.
Desiring the true and complete liberation of the people, we seek (1) the abolition of the right of property inheritance, and (2) the equalization of women's rights, both political and socioeconomic, with those of men; we consequently desire the abolition of family rights and of marriage, both ecclesiastical and civil, which is inseparably connected w!th the right of inheritance.
We make two fundamental principles the basis of economic justice:
1. Land belongs only to those who cultivate it with their own hands-to agricultural communes.
2. Capital and all the implements of labor belong to the workers-to workers' associations.III. The political organization of the future must be nothing other than a free federation of free workers, both in agriculture and in industrial artels (associations) in the factory.
Therefore, in the name of political freedom, we want first and foremost the complete destruction of the state; we want the eradication of the state system with all its ecclesiastical, political, bureaucratic (both military and civil), legal, academic, and financial and economic institutions.
We want complete freedom for all peoples now oppressed by the [Russian] Empire, with the right of complete self-determination on the basis of their own instincts, needs, and desires; so that by federating from the bottom up, those among them who wish to be members of the Russian nation could jointly create a truly free and happy society in a friendly and federal union with similar societies in Europe and throughout the world.
*1868:Catechism of a revolutionary (w/Nechaev) [TXT
|_Edie,1:385-423]
*1871no:letter to “My Italian Friends” |_VSB,3:645
*1871:|_On the Paris Commune [TXT]
*1872: Texts on the struggle with Marx in the First International [TXT]
*1873:|_Statism and Anarchy
[TXT]
|_VSB,3:645-7
*1950:|_Marxism, Freedom and the State| [TXT]
translated and edited with a biographical sketch by K. J. Kenafick| ((Writings
combined w/o clear indication of original publication information))
*1964:LND,Free Press of Glencoe|_The_Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific
Anarchism| EBy G. P. Maximoff with a biographical sketch by Max Nettlau| [TXT
excerpts]
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Baring,Maurice| a{874}e{945}n{trv
RREV1 }o{
}r{
*1913:LND|_What I Saw in Russia| ((1905oc17:1907se;
Narrative:212-381))
*1914:LND|_Mainsprings of Russia| ((OWN| prm trv RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Beattie,Bessie| a{}e{}n{}o{}
*`1918:N.NY|_The_Red Heart of Russia| ((trv wmn))
<>Bebel,August| a{}
*1906:on RREV1| ((G/PREV:197-8 rvw))
<>Bely,Andrei [pseud. of Bugaev]| a{
}r{
|_Petersburg| ((prm blt hst RREV1))
--| “Revolution and Culture” [RB-C]
}s{}t{}8{}
<
>Berdiaev,Nikolai Axr*| G/EUA
<>Bervi,Vasilii
Vxi*|>Bervi-Flerovskii,Vasilii Vxi*|>BFl|>BrvVV| a{1829ap28
}r{
Most pst by pseud,thus most cannot identify
*1859:JMlwx#3|re.ENG lwx
*1862?| “Pis’mo V. V. Bervi k predvoditeliam dvorianstva”|In YMI:54-55| ((8x11 w/YMI| prm dvr.mtg))
*1869:SPB|_Polozhenie rabochego klassa v Rossii| ((>PRK|prm Mrx prl krx trv|not
systematic study,but empassioned reportage, “to be
read w/bated breath”[VRR:488] 872:2nd ed. destroyed at press by stt|Only few survived, re-prt in BFl,Izb v1 abv))
*1870:71; Nedel’|re.vlg.o
*1871:1894; |_Azbuka sotsial’nykh nauk|Several?? vv|:1871-1894| ((prm scx pbl.scs| CF:GrkM vsp re.TolL))
*1872:SPB|_Issledovaniia po tekushchim voprosam| ((prm PRS.cmn G/RRE:172-3, LiN#7/8:176))
*1872:G&K:33?-52| “Klassicheskaia strana krupnogo zemlevladeniia”| ((IREland lnd brz ekn.trx idl MllJS))
*187?:SPB|_Na zhizn’ i smert’: Izobrazhenie idealistov| ((Hkd BRN#25| prm blt))
*1932:LiN#2:55-74|“Neizdanaia stat’ia”|Introductory article by Lev Kamenev,“Marks o Flerovskom”| ((prm Mrx hst.gph))
*1897:LND|_Tri politicheskie sistemy: Nikolai I, Aleksandr II, i Aleksandr III; vospominaniia...| ((NYP cat|8x11-Brv| prm
vsp N-1 A-2 A-3 plt.mvt plt.clt|543 pp|GRM tlng made))
*1915mr:GoM#3:134-82; 4 #4:144-66; #5:122-42; more in 1916??| “Vospominaniia”| ((8x11-Brv| Re-prt (more complete?)
of Tri abv| LTF held rights to vsp))
*1929:MVA-LGR|_Zapiski revoliutsionera mechtatelia|Edited with a forward by M. Klevenskii|
((NYP & HoT cat| prm vsp A-2 plt.mvt|shorted version of GoM vsp; bxo ndx))
*1958:MVA|_Izbrannye ekonomicheskie proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh| ((OWN prm ekn))
|_O muchenike Nik.... [IISG]
}s{
Nikolaevskii on what Marx thought about Bervi's 1869:Polozhenie... [TXT]
}t{}8{}
<>Beveridge,Albert J| a{1862}e{1927
}r{
|_The_Russian Advance|NYC:1903| ((prm trv SIB TolL))
}s{}t{}8{}t pbd))
<>Bezborodko 1799:memo on reform [Raeff2:70-74]
<>Blok,Aleksandr A| a{
}r{
*1908no| “Ironiia”| In SoS,5:269-73
*1908no| “Narod i intelligentsiia”| SoS,5:259-68| Translated as “The People and the Intelligentsia” in Raeff3:359-63|
*1918ja19| “Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia”| SoS,5:396-406| Translated in Raeff3:364-71|
*1908de| “Stikhiia i kul’tura”| SoS,5:274-83
*1918mr| “Iskusstvo i revoliutsiia (Po povodu tvoreniia Richarda [?sp] Vagnera)”| SoS,5:408-12| ((G/1920 blw))
*1918my| “Katilina: Stranitsa iz istorii mirovoi Revoliutsiia”| In SoS,5:449-50| Translated as “Catiline: A Page from the History
of World Revolution”| In RB-C|
*1920:|_Iskusstvo i revoliutsiia| ((G/1918mr abv))
*1920:BRL|_Rossiia i intelligentsiia| ((OWN| prm ntg blt| 71p|
Gathered Narod i Int, Stikhiia i kul’tura, Intelligentsiia i rev”, etc))
*1971:MVA|_SoS v shesti tomakh| 5 vols| ((OWN))
}s{
*1975:O.ENG|_The_Poet and
the Revolution: Aleksandr Blok’s The Twelve| Russian text of the poem,plus translation]| EBy
Sergei Hackel | ((PG3453.B6d857| prm stx RREV mnt clt blt))
}t{}8{}
<>Bobrovskaia,Cecilia| a{
}r{
*:|_Twenty Years in Underground Russia: Memoirs of a Rank and File Bolshevik|
((prm vsp wmn SDs(b) RREV1 RREV2 RREV3))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Bonch-Bruevich,M|
a{}n{WW1 Gwrx}o{mlt
}r{
*1966:MVA|_From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Brusilov,Aleksei Alekseevich|
a{}n{WW1}o{mlt
}r{
*1971:Westport CN,Greenwood reprint of *1930:L.ENG|_A_Soldier's Note-book,1914-1918|
((UO))
}s{}t{}
<>Bukharin,Nikolai| a{}e{
}r{
| “Bringing Up the Young Generation [1922]” in RBV1:55-61;edc chd clt
|_Imperialism and World Economy| Introduced by Vladimir Lenin. NYC: 1967. HB501.B84613
|_Politics and Economics of the Transition Period| Edited by Kenneth Tarbuck. LND: 1979. JC474.B7413
|_Selected Writings on the State| Introduced by Stephen F. Cohen and Ken Coates. Armonk NY: 1982. HB97.5.B854
Bukharin,Nikolai,and Evgenii A. Preobrazhenskii|_The_ABC of Communism: A Popular Explanation of the Program of
the Communist Party of Russia| Introduction by Sydney Heitman. Ann Arbor: 1966 [1922]. HX314.B822
|_ABC of Communism| Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul,with an introduction by E. H. Carr. LND: 1969
--|_Imperialism and World Economy. Introduced by Vladimir Lenin. New York City: 1967. HB501.B84613
--|_Politics and Economics of the Transition Period. Edited by Kenneth Tarbuck. London: 1979. JC474.B7413
--|_Program of the Communists (Bolshevists)| Pamphlets on Communism,v. 1,no. 11,collected
by Tom Burns. New York City: Communist Labor Party of America,[1918]. Rare bks 335.408 P191
--|_Selected Writings on the State. Introduced by Stephen F. Cohen and Ken Coates. Armonk NY:1982. HB97.5.B854
--|_“The New Economic Policy of Soviet Russia”. In Lenin et al. The New Policies of Soviet Russia, pp. 43-61
--|On factionalism [RRC,3]
<>Bukharin,N. I.,A. M. Beborin,Y. M. Uranovsky,S. I. Vavilov,V. L. Komarov and A. I. Tiumeniev.
Marxism and Modern Thought. New York City: 1935. HB501.M5M3
<>Bukharin,Nikolai,and Evgenii A. Preobrazhenskii. ABC of Communism| Introduction by E. H. Carr. London: 1969
<>Bukharin,Nikolai,and Evgenii A. Preobrazhenskii. The ABC of Communism: A Popular Explanation of the Program of the Communist
Party of Russia. Introduction by Sydney Heitman. Ann Arbor: 1966 [1922] | ((prm)) HX314.B822
<>Bukharin,Nikolai,et al. Science at the Cross Roads: Papers Presented to the International Congress of the History of Science and
Technology,held in London from June 29th to July 3rd,1931,by the Delegates of the USSR. Second edition. London: 1971. SCI bbt Q175.5.S35
}s{
>Cohen,Stephen F.|_Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography,1888-1938. NY: 1973. DK268.B76C63 1973
Tucker,Robert
}t{}8{}
<>Catherine II, Empress of Russia| a{
}r{
*1767jy19:|_Nakaz ... dannyi Kommissii o
sochinenii proekta novago ulozheniia|_Catherine the Great’s Instruction (Nakaz) to the Legislative Commission|EBy and TBy
Paul Dukes| Series:Russia under Catherine the Great,v2|Newtonville MA:ORP,1977| ((DK171 .R87|129p bbl:39-41| prm
lwx.kmm tUt C-2 RUS2))
*1785|_The_Charters to the Nobility, Towns, and State Peasants| EBy David Griffiths and George Munro| ((dvr grd stt.srf))
| The Memoirs of Catherine the Great|TBy Katharine Anthony|NYC:1927| ((DK170.A5|UO special collections| prm vsp C-2 stt))
|_Voltaire and Catherine the Great: Selected Correspondence|TEby A. Lentin,with foreword
by Elizabeth Hill|C.ENG:CUP,1974| ((PQ2084.C313| prm C-2 idl))
*1931:C.ENG|_Documents of Catherine the Great| EBy William F. Reddaway| prm noUO
}s{
Alexander, John T|_Autocratic Politics in a National Crisis. Bloomington:1969. DK183.A44
--------|_Emperor of the Cossacks:Pugachev and the Frontier Jacquerie of 1773-1775. Lawrence KS:1873. DK183.A45
--------|_Catherine the Great: Life and Legend. Oxford UP. DK170.A58
Donnert, Erich|_Russia in the Age of Enlightenment. Leipzig:1985. DK127.D6613 | prm
Jones, Robert Edward|_The_Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785. Princeton:1973. HT647.J65
Madariaga, Isabel de|_Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great. New Haven:1981. DK171.D45
Raeff, Marc, ed|_Catherine the Great: A Profile. NYC:1972
}t{}8{}
<>Chaianov,Aleksandr| a{}n{theorist of
peasant or village culture| Called static peasant way of life a “mode of production”
[contradicted orthodox followers of Mrx [EG] & Lenin
[EG] who denied existence of
independent "village" mode of production] Susan Solomon, The
Soviet Agrarian Debate described how Chaianov has been called “neo-populist” | Katerina Clark, “The City versus
the Countryside in Soviet Peasant Literature of the Twenties: A Duel of Utopias”, in Blw.clt, explored
the neo-Slavophile [ID] side of Chaianov}o{
}m{
Chaianov's theoretical accomplishments or failures must be placed in the context of the
profound changes being worked on rural populations in the early phases of
industrialization [EG]
}r{
*1920:”The Journey of My Brother Alexei to the Land of Peasant Utopia” | pseud=Kremnev,Ivan| tlng in Smith,R.E.F.,RUS
krx,1920-1984:63-106| (())
*1966:Homewood IL|_The_Theory of the Peasant
Economy|
((
1.The family farm
2.land husbandry
3.traditional.culture
4.vulnerability to complex web of powerful outsiders|
Chaianov had much
influence on Shanin,Awkward [ID]
Edelman,krx.prl:14-19
summary = “The continuing vitality of the
community was supposed to bind peasant to each other in opposition to the outside forces of landlords, governments, markets, and (one
should add) other villages. This last view dominated Shanin’s conception of the
political sociology of the peasantry. With its strong emphasis on the
centripetal forcers in the village, Shanin’s approach left little room for the
formation of the true social classes in general and rural proletariat in
particular. The dominant struggle on the land then became one of united insiders
versus outsiders rather than of rich against poor within the village”[19] SAC
editor added boldface above in order to raise this question = Why has Edelman
written "in opposition to" rather than “in dynamic factional relationship with”?
Is it because he sees politics as struggle of one against all rather than as a
process of constant rebalancing among various overlapping interests?] | Q's
economic views are similar to Robert Redfield's anthropological views
[EG#1] [EG#2]
= village life over many centuries and in many areas of the world can be seen as
a closely knit and harmonious network of interpersonal relations and kinship
patterns
))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Chaikovskii,Nikolai Vxi*| a{
}r{
*1905:LND|_Russia in Revolution:193-206| ((vsp “recorded” by G. H. Perris| 3x5:bxo))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Chernov,Viktor
M|>QerVM|
a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
}f{}g{}h{}i{}j{}k{
}l{
}p{
SRs leading figure
*1918ja:Constituent Assembly elected him president
}r{
Great Russian Revolution| UqS
vsp in Moh.RR|
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Chernova,Olga E. [Chernova-Kolbasina]|>QeraOE| a{
}r{
--|_New Horizons:Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution| Westport
CN:1975 [L.ENG:1936]| (( prm RREV vsp SRs))
--|vsp of krx.rbx,RREV2 [Page.RR]
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Chernyshevskii,Nikolai
G|>QrnNG| a{}n{}o{journalist| LOOP
}r{
}s{}t{}8{}
<>De Leon,Daniel| a{852}e{914}
*1920:NYC,National Executive Committee, Socialist Labor Party|_James Madison and Karl Marx: A Contrast and a
Similarity; Two Articles| ((UO Mds Mrx plt.clt USA2.cst 30p lxt 889:913;1st pbd))
<>Denikin,Anton| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{mlt.srv
}r{
*1922:LND|_The_Russian Turmoil: Memoirs, Military, Social, and Political
--|The White Army
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Dixon,William Hepworth| a{}n{R&A}o{
}r{
*1867?:|_New America | ((UO | Traveled in USA west w/ Dilke,Charles Wentworth | Mormans, ch.XVI-ch.XXXIII, pp.114-219))
*1870:|_Free Russia | ((SUMMIT | ch.24-ch.33, pp. 135-186, religious dissent and "Old-Believers" [Old-Ritualists
(StO)] ))
*1872:LND|_Secret History of "The International" Working Men's Association|
Pseudonym= Yorke,Onslow| ((noUO| *1862:1870; Ntx1 origins & increasingly fraught
hst| ~~ 62:wrl.faire, Nap3 FRN/GRM irx conflict| w/spc emphasis on avocational
ID of dddists| vs.Bkn vs.Mrx pro-Tolain| very vs.Cluseret
[ID] & his
conflation of wrx w/rvs))
}s{
*1870:LND|>Barry,Herbert|_Russia in 1870, offered serious critique of D
on Russia| ((SUMMIT| Barry had been dtr of Chepeleffsky [Chepelevskii] lnd and
iron works in VLA TMB & NNG gbx~| He also pst Russian Metallurgical Works | G/kbk
for more Barry "Ivan at Home"| These 2 kng~ available in etxt))
}t{}8{}
<>Dobranitskii,M| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1924:Proletarskaia revoliutsiia#8–9(31–32):73–75| "Zelenye partizany (1918–1920 g.g.)"|
((krx.rbx vs.SDs(b) Gwrx))
*1926:MVA|_Sistematicheskii ukazatel' literatury po istorii russkoi revoliutsiii|
((REF bbl))
}s{
}t{BSE3 ZDV,5 MSP
}8{}
<>Dorosh,Harry| a{
}r{
*1944:NYC|_Russian Constitutionalism| ((342.47 D737|plt.clt cst rfm Wbr?| USA ?beginnings of CWX.hst.gph| “a sketch” but
w/attention to cst idl of DKB| ch on rfm A-2,emphasizing lbx gnt & Vlv.rxn| rdx=
main threat,& spc ch on LMeM cst prj shows better future squelched by rvs))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Dostoevskii,Fedor M|>Dostoevsky,Fedor| a{}n{world
fame}o{writer| LOOP
}r{
--|Winter Notes on Summer Impressions
--|Notes from
the Underground
--|The
Possessed
--|Brothers Karamazov
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Drahomaniv,Mykhailo Ptr*|>Dragomanov,Mikhail
Ptr*|>DrhMP| a{}n{}o{UKR ntn plt pundit
}r{
*1905:PRS|_Collected Works??|EBy Bogdan Kistiakovskii| ((noUO))
*1952:NYC|_A_Symposium and Selected Writings: The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy
of Arts and Sciences in the U. S. 2/1| ((noUO UKR))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Durnovo,Petr N| a{
}r{
}s{
--|>Aldanov,Marc,on Durnovo,PN in Moh.RR
}t{}8{}
<>Dziewanowski,M. K.,ed|
*1970:NYC|_The_Russian Revolution: An Anthology| ((Contains=
Pares
Katkov
Sukhanov
Chamberlin
Trotsky
Daniels
Reed
}}
<>Eastman,Max| a{
}r{
Trotsky:Portrait of a Youth| ((??noUO| chd.Trt))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Florenskii,Pavel Axr*|
a{}n{}o{
}r{
--|SUQ: 137-172| “On the Holy Spirit”
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Florovskii,Georgii Vxi*| a{893au29}b{ODE}c{USA}e{979au11}n{}o{rlg.phl
}p{
EUA Evraziistvo briefly = they ask right Q~ but give wrong A~
}r{
--|RB-C| “In the World of Quests and Wanderings”
--|_Puti russkogo bogosloviia IN ENGLISH = |_Ways of Russian Theology
--|KNIGHT
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Fonvizen,Denis. 1779my:"Ta Hsüeh” and other political essays [Raeff3:88-105]
<>Francis,David Rowland| a{
}r{
The Papers of David Rowland Francis,American Ambassador to Russia: 1916-1918. University Publications of America. flm (11 reels)
--|Dollars and Diplomacy: Ambassador David
Rowland Francis and the Fall of Tsarism,1916-1917. Edited by Jamie H. Cockfield.
Durham NC: 1981. E183.8.r9f65
--|Russia From the American Embassy. 947.084 F847
}s{
Clay,Catherine| "Responsibility
in an Untried Field"
}t{}8{}
<>Freeze,Gregory L.,ed|
*1988:O.ENG|_From Supplication to Revolution: A Documentary Social History
of Imperial Russia [through 1906]| ((OWN |>FFS sbr.prm pbl|RREV1=part 3:197-309| dxv dvr kpq mww krx))
<>Gershenzon,Mikhail O| a{}n{ntg
plt.clt RUS2}o{
}r{
*1909:MVA|_Tvorcheskoe samosoznanie| Reprint,Latchworth ENG: Prideaux P,1980. B4238.G5t83
*1909|_Vekhi|
CLICK FOR SEVERAL EDITIONS| ((>Vexi| sbr.prm ntg RUS2|
Ger1shenzon,Mikhail,ed
Berdiaev,N
Bulgakov,S
Gershenzon,M
Izgoev,A
Kistiakovskii,N
Struve,P
Frank,S
))
G/*1921:|>Ivanov
*1923:MVA|_Istoriia molodoi Rossii: Analiz russkoi mysli i
dushevnogo sostoianiia intelligentsii; Pecherin, Stankevich, Granovskii, Galakhov, Ogarev i dr|
((| prm ntg RS0| ?includes 906:MVA kng on plt.idl Hzn? krj.StnNV))
*1986:CA Irving, Schlacks|_A_History of Young Russia| TBy ?| ((SUMMIT))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Golovin,Nikolai Nxi*| a{
}p{
gte PRS
WW2 ~~FSCh & Vlasov mlt
}r{
*1931:New Haven, YUP|_The_Russian Army
in the World War| ((1of Shotwell series| mlt))
In Adams.RR
*1917su:WW1 mlt disintegration in Moh.RR
}s{
BSE3
}t{}8{}
<>Gorky,Maxim|>GorM| a{}n{ RREV3 clt rvs SDs(b) Lnn}o{
}r{
*1917-1918:PGR|_Untimely Thoughts: Essays on Revolution, Culture and the Bolsheviks,1917-1918| ((prm))
*1946:MVA|>Gorky,Maxim |>Molotov |>Voroshilov |>Kirov |>Zhdanov |>Stalin|_History of the Russian
Revolution| 4vv|
*:|_PSS|
w/Lnn [RRC,3]
*1977:L.ENG|>Gorky,Maxim |>Radek,Karl |>Bukharin,Nikolai
|>Zhdanov,Andrei|_Soviet Writers' Congress,1934: The Debate on Socialist Realism and
Modernism in the Soviet Union| (())
}s{
G/BBL
}t{}8{}
<>Got'e,Yurii Vladimirovich| a{}n{}o{prf
}r{
Time of Troubles: The Diary of Iurii Vladimirovich Got'e,Moscow,July 8,1917[,] to July 23,1922. Translated
by Terence Emmons. Princeton NJ: 1988. DK265.6.G66a3
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Graham,Stephen| a{
}r{
Russia in 1916. NYC: MacMillan Co.,1917
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Graves,William S| a{865}e{940}n{Gwrx irx
R&A}o{mlt
}r{
*1931NYC|_America's Siberian
Adventure: 1918-1920|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Great Britain|
Foreign Office|
|_British Documents on Foreign
Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print|
Part 1 (From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to
the First World War),section 1:“Russia”| EBy Dominic Lieven| 6 vols| ((irx
ENG))
Part 2
(From the First to the Second World War),section 1:“The Soviet Union”|| 15vv|
((prm irx ENG Cwrx
RS1 RS2 RREV1 WW1 RREV2 RREV3 Gwrx NEP STL))
<>Gurko,Vasilii|>Gourko,B|
<>Gurko,Vladimir Iosifovich| a{
}r{
*1922:PRS|Russkaia letopis'#2:94-99 etc| “Chto est' i chego net v 'Vospominaniiakh' grafa S. Yu. Vitte”| ((GRS:55,120 prm vsp RREV1 stt.srv))
*1939:SUP|_Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign
of Nicholas II| ((947.08 G936 prm stt pbl))
}s{}t{}
<>Harper,Samuel|
a{882}e{943
}r{
*1945:CHI|_The_Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941|
((OWN vsp trv RREV1 hst.gph USA2))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Harcave,Sidney| a{}n{}o{}
|_First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905| ((>H05| RREV1 RUS3 noWbr|
aka >Russian Revolution of 1905
*1903:prg of SDs [H05:262-8]
*1904my04:Draft prg of SRs [H05:268-73]
*1904no:Zmv cng 11 theses [H05:279-81]
*1904de12:TSR ukaz to SNT [H05:282-5]
*1905ja09: Father Gapon and Ivan Vasimov, Workers' petition to TSR [H05:285-9]
*1905mr:05my; prg of Union of Lib [H05:273-9]
*1905oc18:Pravitel’stvennyi vestnik published Witte memo to TSR [H05:289-92]
*1905oc:KDs program [H05:292-300]
))
*2004|_Count Sergei Witte and the Twilight of Imperial Russia: A Biography| ((Wtt RREV1
STUDENT REVIEW =
The last decades if the Romanov dynasty saw serious threats to it's existence, culminating in the revolution of 1917 that did
finally topple the tsarist government. However, from 1879 until 1906, the state was served by a very energetic and capable
administrator in the person of Sergei Witte. Witte served in a variety of posts within the government during his career, the
most important as the first premier of Russia. His accomplishments are quite varied, and he was involved in many of the major
developments in Russia during his tenure. Sidney Harcave's biography of Witte is the first biography of Witte in the English
Language. It is relatively short for such an important and active individual, being just 270 pages. The biography begins with
Witte's early life in Southern Russia. After completing his university degree in Mathematics at Odessa, he began his career as
an executive for a private railroad based out of Odessa. From here he was appointed by Tsar Alexander III to a position in
the Baranov Commission, with the intention of assessing the shortcomings of the rail system in Russia. From here he was appointed
to head the department of railroad affairs, a huge leap in power, especially for someone as young as Witte. Subsequently, Witte
was appointed Minister of Ways and Communications by Alexander, a post which allowed him direct access to the tsar. In 1892, Witte
was appointed to the important position of Minister of Finance. In this capacity Witte was able to set policy for most economic
activity in Russia. It was in this capacity that he also oversaw construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, with railroading
being his area of expertise. Witte personally considered his greatest accomplishment as Minister of Finance overseeing Russia's
transition to the gold standard. In 1894, Alexander III dies and is succeeded by his son Nicholas II. While Alexander and Witte
got along quite well, with both being confident and somewhat provincial in manner, Nicholas was a rather weak and refined tsar
that often took offense at the manners of Witte. The relationship between the two would prove to be very problematic for Witte's
future career. In spite of this, Nicholas kept Witte as his Minister of Finance, both because of his mother's influence and
because of Witte's reputation for hard work and competence. Because of Witte's work on the Trans-Siberian Railway, he found
himself immersed in Far East policy, and later disagreements over what direction to take in the East would lead to his first
political downfall. Another important development of Witte's during his tenure as Minister of Finance was the implementation
of the so-called “Witte System,” a plan for industrialization based around the construction of railroads to spur economic
growth. However, this system led to an incomplete industrial revolution in Russia. In 1903, Witte was abruptly dismissed by
the tsar as Minister of Finance on the advice of Witte's political rivals, primarily by Plehve and Bezobrazov. For the next
two years Witte held positions of little importance, until selected by the tsar to head to peace delegation at Portsmouth to
conclude the Russo-Japanese War. Though Russia had not fared well in the war, the agreement reached was very favorable to
Russia, which greatly increased Witte's prestige, and led to his becoming Premier of the newly reformed Council of Ministers, a
position similar to that of Prime Minister, on his return to Russia. In this position Witte was able to convince the tsar of
the necessity of the October Manifesto and was able to overhaul the Fundamental Laws. However, he faced intense opposition by
those both within and without his cabinet. As the cabinet that Witte formed was intended to present very diverse views, it
ended up being unworkable. Political infighting eventually led to his resignation as Premier in April 1906. Witte spent the
remaining eight years of his life embittered to the tsar and the figures that opposed him. Harcave does a good job of presenting
the politics involved with the ministries and Witte's cabinet, but does not do the best job covering what Witte's actual
policies were. Additionally, Harcave presents Witte in an overwhelmingly positive light, only rarely criticizing him. Overall,
this is a good short biography.
))
*1962:NYC|_Readings in Russian History| v1= ”From Ancient Times to
the Abolition of Serfdom”| v2= ”The Modern Period”|
((|>HRR|noUO & cannot locate vender OWN sbr|sbr.ndr|
Coolidge Plea for N.EUR hst
Chubaty Def.RUS & UKR
VoI periodization
Kerner Eastward frn mvt ASA MPR
Morrison Warm Water
MlkP EUAism
Toynbee BYZ Heritage
Obolensky BYZ
Rostovtzeff Origin of stt
Riasanovsky Norman.trx
KqvVO St.Sergius
Dewey 1479 Sudebnik
Raeff absolutism trx
Platonov I-4
Keep ZmS
VrnG srf
Spinka Nikon
Sumner P-1
Lipski Anna
Beloff dvr
Gorodetzky dxv scl
Lord 3rd POL rzm
Kutuzov&Nwrx
Squire Tsct
Berlin,Marvellous
Curtiss N-1 mlt
Raeff stt.srv
vol.2:
Tomoshenko skz stt prg &WW1
Portal mfg
Sumner PSLV
Byrnes Pbd
Von Laue Witte
Baron Plx
Karpovich 2 lbx
Godwin
Portsmouth
RJwrx
Schapiro Vexi
Florinsky WW1
Katkov GRM
Scott QKa
Utechin SDs(b)
Belov STL.skz
Jasny xtx
Labedz ntg
Gsovski chx lwx
Karpovich cnp
Matloff WW2
Mosely CWX
Gurian irx
))
<>Heald,Edward T|_Witness to Revolution: Letters from Russia,1916-1919. Edited by James B. Gidney| ((DK265.7.H4))
<>Herzen,Alexander I|
a{
}p{
Managed and edited "Russian Free Press"
[ID] with close associate Nikolai Ogarev
}r{
*1851se22:Letter to Michelet [TXT]
From the Other Shore/The Russian People and Socialism
*1857:1860s; Journal “Kolokol” | Edie,1:328-78 |
KMM:165-90
My Past and Thoughts (many editions)
|_Childhood, Youth and Exile. Translated by J. D. Duff with an Introduction by Sir
Isaiah Berlin. Oxford ENG: 1980| ((chd))
|_Ends and Beginnings. Translated by Constance Garnett;edited by Aileen Kelly and Humphrey Higgens. Oxford ENG: 1985
|_Who is to Blame? A Novel in Two Parts. Translated and edited by Michael R. Katz. Ithaca NY: 1984
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Hoetzsch,Otto|
*1913:BRL|_Russland: Eine Einfuhrung auf Grund seiner Geschichte von 1904 bis
1912| ((frm Honigsheim ndr gnr RREV1 GRM.hst.gph Wbr idl of sham cst is
“exaggerated” and “one-sided”[Schultz“Constitution of 1906:45]))
<>Ivanov,Viacheslav| a{}
--|RB-C| “Crisis of Individualism”
*1921:| Ivanov,Viacheslav, and >Gershenzon,Mikhail|_Correspondence from two
corners| ((dispute discussed by Florovskii))
<>Ivanov-Razumnik| a{}n{}o{
}r{
reflection on RREV 20 yrs after, on eve of WW2, in Moh.RR
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kablits,II|>Yuzov,I| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1886:SPB|_Intelligentsiia i narod v obshchestvennoi zhizni Rossii| ((IISG=R240/38| prm ntg nrd pbl|303p|ch1="ntg-nyi biurokratizm
i ppx|2="Bor’ba zpd s ntnalizmom"|3="lbx i ppx"|4="ntn-yi voprosy v
Rossii,vkliuchaia i Jwx-skii"|5="Eticheskiia ucheniia i ppx"))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kautsky,Karl|>KtsK| a{G/APL}
*1934:| “Marxism and Bolshevism: Democracy and
Dictatorship”| In Socialism,Fascism,Communism. Joseph Shaplen and David
Shub,eds| ((335 Sh 22))
*1984:NYC|_Selected Political Writings| E&TBy
Patrick Goode| (( bbt.rqt 86.02))
<>Kennan,George| a{845}e{924
}r{
*1891:|_Siberia and the Exile System| ((OWN| prm trv
STUDENT REVIEW =
Siberia and the Exile System, which was originally published in 1891, is an investigative report made
by the American businessman George Kennan into the lives and conditions of Siberian exiles. Having made a
previous trip to Siberia for business, Kennan prefaces this work by investigating whether or not the
rumors of horrible prison conditions in Siberia were true or not. The author admits that, before
making this particular trip which is described in the book, he had personally looked upon the Russian
government favorably and did not believe that the prisons could be as deplorable as he had heard.
During the time of Kennan’s visit, the Russian empire was going through incredibly reactionary times
in response to the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The term ‘nihilism’ invoked in Kennan visions
of violent and ruthless enemies of the state; people who should undoubtedly endure years of Siberian
internment. However, Kennan quickly goes back on this judgment after his first meeting with a Russian
exile. Upon discussing works of literature, world events, and most of all, politics, with a large
number of exiles in Siberia, Kennan comes to the conclusion that those he spoke with should be considered
moderate. In his own personal opinion, there were no real grounds on which the Russian government
should have found the majority of exiles as a threat. As a result, hundreds of smart and capable
young Russians were doomed to a life of toil and misery because of Russia’s harsh political climate
of the time.
Of course, knowing what we as Americans know now about the Gulag system during Soviet times, it is
not surprising that Kennan ultimately comes to the conclusion that the treatment of exiles in
Siberia was arguably the worst in a ‘civilized’ country. As an example, the first prison that
Kennan investigates is the forwarding prison in Tyumen, whose purpose it was to house exiles on
their way farther east. Prisons during this time, in every part of Siberia, revealed horrifying
conditions for prisoners because of severe congestion. The political tensions of the time could
easily be seen in these prisons, because of the numbers of those arrested drastically
increased. As a result, prison conditions were crowded and rife with disease and death. In
addition to not having nearly enough space to house the prisoners, there were also no plans to
make the conditions any better. Kennan notes that, upon asking prison and prison hospital
officials about plans to make improvements, he found that “the officials who care have not
the power, and the officials who have the power do not care” (page 404). The prisons in
Siberia remained congested for many months of the year, until the Siberian summer came and
allowed the prisoners to continue their journey east (on foot, naturally).
This work is valuable for a number of reasons. Not only does it give the reader an inside
view of a rarely traversed part of the Russian empire, but it allows the modern day reader
to note the progress (or lack thereof) of the Russian prison system, as well as the
settlement of Siberia in its entirety. Even in the late nineteenth century, Kennan writes
about this system of exile into Siberia as a longstanding tradition, one that has been
around since before the times of the Romanovs. The author places the blame of thousands
of needless arrests and hundreds of deaths each year on the Russian government itself, stating
that the “government is out of harmony of the spirit of the time” (page 187). Russians who
showed a lot of intelligence, youth, and vigor in Kennan’s eyes were instead eaten up into
the exile system because of the paranoid and outdated government that ruled them.
))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kennan,George Frost| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1946:WDC|_Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946
(WDC:
United States Institute of Peace,1991)| ((prm CWX))
*1956:1958; PNJ, PUP|_Soviet-American Relations,1917-1920|
v1= “Russia Leaves the War”| v2= “The Decision to Intervene”|| ((ndr WW1 irx USA
STUDENT REVIEW of v1 =
Russia Leaves the War delineates the international setting of the Bolshevik regime from the November
revolution of 1917 to the signing of the Brest Litovsk treaty in March of 1918. The first section of the book
analyzes the relationship between the Provisional government and the government of the United States. The
analysis is meant to provide historical background to the study of Soviet American relations during the first
months of the Bolshevik regime. Kennan writes that American acceptance of the Provisional government allowed
for the United States to attach an ideological dimension to the First World War. Such an ideological positional
would have been rather unconvincing had the November revolution of 1917 not occurred. The first section can
also been seen as delineating the respective goals that the United States government had for the Provisional
government. Kennan writes that such goals were contradictory in nature. However, once pursued the American
government was unwilling to make modifications to the subsequent goals. Kennan concludes the first section of
the book by commenting on the general attitude of the American government when the rein of power shifted from
the Provisional government to the Bolshevik regime.
The next section of Kennan’s book describes how the American government reacted to the Bolshevik revolution in
November of 1917. Kennan establishes that America’s policy of non-recognition, toward the Bolshevik government, was
based upon their understanding that the Bolshevik government wanted to make peace with the Central powers. Such an
idea was seen as an act of betrayal by the United States. In this manner, Kennan maintains that American and Soviet
relations were colored by Bolshevik war policy. It is against this backdrop that Kennan delineates how the American
government came to support a policy of non-recognition.
Kennan’s analysis of Soviet American relations during the first months of the Bolshevik regime can also be seen as
addressing the problems of allied intervention within the Russian state. Allied intervention is discussed most
closely in relation to the Siberian state. However, the book does mention allied intervention in the Don Cossack
territory during the last months of 1917. The primary analysis of Kennan’s book is centered however, on the day
to day decisions of American peoples operating in the Russian state and the American government. Kennan establishes
that the United States foreign policy was directed and influenced by these individuals. Each individual is
introduced in full, so as to underscore their relative importance in the story of American Soviet relations
from November 1917 to March of 1918. Kennan states that the policy of non-recognition by the United States
government, forced the government to rely upon armatures who served to complicate relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States. In this manner, Kennan’s book can be seen as a story of diplomatic
confusion, “misunderstanding, intrigue, and malevolent exploitation.” Kennan’s central thesis establishes that
the initial stages of Soviet American relations were dominated by diplomatic confusion. It is from this confusion
that Soviet American relations receive their complexity.
Kennan’s book provided an excellent analysis of Soviet American relations. The only critique of Kennan’s work is
that he places too much focus on individuals and not enough focus on structural constraints.
))
<>Kerenskii,Aleksandr Fdr*|>KrnAF| a{}e{}n{RREV2 VRM}o{Provisional
Government official
}m{
[SAC LOOP]
}r{
RUS On eve of WW1 in Moh.RR|
*1919:LND|_The_Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rebellion
*1927:LND|_The_Catastrophe: Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution
*1934:NYC|_The_Crucifixion of Liberty| ((??noUO))
*1965:NYC|_Russia
and History's Turning Point
re.VRM plt in Moh.RR
}s{
--|>Abraham,Richard.
Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution
G/Katkov,George
}t{}8{}
<>Khabalov,on RREV2 [RRC,3]
<>Kizevetter,Aleksandr Axr*| a{866}e{933}n{}o{
}r{
*1910:MVA|_Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Rossii IX-XIX st.: Istoricheskii ocherk|2nd
ed= PGR:1917| ((gbx.rfm plt.clt lcl.slf.apx cst
fdr|2nd ed=JS6056.K47))
*1912:MVA|_Istoricheskie ocherki| ((OWN ndr lbx|“Iz istorii russkogo liberalizma: Ivan
Petrovich Pnin”:57-87 (lxt lbx mvt,cst pressure,1730; Pnin:pbl structure has no foundation) ))
*1929:PRAGUE|_Na rubezhe dvukh stoletii| ((GRS:187,221! prm vsp? hst.gph RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kliuchevskii,Vasilii
Osip*|>KqvVO|
a{841ja16}b{PNZgbx}e{911my12}n{}o{lbx hstian prf
}k{dxv
}r{
*1910c:L.ENG and 1911-1913:NYC|_A_History of Russia| The great
Kurs
russkoi istorii TBy C. J. Hogarth??| 5vv|
((|>Kliuchevskii,1-??|>Kqv,1-5|DK40.K6|A faulty old translation; volumes 3 and
four available in later, superior translations (EG=see *1969)| gnr))
*1911c:|_Kurs russkoi istorii|v5(1958 ed.):461 deals w/final v.of Kurs, never finished at K’s death|
K pst nabroski to his kurs in order to bring out a final ed| We will never know bcs he died bfr v5 cld be revised| The era of rfm was the final topic treated in his kurs, and the txt under revision at this death concentrated on the institution and econ dimensions of serf emancipation| As a young man, K witnessed the era of rfm in all its complexity,but in his unrevised txt he elected to skim over the broader social hst of the era| In the freer atmosphere of the 1905 REV era, his nabroski sought to rectify this delicate evasion in the unfinished revision of v5| Society, he noted, found it nearly impossible, under pressure of endless sequence of innovations, to sustain a well-considered relationship of support and involvement in state sponsored rfm. Society could not adjust them to its own needs. As the reform came into full and coordinated operation, a complex, instinctive, natural mobilization of social forces arose “which was not based on conscious leadership or direction” and which expressed itself only through “aggregate indicators” [avtomatiqeskix pokazatel’ei]. It could be described statistically, for example, stockmarket and price fluctuations. The appearance, for example, of joint stock companies in aggregate indicated that the center of gravity of national life was shifting. Just as the old basis of wealth evaporated, so also did the social presumptions that underpinned them [the social-service hierarchies]. New enterprises and new professions quickly and unexpectedly transformed the perceived social landscape.
“Human [this word substituted for marked out “social”] relations were coming unraveled and at the same time were reweaving themselves in new combinations. The dense structures of community disintegrated along with the ancient gentry estates. Society quickly changed its membership and profile [phrase marked out: “persons re-measured themselves with a new yardstick, old authorities were replaced by new, less ancient”], new types made their appearance in society and in literature. In this whirlwind of new movements, one’s personality lost its stability. Old foundations of personal and social significance crumbled and were replaced by new. People still continued to feel motivated to act, but had ceased to predict the consequences of their actions.” [This was the last sentence that K completed in his MS revision of the famous Kurs.]
*1969:C.IL|_A_Course
in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century| TBy N. Duddington|_Kurs
russkoi istorii| v3| ((>Kliuchevskii,3|>Kqv,3| DK114.K573| gnr))
| Re.Dmx1 & RREV1,GO GRS:190 etc
))
}s{
}t{
}8{}
<>Knox,General Sir Alfred| a{}
*1921:LND|_With the Russian Army,1914-1917| 2vv| ((D550.K6| mlt WW1 RREV2
RREV3))
<>Kokovtsov,Vladimir
Nxi*| a{}n{}o{Imperial governmental figure
}m{
*1904:1914; Mstt.mny| State Finance Minister
*1911:1914; SoM prx| Council of Ministers President
}r{
|_Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov...|_Iz moego
proshlogo (MVA:1992, NB! 2vv| Earlier PRS:1933) TBy L. Matveev|Stanford:1935| ((vsp stt.srv ekn vsp))
G/Shotwell
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Kolchak,Aleksandr V|_The_Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials| Edited by Elena Varneck and H. H. Fisher. Stanford: 1935
<>Kollontai,Aleksandra M| a{
}r{
*1918: “The Family and the Communist State” [RBV1:79-88]
*1921: “Fight Against Prostitution” [RBV1:96-106]
*1923: “Make Way for the Winged Eros” [RBV1:179-84]
}s{
Clements
Farnsworth
}t{}8{}
<>Korolenko,Vladimir Galaktion| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
}r{
*1972:O.ENG|_The_History of My Contemporary| ((UO))
CF=APL
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia|>KDs|
*1906ja05:11; |_Vtoroi vserossiiskii
s”ezd Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskoi partii 5-11 ianvaria 1906 g|
<>Kostomarov,Nikolai
Ivn*|>KstNI| a{817}n{PBL| prf Pvsp:193 sd Wwa & Kst = new hst.gph sense of nrd; pbl
heard “the voice of a living people” not as passive material in hands of ddd
stt,“no kak faktor,pytavwiisya samostoyatel’no napravlyat’ istoriqeskii process,
po men’wei mere vyrajavwii svoe otnowenie k tem ili drugim ego storonam”}
}r{
*1847:GRM Augsburg|_Knigi bitiia ukrains’kogo naroda| Translated as Kostomarov’s “Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People”|
IBy B. Yanivs’kyi [Volodymyr Mijakovs’kyj]|Mimeographed Series:Research Program on the U.S.S.R.,60|NYC:1954| ((prm UKR KMO))
*1850s:SAR.gbx.vd
*1854:pbd nrd songs (got into trouble w/plc [KstN,Avto:218])
*1857:pbd rpt [?re.StO or Jwx ritual dth-?] Mordovtsev reprted this in Pamiatnaia knizhka SARoi gubernii [KstN,Avto:226 PmK]
*1857:|_Bogdan Khmel’nitskii i vozrashchenie Yuzhnoi Rusi k Rossii| ((UKR hst))
*1858:|_Bunt Sten’ki Razina| ((rvs RS0 UKR))
*1860jy:Svm#7,3:75-92|“O kazachestve: Otvet 'Vilenskomu vestniku'”| ((Attacked idea that kzk anarchy,KstN tried to show that simple dmk idl
motivated kzk| To protect dmk,they shifted back and forth twixt RUS &POL [KstN,Avto:270-1]))
*1860:Klk#61:| ltr-edt Hzn re.UKR
*1861??:Osnova:| “Dve russkoi narodnosti”| ((prm UKR ntn nrd idl=UKR.distinctness;“clxless” “brz-less” nrd| hst= whole nrd|
All my hst work in the reform era has given rise to plm attacks|My idea that in udel system of Rus a fdr principle existed, and that I intended
that to apply to the present day,perhaps to predict future|But I never said anything directly about that|People read things into my pst [he seems
to be saying,in so many words]|Esp. “Dve russ. narodnosti”|People have the habit of reading between the lines,esp. under severe cnp|
Even took me to be in favor of “serparatism”,esp. after POL.rbx|Once that great fear passed,then people could see how two RUS narodnosti
fulfill one another|Still,I hve been acz- of “UKRainofil’stvo” [KstN,Avto:272-4]))
*1861??:Osnova:| “O federativnom nachale drevnei Rusi”| ((prm ntn fdr hst plt stt idl))
*1909:YSL:117-139| “Peterburgskii universitet nachala 1860-kh godov”| ((prm SPB.unv|xrx))
*1922:MVA|_Avtobiografiia...| ((HOT UIL;noNYP|8x11 xrp:210-226 “5. Zhizn’ v Saratove”| prm slf.bxo vsp))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kovalevskii,Maksim M|>KvyMM| a{}n{vlg.o
Mrx | lbx tUt dmk trx idl | FREV}o{prf
}r{
*1879:|_Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie [Communal Landownership]| ((hd715.k66| 231p|
Translated excerpts in >Krader,
The Asiatic Mode:343-412))
*1895:MVA|_Proiskhozhdenie sovremennoi demokratii | 2v|
v1: “Obshchestvennyi i politicheskii stroi Frantsii nakanune revoliutsii”| 3d edition| SPB:1912|
v2: “Narodnaia monarkhiia: razbor sotsial’nogo i politicheskogo zakonodatel’stva konstituanty”|
(( v1:hst of pbl/plt background to FREV| v2:course of FREV, shifting to tUt crystalizations of pbl/ekn changes))
*1902|_Russian political institutions; the growth and development
of these institutions from the beginnings of Russian history to the present time
*1906:SPB|_Politicheskaia programma novogo Soiuza narodnogo blagodenstviia | ((prm grp/Partiia.dmk.rfm plt.pty RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Kropotkin,Petr| a{842no27}e{921fe28}n{gte anx}o{anarchist
theorist| LOOP
}p{
*1874:Arrested & imprisoned for participation in populist movement
*1876:Escaped into west European emigration
*1917:Returned to Russia in the midst of great revolutionary changes
}r{
*1862:1867; Siberian diary [RGIA f.1410, op.1, d.84]
*1882:Fortnightly Review#37 or #38:| “The Russian revolutionary party”| ((893:rvs.bbl| AP4.F6))
*1899:Boston-LND|_The_Memoirs of a Revolutionist| ((
[ID] 1971:Dover pb ed., w/notes by Nicolas Walter:503-40 and w/original index))
--|_Mutual aid [Hollister,Landmarks,2:301-303]
*1918je16:Svoboda Rossii#48:| “??,re. Linev,LA”
*1995|_Selections| EBy Marshall Shatz
*--JANUS HOLDINGS
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Krupskaia,Nadezhda K|
*1917oc26: Leninist party [Senn,Readings,2]
*1922: “What a Communist Ought to Be Like” [RBV1:38-41]
--|Reminiscences of Lenin
<>Kurbskii,Andrei and Ivan IV. The correspondence| DK106.A25
<>Lane,David Stuart,ed| a{}
*1978: & 1971|_Politics and Society in the USSR| ((jn65...|
sbr.prm plt.clt))
<>Lange,Ch. L|
|_Russia, the Revolution and the War...|:| ((947.084 L26 prm trv WW1 RREV))
<>Lavrov,Peter L|>LvrPL| a{}o{prf
}r{
--|_Historical Letters| TIEBy James P. Scanlan|
--| In Edie
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Lenin,Vladimir Il'ich|>Ulianov,VI|>LnnVI| a{
}p{
SAC 18-hop LOOP
}r{
|_The_Development of Capitalism in Russia
|_Persecutors of the Zemstvo|
*1902|_What’s to be Done?
*1905| “Ein Vortrag ueber die Revolutionsbewegung in Jahre 1905”|In Leninskii sbornik#5:46| ((crt of Wbr))
*1905|_Lecture on the 1905 Revolution|
*1916|_State and Revolution
*1916|_Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism
--| In Moh.RR
*1921| “Better Fewer, But Better”
*1960:1978; MVA & LND|_Collected Works| 46 vols| ((prm Mrx Lnn idl))
*1975:NYC|_The_Lenin Anthology| Edited by Robert C. Tucker
|_Reference Index to Collected Works of V. I. Lenin. Parts one and two. bbt.rqt 86.02
|_Selected Works
|_Complete Collected Works | :| ((bbt.rqt 86.02| prm))
}s{
re.chd.Lnn = Pipes.RR | Theen |
Vol'skii
Lenin cited by GRS:58 (9:129);59
(10:252);191 (ll:182);222 (12:27)
}t{}8{}
<>Leont'ev,Konstantin| a{831}e{891}n{}o{phl
}p{
}r{
KNIGHT
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Leontovich,Viktor V|>Leontowitch,Victor| a{
}r{
*1957:Frankfurt am Main|_Geschichte des liberalismus in Russland| ((lbx stt.srv| p418:apologizes for Wbr’s
wrd.hst “Pseudokonstitutional” [sic],explaining that the great scholar fell under the [temporary] influence of KD acquaintances))
*1980:|_Istoriia liberalizma v Rossii, 1762-1914| ((Translated
from the 1957 GRM ed| Later RUS ed=OWN))
*1995:MVA, Russkii put’|_Istoriia liberalizma v Rossii| Series: Issledovaniia noveishei russkoi istorii,1|EBy A. I. Solzhenitsyn|
((OWN NOndx| Dmx4;txt [762] A-2 era [135-163] concentrates on qin lbx,stt.srv lbx & isolates attention to issues of srf.rfm & lwx.rfm|
Brief attention to gnr atmosphere of 60s,& to Ktk & Qqn BUT not Blg Egt Lvr Drj PavP Pnt KstN etc;NO LTF WXM VSH etc|
Accepts Kulczycki’s “spiritual atmosphere” analysis of 60s,seeing only
replacement of Hglan abstractions by Vogt & Moleschott “vulgar
materialism”,equally abstract [138] Intro sets down strict definition| Divides
rdx~ frm lbx| Combo cannot be| lbx anti=rvs| L follows Hauriou,“Principles de
droit public”(PRS:1916) & Dec.Rights of Man and of Cit| Principle idl of lbx is
pzn freedom [pzn.rgt] Principle method is not construction but disassemblement
[Abschaffen] Historically lbx predates evolution of classical
plc.stt~,centralized gvt~ of 18th.c,but was called into being in mod.times to
combat centralized stt| lbx strives to reduce gvt control & tUt~ to minimum
(therein is major distinction frm anarchism) lbx recognizes need to humanize nkz
-- minimum stt does this| lbx.stt based on “répartition de la souveraineté” [fdr
of stt.ndp] Power distributed throughout pbl, creating free pzn~ w/in free stt|
plt.freedom is extension of public freedom [cvc.rgt], but fundamental difference =
Civil freedom can be guaranteed by a centralized stt [235] L pits
Granovskii v.Hzn| lbx~ are Qqn,early Kst etc [I suppose even Vlv Zmv plan L-M
cst pln| Too bad this tlng appeared just when RUS needed a little authentic,
old-fashioned lbxism]))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Leroy-Beaulieu,Anatole|
a{}e{}n{}o{pundit jrn.svt media
}f{}g{brt also pundit & svt
}m{
*1881:elx prf École Libre des Sciences Politiques
*1887:elx mmb Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques
*1906:dtr of Ecole after Albert Sorel dth
}r{
*1882:1889; series of rtl in RdDM which fed into editions of L’Empire
*1881:PRS, Hachette|_L’Empire des tsars et les Russes|
3vv| Reprint=*1988, Lausanne, L’Age d’homme (3rd ed?)| ((DK32.L6| Intended for the gnr pbl [893:rvs bbl| trv krx tUt stt|
plt.vlg.o:“La commune est [...],en dehors de l’autocratie,la seule institution indegène,la seule tradition vivante du peuple russe” 2:2| But
at end of v1 he savaged ekn.vlg.o))
--|_The_Empire of the Tsars and the Russians| 3vv| ((RUS3 USA2.gnr w/brt blw))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Lockhart,Robert Hamilton Bruce| a{
}r{
*1915:1938; |Diaries v1
*1933|_British Agent
*1967|_Two Revolutions
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Loris-Melikov,Mikhail Tarielovich| a{
}r{
*1881ja28:mmo to A-2 [Raeff2:133-40] (( prm cst plt.clt| See 25:KrA#8 for A-3 & Loris, plus 1881mr08:SoM mtg in Perets dnv [full
& corrected re-prt of 1906:Byloe version]))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Lotman,Yurii Mxl*|
a{922}b{}c{}d[}e{993}n{}o{
[ID] blt.svt clt.trx "Semiotics"
}f{
}g{
}m{
}r{
ENG.lng.bbl
*1985:|_Semiotics of Russian
Cultural History| IBy Gasparov,Boris| ((Anthology of rtl~ w/ Ginsburg,LidiiaYa Uspenskii,BorisA))
}s{
*2006:Lotman and Cultural
Studies
}t{}8{}
<>Lunacharskii,Anatolii V| a{
}r{
*1918:1927; on edc in RBV: 285ff
*1923|_Revolutionary
Silhouettes
}s{
>FitzPatrick
>O'Connor,Timothy E. The Politics of Soviet Culture: Anatolii Lunacharskii. UMI Research,1983
}t{}8{}
<>Luxemburg,Rosa|
a{
}r
*1905:SPB|_Staraia i novaia revoliutsiia [The Old and the New
Revolution] ((|>LS&N|))
--|_The_Mass Strike| LND: Bookmarks,1986
*1906se25(NS):GRM Manheim| speech re.RREV1, RUS tlng=Rech' proiznesennaia na narodnom sobranii v Mangeime 25 sentiabria 1906 g. (SPB:?)|
((8pp| G/PREV:183-6 rvw))
--|_Reform or Revolution| With an appendix (63-75),Eduard
Bernstein, “Evolutionary Socialism: Ultimate Aim and Tendency.” NYC:Pathfinder,1973| ((rfm.rvs))
--|_Lenin and Marxism|| ((see just below))
--|_The_Russian Revolution and Leninism or Marxism| A.MI:1961|
((G/PREV:179-82| pbd here in reverse order of original composition & pbc))
--|_Gesammelte Werke 5vv
--|_Gesammelte Briefe
--|_The_Letters of Rosa Luxemburg|Boulder CO: Westview,1978|
--|_Politische Schriften|3vv|Frankfurt,1966-1968
--|_Selected Political Writings....|NYC:Monthly Review,1971.
}s{
}t{
}8{}
<>Maiakovskii,Vladimir,various
<>Maklakov,Vasilii
A|>MklVA| a{}n{RREV1}o{1905 activist and
KD party leader
}p{
Maklakov LOOP
}r{
*1923de:SEER#??| “The Peasant Question and the Russian Revolution”| ((prm krx RREV3))
*1936:PRS|_Vlast' i obshchestvennost' na zakate staroi Rossii|2 (or more??) volumes| ((GRS:53,187 prm vsp RREV1 stt.dmx lbx))
*1950:RRe1| “The Agrarian Problem in Russia before the Revolution”| ((krx Stp))
--|_The_First State Duma: Contemporary Reminiscences| ((stt.dmx1 RREV1 vsp plt))
*2006:MVA|_Vtoraia gosudarstvennaia Duma. 20 fev-2 iiunia 1907 g| ((UO))
--| on skz bfr WW1 [Moh.RR]
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Manakin,V| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1917su:WW1 mlt shock battalions in Moh.RR|
}s{
}t{BSE3 DS&D ZDV,4 MSP
}8{}
<>Mandelstam,Nadezhda| a{}n{clt blt dsn}o{
}r{
*1970:NYC|_Hope Against Hope: A Memoir|
etc
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Marx,Karl| a{
}p{
LOOP
}r{
*1853:1856; |_The_Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War
--|_Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and the Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston|
((A translation of | Die Geschichte der Geheimdiplomatie des 18. Jahrhunderts: Über den asiatischen Ursprung der russischen Despotie....
(See 1977:Berlin edition) ))
*1859:Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [TXT
of Marx's brilliant summarization of his
historical/materialist doctrine]
*1878fa:Marx's letter to editor of the Russian journal Otechestvennye zapiski|
Translated in SLM
*1881| “Briefwechsel zwischen Vera Zasulich und Marx”| Marx-Engels Archiv 1: 309-342| Translated in
SLM
*1882ja:Marx and Engels preface to 2nd Russian edition of the Communist
Manifesto| Translated in SLM
*1948:ArxME#11, series 2| “Konspekty i vypiski K. Marksa iz russkikh knig”|
((Contents = “Konspekt raboty N. G.
Chernyshevskogo 'Pis'ma bez adresa'” (3-17) | “K voprosu ob otmene krepostnogo prava v Rossii” (18-20; also frm
Qrn) | Koshelev, Samarin & Dmitriev, Kavelin (“Chem nam byt'?”) | Skaldin |Yanson
| Engel'gardt,“Voprosy russkogo
sel'skogo khozaistva” | Issue also contains “'Pis'ma bez adresa' N. G.
Chernyshevskogo s pometkami Marksa” (172-99). See SLM; see also Kimball resume
*1962:NYC|_Marx vs. Russia| Edited by J. A. Doerig| ((noUO))
--|_The_Unknown Karl Marx
>Marx,Karl, and Friedrich Engels|
*1953:LND|_The_Russian Menace to Europe: A Collection of Articles,Speeches,Letters and News Dispatches| Edited by Paul Blackstock
and B. F. Hoselitz| ((noUO))
*1972:Munich|_Die russische Kommune: Kritik eines Mythos| Edited by M. Rubel
>Marxism-Leninism,Institute of,Moscow|
--|_The_General
Council of the First International,1864-66
[1866-1868;1868-1870;1870-1871;etc.]
--|_The_Hague Congress of the First International, September 2-7,1872|
*1967:MVA|_K. Marks,F. Engel's i revoliutsionnaia Rossiia. Edited by A. K. Vorob'eva
}s{
Boris Nikolaevskii on Karl Marx's Russian-language library [TXT]
Marx's interpretation of Russian society
and politics = Shanin and Wada and Wittfogel chs. 9 and 10
On the "Asiatic Mode of Production", G/Kovalevskii
G/Krader
}t{}8{}
<>Marye,G. T|_Nearing the End in Emperial Russia. 947.08 M369
<>Matlaw,R. E.,ed. Belinsky,Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov: Selected Criticism. NYC: 1962 [reprint,Bloomington IN: 1976]. PG3011.M33
<>McCauley,Martin,ed|
a{}n{}o{}
--|_Octobrists to Bolsheviks: Imperial Russian 1905-1917|>McC1|
--|_Russian Revolution and the Soviet State,1917-1921: Documents|>McC2|
<>Medvedev,Roy A| a{}n{STL| RREV3}o{hst dsn
}r{
--|_All Stalin's Men| Anchor pb. Hamilton bks| ((prm dsn))
--|Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. NY: 1971
--|Essay in Tucker,Stalinism
--|The October Revolution
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Medvedev,Zhores
A| a{}n{scs plt.clt}o{
}r{
*1969:NYC,CUP|_The_Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko|
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Mel'gunov,Sergei Ptr*| a{879}b{}c{}d{}e{956}n{vs.SSR
gte}o{jrn
pbc plt.ddd
}p{
KDs
Narodnye sotsialisty
}r{
*1924|_Red
Terror in Russia
*1953|_The_Bolshevik Seizure of Power
}s{
[W] [Russian
W]
}t{}8{}
<>Mendeleev,Dmitrii| ((prm clt scs))
<>Merezhkovskii,Dmitrii| a{}
--|RB-C| “Revolution and Religion”
<>Miakotin,Venedikt|
a{1867}e{1937
}p{A member of the Union of Unions in 1905 Rev., and later National Socialists. Left Russia in 1918
}r{
*1924mr:Slavonic Review#2,6:465-86| “Lenin (1870-1924)”| ((obituary. Lenin “was the incarnation of certain characteristic
features of Russian life; a typical outcome of the distorted development of the
public life of Russia in the times of tsarism, when the Government drove it into
the underground of revolution”. Lenin lived his whole life “remote from the
broad life of the people and its complex, mutually interconnected needs,
interests and problems”. [IE:Lenin “incarnated” “certain characteristic
features”, “the distorted development of the public life of Russia in the times
of tsarism”, namely the absence of what has to be described as “a civil society”
}s{
APL
}t{}8{}
<>Military-Revolutionary Committee|>Voenno-revoliutsionnyi
Komitet|>MRC| a{917}n{RREV3}o{mlt.rvs.cmm sld}
*1964-1967:MVA-LGR|_Petrogradskii Voenno-revoliutsionnyi Komitet: dokumenty i materialy|
3vv|
<>Miliukov,Pavel Nxi*|>MlkPN| a{}n{prf
RREV1 RREV2 Gwrx | KDs, Dmx, VRM, gte| ntg}o{Historian and leading Russian lbx politician, 1905-1920
}m{
*1905:1920;
}p{
Miliukov LOOP
}r{
*1903?|_Iz istorii russkoi intelligentsii: Sbornik statei i etiudov|
Reprint of ed#2 (Gulf Breeze FL:1970?)| (())
*1904:C.IL|_Russia and Its Crisis
| Concentrate on chapters 5, 7 &8 | Summary of chapter four| ((|>MR&C))
*1915se:Progressive Bloc program [DIR]
*1917:C.ENG, CUP|_Russian Realities and Problems|>Mlk.R&P| Co-authors = Miliukov,Paul | Struve,Petr | Lappo-Danilevskii,A | Dmowski,Roman | and Williams,Harold| Edited by J.D. Duff
STUDENT REVIEW =
[This] is a collection of 6 essays written by various professors and specialists in the fields of Russian
political, foreign and social policy. The book is compiled and edited by J.D. Duff into a comprehensive look
at pre-revolutionary Russia and the various problems it was faced with. A few of the authors are ex-patriots
of the Russian system leading to some natural biases toward the subject matter while one author
is British (Harold William), who wrote with a more objective tone.
Part 1 was written by Paul Miliukov, a former professor at Sofia University,
Miliukov was a prominent
member of the Russia Duma from its creation in 1905. He was the leader of the Constitutional Democrat
party and it is claimed by the editor that no man knows more about Russian legislative politics had
Paul Miliukov. Part 1 talks about World War I from an interesting perspective,
Miliukov believes that World War I was primarily a war of England versus Germany, and Russia versus Austria Hungary. The
dangers of imperialism come to a head in the struggle of the major European powers. Germany feels they
are being suffocated by British commercial and naval might, while Russia wants greater influence
over the Slavic peoples in the Balkans.
Part 2 also written by Miliukov, discussed the tsar’s corrupt influence on the workings of
the Russian Duma established after the 1905 revolution. The 1905 Russian constitution brought
a small taste of democracy to Russia by allowing political parties and giving some people the
right to vote. This democracy, however, was largely a farce as the tsar constantly undermined
the Russian Duma. Abusing his power the Czar severely limited the voting power of the peasants
and urban workers, while expanded the rights of the rich and landed gentry. The
tsar also
exempted his own personal finances from Duma control, despite his personal finances being
directly tied to the state treasury.
In part 3 Peter Struve, covers the history of Russian economics leading up to the war. Struve
discusses Russia historical position as a link between the Western and Eastern worlds. He
attempts to identify the difficult moments when it can said that Russia entered the world
of European economics, as opposed to the relative isolation if lived under before the reforms
of Peter the Great. The founding of St Petersburg, he argues was a key moment as it was a
window to the West.
Roman Dmowski, in part 4 discussed Russia’s tenuous relationship with Poland throughout
the century. World War I calls in question the Polish identity and the existence of
a Polish nation. The essay deals with the issues that empires with Polish lands faced
in dealing with Polish people. Dmowski also goes further back into history to
discuss Poland’s unfortunate position of constantly being wedged between great Empires, such
as the Holy Roman Empire or the Byzantine Empire. Due to Poland’s geographic position Poland
has always had to absorb culture and ideas that where alien to the nation. The essay also
deals with the differing lifestyles of people living under different occupying nations and
empires throughout history.
[EUA=]
In part 5, Harold Williams discusses the multi-ethnic nature of the Russian Empire. He
argues that some people knew that under the Russian empire there exists a large Finnish,
Polish, Armenian, and Jewish population. Russia is not the mono-ethnic homogenous state
that many believed it to be, with over 100 different languages being spoken throughout
the Russian Empire. During the 18th century Russia moved to a heavy development of
Western culture, largely drowning out some of the smaller Eurasia cultures present in
Russia at the time.
The final part is about scientific development in Russia. Lappo-Danilevsky, the author
of the chapter discusses the historical influences on Russian learning throughout
history. The influences on Russian learning range from the Greek civilization to
monotheism. A gradual rise of secular thought and trade with the West was responsible
for a great deal of Russian education and learning.
Russian realities and problems is a rather old book that may be outdated by much more
recent research. The book does present an interesting style of primary source narratives
of people who where very much involved in the history directly. The first two chapters
in the book written by Paul Miliukov prove to be the strongest and most useful for
historical research and understanding due to Miliukov’s position in the Russian Duma
during it’s founding.
*1921:1924; Sofia|_Istoriia vtoroi revoliutsii| Translated by T. and R. Stites, et al. as = The Russian Revolution| 3vv|>Mlk.RR| Excerpted in Moh.RR|
STUDENT REVIEW =
The book begins with a good, though brief, introduction to the author, Paul
Miliukov, giving the reader an idea of the perspective from which he is
writing. This early section contains what I see as one of the most important
lines of the book "Miliukov's attempt to maintain the distinction between
historian and memoirist does not come off." (page xx) As a reader it is very
important to keep in mind that Miliukov's writing has been called "False
from beginning to end" (Trotsky). Almost all
historians acknowledge that he at least omits details which might prove
critical of him or his pro-Romanov, or rather pro-strong government beliefs.
This is the first volume in a three part series dealing with the 1917
revolution and the events which followed. This installment focuses on the
events which took place in 1917 with a pair of chapters on the important
events leading up to 1917, one covering the 1700's until 1905 and another
from 1905 and 1907.
One topic which is covered in depth throughout this book is the Duma.
Miliukov being an influential political leader witnessed the inner workings
of the Russian legislative body and gives some interesting insights as to
the body's operations (the Duma's reaction to the appointment of Protopopov,
pgs. 18-20, the failed attempt to dissolve the Duma, pg. 169).
Another topic discussed in some detail is the role of the military in
the 1917 revolution [mlt]. Beginning with the uprisings in Tauride Palace mutinies
on Feburary 26 th (pg. 26) and continuing with the problems of
morale amongst the men fighting at the front after the overthrow of the old
government. (pgs. 97-108)
There are also many descriptions of the role of the soldiers in the
Bolshevik revolution which starts on about page 175 and goes throughout the
rest of the book.
One of the main actors of this period that Miliukov mentions at length is
I.G. Tsereteli, a onetime Duma deputy from Georgia. He goes so far as to
quote one as saying, "As a whole, the history of the Committee in terms of
its organization and membership should be divided into two periods: before
and after the arrival of Tsereteli " (pg. 52).
Since there are two members in our group who are focusing their researching
on the Okhrana I should note that there are only two references to the group
in this book, both of which are brief. On Page 24 there is a mention of how
the major proponent of a plan to march on the same day as the Duma reopened
was in fact an Okhrana agent provocateur. On page 26 there is a mention that
one of the first acts of the mutinying soldiers mentioned above was to burn
the Okhrana headquarters at Tverskaia Street (pg. 26).
))
*1926:SEER#5:?| “The Influence of English Political Thought in Russia”| ((lbx plt.idl mnt))
*1935:PRS|Sovremennaia zapiski#57:??| “Liberalizm, radikalizm i revoliutsiia: Po povodu kritiki V. A. Maklakova”|
((GRS:54 prm plm w/Maklakov RREV1 lbx rdx plt.trx))
*1942:Ph.PA|_Outlines of Russian Culture| v1= “Religion and the Church in Russia”|
v2= “Literature in Russia”| v3= “Architecture, Painting, and Music in Russia”| ((gnr clt chx rlg avc blt xdj rkt mzk RUS2))
*1955:NYC|_Vospominaniia| Abridged translation EBy Arthur Mendel|_Political
Memoirs,1905-1917| ((prm vsp KDs RREV lbx RUS2))
*1974:1975; Gulf Breeze FL, Academic Internatinal|_Outlines of Russian Culture|
v3,pt1 = _Origins of Ideology| v3,p2 = _Ideologies in Conflict| TEby Joseph L. Wieczynski| IBy Joseph T. Fuhrmann,“The Two worlds of Paul
Miliukov”| ((trx RUS1 re.ToT zpd StO Raskol Krizhanich | pbl sSs/ToR clx| pt2 ch.2= “Lack of Opposition to the P.1 rfm~”:12-20| ch. 7=“Social
Opposition”| ch. 11=“Society and the Table of Ranks” 91-96))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Mirsky,Prince D.S|>Sviatopolk-Mirskii,Dmitrii
Petrovich.| a{890au22}e{939je06}n{}o{
ID
}f{G/ftr
}p{
~~EUA
}r{
--|Contemporary Russ Literature. PG2951.M52
--|History of Russian Literature. 891.709 M679h
--|Russia: A Social History
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Mohrenschildt,Dmitri,ed|>Moh.RR| a{}
*1971:NYC|_The_Russian Revolution of 1917: Contemporary Accounts| ((noUO
sbr.prm vsp WW1 RREV2))
<>Mossolov,A. A|_At the Court of the Last Tsar (1900-1916). London: 1935
<>Nabokov,Vladimir Dmt*|
a{869}b{}c{}d{}e{922}n{}o{
}r{
--|_Provisional Government,
1917 [being a translation of “Vremennoe pravitel'stvo”
in 1922:BRL|ARR,1:9-96]
--|_V. D. Nabokov and the Russian Provisional Government,1917
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Nevison,Henry
Woodd| a{
}r{
*1906:|_Dawn
in Russia: Or scenes in the Russian Revolution|Second edition
[1906]|Reprint series:Russia Observed| NYC:Arno P,1971| ((DK263.N45| prm vsp
trv lxt flm mxp RREV1|jrnist for Daily Chronicle))
--|In Page.RR
}s{}t{}8{}
<
>Nicholas II GO/Russia| Emperor Nicholas
<>Nol'de,Boris Emmanuilovich|
a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
}r{
--|_Russia in the
Economic War| ((WW1 MIC ekn| G/Shotwell,J))
}2{}t{}8{}
<>Novikov,Nikolai|
Editorial in 1st issue of his Masonic journal\Utrennii svet\[Morning Light] and an essay on education [Raeff3:62-86]
More = [BL&T:59, 117f]
<>Nol'de,E. Yu|
| re.cst in RUS; hst basis for different path, etc GO GRS:115-16
| GO SoM
<>Novgorodtsev,Pavel| a{}
--|RB-C| “The Essence of the Russian Orthodox Conscience”
<>Novikov,Nikolai,*1946:USSR ambassador to USA. GO Kennan, Origins | ((prm CWX))
<>October Storm and After: Stories and Reminiscences| ((sbr.prm vsp RREV3))
<>Ogarev,Nikolai|
a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{rvs gte
}p{
*1856:+; Close associate of Hzn in west European political
emigration [ID]
}r{
*1861jy01:Proclamation "Chto nuzhno narodu?" [What do the people need?] ((Compare
w/1905 era peasant demands))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Okhrana| Russian Imperial Department of Police| a{}b{}n{}o{tUt plc
}s{
The Okhrana--the Russian Department of Police; a bibliography, edited by Edward Ellis Smith
G/Fischer,Ben
*1930:Philadelphia|>Vasil'ev,Aleksei T. [Vassilyev here] _The Okhrana: The Russian Secret Police. Edited,with an introduction,by
Rene Fülöp-Miller
*1932:MVA|>Men'shchikov,A. P|_Okhrana i revoliutsiia| ((GRS:52,117 plt.plc RREV1))
}t{}8{}
<>Okudzhava,Bulat
<>Owen,Lancelot A| a{}
*1937:L.ENG||_The_Russian Peasant Movement, 1906-1917| ((NoUO| krx RREV2))
| in Adams.RR:
<>Page,Thomas,
ed| a{}
*1965:N.NY|_Russia in Revolution: Selected Readings in Russian Domestic History
since 1855| ((>Page.RR| NoUO; OWN sbr.prm|
*1861:krx.rfm in NVG gbx|
*1880:corporal punishment in mlt|
*1881:dlo.Bgq ppx trr|
*1898: Isaev on vqt,ekn,krx|
*1902:plc rpt on prp among krx QER gbx|
*1904:Ganz's observations trv|
*1905:Ermolov disc. w/ N-2 re. Gapon|
*1905:plc rpt re.krx in TVR gbx|
*1905no:plc rpt on Wtt & krx.rbx; other plc rpt,KZN|
*1905:mlt.nvy & RREV1|
Nevison on RREV1|
Khrustalev-Nosar on soviet|
*1910:gzt rpt on rxn,Black Hundres|
Pollock trv account|
Lobanov-Rostovsky vsp|
Chernova,Olga vsp of krx.rbx|
Kossak-Szucka,Sophia vsp|
Farson vsp on mfg|
SDb jrn on prl|
Trt on Red Army mlt in Gwrx|
Gordon,A Gwrx|
Mrs. Stan Hardin in SSr jld|
re.Reed 921:prl.rbx,prc|
Bechhofer,C trv Gwrx,krx hunger|
Strong,Anna vsp,Gwrx|
Duranty,I Write As I please etc|
Reswick,I Dreamt Rev|
White,W These Russians|
Kravchenko,Choose Fr|
Burg,D HRM,dissent
))
<>Paléologue,G. Maurice|
a{}n{}o{ [ID]
}m{
*1914:1917; French Ambassador to Russia
}r{
*1925:NYC|_An Ambassador's
Memoirs| 3vv|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Panin,Nikita|
*1762de28:memo, etc. [Raeff2:54-68]
<>Pares,Bernard|
a{
}r{
*1907:LND-NYC|_Russia and Reform| Reprinted as Russia Between Reform
and Revolution| ((|>PR&R| trv RREV1 Dmx noWbr))
*1915:LND|_Day by Day in the Russian Army,1914-1915| ((940.918 P216| mlt))
*1939:LND|_The_Fall of the Russian Monarchy: A Study of the Evidence|
(( RREV2 stt
STUDENT REVIEW =
Just before the end of WWI, Nicholas II abdicated his throne due to problems that arose during his rule, which was ordered by the government
itself. The problems were not few and it resulted in lies and secrets from the government. Bernard Pares writes about the problems in “The Fall
of the Russian Monarchy”. He gives a basic background of these troubles. One, which happened as part of Sturmer’s Mystery Cabinet, was “to
assign five million rubles from the military fund to the Premier for the purposes which were to be disclosed” (318).
At the end of the Russian/Japanese war, there was a question of who was going to be the Emperor. This issue would show that the
government had problems because there was no general election for the public to elect a new leader. Pares writes how Sergei Witte
wanted to be Emperor and told Nicholas that he would kill himself if he were not leader. The Russian/Japanese war in itself had problems
as Pares explains because Nicholas did not calculate the costs of waging a war.
Another government plot was what to do with Poland, which was in the hands of the Romanov Empire. The government devised a plan, which
basically stated that the government of Russia was to be the ruling government. Nicholas personally signed off on this. Nicholas had always
wanted government affairs to be kept from the public and Pares writes from letters written by Nicholas that Nicholas was not happy with
the publicity of Witte by saying, “I do not quite like his way of getting into touch with various extremists, especially as all these
talks appear in the press the next day” (90).
These readings help to define Russian Political Culture because they are giving insight into the realities of this time period. The
government was corrupt and the leaders knew this was going on. It also shows how the people were willing to uprise against the government
as shown during the 1905 revolution and how a complete government can be overthrown if a leader is not liked as in the February
Revolution. Pares writes how Nicholas was not really ruling when he was away which created arguments within parliament with no central person
acting in charge. This was after Russia went into World War I even though the public opinion was very low. Even among his wife, Alexandra, the
opinion of Nicholas was low. Pares writes that Nicholas and Alexandra were separated due to their different sides and opinions.
The insights presented by Pares are that the Fall of the Regime was inevitable based on the actions or lack thereof on the part of the
government in Russia. There was no government order taking place and the extreme secrecy within the government and encouraged by Nicholas II was
no secret from the public. Certain events such as the absence of Nicholas from government affairs and decisions led to his forced abdication
and betrayal from people who he saw as the most trusted such as his wife Alexandra. Pares uses personal accounts through quotes from people
living through these events to add to his opinion. Pares writes how Nicholas believed he was the “sole protector” but in reality people did
not trust him.
Pares believes the most important time during the fall of the Romanov Empire was the three months right before the forced abdication of
Nicholas. The abdication was inevitable because the leaders within the government had hit their breaking point in dealing with Nicholas. Pares
believes there were three tasks that Nicholas failed to do which were to “restore the administration of the country, give it a new shape as
would represent the colossal change which had taken place, and to keep Russia in the war” (477) Nicholas could not fulfill these especially
since he had deserted the government and country to fight in World War I himself. Therefore, the collapse of the old regime was going to happen
with or without Nicholas in power but Russia was not prepared to have someone else take over when they forced Nicholas to leave.
STUDENT REVIEW =
This book covers the years of
the reign of Nicholas II of Russia. It gives a brief background of the years and events before his
reign. His father is described
as a firm autocrat with a powerful personality, coupled with a strong will. When
Nicholas's father came to power, he regulated the various
reforms that had been put in place by the previous administration. These
regulations so limited the reforms as to render them, in all
practical sense null and void.
The author, Bernard Pares, takes great care throughout the book to show that
the prospect of revolution was always regarded by the monarchy as a
continuous threat. The
Revolution did not spring up out of nowhere, newly born as a fresh idea in
the peoples' mind. It was always
there, just simmering underneath the surface, with the lid of an archaic
class organization holding any liberal tendencies firmly in check. The
class structure was based on an economy and infrastructure that
had not truly entered into the 20th century. Russia
was used to just ‘muddling through,' a phrase or a similar
variation of it that is found throughout the book, but that speaks volumes
about the way things were handled.
Nicholas II is faced with disruption and a possible major crises, which he
averts by creating the Duma. The Duma
is an organization that is supposed to be elected by the people to represent
them as a governmental body, although the Emperor still has the last and
final say. Disagreements arise and
eventually the Duma is disbanded, and the members are prevented from running
in future elections by Nicholas. The
voting franchise is henceforth limited so that the Duma no longer is a true
representative of the population, but it continues to question Nicholas and
provide him with headaches and opposition. Nicholas runs his government in a seemingly haphazard fashion,
nominating rivals, reactionaries, liberals, and personal enemies to
different posts in government. This
makes it so that petty squabbles for power, cutthroat and dirty politics
become the way the government was run. The
good and honest governmental officers were the exception, not the
rule, and Nicholas was severely lacking in judging the character of men. This
is extremely unfortunate, since the road to power and
appointments was through him, and it was not based upon a merit system but
simply through currying his personal favor. Rasputin
is a perfect example of this, and the author goes into much
detail in how Rasputin effectively helped ruin Russia and its
administration. He especially goes
into detail on the relationship between Rasputin and the Empress. The
author gives the impression that he feels that the Emperor was
controlled by his wife in certain respects, to the detriment of the country. Eventually
the situation completely crumbles around the monarch,
hastened by Nicholas' decision to take command of the army, and the many bad
appointments that he made. The men he
picked did not do their jobs, and the population started to have a defeatist
attitude. The main issue was that of
food. It was not necessarily the lack
of food supplies, but rather the lack of infrastructure and organization
that was necessary to transfer the food were it was needed. The
people eventually rioted, military regiments mutinied, and chaos
was moving forward. The revolution
had began. Nicholas II, faced with
all this, abdicated the throne. He
had truly believed God had appointed him to be the autocrat of Russia, so
this was the most drastic move he could make. The idea of giving up the throne would never have occurred to him
when he first took power. The world had changed, but Russia had failed to change along with it.
))
*1931:LND|_My Russian Memoirs| ((SUMMIT))
*1948:LND|_Wandering Student|
}s{
}t{
}8{}
<>Pasternak,Boris L| a{}n{xdj.clt Gwrx}o{pst
stx
}r{
--|Doctor Zhivago
--|Memoirs
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Pavlov,Platon V|>PavPV| a{}o{prf
}r{
*1850:SPB|Brilliant defense of PhD bfr GrnTN Slv etc|_Ob istoricheskom znachenii tsarstvovaniia Borisa Godunova|
*1858ja:EkU#1:19-21; #2:36-9| “Pis’ma iz-za granitsy: Mysl’ o vseobshchem muzee”| ((E.Pav:249| rsp vst edc, creation in lcl
grd~ “populyarnyi, obwwenarodnyi universitet” on foundation of encyclopedic
vst~, lct, blt.vqr, rdg, etc, “obwwee obrazovanie”| NB! cld be developed on bzn
basis, as stk.cmp [E.Pav:232] More in 58ap:OtZ#4))
*1858ap:OtZ#4
*1859ja:mr; OtZ#1 & #3| “?”| ((E.Pav:226 sd cnp
wld not allow full pbc of these idl= vqe & oxo are “korennye stixiia russkogo
grajdanskogo obwwestva” cvc.pbl| they did provide “nekotorye garantii kak protiv
qrezmernogo usileniya centralizacii [stt], tak i protiv rezkogo vozvyweniya
odnogo svobodnoe sosloviya [sSs] na sqet drugogo| RUS capable of sustaining its
traditional plt.clt “obwwenarodnost’ i sovewwatel’nost’” [ntn dmk] Had sense of
conflict in this non-idealized tUt structure. There have been not onloy boyars,
slujilye lyudi, dxv, but also oxo “ne byli soverwenno bezglasny kak v
politiqeskom, tak i obwwestvennom otnoweniyax”. Conclusion = “Rus’ XI, XII i
XIII stoletii byla nevejestvenna, sueverna, opozorena yazvoyu xolopstva, no
vmeste s tem obladala samostoyatel’nost’yu oblastnoyu, slujiloyu, cerkovnoyu,
obwwinnoyu. Pri drugix obstoyatel’stvax ona mogla by vyrabotat’ iz sebya i
drugie formy jizni, vyswie gosudarstvennye i obwwestvennye uqrejdeniya”))
*1860ja:fe; OtZ#1-2|“O zemskikh soborakh XVI i
XVII stoletii”| ((SLF idl different, no idealization of zmisbo))
*1862:SPB|_Mesiatseslova
na 1862 god| Appendix: “Tysiacheletie Rossii”| Reprinted in YMI:52-54| The
version presented in his lecture, SNC,2:351-4 and LOD:7-13| ((prm 1000y.lct zms~
This pbc a kind of kln))
*1863:SPB| “Tysiach.”|re-pbd under separate covers| ((A vast plan to study R hst frm point of view of “samopoznanie nrda”
w/big role fr clt))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Pethybridge,Roger. The Spread of the Russian Revolution: Essays on 1917. London: 1972
<>Pethybridge,Roger,
ed|
|_Witnesses to the Russian Revolution| ((trv RREV1 RREV2 RREV3))
<>Petrunkevich,Ivan
I| a{
}r{
*1934:ARR#21:??| “Iz zapisok obshchestvennogo deiatelia”| ((GRS:55 prm vsp RREV1 NB! tlng|lbx))
*:|_Memoirs of a Social Activist| :| ((noUO GO SUMMIT|98je:noUO|Birn,81de17:bbt.rqt| prm vsp Zmv lbx KDs lbx plt.clt|NB! UO RXV re.ssn))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Piatnitskii,O. A|_Memoirs of a Bolshevik| ((SDs(b) vsp))
<>Plekhanov,Georgii V|>PlxGV| a{}n{}o{("father"
of Russian Marxism and a critic of previous Russian revolutionary traditions
}p{
SAC LOOP
}r{
*1884:GNV| “Our Differences” [Nashi raznoglasiia]| With “Letter to P. L. Lavrov
(In lieu of preface)”| In
Selected Philosophical Works 1:122-400| (( |>NaR| prm Plx LvrPL))
*1910:SPB|_N. G. Chernyshevskii| ((OWN ndr idl.bxo Qrn))
*1929:L.ENG|_Fundamental Problems of Marxism| EBy D. Riazanov| ((HX314.P54513| prm Mrx))
*1961:1981; MVA & L.ENG|_Selected Philosophical Works| 5vv| ((HX314.P556| bbt.rqt 86.02| prm Mrx SDs idl ntg))
--|Oriental Despot AMP [Raeff,Peter the Great]
}s{
Baron
}t{}8{}
<>Pobedonostsev,Konstantin
P| a{}n{cnx | ntg idl stt.srv}o{
}m{
SAC LOOP
}r{
*1898:L.ENG|_Reflections of a Russian Statesman| Translated
from the Russian by R. C. Long| (( You will have to order this through ORBIS
(SUMMIT)| Excerpt = On false dmk in RRC,2))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Pokrovskii,MN, Yakovlev,YaA, et al.,eds| Arkhiv oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii: 1917 god v dokumentakh i materialakh. 10 volumes. (1925-1939)| ((noUO or SMT))
<>Ponomarev,Boris N.,ed|
a{}n{STL.prs hst.gph}o{stt.srv
}r{
*1938:NYC|_The_Plot Against the Soviet Union and World Peace: Facts and
Documents Compiled from the Verbatim Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case
of the Anti-Soviet “Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites”| ((prm)) DK267.P64
G/KPS
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Postgate,Raymond| a{}{}n{}o{jrn scx pop.hst
}r{
*1920:|_Bolshevik theory| ((SDs(b) trx Mrx mrx MRX))
*1920:LND|_Revolution from 1789 to 1906: Documents Selected
and Edited with Notes...| ((sbr.prm))
--|KNIGHT
}s{
Wiki
}t{}8{}
<>Proletariat |>Workers |>Unions |>Labor
etc| n{wrk prl unx}o{}
*1979:MVA,Nauka|_Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917
godu: Protokoly|
*1982:N.NY,Krause reprint|_Tret'ia vserossiiskaia konferentsiia professional'nykh soiuzov,3-11 iiulia (20-28 iiunia st. st.)....|
EBy Diane Koenker| ((RREV2 RREV3))
*1983:N.NY,Kraus reprint of *1927:MVA|_Oktiabrskaia revoliutsiia i fabzavkomy|
<>Pushkarev,Sergei German|>PwkSG| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1917:Memoirs in Moh.RR| ((prm vsp))
}s{
}t{noW.bxo
}8{}
<>Ransome,Arthur|
a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1976:L.ENG|_Autobiography of Arthur Ransome| EBy Rupert Hart-Davis| ((PR6035.A63 Z513))
*1919:NYC|_Russia in 1919| 914.7 R 174
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Radishchev,Aleksandr| a(}e{802}n{dsn}o{
)r{
*1791:Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow| (Cambridge:1958) [HN525.R313. Cf.:RRC2,2#22 and DIR2:112-124]
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Radzinskii,Edvard|_The_Rasputin File...
STUDENT REVIEW =
The author, Edvard Radzinsky, started off by telling and taking the reader along to help him
look for a lost file. He takes his audience to a revolutionary time in history and to untouched
places since the time of the Tsars to find the Rasputin File.
The Rasputin file is first hand accounts of Rasputin’s inner circle that was taken by
the Extraordinary Commission. The testimonies vary from court, government and church
officials to the every day peasant. The documents are oral accounts of people that he
held influence over, his friends, his enemies, and his lovers. It is rifled with
scandals of backstabbing, masked friends, and lies. It is a file that shows how Rasputin
bought the end to an absolute monarchy.
Radzinsky explained how Rasputin climbed into the hearts of the Tsar and Tsarina and how
other people used that affection for their benefit. If someone desired to increase their
status politically or within the courts then they had to follow monarchal suit and be
fond of Rasputin or at least pretend to enjoy him. The reign of Rasputin led to political
changes and personal association changes of Tsars based upon the degree of affection that
each gave ‘Our Friend’. It was not until a traitor appeared among Rasputin’s inner circle
that the elite began to question the friendship between him and the Tsars and take a closer
look at who the man called Rasputin really was.
Who Rasputin was is a mystery still. He has several names, two that are real and others
that have been attached to him because of history and reputation. Some are well in meaning
and some are just. But who is Rasputin? In the first few pages the character is put on
a judgment block for the reader. Readers learn about his home life, reputation, work
ethic, and his travels. Rasputin at home was lazy, stupid and did not care about his
life health or his family’s life or health. It is not until he gets beaten to the point
of death by someone he was stealing from that Rasputin decides he was a changed man and
goes on to travel to monasteries. Radzinsky goes into detail about Rasputin’s travels
and the different types of Orthodox religion and religion in general that he
encounters. It was these journeys that turned Rasputin into a pious man of god, but
it was his foundation character that breaks his plastered holy image and leads his
friends to turn against him.
<>Reed,John Silas| a{}n{}o{Influential journalist and member of the American socialist
movement of the early 20th century
}f{
Son of a prominent Portland, Oregon, business family
}p{
*1917:With wife Louise Bryant, traveled to Petrograd, Russia, into the maelstrom
of Soviet Revolution
*1919se:Chicago|_Communist
Party of America [USA] founded. Reed closely associated| Reed had only one more
year of life left to him, and it was not a happy year. He reacted strongly
against the efforts of Soviet Communist Party leaders to dominate the American
movement. A great admirer of the Soviet Revolution, an eyewitness to it and one
of its most widely read chroniclers, Reed became disillusioned
*--He died in Russia and, despite his misgivings about the course of
revolutionary events in Russia, was buried in the Kremlin wall with other
honored figures
}r{
*1919:USA N.NY|>Reed,John|_Ten Days That Shook the World
[W#1]
[W#2],
the most famous English-language first-hand account of the Soviet Revolution
*1919:LND,Workers' Socialist Federation|_Red Russia: The Triumph of the Bolsheviki
--|The War in Eastern Europe
}s{
*--Michael Munk biographical sketch with emphasis on Reeds Oregon roots [TXT]
}t{}8{}
<>Robins,Raymond|_Raymond Robins' Own Story. Edited by William Hard. NYC: 1920| ((947.084 R558 H))
<>Rodichev,Fedor| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*?:Slavonic Review#2:249-62| “The Liberal Movement in Russia (1891-1905)”| ((lbx RREV1))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Rodzianko, | a{}b{}n{Dmx WW1 RREV1}o{stt.srv
}r{
Reign of Rasputin
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Rosenthal,Bernice Glatzer and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, eds| a{}
*1990:NYC, Fordham|_Revolution of the Spirit| 2nd ed|
((|>RB-C| sbr.prm phl idl ntg REV.clt RUS3|
Slv
Grot
Diaghilev
Rozanov
Brd
Bulgakov
Ivanov
Chulkov
Merezhkovskii
Florovsky,GV
Novgorodtsev
Struve
Belyi
Blok
Toi?
))
<>Rozanov,Vasilii Vasil’evich| a{}n{}o{
}r{
--| “On Sweetest Jesus and the Bitter Fruits of the World”| In RB-C
| SUQ:227-240
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Russia| Committee of Ministers|>Komitet ministrov|>KoM|
|_Zhurnaly Komiteta ministrov po ispolneniiu ukaza 12 dekabria 1904 g|SPB:1905| ((GRS:58 prm stt.tUt RREV1))
<>Russia| Council of Ministers|>Sovet ministrov|>SoM| n{prm stt tUt RREV1}
|_Petergofskie soveshchaniia o proekte Gosudarstvennoi dumy [1905jy19:29;]|PGR:1917| ((GRS:168f,188))
| “Soveshchanie pri Sovete ministrov,24 maia 1905 g”|In Monopolii i ekonomicheskaia politicka tsarizma v kontse XIX-nachale XX v (LGR:1987):127-42|
((GRS:186))
| “Zasedaniia Sovieta ministrov Rossii 3 i 11 fevralia 1905 g.:Zapisi E. Yu. Nol'de”| EBy R. Sh. Ganelin| Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik
za 1989 g (MVA:1950):296-305| ((GRS:115))
<>Russia| Emperor
Alexander II| a{}e{}n{}o{
}r{
Politics of Autocracy: Letters..., 1857-1864
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Russia| Emperor
Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
}m{
*1914jy29:1914au01; Four days of correspondence by telegram between N-2 and
Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany [W
TXT]
--|_The_Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in
a time of Revolution
}r{
--|_Secret letters of the last tsar : being the confidential correspondence
between Nicholas II, and his mother, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna
--|_Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa,1914-1917| ((SUMMIT))
--|_Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916
--|_Complete wartime correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress
Alexandra : April 1914-March 1917
--|_Last diary of Tsaritsa Alexandra
--|_A_lifelong passion : Nicholas and Alexandra : their own story| (())
--|*1905: Memo on the State Duma [Raeff2]
--| Some letters [Page.RR | WRH]
}s{
--|>Bark,Peter N-2 at GHQ in Moh.RR|
--|_Bazili,Nikolai Aleksandrovich, two memoirs
*1905:|>Ermolov disc. w/ N-2 re. Gapon in Page
Treadgold in Adams.IR
G/Verner
}t{
}8{}
<>Russia| Gubernatory|>Governors|>Gubernatorial Reports of Russian Imperial Governors, 1855-1864| ((SMT UW))
<>Russia| Grand Duke Aleksandr
Mxl|
|_Kniga vospominanii|2? volumes|PRS:nd|
((GRS:222 prm vsp RREV1))
<>Russia| State Council|>Gosudarstvennyi sovet|>GoS|
<>Russia| State Duma|>stt.dmx|>Gosudarstvennaia duma| a{}b{}e{}
<>Russian Court Memoirs, 1914-1916
<>Russian Revolution: Essays, Photographs, and Excerpts from Classic Works about the Men [sic] and Ideas that Shaped the Most Significant Revolution of the 20th Century| NYC: Macmillan,1967| ((sbr.prm RREV2 RREV3))
<>Russian Version of the Second World War: the History of the War as Taught to Soviet Schoolchildren| EBy Graham Lyons. TBy Marjorie Vanston|New York City: Facts on File,1976,1983| ((ndr WW2 R&A))
<>Savinkov,Boris
Vkt*| a{879}b{}c{}d{}e{925}n{}o{rvs trrist
}p{
SRs boevaia organizatsiia [IE=mlt angle -- more precisely a total.wrx angle --
to his plt from very beginning]
WW1 FRN mlt
VRM gvt Mwrx mnr under KrnA
Gwrx
}r{
Web
bibliography
*1917:|_Pale Horse [TXT1
| 1919:
TXT2(searchable)] ((1913:blt re.RREV1| Written under pseudonym "Ropshin"|
F/March 17/ F/George/ [F/ I /] F/Fedor/ F/Vania/ F/Heinrich/ F/Erna/ F/love/
F/hate/ F/flower/ [=esp."red" flower] F/kill/ F/spirit/ F/Andrei Petrovich/ F/In
my childhood/ F/You love no/ F/Frol Sem/ [=2nd false ID] [kbk=] F/tavern/
F/Nothing/ F/Tivoli/ [=night bfr botched dth.x.assassination] F/I rise./
F/vengeance/ F/What would I be doing/ F/counsel/ F/August 5/ F/I don't care who
dies/ F/you lost a fellow/ F/August 18/ F/August 22/ F/time I was in prison/
F/September 5/ F/radiant in the night/ F/thinking again of Elena/ F/tottering on
his feet/ F/September 15/ F/September 16/ F/September 17/ F/Tsushima/
F/Peter continues to unsheathe/ F/September 25/ F/September 27/ F/October 5/))
*1927:|_The_Tale of What Was Not| OR = What Never Happened [TXT] ((re.RREV1))
*1931:|_Memoirs of a Terrorist
}s{
Web bxo
*1991:|>Richard Spence,Richard|_ Boris Savinkov: Renegade on the Left| ((TXT
of review))
*2004:|_THE RIDER NAMED DEATH [Vsadnik po imeni smert']
[ID] | a FLM based on
Savinkov's life [Website
release announcement |
TXT of
review]
*2007:SEER#85,1::25-46,198| Daniel Beer, "The Morality of Terror: Contemporary
Responses to Political Terror..."| ((Re.2 pre-revolutionary novels of Savinkov,
The Pale Horse (1909) and What Never Happened (1912) and the public debate they
provoked among contemporaries about the legitimacy of political violence. The
anguished meditations of the doubt-ridden heroes of Savinkov's novels issued a
powerful challenge to existing justifications, notably among SRs, for violent
insurgency against the state. Mounting individualism had important consequences
for the contemporary understanding of political conflict.))
}t{
}8{}
<>Sazonov,SD| a{}n{WW1}o{stt.srv irx.amb
}r{
*1928:LND|_Fateful Years,1909-1916
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Scheibert,Peter| a{}
*1972:Darmstadt|_Die russischen politischen Parteien von 1905 bis 1917: Ein Dokumentationsband| ((plt.pty~ RREV1 RREV2 RREV3))
<>Schierbrand,Wolf von| a{851}e{920
*1904:NYC|_Russia, Her Strength and Her Weakness| ((OWN| trv RREV1 ekn))
<>Scudder, J. W. Russia in the Summer of 1914. Boston:ca. 1920. DK262.S35| prm
<>Sechenov,Ivan M| a{}n{}o{scs psx
}r{
*1952:MVA|_Autobiographical Notes|
--|Selected Physiological and Psychological Works| MVA:?|
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Semevskii,Vasilii Ivn*|>SmvVI| a{848
}r{
*1881:1901; SPB|_Krest’iane v tsarstvovanie imp. Ekateriny II| 2vv| ((krx C-2
ppx.hst.gph))
*1888:SPB|_Krest’ianskii vopros v Rossii v XVII i pervoi poloviny XIX v| ((SPB.unv PhD diss))
*1898:SPB|_Rabochie v sibirskikh zolotykh promyslakh|2vv ((1 of first hst of RUS prl; so S originated krx.scl of RUS.hst & prl.scl))
*1909:SPB|_Politicheskie i obshchestvennye idei dekabristov| ((DKB mnt plt.clt| ?Is S now pulling krx, prl & ntg together? hst of cvc.pbl))
*1911:PkrVI,edt:7-18| “Idei, ob”ediniavshiia uchastnikov kruzhka Petrashevskogo i drugikh”| ((OWN in PET 8x11 under Bykov,PV| PkrV axx gte Plw))
*1919:GoM#1-4:??| “Petrashevtsy: Kruzhok Kashkina”| ((PET EvpAI RS0 krj))
*1922:MVA|_M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevskii i petrashevtsy| ((PET| UO HAS))
bxo WtnVI?
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Serge,Victor [pseudonym of V. L. Kibalchich]
*1963, then 1978:O.ENG|_Memoirs
of a Revolutionary,1901-1941|
--|_The_Case of Comrade Tulayev| ((prm))
<>Service,Robert| a{
}r{
|_Russian Revolution,1900-1927|L.ENG:1986| ((UO:DK262.S455| prm RREV Gwrx NEP irx ENG))
|_The_Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organisational Change,1917-1923. LND: 1979
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Shakhovskaia,Zinaida|>WxvaZ|
Memoirs of WW1 & RREV1 childhood [Moh.RR] | ((prm vsp
chd))
<>Shanin,Teodor, with Haruki Wada, Derek Sayer, Philip Corrigan, and Jonathan Sanders| a{}
*1983:L.ENG|_Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘the Peripheries
of Capitalism:’ A Case| ((|>SLM| HX39.5.L363| prm krx
SHANIN AND WADA ARTICLES (SLM:1-77)
SECTION ON MARX and RUSSIA, AND CHERNYSHEVSKII’S TWO ESSAYS (SLM:95-204)
*Marx,Confessions
*1859:Chernyshevskii critique of those who harbor “prejudices” against the Peasant commune [Q.PSS#05:357-92]
*1862fe05:fe16; Chernyshevskii, Unaddressed Letters (5) [Q.PSS#10:90-116] [MER 44 246 256 272 277]
*1878fa:Marx's letter to editor of the Russian journal Otechestvennye zapiski [date suggested by Wada,56; 1877no:Traditional date]
*1879fa:NaV Executive Committee Program (SLM:207-212) [RN7,2:170-4]
*1879oc01: The People and the State (SLM:219-23)
*1880sp:NaV tactical Program (SLM:223-31) [RN7,2:175-183]
*1880no:NaV Workers’ Organization Program (SLM:231-7) [RN7,2:184-91]
*1880oc25:Revolutionary populist journal Narodnaia Volia [NaV] Executive Committee letter to Marx (SLM:206-7) [RN7,2:228-9]
*1881fe05:Kibalchich, article on political revolution and the economic question (SLM:212-8)
*1881fe:Zasulich's letter to Marx (draft)
*1881fe:mr; Marx's reply to Zasulich letter (draft)
*1881mr:Marx's final text of letter to Zasulich
*1881fa:1882wi; NaV Military-revolutionary organization Program (SLM:238) [RN7,2:196-200
| mlt]
*1882ja:Marx and Engels preface to 2nd Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto [MER:88-9]
*1882fe16:Last will and testaments of revolutionary populists A.Mikhailov and A.Barannikov (SLM:239-40)
*1924:Riazanov,David discovered the drafts of the 1881wi:Marx/Zasulich correspondence
))
<>Shchapov,Afanasii P|>WwaAP| a{
}r{
*1858:KZN|_Russkii raskol staroobriadchestva,razsmatrivaemyi v sviazi s vnutrennym sostoianiem
russkoi tserkvi i grazhdanstvennosti v XVII veke i v pervoi polovine XVIII: Opyt
istoricheskogo issledovaniia o prichinakh proiskhozhdeniia i rasprostraneniia
russkogo raskola| *1906:Soq#1:173-450; and KZN:1959 reprintings| ((BX601.s5|
StO|cvc.virtu Dbr & AnvM plm,Svm))
*1859:KZN|_Golos drevnei russkoi tserkvi ob uluchshenii byta nesvobodnykh liudei|*1906:Soq#1:1-15
reprint| ((srf.rfm srf vqt chx rlg|based on 858no08:lct;also earlier 857no08:lct
“Religiia i russkaia narodnost’” [text lost po-edt note, Soq:15]))
*1860:MVA|_Narodnye russkie legendy|Second ed|Published by Shchepkin and Soldatenkov| ((nrd.blt
spx, cf.Dobrovol’skii,Zapreshen:50-5 SldKT pbc))
*1860:1861; OtZ| “Zemstvo i raskol”|
*1906:Soq#1:451-504 reprint| ((Zmv StO|Wlg plm G/26:KrA#14:128-47 [Nqka.Wwa]))
*1861my:WwaA ltr-A-2| “Pis’mo ... Shchapova Alek. II v 1861 g.”|Published 1926:KrA#19:150-65| ((See VR-D:177| Nqka.Wwa:646 sd
[plt.clt] Wwa,like Hzn, suffered “liberal’nye kolebaniya”; for Hzn it was dvr
ogrqaniqennost’; for Wwa, krx ograniqennost’| Verya v carya [odd assertion in
view of Wwa ref. to TSR blw] i v iduwwie sverxu rfmy on prosit carya sozdat’
Rossiiskuyu federaciyu samoupravlyayuwwixsya obastei [fdr slf.gvt rgn~] s
“narodnym kontrolei nad provincial’nym gubernskim upravleniem” [C&B], s
“vosstanovleniem” vsesoslovnyx [vse.sSs] “zemskix sovetov” [zmi.SOV~] i
central’nogo zemkogo sobora [ZmS], ograniqivayuwwego carskuyu vlast’ [TSR]
Prosit uniqtojit’ “nepomernuyu ekonomiqeskuyu centralizaciyu” [ekn.sttism] i
osuwwestvit’ “vsenarodnoe prosvewwenie” [vse.nrd edc] [646] re.edc:has been
exclusive, cannot remain “kastal’nuyu monopoliyu [clx.mpy] gorodskix korporacii
[crp] samyx maloqislennyx privilegirovannyx sSsovnyx kast”|Must be VsR &
vse.sSs))
*1861wi:KZN.unv|lct-krj “O cst” [*1924:Izvestiia
Obshchestva arkheologii, istorii, etnografii pri Gosudarstvennom Kazanskom
universitete#33,2/3:38-58 (KZN.rxl)]
*1861ap:KZN| “Rech’ posle panikhidy po ubitym v
s. Bezdne krest’ianam”| *1923:KrA#4:407-10| ((pnxB srf.rfm krx.rbx|
Field,Rebels:96-102 tlng 3 versions of Wwa lct))
*1861oc:OtZ#10:579-616 & 11:79-118|“Velikorusskie
oblasti i smutnoe vremia”| *1906:Soq#1:648-709 reprint| ((ToT gbx))
*1861oc08: as copied 1862ja07: “Pis’mo Shchapova
k Kn. [P. P.] Viazemskomu”| NVD:368-77 w/Nqka comments, originally
*1959:LiN#67:657-68| ((See Nqka.Wwa:645-56| VzmPP| re. 861au:RVe|Vzm poem
“Zametka”,an attack on civil libertarianism in name of spiritual liberty, it
would seem [?~~ 1909:Vekhi idl~?] Lozung “sozyva Vsenarodnogo ZmS imeyuwwii
funkcii Uqreditel’nogo sobraniya| ltr not sent to V, but to Hzn who cldn’t pbc
in ltr form| Wwa then decided to put main idl in rtl prj “O russkom dvorianstve”
[dvr] which was never pbc & has not survived [Nqka.Wwa] TXT (as from LiN; get
NVD pages) = Ya demokrat, drug federal’noi soyuznoi obwwinno-demokratiqeskoi
konstitucii russkoi, vo imya demokrata Xrista i demokrata-mujiqka Antona
Petrova, za krov’, za svobodu mujiqkov i vsego naroda, derznul skazt’ v sobranii
molodogo pokoleniya: “Da zdravstuet, da budet obwwino-demokratiqeskaya
konstituciya!” [LiN:657]|| A popular assemblyh nakanune kotorogo miy jivem i o
kotorom pomywlyal pervyi krest’yanin
– Pososhkov [LiN:657] A hybrid of sel’sk.mir [vlg.mir], vls.sxd, grd.sxd
[grd.dmx], vsegrdie dumy, Veqe [Vqe], oblast.sovet [rgn.SOV], obww. fed. soyuzn.
sovete [fdr], sxode, ili s”ezde|| Mistakes ofr P-1 = on napered s”ezdil v
Zapadnuyu Evropu, za granicu, a ne ob”exal napered Rossiyu, da i ottogo, qto
ewwe pri otce vladeli vospitaniem carskix detei
nemcy – istoriqeskie vragi
slavyan||Ya gotov umeret’ za etu muqawwuyu menya mysl’
ob obwwinnom narodosovetii, o zemskom –
oblastnom i soyuznom narodosovetii| Ya gopvoryu i budu govorit’ do smerti
ili do katgorgi odno: konstituciya russkaya
ne mojet byt’
soqineniya ne novym Speranskim [SpxM]
– geniem byurokratiqeskim, ne novym Mura’evym ili Pestelem [DKB] – nespelym,
odnostoronnim geniem 14-go dekabrya, ne odnim Iskanderom [Hzn], --
nikem. Ona
doljna byt’
sozdana, organizovana samim narodom,
izlyublennymi vybornymi umom narodnym,
kogo – skaju starinum narodnym slovom –
kogo mej sebya izlyublyat i vyberut.
[LiN:651] Wwa sd he wldn’t gtz Hzn but to the graves of Rdw & Ryleev))
*1862:Iskra|“Iz bursatskogo byta”| ((chx dxv
vqt))
*1862fe18:Vek#1/6|“Sel’skaia
obshchina”|*1906:Soq#1:760-7 reprint| ((vlg.o))
*1862mr11:Vek#7/8:| “Zemstvo”|*1906:Soq#1:753-9
reprint| ((Zmv lnd ntn hst.gph dmk))
*1862mr:Vek#11| “Zemskie sobory v XVII stoletii:
Sbor 1642 goda”| *1906:Soq#1:710-17 reprint| ((elx zms~))
*1862mr:Vek#12| “Gorodskie mirskie skhody”|
*1906:Soq#1:783f reprint| ((grd.sxd))
*1862ap01:Vek#13/14|“Sel’skii mir i mirskoi
skhod”| *1906:Soq#1:768-82 reprint| ((vlg.sxd vlg.m))
*1862oc:Vremia#10:319-63 & 11:251-97| “Zemstvo i
raskol”| *1906:Soq#1:505-579 reprint| ((StO|#1 “Beguny”?))
*1862:SPB|_Zemstvo i raskol| ((StO Zmv 862oc10:cnp rzr 16p brochure))
*1862no:OtZ#11:1-43|“Zemskie sobory 1648-1649 i
sobranie deputatov...”| *1906:Soq#1:718-52 reprint| ((elx dep.rpz ZmS))
*1870mr:de; OtZ#3 #4 &
#12|“Estestvenno-psikhologicheskie usloviia umstvennogo i sotsial’nogo razvitiia
russkogo naroda”| ((PSU| prm psx mnt pbl nrd| ?Relation of this title w/
“Istoricheskie usloviia intellectual’nogo razvitiia v Rossii”|*1906:Soq#2:??|
ntg edc clt.hst))
*1906-1908:SPB|_Sochineniia| 3vv| Biography by G. A. Luchinskii,3: I-CIX| ((Hkd:281.947
Shch29))
*1927:KZN|_Neizdannye
sochineniia| ((prm SldKT pbc))
*1937:IRK|_Sochineniia| Supplement to 1906-1908 ed|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Shchepkin,Nikolai Mxl*|>WwpNM| a{
}r{
*1905:RnD|_Zemskaia i gorodskaia Rossiia o narodnom predstavitel’stve| ((IISG 60p rpz cst plt.clt grd krx vlg))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Shcherbatov,Mikhail|
*1787:"Petition..." and "Pace of Russia's Modernization" [Raeff3:49-60]
--| "On the Corruption of Morals in Russia [English-Russian text = HN525.S513 1969]
<>Shein,Louis J., ed| a{}
*1977:ONT Waterloo|_Readings in Russian Philosophical Thought: Philosophy of
History| ((|>WPT| D16.8.R34| sbr.prm hst.gph idl RUS2 plt.clt|
Lvr
Kareev
Bitsilli[NOdtf]
Florovsky,GV
MxiNK
DnlNYa
BrdN
QrnN
Ern[?]
Rst[?]
Plx
Kon,IS
Gulyga,AV[NOdtf]
Mishin,VI[NOdtf]
))
<>Shipov,Dmitrii N|
*1918:MVA|_Vospomananiia i dumy o perezhitom| ((GRS:53,121 prm vsp RREV1))
<>Shklovsky,Viktor| a{}n{}o{
}p{
*1917su:WW1 front vsp in Moh.RR|
}r{
A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs,1917-1922| TEBy Richard Sheldon| IBy Sidney Monas|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Shmemann,Aleksandr|>Schmemann,Alexander,ed|. ((|>SUQ))
<>Sholokhov,Mikhail A|
--|And Quiet Flows the Don
--|Man's Fate
<>Shotwell, J. T., ed|
*1928-1931:New Haven:YUP for the Carnegie endowment for international peace.
Division of economics and history|_The_Economic and Social History of the World War: Russian Series|
((sbr.ndr OR sbr.prm series WW1 ekn.hst skz mfg|
--|Here are some of
the titles in the series and here is a list of the authors =
|>Antsiferov,Aleksei (1867-1943) on Russian agriculture
|>Bilimovich,Aleksandr (1876) on R agriculture
|>Batshev,Mikhail on R agriculture
|>Ivantsov,Dmitrii on R agriculture
|>Struve,Petr on food supply| Other pbc (with Miliukov et al.)= 1917:Russian
Realities and Problems (ENG lectures)
|>Polner,Tikhon Ivn (1864-1935) and >Obolenskii,Vladimir.
lcl gvt, Union of Zemstvos| Other pbc~ re. TolL
|>Obolenskii,Vladimir (1869-) Other pbc= Moia zhizn'
|>Turin,Sergei Ptr on lcl gvt, Union of Zemstvos| Other pbc= survey hst of prl.unx
|>L'vov,Georgii Evg (1861-1925) Other pbc= vsp]
And yet another clutch of titles written by
|>Kohn,Stanislas (1888-1933) on
cost of war to Russia
|>Meiendorf,Aleksandr Feliks (Meyendorff,Alexander) (1869-1964) ditto| Other pbc=
1929:Background to the Russian Rev
|>Nol'de,Boris (1876-1948) on
R in the ekn wrx
|>Zagorskii,Semen (1881-1930)
on state control of industry
|>Gronskii,Pavel (1883) on central gvt
|>Astrov,Nikolai (-1934) on
All-Russian union of towns
Then there is this =
|_Russian Public Finance During the War, with sections by
|>Kokovtsov,V intro
|>Bernatskii,Mxl Vxr (1876-) on R pbl finances, monitary policy
|>Mikel'son,Axr Mxl on R pbl finances, expenditures
|>Apostol',Pvl Natanovich (1872-) on R pbl finances, credit
And these scattered here and there in JANUS =
Antsiferov (abv) a 2nd title on Coop movement during war
))
<>Siniavskii, Andrei. The Russian intelligentsia [HN530.2.A8 S56 1997]
<>Sochor,Zenovia A| a{}
|_Revolution and Culture: The Bogdanov-Lenin Controversy|I.NY:CUP,1988| ((PG3467.M29 Z88| Bgd Lnn phl trx rvs.clt idl SDs(b)))
<>Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia|>Union of Liberation|
*1905:PRS|_Osnovnoi zakon Rossiiskoi imperii: Proekt russkoi konstitutsii, vyrabotannyi gruppoi chlenov 'Soiuza osvobozhdeniia'|
((GRS:54 prm cst SoO))
<>Solov'ev,Vladimir Srg*|
a{853}b{}c{}d{}e{900}n{}o{phl
}r{
--|_A_Solovyov Anthology
--|_Politics,
Law and Morality
--| “Beauty, Sexuality, and Love”. In SUQ:73-134
--| “The Enemy from the East”. In RB-C
--| “The Russian National Ideal”. In RB-C
--|_Russia and the Universal Church. TBy Herbert Rees. LND: 1948
--|_War, Progress, and the End of History. CLND: 1915
--|GO Birkbeck for 844: 54;crr [in FRN] w/Wm Palmer
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Solzhenitsyn,Alexander Il'ich| a{
}r{
--|Cancer Ward
--|First Circle
*1974:1976; NYC|_The_Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation|
3vv|
--|August 1914
--|November 1916
G/Leontovich
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Sotsial-demokraticheskaia Rabochaia Partiia,Rossiiskaia|>SDs|>SDs(b)|>SDs(m)|>Social
Democratic Workers Party| a{}n{}o{plt.pty~
}r{
*1905:| “Materialy po istorii konferentsii
s.-d. partii v Rossii v 1905 g”| In 1922:Proletarskaia revolutsiia#11:157-78|
((GRS:81))
*1912:|_Vserossiiskii konferentsiia... 1912 goda|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>SDs(b)|>Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia (bol’sheviki)| a{}
<>SDs(m)|>Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia (men’sheviki)| a{}
|_The_Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution| ((RREV2 RREV3))
<>Soviet Union,Communist Party of|
Kommunisticheskaia partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza|>KPS| a{}n{}o{prm
RUS3 plt.clt
}r{
--|UPNE = NH Hanover: Published for the University of Vermont by University Press of New England
*1930:|_Istoriia VKP(b)|2 special issues: 1) pererastanie of brz-dmk REV into scx REV; & 2) Lnnist prg for STL.skz|EBy
E. M. Yaroslavskii| ((prm SDb hst.gph))
*1938:MVA| 1960:MVA|_History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union| EBy
Boris Ponomarev, et al| ((>HCP|))
*1959:Notre Dame|_The_Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning Suppression of Religion by the
Communists,1917-1925| EBy B. Szczesniak| ((prm RREV Gwrx rlg stt&chx))
*1960:MVA|_History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union| A post-Stalin
edition, EBy Ponomarev,Boris N.,et al| G/1938 abv|
*1961:MVA|_Russia enters the 1960s: A documentary report on the 22nd Congress...|
EBy Harry Schwartz| Ph.PA:Lippincott [1962]| ((278p))
*1969:1974; MVA|_History of Soviet Foreign Policy,1917-1970| 2vv| EBy Ponomarev,Boris N [Ponomaryov here]; Gromyko,A.; and Khvostov,V| ((prm))
*1970:MVA|_A_Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union| EBy
Ponomarev,Boris N.,et al| TBy David Skvirsky| ((SDb))
*1972:Toronto|_Guide to the Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union,1917-1967|
*1974:Toronto|_Resolutions & Decisions of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union|Vol. 1,“The RSDLP,1898-October 1917” (Elwood);vol. 2,in four books,“The Early Soviet Period,
1917-1929” (McNeal)| ((sbr.prm SDb REV SSR.stt Gwrx NEP RUS3))
*1984:UPNE|_A_Documentary history of Communism|EBy Robert V. Daniels|2vv|Rev. ed|
((Another edition?: D228 335.4))
*1988:+; UPNE|_A_Documentary history of Communism| EBy Robert V. Daniels|2vv |
Updated, rev. ed|
*1989:MVA, Novosti|_Documents and Materials: Moscow, Kremlin, September 19-20,
1989| ((Prs))
*1993:UPNE|_A_Documentary history of Communism in Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev|
EBy Robert V. Daniels|“Third, revised and updated edition”--Preface (1993 ed.)|
|_Russian Rev| ((NoUO))
--|Aid to wrl REV [SP&D,2]
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Stalin,Joseph V|>Dzhugashvili,Iosif
V|>StlJV|>StlIV|
a{}n{}o{LOOP
}p{
--| In Moh.RR
}r{
--|_Essential Stalin: Major
Theoretical Writings,1905-1952. Edited by Bruce Franklin. Garden City NY: 1972. DK268.S75 A38
--|_Selected Works. Davis CA: Cardinal Publishers,1971
--|_Selected Writings. NYC: [1942]. 947.084 St16s
--|_Works| 13vv| Moscow: 1952-1955| ((308 St16| 12vv only?))
*1931je23: speech| Edited by Geo Counts| ((HC335.St5;other ed HD3616.R9 S782))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Stead,William Thomas| a{
}r{
Baylen,Joseph O|_The_Tsar's Lecturer-General: W. T. Stead and
the Russian Revolution of 1905
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Stolypin,Petr Arkad*|>StpPA| a{}b{}c}d{}e{}n{RREV1 krx.rfm lnd.rfm}o{stt.srv mnr MID
}m{
1907:1911; Prime Minister| ~~stt.dmx| krx.rfm Stp.rfm S.rfm
}r{
}s{
*1970:Metuchen NJ|>Bock,M. P|_Reminiscences of My Father, Peter A. Stolypin|
Excerpt in Moh.RR| (())
*1976:CO.Boulder|>Conroy,M. S|_Petr Arkadevich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia| (())
*1965je:SEER#43,101:257-274|>Mosse,W. E| “Stolypin's Villages”| (())
G/Yaney
*1985:NJ.P, Kingston P|>Zenkovsky,AV|_Stolypin: Russia’s last Great Reformer|TBy M. Patoski;introduction by Ph. Mosely|
((85fa:bbt.rqt))
}t{}8{}
<>Stronin,Oleksandr
Ivn*| a{
}r{
*1885:SPB,tpg.Mtpt|_Istoriia obshchestvennosti| ((cvc.virtu| Vast(767p) plt.trx search for scs lwx~ of cvc.pbl hst of obwwejitiya [i]
ch1=“Istoriia grazhdanstvennosti”| Takes up ntn & shows all are a mix predanie ~~only to lng; thrfore not blood but blt=ntn lgc [726ff]
86my17:no14; Pypin 2ltr-Qrn [LpC:554,8| Q#15:612f,942] pbl=structr on lwx of mech;pbl=like“pyramid s kruglym osnovaniem” idl [SWG:436]
BrE#62:825 d.scr- geometric concept of pbl.structure well| L-S“Stronin”, frm RXV,re.his idl:only 2 plt pty:pro-krx & con-krx(159),
representative gbx figure))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Struve,Petr Berngard| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
}r{
*1909: G/Vexi
--|RB-C “The Intelligentsia and the National Face”|
|_Out of the Depths (De Profundis): A Collection of Articles on the Russian
Revolution| ((>IzG| sbr.prm ntg rlg.idl RREV
Struve,Petr,ed
Askol'dov
Berdiaev
Bulgakov,S
Ivanov,Viach
Izgoev,A
Kotliarevskii,S
Murav'ev,VN
Novgorodtsev,PI
Pokrovskii,IA
Struve,PB
Frank,SL
))
*1931:Vienna| “Witte und Stolypin”|In Menschen die Geschichte machten|
v3| EBy
P. R. Rohden and F. Ostrogorsky| ((ndr Wtt Stp stt.srv RREV1))
}s{
Pipes.Struve
}t{}8{}
<>Sukhanov,Nikolai|>Gimmer,NN|
a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{rvs dddist SR SDs RREV2 VRM RREV3}o{Russian SD
}r{
|_The_Russian Revolution| Excerpt in Moh.RR| ((1917mr02:oc25; Eye
witness to events))
}s{
[W]
--|>Getzler,Israel|_Nikolai Sukhanov: Chronicler of the Russian Revolution
*2003:Journal of European Studies#33| Paul Dukes, "Nikolai Sukhanov: Chronicler of the Russian Revolution"
}t{}8{}
<>Sviatopolk-Mirskaia,E. A| a{
}r{
*1965:IsZ#77:241 etc|“Dnevnik ... za 1904-1905 gg”| ((GRS:51,115 prm dnv RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<
>Sviatopolk-Mirskii,Dmitrii| G/Mirskii,D
<>Sviatopolk-Mirskii,Petr D| a{
}g{ssn=SMiDP
}r{
*1905:SPB|_Rechi g. ministra vnutrennikh del kn. Sviatopolk-Mirskogo i tolki o nikh pressy|EBy
A. Achkasov| ((GRS:53 prm MVD tUt
stt RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Szczesniak,Bolesław,ed|_The_Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning Suppression of Religion by the Communists,1917-1925. Notre Dame: 1959| ((274.7 Sz19| RREV3 Gwrx NEP))
<>Taylor,Graham Romeyn| a{}n{trv gbx RREV2
RREV3}o{
}r{
“The Revolution [1917-1918] in the Provinces” In WRH2:604-615| ((unpublished diary and
letters (see s-field below) ))
}s{
[W re. father's archive w/letters]
}t{}8{}
<>Tikhomirov,Lev| a{852}b{}c{}d{}e{923}n{lgcNO}o{Revolutionist
of the 1870s-early 90s, turned loyal subject of tsar
}p{
Narodnaia volia party
}r{
|_Russia, Political and Social|
[TXT] (( prm plt pbl idl))
|_Vospominaniia| ((UO vsp))
*1930:KrA#2/39:63-6 etc| “25 let nazad: Iz dnevnikov...”| ((GRS:117 prm dnv))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Tolstoy,Leo| a{}n{}o{World famous writer
& moralist
}r{
SAC LOOP
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Tolz,Vera| a{}n{G.rfm Prs}o{jrn RFE/RL
}r{
on jrn & mxx in LRF
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Trotsky,Leon|>TrtL| a{}n{}o{LOOP
}r{
|_1905| TBy A. Bostock| NYC:1972| ((DK254.T7a48 (NO LONGER IN CATALOG?)| prm RREV1 hst.gph
RREV:noWbr))
*1917:1922; |_Trotsky Papers,1917-1922. Edited by Jan Meijer. 2 vols. NoUO
*1920:|_Antwort auf Karl Kautsky's "Terrorismus und Kommunismus"| ((UO KtsK ?ENG
tlng?))
*1923:| “From the Old Family to the New” in RBV1:89-95; fmy
*1930:NYC|_My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography| ((prm vsp rvs idl))
*1932:NYC|_History of the Russian Revolution|
On theory of "permanent revolution" = TXT
--| In Moh.RR
*1937:LND|_Revolution Betrayed
--|_Whither Russia? Towards Capitalism or Socialism. 330.947 T 756
--|_Writings. (1929,30,30-31,36-37,29-33 supp.,34-40 supp.) (83mr31: bbt.rqt)
--|_Bulletin of the Opposition| 4vv| ((prm WWW?))
--|_Literature and Revolution. PG2951.T76
--|_Portraits: Political and Personal. . HX23.T76
--|_Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influences
--|_First Five Years of the Communist International. 2 vols
--|_Whither Russia? Towards Capitalism or Socialism. 330.947 T 756
}s{
Eastman ((chd.Trt))
>Deutscher,Isaac.
The Prophet Armed| The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky,1921-1929. The 2nd of 3 vols. London: 1959.
Pomper
Ponomarev
}t{
}8{}
<>Trubetskaia,O. N|>ToiaON| a{
}r{
*1937:PRS|Sovremennye zapiski#64:??| “Iz perezhitogo”| ((GRS:53,117,187 prm vsp
RREV1))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Trubetskoi,Evgenii|>ToiE|
a{}e{}n{EUAist}o{phl
}r{
--| RB-C| “The Bolshevist Utopia”
--|RB-C| “The Religious Movement in Russia”
TITLES IN
KNIGHT LIBRARY
--|The Legacy of Genghis Khan
and Other Essays on Russia's Identity
STUDENT REVIEW =
The collection of essays by the esteemed linguist Nikolai Trubetskoi entitled “The Legacy of Genghis Khan” describes
his less well-known views as a participant in the movement in the early 20th century Russian intelligentsia
community known as “Eurasianism.” His main points are outlined in the essays, “On True and False Nationalism,” “The
Legacy of Genghis Khan: A Perspective on Russian History,” and, perhaps to a lesser extent, “The Upper and Lower
Stories of Russian Culture” and “At The Door: Reaction? Revolution?”
His first main point discusses the “wrong path of European culture” described by the Eurasianist movement, or
what he deems true and false nationalism. Essentially, his argument is such that every individual should be
self-aware and strive to be unique – and that all nationals of such individuals should strive to do the
same. He stresses three types of false nationalism. The first involves the downplaying of one’s own unique
culture, in striving to resemble the Romano-Germanic “Great Powers,” while the second, which he
labels “militant chauvinism,” is ostensibly the opposite – claiming that one’s own unique culture is
somehow superior to others and attempting to force assimilation of “inferior” cultures to one’s
own. “Cultural conservatism” is his last false nationalism, or the attempt to identify uniqueness of
culture of patterns or culture from a nation’s history without account for the passage of time. He
asserts that Russia in the post-Petrine era falls in the most former category, or that any Russian
“nationalism” since that time has been merely a thinly veiled attempt at being more European and
not “nationalism” at all.
He then moves to discuss what nationalism should mean to Russia in the post-Petrine period, after Peter
introduced the dangerous false nationalism and idealization of European culture that divided the upper
and lower classes of Russia and the old Rus’ from the new Russia. It is his assertion that this
nationalism should be determined by the very unique development of Russian history, that it is to
say, that the Russian state should not be assumed to have risen from the ashes of even Kievan Rus’,
but that “Russia-Eurasia” is the rightful heir of the Golden Horde and the legacy of Genghis
Khan. Russia, then, is not European (or Asian, really), but Eurasian, and it is from this point that
the views of the Eurasianists stem.
The final very important point is a more abstract one, discussed in his essay, “At the
Door: Reaction? Revolution?” After a discussion of the differences between leftist and rightist
ideologies, he explains that European history has travelled along a practically straight line a
leftward direction (democracy-socialism-communism, constitutional monarchy-democratic republic-Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic). This hypothetical line, however, is not infinite and has, the Eurasianists
believe, reached its end, and that these leftist ideologies are becoming decrepit, deteriorating. It
seems then, that as the younger generations look begin to look back to the right, the future will lead
to reactionary rightism, but he does not believe historical development can return on the same line –
instead, he believes that this will not be reactionary except in optical illusion, but will be rather
a jump to a whole new line, a whole new plane. In order to move forward, he asserts, the creation of
something new in place of a used-up history is necessary. The European ideological path has reached
its end, and should be abandoned in favor of something new.
}s{
Bohachevsky-Chomiak
}t{}8{}
<>Trubetskoi,Nikolai
Srg*| a{890}b{}e{938}n{MNG EUAist}o{
}p{
>Evraziistvo|>EUA| Evraziisty Eurasianists
[ID] CF=Leont'ev,K|
Trubetskoi,N| Savitskii,PN| Suvchinskii,PP| Chkheidze,KxtAxr| Arapov,P|
Efron,Srg| Mirskii,D| Florovskii,G (brief ~~)| Influenced BrdN
PRG & PRS? location of Evraziĭskoe knigoizdatel'stvo| jrn Evraziiskii sbornik
[SMT] edt=AleNxiIvn|
}r{
SAC NARRATIVE EXTENSION
KNIGHT =
Common Slavic Element...
Legacy of Genghis Khan
...
Letters and
Notes
Puti Evrazii
Three Phil. Studies|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Tsereteli,I. G| a{
}r{
*1917ap:Crisis in Moh.RR| ((prm vsp VRM))
}s{
--|>Roobol,W. H|_Tsereteli--A Democrat in the Russian Revolution: A Political Biography
}t{}8{}
<>Tugan-Baranovsky,M. I| a{}n{prl
krx zvd}o{ekn
}r{
*1898:SPB|_Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem| Translated as
The Russian Factory in the 19th Century|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Tyrkova-Vil'iams,Ariadna|>Tyrkova-Williams,A| a{869}e{962}n{}o{plt.ddd
[ID]
}g{hsb= Williams,A
}r{
*1919:|_From Liberty to
Brest-Litovsk: The First Year of the Russian Revolution [1917]
*1935:|_Cheerful Giver | ((re.her hsb Williams,A))
*1952:NYC| *1990:LND, ed#2|_Na putiakh k svobode| ((GRS:115 prm vsp gte RREV1|
?Part of 3vv vsp, including To,chego bol'she ne budet [SMT noUO]))
--|On KDs in Moh.RR
}s}s{}t{}8{}
<>United States Department of State|
a{}n{R&A}o{}
*1920:WDC| Foreign Policy Association|_Russian-American Relations,March,1917-March,1920: Documents and Papers
(Westport CN: 1977)
--|_American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China| v9= Russia and the Manchurian Borderland| v10= The Russo-Japanese
War| (( RJ.wrx USA-CHN irx))
--|_Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Post Records: Russia and the Soviet Union. 3 parts: “Russia: From Czar to
Commissars,1914-1918”. flm (10 reels). “The Soviet Union,1919-1933”. flm (75
reels). “The Soviet Union,1934-1941”. University Publications of America,flm (60
reels)
*1940:WDC|_Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers,1914-1920|
2vv|
*1931+:WDC|_Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States,1918-1919: Russia| 4vv|
--|_Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and the USSR,1910-1929|
((Microcopy of National
Archives holdings #316,177 rolls=
#1-6(lists)
#7-18 (1910mr:1918no;)
#97-105 (1914mr:1918se;Calamities & disasters,etc)
#107(?)
#109-110(?)
#116-117(NoUO 1913se:1918de; Financial conditions)
#132-34(?)
#142 (NoUO 1910mr:1919au; Railways rrd)
#164 (NoUO file #861.797-861.7971)]
See 8x11 US Nat.RXV for pbd ndx~=
*1966:WDC| “Pamphlet Accompanying Microcopy No.
316: Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Russian
and the Soviet Union,1910-29”, and
*1976:WDC| “Purport Lists for the Department
of State Decimal File,1910-1944”| See Univ. Pubs. Confidential. flm DK246.U5 cf. Z2491.U4
))
<>United States Department of State, Division of Near Eastern Affairs. Periodical Report on Matters Relating to Russia [1917de01:1919je; ]. WDC:|
<>United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Bolshevik Propaganda: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary,United States Senate,65th Congress,Third Session. WDC: 1919
<>Vekhi [Landmarks; Signposts] prm RREV1
<>Vernadskii,George Vxr*| a{}n{]o{hst
}p{
~~EAS
}r{
Nachertanie russkoi istorii.
S prilozheniem "Geopoliticheskikh zametok po russkoi istorii" by
Savitskii,PN
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Vinogradov,Pavel [Vinogradoff,Paul here]| a{}n{plt stt.dmx Zmv
lbx unv.prf}o{Professor and political theorist
}m{
*1914:1915; Lectured in London [SAC]
}r{
*1915:L.ENG|_Self-government in Russia|
((As WW1 got under way, V tried to explain to English why Russia was a good parliamentary ally =
|pp.50ff: local self government in the time of Alexander II| Tver Province gentry projects for a Russian political future were
central to Vinogradov's vision [ID]
| V shared the Tver gentry disgust with social/service hierarchies =
(1) superannuated but still enforced medieval social estates [sosloviia] and
(2) bureaucratic [chinovnik] arbitrariness built into the autocratic Table of Ranks
Vinogradov proposed a 3rd alternative = Democratic [vsesoslovnye] self government | Preliminary stages of democratic rule in Russia
might result in gentry and other elite social forces predominating over the laboring masses, but it would be step one
in a process that would lead toward
authentic democratic self rule
))
--|_The_Russian Problem|
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Vodovozov,V. V., ed|>VdvVV| a{
}r{
*1906:SPB|_Sbornik programm politicheskikh partii v Rossii| 4+? volumes| ((sbr.prm plt.pty RREV1 lgc))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Voline [pseud. of V. M. >Eichenbaum,VM]|
a{}n{}o{
}r{
Nineteen-Seventeen: The Russian Revolution Betrayed
--|_La révolution inconnue,1917-1921: Documentation inédite?? sur las Révolution russe. PRS: 1969. DK265.E4
--|_The_Unknown Revolution,1917-1921. NY: 1974| ((NoUO))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Vol'skii,NV|>Valentinov|
a{879e{964}n{}o{
}r{
*1969:M.AnnArbor, UMP|_The_Early Years of Lenin| ((Lnn.chd))
--| vsp Lnn in Moh.RR
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Vyshinskii,Andrei| a{}n{}o{
}r{
*1948:NYC|_The_Law of the Soviet State| tlng of “Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo”|
((342.47 V998))
*1952:MVA|_Lenin and Stalin: The Great Organizers of the Soviet State| tlng of
ed#2| ((UO))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Wade,Rex A.,ed| a{}
*1989:FL Gulf Breeze|_Documents of Soviet History| v1= The Bolshevik Revolution
and Establishment of the Soviet State|
<>Wallace,Donald McKenzie| a{841}e{919}n{}o{Englishman, a long-time visitor
to Russia and astute observer
}r{
--|_Russia|
SEVERAL EDITIONS, 1877,
1881 [TXT], 1905, 1910. 1912| ((krx trv| Only
about 2/3 of 1912 edition got into Cyril Black's pb ed))
}s{
*1971:OSP#4:73-88|>Harrison,W| “Mackenzie Wallace's View of the Russian Revolution, 1905-1907”| ((trv))
}t{}8{}
<>Walling,William English| a{
}r{
*1908:NYC|_Russia’s Message: The True World Import of the Revolution| |
((Several editions| prm RREV1 mnt USA1~~))
*1917:NYC|_Russia’s Message: The People Against the Czar| ((947.08 W158| prm USA1~~ REV| See Kennan,RUS leaves the wrx,p. 266ff))
*[1918]:[n.p.]|_Bolshevism Self-Revealed| ((335.4 P 191 v. 1 no. 21| prm USA1~~ REV))
}s{
[W]
[W]
}t{}8{}
<>Weber,Max| a{}n{prf}o{Great
German sociologist learned Russian in order to follow portentous 1905 Revolution
[LOOP]
}r{
*1894: See MWG 1/3| “Developmental Tendencies in
the Situation of East Elban Rural Labourers” [“Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage
der ostelbischen Landarbeiter”] Translated with an “Introduction to Weber” by
Keith Tribe. In Economy and Society 8 (1979): 172-205. H1.E25
*1895:| “Der Nationalstaat und die
Volkswirtschaftspolitik”| Inaugural address at Freiburg U| ((In GPS (3rd
edition,1971)( [1st ed. Munich: 1920;2nd: 1958]. Translated in part as “Economic
Policy and the National Interest in Imperial Germany”. In WST: 263-8))
--|_The_Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parson. Second ed.,with Introduction by
Anthony Giddens. LND: Allen & Unwin,1976 [NYC: Scribner,1977]
--| “Die protestantischen Sekten und der Geist
des Kapitalismus”. Translated as “The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of
Capitalism”. FMW: 302-22,450-9
--| “The Relations of the Rural Community to
other Branches of Social Science”. Translated by Charles Seidenadel in Congress
of Arts and Science,Universal Exposition,St. Louis,1904. Boston MA:
1906;reprinted with alterations, FMW: 363-85
*1905je06:Heidelberger Zeitung#131 [Zur Rede
Alfred Hettners über “Das europäische Russland: Volk, Staat und Kultur”], and
*1905je06:Heidelberger Tageblatt#131| “Russland-Abend”| These are two newspaper
reports on Max Weber’s critique of Hettner’s presentation, “Russland-Abend im
nationalsozialen Verein”| Reprinted in MWG1/10:698-700| ((| no Weber,Wbr))
*1906fe:ASS#22| “Zur Lage der bürgerlichen
Demokratie in Russland”| An appendix titled “Zur Beurteilung der gegenwärtigen
politischen Entwicklung Russlands” which also included S. J. Zhivago’s [Giwago
here] review of the constitutional project published by the newly formed Russian
political party Soiuz Osvobozhdeniia
[Petr Struve, ed., Loi fondamentale de
l’Empire Russe (Paris:1905)] Reprinted in MWG1/10:86-279|
Translated in part as “The Prospects for
Liberal Democracy in Tsarist Russia” in WST:269-284| GO
Istoricheskii ocherk blw| ((lbx dmk
RUS RREV1| sig. passages:GO FMW:71-2 & Moore| cynical; contemptuous of fa?? of
rxn,sceptical re.KDs| Fall of tsar leads to bureaucratic authoritarianism, not cst dmk| Only disasterous EUR wrx can lead to overthrow of N-2
Mommsen,WbrP:7(both pieces re.RUS essentially journalistic, to keep GRM
informed); 29; 14(re.rigidity of lbx plt; missing opportunities);
43(Realpolitik); 56f(RREV1)| Weber,Wbr:327-8))
*1906au:ASS#23| “Russlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus”| Reprinted in MWG1/10:293-684| ((RUS cst|
Mommsen,WbrP:56f,29| GO Wbr.RREV1))
*1906|_Russian Revolutions| *1995:I.NY:CUP=Abridged and translated| ((>Wbr.RREV| trx plt.clt
STUDENT REVIEW =
Max Weber’s work Russian Revolutions come as a four-part collection of his Russianist essays. These four
essays can generally be split into two distinct categories of both topic and length, based on two
different thematic moods that run through Weber’s works as a result of world events happening during
the different periods in which the essays were written. The essays’ topics illustrate to the reader
the gradual transition of a political culture still roughly confined to a small group of literate
political activists and the Tsarist bureaucracy in 1905 into a relatively larger body of the Russian public in 1917.
The first group is comprised of the two larger essays covering the Russian revolutions in 1905: “Bourgeois Democracy
in Russia” and “Russia’s Transition to Pseudo-constitutionalism.” The general mood that runs through these two
texts can be described as an expression of Weber’s sympathy to the plight of idealistic liberalism
struggling in the Russian Empire. Beginning with “Bourgeois Democracy in Russia,” Weber deals with
the conflicts and dilemmas facing the anti-autocratic movement, followed by “Pseudo-democracy in Russia,” which
is more centrally focused on the mechanisms of the Tsarist political system.
Following Russia’s defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Tsar Nicholas II moved to stabilize his regime by
alleviating the pressure of liberal reform movements (the core of which were the local administrative
zemstvos) by offering some kind of accommodation – to no avail. The reformists pressed hard for the
establishment of civil liberties and a functioning parliament but continue to be unsatisfied with offers
made by the autocracy. Culminating with the 9/22 January “Bloody Sunday,” in which civil liberties
demonstrators were massacred outside the Tsar’s Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, the ensuing upheaval
finally extracted a promise from the autocracy for the civil rights of freedom of thought, speech,
assembly/association, as well as a promise of habeas corpus and increased popular representation, coupled
with a provision calling for all Imperial laws to be approved by the Imperial Duma – promises that have
been attributed to an attempt by Nicholas II and Count Sergei Witte to split the opposition into liberal
reformists and Marxist radicals.
Weber saw this episode as an indication that the Tsar had alienated his subjects beyond the possibility
of compromise, though Weber conceded that the fall of the Tsar, however inevitable, would still require
a war. Weber goes on to describe three elements of the liberal-democratic forces that would be responsible
for pushing Russia towards federalist democracy once the autocracy crumbled. Those three elements are:
1. The bourgeois “status-group,” who could be considered bourgeois in “attitude to life and education” and
should be distinguished from the industrial bourgeois social class that possessed an inconsistent
commitment to notions of liberal constitutionalism, often even expressing overt hostility to it.
2. Landed members of the zemstvos, members of the Union of Liberation and the Constitutional Democratic Party.
3. The quasi-proletarian intelligentsia, such as doctors, teachers, journalists, etc.
The accomplishments of these three different elements, particularly through acts by the zemstvos in the
fields of education, health and road construction despite obstruction by the autocracy, Weber claims, flew
in the face of assertions that the Russians were unable to exercise effective self-governance. However, despite
these accomplishments, Weber sees only a slim chance of a successful establishment of a liberal-democracy
in Russia, as any improvement in the status of peasants was more likely to aid communist radicals
rather than liberal reformers. Additionally, liberal reform movements faced obstacles from the
Church, which had high resistance to change; difficulties arising from the peasant class, which
was already experienced with concepts of communism and wary of notions of individualism; the challenge
of cooperation from a volatile petty bourgeoisie; and the opposition by socialist radicals opposed
to ideas of a necessary “bourgeois step” preached by Marxism.
In the second essay, “Pseudo-democracy in Russia,” Weber examines the political systems of the Tsarist
regime, particularly by focusing on the “interim ministry,” which refers to the period of time between
Count Sergei Witte’s appoitment to the position of Premier in October 1905 to his resignation in April 1906.
Reeling from concessions made to the reformers, Nicholas worked to reinstate his authority through the
cooperation of the Cossacks, police and army in instituting harsh repression upon perceived threats
to the established power structure. Running parallel to these more aggressive endeavors was the task
undertaken by the government to “create institutions which would give the outward impression abroad
that the Manifesto of 17 October was being carried out, though without seriously jeopardizing the
power of the bureaucracy.” Weber points out that the motives for presenting an image of a flowering
Russian democracy were rooted in Russia’s status as a “debtor state.” As a debtor state, Russia relied
heavily on foreign investments and loans, whose preconditions demanded social order and a
western-style constitution.
In actuality it was inevitable that those rights granted in the October Manifesto would amount to
nothing more than an empty promise, as the protection of such rights requires certain institutional
structures that Russia lacked. As Weber explains, rights such as habeas corpus “assume the existence
of bodies with constitutionally guaranteed independence, which can exercise effective control of
the administration.” Rather than establish such bodies, Weber continues, the imperial bureaucracy
only had “police interests.”
To further ensure the ineffectiveness of any popular representation in government, the administration
coupled its promises of strengthening the Imperial Duma’s governmental oversight abilities with an
electoral process so complicated so as to confound attempts to turn the Duma into a successful
means of popular expression. The additional prohibition of political meetings eventually convinced
the public that “whatever the bureaucracy banned must necessarily be something excellent.”
In the end, the duality of granting and promising specific civil liberties while simultaneously
taking such extravagant efforts to render those liberties ineffectual proved to be so much more
destructive to the bureaucracy and bred so much more hatred among imperial subjects than outright
repression. It was by this practice that Weber claims the bureaucracy established a superficial
pseudo-democracy rather than instituting genuine reforms.
The second part of “Russian Revolutions” comprises two significantly smaller essays: “Russia’s
Transition to Pseudo-democracy” and “The Russian Revolution and Peace.” Contrary to the two
earlier essays, these later works began in 1917 and have been said to display a strongly
nationalistic, defensive side to Weber, wary and pessimistic of notions of a Russo-Germanic
peace arising out of the Russian Revolutions of 1917. For Weber, the success of the 1917
revolutions was particularly shocking for three main reasons:
1. The Stolypin agrarian reforms had so definitively split the peasant classes into two
categories: those with land and the mass of the poor and land-hungry.
2. Despite significant growth since the 1905 revolutions, the body of radicalized
proletariats was still quite small.
3. Those radicalized proletariats were unable to establish a lasting alliance with the
bourgeois, whose credit was necessary to finance “the organization of a permanent
administration.”
Despite the successful destruction of the Tsarist autocracy, Weber still saw little hope of
the forging of a peace agreement between Germany and Russia (which he saw as Germany’s chief
threat due to Russia’s explosion in population) because of the disinterest in peace
expressed by the Provisional Government under Miliukov. As Weber saw it, the radical
elements of the Duma and bigger landowners supporting the Provisional Government had
identified two main benefits to the continuation of the war:
1. The war would keep revolutionary elements of the peasant class occupied in the trenches
and contained within a system of military discipline.
2. The foreign banks, whose funds the Provisional Government relied on, would only
grant loans if the peasants were suppressed and Russia remained in the war.
Weber was equally pessimistic of the motives and ability of the Petrograd Soviet to
generate a significant shift in what Weber saw as a tendency towards imperial
expansionism. Weber expands on this concern by describing a test of imperialism for
the Soviet’s chairman, Chkheidze: “Does the politician in question restrict himself
to cleaning up his own backyard, i.e. to creating a democracy within his own country or
not? If he does not, he is an imperialist, whether or not he intends to be.” Citing
Chkheidze’s call for the Germans to depose the Kaiser as a failure of the test, Weber
pushes his offensive, stating “whether Russian imperialism takes a despotic, a liberal
or a socialist form is neither here nor there.”
All in all this left Russia waiting for a real federalist democracy, rendering the
current state of political limbo a “pseudo-democracy,” leaving a lingering threat to
liberal democratic ideals and dashing hopes of a swift end to Russia’s participation
in the Great War.
))
*1906:KIV, I.I.Chokolov|_Istoricheskii ocherk osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia v Rossii i polozhenie
burzhuaznoi demokratii| ((SIE| noUO| MWG 1/10:78f| prm| G/Zur Lage| in 8 parts))
*1909mr17:Russkie vedomosti#62| “Maks Veber o Germanii i svobodnoi Rossii” [1909 March 20]| A
letter to the editor, reprinted with a German version (“Ueber die Erneuerung
Russlands”) in MWG 1/10:689-90
*1917ap26:Frankfurter Zeitung| “Parlamentarisierung
und Föderalismus”| ((frm Mommsen,WbrP cst fdr))
*1946:O.ENG|_From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology. Translated by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills|
*1978:C.ENG|_Selections in
Translation. Edited by W. G. Runciman| ((>WST|
HM51.W396))
}s{
Baron (1970)
Honigsheim,Paul| *1949:Agricultural History#23:179-213| “Max Weber as Historian
of Agriculture and Rural Life”
Kimball (1991se)
Pipes (1955ap)
>Scaff,Lawrence A, and Thomas Clay Arnold| “Class
and the Theory of History: Marx on France and Weber on Russia”| In Antonio,
Weber-Marx: 190-214
}t{}8{}
<>Weidlé,Wladimir|>Veidle,Vladimir| a{895}n{}e{979
}r{
|_Russia Absent and Present| Translation
of La Russie absente et presente, v1 of “Triptique européen” (PRS:1949) | ((gnr REV.trx RUS2 plt.clt|pst also on
Goethe & PuwAS
Veidle described the tragic evolution of an immensely broad popular culture in Russia
(not unlike Dostoevskii's notion of wirokaia natura [ID]). He described how an
astonishing high culture arose on that flat popular culture. Russian high civilization was a thin ascending line of creative
brilliance, stretching to the loftiest reaches, but it had feeble roots in the broad popular culture. We might illustrate these lines
thusly =
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
___________________|___________________
Both popular culture and high civilization were to be admired and respected for their various roles in
national life. The issue was the way in which each of these lines just barely
interacted with one another. In a healthy national environment, high and low culture nurtured one another. But
in Russia, high culture was alien to, alienated from, the broad culture and
unstable in its contact with "the people". Veidle imagined a more normal, a more
sound, relationship between popular culture and high culture in the form of a
triangle, broad at the base and high at the apex, but with stable sloping
foundations on the base. In Russia, the image was a low thin (but unusually
broad) horizontal line from which, at one narrow point, there arose a lofty thin and wobbly (but unexpectedly
high-reaching) vertical line
))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Williams,Albert Rhys|
a{}n{}o{jrn
}g{wfe= Tyrkova-Vil'iams
}r{
*1919:NYC|_The_Bolsheviks and the Soviets : the present government of Russia, what the Soviets have done, difficulties the Soviets faced, six charges
against the Soviets, the Soviet leaders and the Bolsheviks, the Russians and America
*1969:CHI|_Journey into Revolution: Petrograd,1917-1918
*1919:NYC|_Lenin: The Man and His Work. With the impressions of Col. Raymond Robins and Arthur Ransome
*1919:NYC, People's Council| Russian Soviets: Seventy-six Questions and Answers on the Workingman's Government of Russia| ((342.47 W67))
*1921:NYC|_Through the Russian Revolution| A facsimile edition of 1921 edition| Biographical sketch by Joshua Kunitz| NYC: 1967| ((DK265.W46; 947.084 W67))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Witte,Sergei
Yuli|>Vitte,Sergei Yuli| a{
}r{
*1899| “A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on
the Industrialization of Imperial Russia”| A translation,with an introductory
article, by T. H. Von Laue of Witte’s “Report of the Minister of Finance to His
Majesty on the Necessity of Formulating and Thereafter Steadfastly Adhering to a
Definite Program of a Commercial and Industrial Policy of the Empire”| In
*1954mr:JMH#26,1:60-74|
((xrx prm ekn mfgR Wtt MPR| Vsepodanneishii doklad ministra finansov S. Yu.
Vitte....; reprint: Adams.IR:))
*1899|_Samoderzhavie
i zemstvo| ((flm| prm stt Zmv))
*1905oc18:Pravitel’stvennyi
vestnik published Witte memo to TSR [H05:289-92]
*1905de:SPB|_Zapiska
po krest’ianskomu delu| ((GRS:110,120| prm skz RREV1|
cf.bbl/Krivoshein))
*1921:NYC|_The_Memoirs of Count Witte| 2 eds| Translated and abridged by A.
Yarmolinsky| ((prm Wtt vsp ekn stt.srv vsp [Stearns,Pageant:672-4] | G/Anan’ich
& Ganelin re. crt of Wtt.vsp))
1938:Ph.PA|_Background for Chamberlain: A Turn of the Century Plan for European Peace [An excerpt
from author’s Memoirs]| ((341.69 W783| prm vsp pcx irx))
| Bakhmet.RXV Columbia U| ((GRS:221))
| on SBR.rrd; USA1~~ desc [Walsh, Readings] prm
| on A.3 [Walsh,Readings] prm
| ekn [RRC,2] prm
}s{
Harcave
Mehlinger
Struve
Von Laue
}t{}8{}
<>Wittfogel,Karl
August| a{896}b{}c{}d{}e{988}n{Mrx MRX Lnn rvs.trx AMP RREV3}o{
}r{
*1957:NHC|_Oriental
Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power| (NB! chapters 9 &
10)| ((>WOD|
p429 & 488,re. Zur Lage,Wbr noticed
“Asiatic” qualities of RUS| Is Russia a European state and culture?
2007:Penguin
Custom Edition, devoted to “Interpretations of the Western World” opens with a
section on “Early Empire, the State, and natural Resources: The Wittfogel
Thesis”. The publisher described the section with these words: “Among the more
influential theories concerning the origin of state power in early civilizations
was the thesis developed by Karl Wittfogel (1896–1988): that early states
developed totalitarian political and social structures in order to develop and
control water resources for intensive agriculture, which in turn required the
ability to command labor”. The essays presented in Wittfogel, “The Hydraulic
Civilizations”, in
Man’s Role in
Changing the Face of the Earth [general principles with limited
relation to Russia]
))
*1960jy:
WoP:487-508| “The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution”|
(())
| “Russia and the East: A Comparison and
Contrast”| SlR, reprinted in
TDU:323-358
with full discussion| (())
}s{
Plekhanov
*1973:Current Anthropology#14.5:|>Mitchell,William| “The Hydraulic Hypothesis: A
Reappraisal” [TXT]|
((Critique of Wittfogel's critics))
}t{}8{}
<>Wrangel,Peter|>Vrangel',Petr| a{}n{}o{
}r{
--|_The_Memoirs of General Wrangel
--|_White armies Gwrx in Moh.RR|
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Yakhontov,Arkadii N| a{
}r{
--|_Prologue to Revolution: Notes of A. N. Iakhontov on the Secret Meetings of the Council of Ministers,1915|
((RREV2 SoM))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Yanov,Alexander| a{}n{}o{
}r{
--|_The_Drama of the Soviet 1960s:A Lost Reform
*1978:|_The_Russian New Right
--|_Russian Challenge and the Year 2000
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Yusupov,Feliks F. [Youssoupoff]|
*1954:LND|_Lost Splendor
*1927:NYC|_Rasputin
<>Zaichnevskii,Petr| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{prc.MoR}o{rvs
std
}l{
MVA.unv
}p{
}r{
*1862my:Proclamation "Molodaia Rossiia" [Young Russia] | Translated
by Jeffrey Rooney in *1982ja:RRe#41,1:47-59| "The Question of Revolutionary
Organization in
the Career of Petr Grigor' evich Zaichnevskii"
}s{
}t{
}8{}
<>Zamiatin,Evgenyi
|_We|_My [an anti-utopian science fiction]| ((SSR blt))
<>Zeman,Z. A. B., ed| a{}
*1958:LND|_Germany and the Revolution in Russia,1915-1918:Documents from the
Archives of the German Foreign Ministry| ((prm irx GRM RREV))
<>Zen'kovskii,Vasilii Vxi*| a{881jy04}b{Prokurov (Xmel'nickii)}c{PRS}d{}e{962au05}n{gte}o{rlg phl
}m{
*1915:KIV.unv prf psx
*1918:Skoropadskii (Hetman) gvt mnrer of rlg~
*1919:gte
*1926+:PRS Russian Orthodox Institute prf in Paris from 1926
*1942:Ordained
}r{
*1914:KIV|_Problema psikhicheskoi prichinnosti
*1924:LPZ|_Psikhologiia detstva
*1926:PRS|_Russkie mysliteli i Evropa| ed#1|
*1934:PRS|_Problemy vospitaniia v svete khristianskoi antropologii
*1948:1950; PRS|_Istoriia russkoi filosofii| 2vv
*1953:AnnArbor MI,American Council of Learned Societies|_Russian Thinkers and Europe| Tlng 1926:ed#1|
*1955:PRS|_Russkie mysliteli i Evropa: Kritika Evropeiskoi kul'tury u russkikh
myslitelei| ed#2| ((B4231.Z5| ch6 on Konst.Leontiev & EUAians))
*1957:PRS|_Apologetika
*1961:PRS|_N. V. Gogol
*1961:1964; PRS|_Osnovy khristianskoi filosofii| 2vv
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Zetkin,Clara| a{}
on RREV1 ((G/PREV:187-91))
<>Zubov,V| a{}n{}o{stt.srv
}p{
*1917oc:Gatchina Palace mzm dtr| WW1 vsp in Moh.RR
~~KDs [Rosenberg.lbx]
}r{
*1968:MNC|_Stradnye gody Rossii| ((WW1 RREV vsp))
}s{(BSE3) Mints.RREV,3:160
}t{
}8{}
<>Adams,Arthur E., ed| a{}
|_Imperial Russia After 1861| Problems in European Civilization (Heath)|
B.MA:1965| ((>Adams.IR| noUO|
G/SUMMIT| sbr| rdx ntg:
Berlin,I ppx mrl condemnation of RUS plt & pbl systems|
Meyer,A Lnn prl rvs|
Fischer,G lbx before RREV1 oscillation twixt “Small deeds” & “senseless dreams”|
Karpovich,M After RREV1, REV or coop w/stt?|
Adams,A Pbd cnx|
Von Laue’s tlng of 899:Witte memo|
Strakhovsky,L Stp|
Volin,L skz improving|
Gershenkron,A mfg progress improving ekn
Karpovich,M modernization making REV more remote|
Black,C No plt alternative to stt|
Treadgold N-2 bulwark against rfm
))
|_The_Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory: Why and
How?|>Adams.RR (1967)|>Adams.RR2 (1972)| 3rd ed.
EBy Suny,G., and Adams|>S&Adams.RR3
Miliukov,P from RUS ed. of Mlk.RR
Pares on Rasputin
Liashchenko on WW1, econ. and social consequences:15-23
Chamberlin on spontaneity of RREV2
Trotsky.RR on workers leading rev
Chernov.RR on R foreign policy
Mitrany,David| primitive peasant war gained momentum (from MvP)
Owen,Lancelot on peasants
Pipes on national minorities
Deutscher on SDs(b) leading workers toward rev
Kerensky on why Prov. Gov failed and why SDs(b)~ succeeded (*1932jyi:SEER)
Strakhovskii,Leonid on Kerensky betraying RUS
Fainsod on SDs(b) organization as key to victory
HCP on how Marxist-Leninist Theory guided SDs(b)
))
<>Adelman,Jonathan R| a{}n{wrx.rvs ~~hst trx
)r(
*1980:Boulder CO|_Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and Chinese People's Liberation Armies| (( UA837.A62))
*1985:Boulder CO|_Revolutions, Armies, and War: A Political
History| ((U39.A34))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Allworth,Edward,
ed| a{}
*1989:Durham|_Central Asia| ((dk851.c46| sbr.ndr USA5.MPR.ntn CAS))
|_Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule|NYC:1967| ((sbr CAS ntn CASA))
|_Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia|NYC:1973| ((dk855.4.a63|sbr))
|_Soviet Nationalities Problems|NYC:1971| ((sbr|ntn))
|_Tatars of the Crimea: Their struggle for survival; original studies from North America, unofficial and official documents
from Czarist and Soviet sources|Durham:DUP,1988| ((DK508.9.K78T37 |394p| prm/ndr ntn TTR))
<>Amari| a{}n{DKB}o{}
*1958:NYC|_The_Decembrists...| ((
STUDENT REVIEW = The Decembrists [deals with] the events that led up
to the December 14th, 1825, uprising [and describes] what happened to those who were
involved. Starting with a group of upper class military commanders who
had come back from fighting Napoleon in Paris, and how they sought to
better Russian through organizing secret societies, and their eventual
violent mutiny of the new Tsar.
The secret groups that were set up started in social gatherings where
revolutionary thoughts were discussed amongst those elites who had
returned from Paris. in January, 1821, the groups had it first meeting
in Moscow. This meeting was called The Congress of the Union of Common
Weal. This event was significant because it was the first nationwide
secret political congress in the history of Russia, However, the ending
decision of the congress was to abolish the congress. However, one of
the leading members, Pestel, wanted to keep the movement alive. He
became the leader of the Souther Society, and began to continued the
work of the secret society. There was also another society that was set
up without any knowledge of the previous societies. This was called the
Society of united Slovs, and it wasn't until a member of the Southern
society attempted to recruit a member of the United Slavs that the
groups became aware of each other's existence. However, none of these
groups did much more than talk or plan. It seemed that the groups were
all talk, despite some of the members eagerly volunteering to
assassinate the Tsar, Alexander. It wasn't until Alexanders death, that
anything actually happened.
On November, 19th 1825, Alexander died of malaria. The next person up
to be the Tsar was his brother Constantine. However, Constantine did not
want the title. But another brother, Nichols who was third in line for
the throne, did not know about this, and he ordered all of the soldiers
to pledge allegiance to Tsar Constantine. After finding out about
Constantine's lack of desire for the throne, he gained control. This was
when the groups decided to put their plan into action. On December 14th
1825, Nicholas ordered the soldiers to now pledge allegiance to him. But
the high ranking officers involved in the secret societies decided that
they were going to convince their troops to not take the pledge and
fight in the name of Constantine against Nicholas. They mutinied against
the man who wanted to be Tsar, in the name of the man who turned down
the job. The ordeal turned into a stand still between the mutineers, and
those who were loyal to the New Tsar. Just as the members of the secret
society assumed, Russians did not want to kill Russians. Eventually
artillery was used from Nicholas's side, and it was over. All of the
conspirators were rounded up and arrested.
Nicholas took his time interviewing and recording everything from his
new prisoners. Many of them told him whatever he wanted to hear, but
many held out with the names of the fellow conspirators. Nicholas then
set up a committee called "The Secret Committee to Investigate the
Members of the Criminal Society" in odder to get the the bottom of what
had happened. In the end, the main five figures involved (including
Ryleyev, Pestel, Sergei Muraviov-Apostl, and Kakhovsky) were sentenced
to death, and the rest were sentenced to hard labor in Siberia. Oddly
enough, the death sentence had been outlawed in Russian, but they were
able to find a heinous crime loop hole. Russian must have been out of
practice, because three of the four ropes snapped, requiring them to be
hung again(which was also against the law).
Those sent to Siberia had many troubles as well. The first prison they
were sent to was very hard for the Decembrist. they were not used to
hard work, and being locked in small dark rooms. However, they were soon
transferred to Chita, where Nicholas had sent General Leparsky to look
after them. This was a much better place, and was almost comfortable.
Slowly, as the years passed, they were released, but still required to
live in Siberia. It was not until the death of Nicholas, that his son,
Alexander II, pardoned the Decembrist and let them leave(but not to
enter Moscow or St. Petersburg). At this point there were only fifteen
of them left alive. On February 17th, 1892, the last of the Decembrist
died, but their story, and ideas lived on.
The uprising of the secret societies, or Decembrists, accomplished very
little in comparison to what they wanted to achieve, but many people
looked up to what they did, even Nicholas on his death bed had wished he
was made some changes that they had wanted. When the remaining
Decembrists returned from Siberia, they were seen as political
heroes, and they were, [they laid] the groundwork for many future
revolutions.
))
<>Andreev,A. M [Andreyev]. The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on the Eve of the October Revolution,March-October,1917. Moscow: 1971| ((SOV))
<>Anweiler,Oskar| a{
}r{
*1968:In Pipes.RR| On
*1917sp:plt idl of PGR SOV leaders
*1979:In Brower.RR| Ideal of rvs dmk
*1974:NYC|_The_Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils,1905-1921|
((rvs plt.clt rvs.SOV RREV1 RREV3 Gwrx
STUDENT REVIEW =
First an expansion on what a “Soviet,” is in the Russian experience. They were councils of delegates elected by workers. The first appeared during the 1905 revolution, then disappeared (via persecution) until reappearing in 1917. One could interpret them as a grassroots movement of an experiment in direct democracy; although the Soviets were dominated by the Socialist parties, they were not the creation of the parties. The delegates were subject to instant recall; this was really the only constant electoral rule in the Soviets. Delegates were chosen at the factory level and larger factories were often under represented. The rules for number of workers per delegate varied from place to place. In 1917 soldiers and sailors also formed Soviets; later still and less pervasively peasants did as well. A hierarchy of Soviets was also formed as they proliferated at the municipal, oblast and later national level. The power structure, like the electoral rules, was not well defined; the Petrograd Soviet and the various manifestations of a national Soviet competed for influence. Throughout most of the eight month period of the Provisional Government the Soviets were dominated by moderate Socialist parties who relied on the Provisional Government to carry out the Bourgeois revolution. They assumed a supervisory role, something akin to a veto power, making sure that the Provisional Government advanced the revolution on a sufficiently revolutionary path.
This book can be broken into three parts: the first part examines the intellectual roots of communes and its development in socialist ideology up till 1917. Although Marx embraced the 1871 Paris Commune for its system of government, the council movement (and the local autonomy that came with it) was the ideological domain of anarchists and utopian socialists. Even though Marx believed that the state would wither away, this would happen only a dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin in his earlier works closely adhered to this belief and espoused a strong central government. The other radical socialist parties, the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, supported the Soviet movement more that the Bolsheviks did. Even so, the Bolsheviks were prominent in the Moscow Soviet in 1905.
The second section of this book examines the eight month course of the Provisional Government. It continues the intellectual history of the first section by studying Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders’ attitudes towards and writings on the Soviets. When Lenin arrived back in Russia in April of 1917 he published his “April Theses” and put his support behind the Soviets. “All power to the Soviets,” became the Bolsheviks catchphrase. The Soviets alone had the right to rule and should assume all power. This belief certainly was something of a departure for Lenin, and he had to fight to get broad party support for his idea. Other parties still put faith in the Constituent Assembly. The Mensheviks, Kerensky and others thought the Provisional Government would disappear after the calling of the Constituent Assembly.
The Bolsheviks made good populist politicians. Their clever agitations engendered resentment among the working class towards the Provisional Government. They had their most success getting support at the factory committee level, particularly in the traditional urban areas. Eventually the Bolsheviks gained an overall majority in the Petrograd Soviet (they had a large majority among worker delegates, but only constituted a minority of solider delegates) that they used to induce the military revolutionary committee
[mlt] (a committee formed by military troops to protect the gains of the revolution from counter revolutionaries) to seize power. This was in the name of the Soviets; the Bolsheviks were not powerful enough to seize power in their name. Still there was immediate reaction against this appropriation of power. Postal and Railway workers went on strike, and counterproductively the Mensheviks and SRs walked out of Soviet meetings. The third section of this book deals with the various ways the Bolsheviks compromised the power of the Soviets after October and set up a dictatorship not of the Soviets or even of the working class, but of the Bolsheviks.
Perhaps because of how dated this work is (mid 1950s) it doesn’t seem to organize itself around a single thesis, or offer much independent analysis, but I think the author’s (never explicitly stated) opinion is that Lenin was willing to flip flop ideologically depending on what he felt was the most advantageous to his gaining power. He didn’t really want all power to the Soviets (indeed after the July days he tried to get the Bolsheviks to change their position once more) but wanted power for himself and for his cadre party.
))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Ascher,Abraham| a{1928}n{RREV1}o{}
*1953:RRe#12:235-252| “The Kornilov Affair”
*1988:1992|_The_Revolution of 1905|
Volume 1:“Russia in Disarray”| Volume 2:“Authority Restored”|
((v1=1905 v2=1906-7| concl. & bbl,(re. Wbr’s optimistic words,ASS 22:353
STUDENT REVIEW =
The publication researches preconditions and results, circumstances and personalities, political leaders and parties, and the main “forces” of
the revolutionary events of 1905, “birth and growth” of political conscience and culture in masses of citizens.
Political culture in Russia was essentially forbidden at the high institutional level until the Manifesto of October 17th 1905. The
social political scene and Russian society was “fragmented,” the “old regime” was “under siege”, the tsar and his ministers were unable
to form a united front against the opposition: the intelligentsia and peasants/workers. The political upheaval initiated by perceived
weakness of the Russian state due to Russian losses in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War and catalyzed by the Bloody Sunday. The author describes
the role of minorities, peasants, soldiers, Cossacks and sailors in revolutionary events (such as the reactionary measures of the
government against Poland and Georgia). Strikes throughout the country in October 1905 definitely took on political rather than just
economic motives and resulted in the Tsar sharing power. The Manifesto was signed and society exercised civil liberties through election
in a representative Duma even though they were not constitutionally protected.
The psychology of the soldiers changed after the Tsar signed the Manifesto. Discipline as a prime virtue or in other words unquestionable
loyalty to absolute authority was challenged. Ten days after its signing 4000 sailors in Kronstadt on the Baltic mutinied. An interesting
and telling episode happened when a railroad strike stranded thousands of troops in the Far East. When Witte informed the Tsar of this
strike the Tsar replied that all strikers should be hung. The Russo Japanese war was a drain on the Russian economy and military manpower
and prestige of the regime yet troops who could have helped stabilized the country during the general strike of 1905 were stationed
in Poland (250,000) which was more than were in the Far East.
The author describes the roles of different parties. The Conservatives supported the autocrats who in a reactionary way want to
preserve the tsarist monarchy and his absolute rule with arbitrary authority. Political murder was not beneath the secret wing of the
conservative party: the Black Hundreds. The other players in Russian politics were the Social Democrats who were the agitators organizing
strikes in the factories. Influenced by Marxist thought, they were split into the tolerant Mensheviks led by Pavel B. Axelrod who wanted
a workers congress to rule the Nation and Bolsheviks with Lenin who wanted a small cadre of committed revolutionaries to lead. Through
illegal pamphlets or newspaper journals these groups tried to destabilize the country with the aim of bringing down the tsar and his
institution forever. An important party which emerged at this time was the Party of People’s Freedom whose members were called
Kadets. By 1906 they had over 100,000 members. Their liberal platform was: Democratic government, progressive taxation, an eight hour
day, distribution of land and the monarchy left alone.
The revolution of 1905 was “a turning point” but the tide did recede by 1907 yet Ascher still titles the book The Revolution
of 1905. Ascher asks in the introduction: “Was the overthrow of the Tsar by force feasible?” “Was the revolution bound to fail
and if so why?” He answers “no”, the military was loyal. The Bolsheviks understood the answers to these questions. With the
feedback from the revolution” of 1905, the military lost its loyalty after the signing of the manifesto, and notes on necessary
adjustments of organization recorded, the Bolsheviks were in position to advance. 1905 was a year of climax but no resolution. The
Empire was near collapse. The revolution had not yet run its course.
))
<>Avrich,Paul| a{}n{anx}o{}
*1967:PUP|_The_Russian Anarchists| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
The book [..] is essentially a history of Russian anarchists both inside and outside of the country, focusing
primarily on the periods before, during and after the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The book begins by describing the political climate in
Russia just prior to 1905 and all the gathering forces of resistance to the old order. The book does not really delve into Russian anarchist
history prior to 1905, though it does offer brief biographies of both Bakunin as well as Kropotkin.
The next chapter is devoted to the issue of terrorism within the Russian anarchist movement during this time. It chronicles how various
anarchist elements within Russia resorted to violence in the name of anarchy. However it makes clear the distinction between those who
were motivated by ideology as well as those that committed “ex’s” or expropriations and other violent acts for personal gain but in the
name of anarchism. The book discusses how in light of this, terrorism was a predominant tactic of many extremist anarchists during and
after the 1905 revolution. The terrorism proved ineffective and often indiscriminate and is not considered to have advanced anarchist
interests during the period of 1905. With the coming to power of Stolypin, the suppression of anarchists by the government who were both
violent and non-violent following 1905 is chronicled. It is discussed how the most common form of dealing with anarchists and other
radical elements was through swift military tribunals and prison sentences.
The book discusses the issue of intellectuals amongst Russian anarchists during this period. The general impression given is that
there was hostility towards intellectuals or the intelligentsia among Russian anarchists during this time. This is mainly attributed
to the view that Russian anarchists saw academia and indeed the entire educational establishment as part of bourgeoisie
structure. Furthermore, they saw the contemporary educational system as being an exclusive weapon used against the masses in the
class struggle.
Throughout the book there seem to be three predominant schools of anarchy represented among the Russian anarchists of this time. The
first of these are the anarchic-individualists. They supposedly were influenced by Nietzsche (a fact I find ironic) and placed individual
freedom as the sole goal of anarchy. Next were the anarchic-Syndicalists who were highly influence by the Syndicalists of France. They
were anarchists however they placed particular focus on the industrial proletariat in the issue of class struggle and the coming
revolution. Last were the anarchist-communists. These (at least in my opinion) were the purest anarchists. They believed in a total
societal revolution in which production shifted into public hands, and an egalitarian (and often utopian) society would subsequently
develop. A key point I feel where the anarchist-communists differed from other schools of radicalism is they believed that the entire
populace was intricate [?involved] in bringing about the coming revolution, and not merely relying on the industrial proletariat.
With the coming of the 1917 Revolution the book discusses the anarchist’s opposition to the provisional government along with
the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary factions. Though they did not engage in terror on the scale of the 1905 revolution there were
sporadic incidents. During this time though there were thousands of active anarchists throughout Russia they suffered from disorganization
and an overall lack of cohesiveness compared to other revolutionary groups (in particular the Bolsheviks). As a result of this, whereas
the Bolsheviks gained cohesion and consolidated their influence leading up to the October Revolution, the Russian anarchists were mired
in disunity and ideological differences. Every attempt to convene to form some sort of central unity failed.
With the October Revolution, the provisional government fell and the Bolsheviks came to power. Within a few years, all political
opposition to the new Soviet regime had been persecuted and suppressed, including that of the Russian anarchists. Avrich’s book covers
the first few years of Soviet power as well as their persecution of the Russian anarchists. Overall I found the book to be both an
objective as well as a comprehensive account of Russian anarchists both inside and outside of Russia surrounding and during the
revolutions of 1905 and 17.
))
*1970:PUP|_Kronstadt,1921| ((ndr))
>Avrich,Paul,ed. Anarchists in the Russian Revolution. Ithaca: 1973| ((sbr.ndr))
<>Baron,Samuel H| a{}
*1958je:JHI#19,3:??| “Plekhanov’s Russia: The Impact of the West upon
an ‘Oriental’ Society”| ((Mrx AMP))
*1963:S.CA,SUP|_Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism| ((Mrx Plx RS2 RREV1 SDs noWbr))
*1970:JGO#8:320-36| “The Weber Thesis and the Failure of Capitalist Development in Early Modern Russia”| ((Wbr trx cpt ekn))
<>Becker,Seymour|
a{}
|_Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia| D.IL:NIUP,1985| ((dvr
transformed=elite clx of ntr plt bnk skz &ntg avc plt.clt| Did not decline;
transformed for privileged lords into entrepreneurs, politicians, financiers,
landed proprietors, and well-edc avc| Found INX.plt easy))
<>Beqiraj,Mehmet|
|_Peasantry in Revolution??|:| ((HN13.B4| krx REV.trx))
<>Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution. Edited by Harold Shukman. NYC: Blackwell,1988. REF dk265.b54 [99]
<>Bonnell,Victoria E| a{}
*1983:B.CA, UCP|_Roots of Rebellion: Workers’ Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow,1900-1914|
((rvs prl orx SPB MVA RUS3))
>Bonnell,Victoria E., ed| *1983:B.CA, UCP|_The_Russian Worker: Life and Labor under the Tsarist Regime|
((
sbr.prm prl))
<>Bradley,Joseph| a{}
*1985:B.CA:UCP|_Muzhik and Muscovite:Urbanization in Late Imperial Russia| ((grd MVA))
*1991:BTsP:131-48| “Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture, and Obshchestvennost’ in Moscow”| ((dms obx cvc.pbl lgc| 131-41, well
over half rtl given to judicious definition of key words in title, then “An
analysis of the membership, [141/42] goals, internal and external
conflicts, and political participation of Moscow’s voluntary associations is
beyond the scope of a short essay, and only a tentative answer can be offered
here.” The question to which Bradley referred asked whether MVA obx~ filled the
need for “industrious and ration” [quoting Locke] ddd in place of the defeated
rdx ddd~, i.e., Locke’s “quarrelsome and contentious”. The presumption here is
that ntg 1st tried rvs, then rather belatedly took up small deeds and
the real hard work of cvc.pbl. We need closer attention to a larger canvas, one
that covers a longer period and a broader geography of the old Empire. We need
to look at but one that does analyze “membership, goals, internal and external
conflicts, and political participation” OWN))
*1995:Taranovski,Reform:212-36| Russia’s
Parliament of Public Opinion: Association, Assembly and the Autocracy,
1906-1914”| ((cvc.pbl Dmx RREV1))
*2002oc:AHR:| “Subjects into Citizens....”|
((cvc.pbl| Google search yields TXT))
<>Brovkin,Vladimir
N| a{}n{ndr & prm SDs(m) NEP vqt}o{}
KNIGHT HOLDINGS
*1994:PNJ,PUP|_Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social
Movements in Russia, 1918-1922| ((Gwrx
STUDENT REVIEW = This book outlines the effects and reactions of the peasants towards the varying factions that
fought for control of Russia during the civil war. The Red Army, White Russians (the political faction, not the drink)
and the Greens all vied for the control of the peasantry. What ended up happening was that the peasantry revolted as
well. The Greens and other village strong factions all doubted the power, and suffered under the power of the White and Red
Russian forces.
Spanning the time of the revolution (1918-1921) the book overviews the many geographically isolated events and western
Russian events that occurred during the civil war when it came to the peasants getting themselves downtrodden all
over. However, they did not let the rival factions completely eradicate them. While they (the peasants) were ultimately
expendable when it came to war or sacrifice, they were also invaluable to the Russian economy. The agrarian policies of
both the Reds and the Whites devastated the peasantry and rewarded it as well. Some factions levied heavy taxes on grain
production centers and when they didn’t get exactly what they asked for, then they got the end of a gun pointed at
them. Intimidation was the rule when it came to dealing with the uneducated masses. Both the Imperialistic views towards
peasants of the Whites, and the distrust the Reds had for the Kulaks made it so the everyman couldn’t get what he wanted
with any side. This peasant distrust of both sides led to the myriad of peasant uprisings and the “Greens” becoming a
pressing force on the soon to be victorious Soviet government.
The book argues that during the civil war, what truly became the driving force behind a united Russia and a united
peasantry was for the factions to compromise with each other in some way. Most people agreed that the old Czarist
imperial Russia had to go, but what continued the fighting were the disagreements others had within to the political
climate of Russia, that spurred the fighting further. In the end the politics was settled with the war of the Reds vs.
the Whites. The book puts it as two equally incompetent fighting forces. But one of which had a better center of
production (the Soviets). That was the political war. The domestic unification war was the Whites vs. the Greens, and
the Greens vs. the Reds. This ended with the NEP allowing the farmers to continue their work, while the growing soviet
powers began to consolidate the economy and industry to new heights.
))
<>Brower,Daniel| G/APL
<>Brower,Daniel, ed| a{}
*1979:St.Louis|_The_Russian Revolution: Disorder or New Order?| Series: Forum
Press “Problems in Civilization”| ((>Brower.RR:|
OWN sbr RREV =
Volobuev,SDs(b)
Rosenberg,Instability of lbx stt
Anweiler,Ideal of rvs dmk
Von Laue,Weakness of stt
Ascher,Defeat of mlt leaderhip
Keep,in zvd
Volin,triumph of krx
Ferro,Citizen sld in REV struggle
Mints,Lnn rvs leadership
Daniels,Unpredictable REV
))
<>Bukhovets,Oleg Grg*| a{}
}r{
*1986:ISSR#4:??:119| “Massovye istochniki po obshchestvennomu soznaniiu Rossiiskogo krest’ianstva (Opyt primeneniia kontent-analiza pri
izuchenii prigovorov i nakazov 1905-1907 gg.)”| ((8x11/B| krx.mnt xtx
Bukhovets presents here an analysis of ca. 200 documents = peasant judgments and instructions drawn up for peasant delegates elected to the new State Duma or
for public distribution. In these documents, Bukhovets identified 1120 discrete expressions of peasant attitude on some matter that
illustrated “social consciousness” in Russian villages in the era of the 1905 Revolution. It becomes clear that Bukhovets might better have said
“political consciousness”.
Bukhovets taxonomized these 1120 discrete expressions of attitude into 177 categories of “social consciousness”. He calls these 177 categories
“variables”. Some variables were frequently expressed, many appeared only once among the 200 documents. The 29 most frequently mentioned
variables (16% of the 177) represented 43% of the total 1120 discrete expressions. These 29 stand in some clear dominant position among the
177 varieties of peasant concern.
Here are Bukhovets' first 17 "variables" in descending order of frequency [SAC editor intersperses his interpretation below in CAPS] =
1. Appeal to the Duma [ID] to defend with firmness the interests of the narod
[people, the whole people, the nation]
2. Amnesty for all political criminals
3. Expression of faith in the Duma and solidarity with it
4. Expression of hostility to the government, the state apparatus as a whole
5. Necessity of support for Duma in its struggle with the government
POINTS ##1-5, THE MOST FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONCERNS, ALL RELATE TO THE NEED TO ALTER THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE STATE TO THE PEOPLE. They are INSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL concerns, not “social” or “economic” concerns
6. “Land and Liberty”
7. Four-tailed electoral procedures [i.e., election of officials by universal,
equal, direct, and secret ballot]
8. Konstatatsiia [verification, guarantee condition] of those poor, hungry, or in the damaging condition of slavery
9. Abolish capital punishment
10. Democratic freedoms
11. Konstatatsiia of those with little land
12. Demand land only in accordance with the slogan “Land and Liberty”
13. Universal free public education [DECLINE IN FREQUENCY IS ABRUPT = POINT #13 APPEARED LESS THAN ½ AS OFTEN AS #1 ABOVE]
14. Replace indirect taxes with progressive income-related [podokhodnym] tax
15. Abolish police, land captains [zemskikh nachal’nikov
(ID)] and security patrols [strazhnikov]
POINTS##6-15 SHIFTED AT FIRST TO ECONOMIC ISSUES (##6, 8, 11, and 12), INTERLACED STILL WITH SIGNIFICANT INSTITUTIONAL-POLITICAL ISSUES. MUCH MEANING IS PACKED IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL REVOLUTIONARY SLOGAN “Land and Liberty”. OVER THE PREVIOUS HALF CENTURY, A WIDELY CIRCULATED PROCLAMATION BY NIKOLAI OGAREV AND THEN TWO POLITICAL MOVEMENTS WERE TITLED WITH THAT SLOGAN. THE SIMPLEST, MOST GENERAL AND MOST DIRECT MEANING WAS “ECONOMIC SECURITY” AND “CIVIL RIGHTS”.
16. Appeal to struggle for “the people’s cause” [narodnoe delo], “the good of the people” [blago naroda], etc
17. Abolish the formal heritable social structure [soslovnogo stroia]
POINT #17 WAS A DIRECT ASSAULT ON AUTOCRATIC SOCIAL/SERVICE HIERARCHIES [ID]. POINT #17 APPEARED 1/3 AS OFTEN AS #1, BUT WAS A LEADING CONCERN OF VILLAGERS. NO MORE ALL-ENCOMPASING STATEMENT OF RUSSIAN “SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS” WAS POSSIBLE IN THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE LATE EMPIRE. THE LIST CONTINUES WITH POINT 18, WHICH APPEARED ¼ AS OFTEN AS POINT #1
Bukhovets offered a sophisticated statistical analysis, using regression tables that yielded numerical results to several decimal
points. His goal was to create something like a precise meta-document of peasant outlook and demand, an “ideal type” or scientific-feeling
composite of village discontent and hope.
Yet he glossed over the fact that 795 of the 1120 discrete expressions of concern (71%) related to political institutions and
procedures. Social and economic issues were vigorously put in the documents but were less frequent.
Bukhovets in fact employed vague, even faulty, readings of the larger social/political environment from which and into which these
documents sprung. For example, consider the way Bukhovets’ concept of peasant “illusions” [illiuzii] distorted his taxonomy of narrative
content. The concept of illusion allowed him to denigrate certain ranges of village outlook, especially ambitious institutional
demands, thus to bolster his presumptions about what was more solid or realistic. Bukhovets seems unable to absorb the heavy commitment
to recognized 19th-century liberal political ideas in these peasant documents. In the colloquial expression, they "do not compute" for
him. This echoes a long tradition of doctrinal pre-judgment of political platforms or goals in Russia. Reform-era Interior Minister
Valuev often described a political position he disliked as “a thing impracticable” [nechto nesbytochnoe]. Nicholas II spoke at
the beginning of his reign “of senseless dreams” [o bessmyslennykh mechtaniiakh] entertained by liberal activists. When Mensheviks
accused Lenin of senseless dreams he replied, “We must dream" [Nam nuzhno mechtat’]
))
*1988:RRe#47:357-75| “The Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry in the Revolution of 1905-1907: Sources, Methods, and Some Results”| ((8x11/B| THIS IS AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PUBLICATION JUST ABOVE| prc etc| G/Verner))
<>Burbank,Jane| a{}
*1986:NYC|_Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922| ((mnt
| EUA))
<>Burdzhalov,E. N| a{}
*1987:Bloomington IUP|_Russia's Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd| ((DK265.19b813))
*1971:MVA|_Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia: Moskva, front, periferiia|
<>Bushnell,John| a{}
|_Mutiny Amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution
of 1905-1906|| ((RREV1 sld mlt|no WBR))
<>Carr,Edward Hallett| a{}n{rvs ntg gte
BknM DstF irx WW2 SSR.gnr RREV krx Ntx3}o{
}r{
*1933:LND|_The_Romantic Exiles
STUDENT REVIEW =
The Russian political émigrés of the nineteenth century are often overlooked when studying the evolving political culture of Europe during the nineteenth
century. This is not necessarily done intentionally; focus is given to the names that affected the modern political culture, which often leaves these émigrés
on the sidelines. Edward Hallett Carr’s The Romantic Exiles attempts to shed some light on some of the notable Russian émigrés giving the majority of
his attention to Alexander Herzen. Carr uses Herzen’s life as a vehicle to give background on where these émigrés came from and how the related to each other.
The Romantic Exiles is a great title for this work as it sheds light on the two key points Carr attempts to get across. Alexander Herzen as well as the
major émigrés he encounters is portrayed in this work, at least partially, as products of romanticism. The title can be taken literally to a point, as much
of the work focuses the love lives of the various exiles, and how this, in part, affected the theories and ideas promoted by the various émigrés. Carr
uses George Sand and her works as a frame for their lives and their romantic ideals. This focus on the personal lives of these émigrés should not be
understated; as this seems to be the focus of the work. The work gives little into the interpretations of these Russian émigrés’ works or ideas.
The focus on the personal lives of the émigrés is to such a point it seems to be more of a biography of Alexander Herzen, rather than a study of the
exiles as émigré writers. That being said Carr does present Herzen’s life in a readable and enjoyable manner. One thing to be gathered from this work is
that historical people were in fact people, with lives, friends, and families. The émigrés are not distant figureheads associated with a theory or cause
but live real lives with real problems. This is something that is lacking often when we think and talk about history today, we always need to realize that
leaders and historical people are people.
The focus on the personal lives shifts in the last third of The Romantic Exiles to the heart of the matter, giving an explanation, to a point of the ideas
of the émigrés. It also shifts from being focused, almost entirely, on Herzen to the larger Russian émigré community, giving due time to Bakunin, Ograev, and
Nechaev. The chapter that focuses on Bakunin and Nechaev’s collaborations is quite fascinating and is, in my opinion, the best written section of the book.
This look into the lives of The Romantic Exiles gives us a few, but important, keys to the lives of the émigré writers from Russia in the mid nineteenth
century. It portrays these towering historical figures as people, people with problems like the rest of us. It also puts these émigrés as thinkers spawning
from romanticism of their generation which gives context to their ideas and allows for a more informed understanding of their ideas. This work shines as it
shifts from the life of Alexander Herzen to his ideas and the émigrés associated with him.
*1937:LND|_Michael Bakunin| ((HX915.B3c3))
*1940:LND|_The_Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939|
*1949:LND|_Dostoevsky
(1821-1881): A New Biography|
*1952:1979; LND|_A_History of Soviet
Russia| 10 vols.,1954-1979| ((DK266.C263 1950 vols. 1-9)) =
*1952:|_The_Bolshevik Revolution,1917-1923| Volumes 1-3 of title just above| 3 vv|
*1954:|_The_Interregnum,1923-1924|
*1959:|_Socialism in One Country| 3 vv|
*1969:NYC|_The_October Revolution: Before and After| ((DK266.c27 1969))
*1969:1979; |_Foundations of a Planned Economy,1926-1929| 3 vv (vol. 1 co-authored with R. W. Davies)|
--|_Russian Revolution and Peasants| ((Proceedings of the British Academy = AS122.L5 v.49))
*1983:NYC|_Twilight of the Comintern,1930-1935| ((UO))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène|
a{}n{Click on author's name for list of highly interpretive studies| Click SUMMIT also}o{
}r{
STUDENT REVIEW =
*:|_Islam and the Russian Empire
While Russia and Western Europe received most of the attention during World War I and the1917 Revolution, a
new world of political culture was coming into being in Central Asia. This is one of the central themes
that Helene Carrere d'Encausse discusses in her book Islam Under the Russian Empire. While looking at
how Central Asia and the Muslim peoples under the Russian Empire, focusing mostly on the people of
the Emirate of Bukhara and Turkistan. Through her book, describes life in pre-Russian Bukhara and
the developments of this region of the world as the Russian Empire rises, falls, and gives birth to
the Soviet Union.
d’Encausse starts with a description of Bukhara before the Russian invasion was ever even a thought
in the minds of the Bukharans. She describes the various inheritance laws, which were most often
based on traditional and Islamic practices, as well the lives of the various classes. Much of
Bukhara’s lands were roaming groups of nomadic peoples, but diversity was strong everywhere in
the Emirate of Bukhara. Within the towns and cities lived peasants in an almost serf-like
manner. Most, if not all, of the peasants were in debt to the various higher classes, including
merchants, land barons, all the way up the emir, the ruler of Bukhara. The majority of these
upper-class citizens were Uzbek Sunni’ Muslims, although a skilled artisan could make their way
to the status of elite with time and impressive feats. The economy of this jewel in Central Asia
was mainly based on agriculture; and due to growing population, frequent draughts and lack of
properly irrigated lands, was a very difficult economy to sustain. As Russia made its way east
into Central Asia building its empire, Bukhara was on the verge of political collapse with many
of the population disliking the emir.
After the Russian conquest and annexation of Central Asia, Bukhara became a vassal state to the
Russian Empire, keeping most of its traditional, Islamic law. While the emir and other nobles
tried to keep good face with the Russian nobles that lorded over them, Russian businessmen penetrated
into markets in Central Asia, finding a lot of promise the production of cotton, which soon became
Bukhara and Turkistan’s key exports. Eventually, after being subjugated under the emir and the
Russians, the people became unsettled. In describing the unrest of the people in Bukhara, d’Encausse
looks at the various reformists that lived in Bukhara, Turkistan, and all throughout Central
Asia. These reformists were known mostly as jadidists. Most of these reformists outcries
concerned the strongly religious education taught in the madrasas of the time, but nationalism
was also important ideal to reformists.
Secret societies of jadidists and political parties filled with intelligentsia start popping
up in Central Asia around 1905, as Russia fights in the feudal Russo-Japanese War and
revolution strikes. d’Encasse describes the roles of these various groups and parties as
Russia’s grip on Bukhara and Turkistan slipped during the bumpy years of 1915 to 1917 and
how the revolutionary spirit took hold of these groups. The emir denies their pleas for
reform and after February revolution, these jadidists joined Russian political parties, one
of the key groups being the Bolsheviks.
With the help of jadidists and other reformists, the soviets took a strong hold in Bukhara
and eventually began to undermine the emir. As the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War
unfolded, the Bukharan emirate fell, and the People’s Republic of Bukhara came into
being. Soon after this new state was created, though, the purges began and those of any
religious knowledge began starting to disappear. Stalin’s policies on ethnically divided
regions eventually were the undoing of Bukhara as a proud Islamic state. The removal of
the many different peoples, especially the Uzbeks, turned the Islamic state into an
artificial, Soviet territory.
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Champagne, Duane| a{}
*1992c:S.CA,SUP|_Social order and political change: Constitutional governments among
the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Chickasaw, and the Creek| ((317p|bbl:258-301 ndx| NAm cst plt.clt))
<>Clements,Barbara
--|_Bolshevik Feminist: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai| ((ndr wmn
SDs(b)))
<>Clowes,Edith W|_The_Revolution in Moral Consciousness: Nietzsche in Russian Literature,1890-1914
<>Clowes,Edith W.,Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds| a{}
*1991:|_Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia| ((>BTsP| OWN| sbr.ndr
pbl ntg sSs RUS2|
“Introduction: The Problem of the Middle in Late Imperial Russian Society”:3-14
2 summary chapters =
Rieber,Alfred J., “The Sedimentary Society”:343-66
Kassow,Samuel, “Russia’s Unrealized Civil Society”:367-71
Balzer
Bowlt
G/Bradley,Joseph
Brumfield,Wm
Curtis,James
Eklof,Ben
Freeze,Greg
Gleason,Abbot
Kassow,Samuel
Loe,Mary
McReynolds,Louise
Monas,Sidney
Norman,John
Orlovsky,Daniel
Owen,Thomas
Rieber,Alfred
Rosenthal,Bernice
Ruane,Christine
Timberlake,Charles
Wagner,Wm
G/West,James L|
))
<>Colodny,Robert G| a{}
*1990sp:Science & Society#89,53,1:47-??| “The U.S. Political Culture of the 1930s and the American Response to the Spanish
Civil War”| ((UNCOVER USA5.wrx SPN plt.clt))
<>Coquin,Grancois-Xavier, ed| a{}
*1986:P.FRN|_1905: La première révolution Russe| ((UO sbr RREV1| Read,Chr,1905 &
ntg:385-96| :543 re. RUS ntg interest in Wbr,rlgP Ethic))
<>Crisp,Olga, and Linda Edmondson, eds| a{}
*:|_Civil Rights in Imperial Russia| ((sbr lbx Dmx stt&pbl))
<>Cunha,Euclides da| a{866}e{909}
|_Rebellion in the Backlands||
((trx krx.rvs “The” classic study of primitive social rebellion sd Hobsbawm,Primitive))
<>Cunningham,James| a{}
|_A_Vanquished Hope| ((ChxO rlg RREV1 clt))
<>Daly,Jonathan| a{}n{plt.plc plt.crm}o{}
*1995fa:SlR#54,3:602-609| "On the Significance of
Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia" [TXT]
*--G/O&S
*2002mr:JMH#74,1:62-100| "Political Crime in Late
Imperial Russia" [TXT] ((RUS
experience within a general EUR and USA context|
Final 5-page summary)))
*1998|_Autocracy Under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905| ((plc mlt
STUDENT REVIEW =
On July 3rd 1826 Nicholas I created Russia’s first Security policing program (Pg.12). Originally created to try and combat terrorist threats towards the government, Daly
[...] goes in depth into the actual infrastructure and its inner workings about it’s operations, personnel, security Bureaus which were dispersed throughout Russia.
[...] The Bureau itself begins as a very small operation that included only a handful of officials (16), operating with only around four thousand military personnel at their disposal. Russia’s security police were referred to as the Third Section of his Imperial majesty’s own Chancellery (1826-1855).
The Third Section consisted of Gendarmes soldiers, which essentially is a
military body that is charged with policing the public and ensuring the safety of its nation’s population.
Only lasting for around thirty years the Third Section of his imperial majesty’s own Chancellery was disbanded and absorbed into the Department of State Police which fell under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. No longer directly under the Tsar himself, they now were authoritatively transferred to the deputy of the minister. Daly is able to go in depth and discuss the different types of policing that the security police were not only responsible for such as execution of court orders, tracking fugitives, riot control, and the detainment of “unusual” criminals. The Security police towards the latter part of the 19th century began integrating old techniques and merging them in with newer types of policing that would enable police to keep better tabs and control over possible revolutionary threats. From surveillance, using plainclothes to create subtlety to the implementation of secret informants, Security police had to adapt to the ever growing revolutionary movement.
[...] Sergei Zubatov [...] from 1896-1902 was the head of security in Moscow
[and] was widely known for being able to integrate traditional policing methods with new, sophisticated methods.
))
<>Danilov,Viktor Petrovich,et al., eds| a{}
|_Dokumenty svidetelstvuiut: Iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927-1932 gg|MVA: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry,1989|
((525p bbl|DK266.A3 D65 1989 NEP STL.skz klx svx vlg nrd krx))
|_Kooperativno-kolkhoznoe stroitelstvo v SSSR,1917-1922: Dokumenty i materialy|Moskva : Nauka, 1990| ((HD1492.S65 K62 1990 396p bbl:398 ndx| prm))
|_Krestianskie khoziaistva, kolkhozy i sovkhozy SSSR v 1924/25-1927/28 gg|MVA:AkN,Institut istorii SSSR,1977| ((619p
bbl|S469.R9K73 3v Po dannym nalogovykh svodok Narkomfina SSSR))
|_Krestianskoe vosstanie v Tambovskoi gubernii v 1919-1921 gg.:“Antonovshchina”--dokumenty i materialy|SERIES:Krestianskaia revoliutsiia
v Rossii 1902-1922 gg|Tambov : Intertsentr : Arkhivnyi otdel administratsii Tambovskoi obl., 1994| ((DK265.8.T3 K74 1994|332p bbl ndx TAM gbx
krx rbx GWX))
|_Mentalitet i agrarnoe razvitie Rossii, XIX-XX vv.: Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, Moskva, 14-15 iiunia 1994 g|Moskva :
ROSSPEN, 1996| ((HD1536.R9 M46 1996|439p bbl|Summary and table of contents also in English))
|_Ocherki istorii kollektivizatsii sel’skogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh respublikakh: Sbornik statei|Moskva : Gospolitizdat, 1963| ((558p bbl|HD1492.R9 D3))
|_Sovetskoe krestianstvo: Kratkii ocherk istorii, 1917-1969|Moskva, Izdo-vo, polit. lit-ry, 1970| ((508p HD1492.R9 S63))
<>Davis,Donald|
|_V. A. Maklakov:A Russian Statesman...| ((Birn,81de17:bbt.rqt ndr stt.dmx lbx RREV1))
<>Dubnow on Jews in Russia| ((Jwx ntn))
<>Eckstein,Harry|
*1965:H&T#4,2:133-63| “On the Etiology of Internal War”| ((wrx.rvs trx))
<>Eckstein,Harry,ed.
*1964:Glencoe IL|_Internal War: Basic Problems and Approaches| ((wrx.rvs trx))
<>Edelman,Robert| a{}
|_Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party,1907-1917|New Brunswick:1980| ((DK262.E42| gnt dvr stt.dmx REV2 RUS3 noWbr))
|_Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905
in Russia's Southwest| ((prl krx UKR hst.gph))
<>Eklof,Benjamin|
--| G/Clowes
--|_Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914|
((krx scl vlg
STUDENT REVIEW =
Eklof’s work exhibits a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s institutional and cultural response to the issue of addressing popular peasant education
in light of the Emancipation of 1861. Under the subtitle “Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914”, Eklof explores a variety
of both top-down and bottom-up narratives of the educational experience of the Russian peasant. From national decrees, regional zemstvo policies,
local village controls, and individual accounts from pupils and teachers alike, Eklof examines the education of the peasant masses in such a way
that the entire Russian social and political demographic is contextually addressed. Of note is Eklof’s examination of the Russian peasant teacher, whose
experiences during this time have more to do with issues pertaining to being introduced and accepted into Russian village culture than the actual
practicalities of pupil education.
In 1862, Russian author Ivan Turgenev published Fathers and Sons, a quote from which is spread across the first page of the Introduction: “The Russian
peasant is in truth that mysterious unknown…Who can understand him? He does not understand himself!” The Russian peasant was thus introduced to the
masses. Throughout history, the Russian peasant has been portrayed as illiterate, incapable of modern or progressive thought, stagnant in their
station. Eklof’s introduction attempts to break away this binding mold of the peasants pre-condition. Established is a less sensationalized view of
the peasants not as a child-like connotation needing constant paternal guidance, but as an independent and spirited social group capable of possessing
a rooted sense of ambition in the form of a long tradition of Russian village culture. Bound in the traditions of expelling the yokes of serfdom,
the village culture is portrayed by Eklof as being wary of attempts by the Russian national government to instill education reforms. The concept
of “education as progress” did not fully take hold in peasant village culture until the 1890’s, some thirty years after Emancipation, a decade in
which zemstvos were given a much broader mandate of controlling the educational framework of peasant curriculum and instruction.
Part One, “Institutions and Sponsors”, begins with a broad overview of historical trends in the Russian education system. For an inexperienced
researcher of Russian history, the first chapter outlines the education policy aspects of Russian authoritative political culture under the reigns Peter
the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander I, and Nicholas I. Amidst various reforms and reactionary measures, a running trend of subverting education
opportunities for peasants remained constant. Providing education for peasants lingered as a fear of the ruling political culture in the years
pre-Emancipation for reasons amounting to keeping the Russian peasant classes within their Petrine station. Education provided the peasant
with “notions and to a style not appropriate to their situation” (see pages 24-26). Rudimentary education was deemed reasonable for the lower
Russian classes, but the ability for a peasant to excel beyond the three R’s in education institutions was rare. Possibilities for Russian universal
education did not become readily apparent until the Emancipation of the serfs in 1861.
Eklof’s focus on both the 1864 Education Stature and the Zemstvo Statute of the same year provide a running parallel theme for the rest of the
work. Local self control of education measures exerted through the zemstvo would become the most effective means of instituting measurable gains
in student cognitive progress, outlined in Chapter 13 “Mere Learning: The Cognitive Results of Schooling.”
As a source for potential research topics, Eklof’s work provides a sufficient background for an extensive array of topics in the history of education
in Russia. The experiences of Russian teachers in the peasant education system is a fascinating story, a narrative which is described in detail
in Part Two, “The Outsider in the Village: Russian Teachers.” Part Three, “Peasant Pedagogy and the Emergence of a School System” explores the
conditions in the Russian peasants’ classroom from the perspective of pupils and teachers. A comparison topic could emerge exploring the modern
academic calendar in contrast with the Russian school year, discussed in Chapter 11, “The School Calendar: Rhythm and Intensity.” In Part Four, “The
Results of Schooling”, Eklof examines the curriculum of the Russian peasant schools and just what a graduate of a peasant primary school might expect
in terms of continued education in Chapter 15, “Beyond Primary School.”
The focus given to the role of zemstvo in providing a role of vital local government guidance to peasants is what drew my attention most in Eklof’s
work. Emerging trends of local control and self-administration gives the reader a broader understanding of preceding political conditions that
existed before both the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. For a researcher looking for a quick introduction to the zemstvo, reference to Chapter 2, “The
Great Reforms and the Zemstvos” is encouraged. I enjoyed Eklof’s work, and if a fellow researcher is debating a topic in the history of Russian
education, or peasant culture in general, Eklof’s book is an excellent work that has a broad introductory scope.
))
<>Eklof,Ben, and Stephen Grant, eds| a{}
--|_World of the Russian Peasant: Post-Emancipation Culture and Society|
((>WRP| sbr.ndr krx RUS2 clt pbl))
<>Emmons,Terence| a{}n{srf.rfm krx rvs gnt dvr RS1 RREV1 stt.dmx1}o{
*1968:Cambridge|_The_Russian Landed Gentry and Peasant Emancipation|
*1973se:SlR#32:461-90| “The Beseda Circle,1899-1905”|
*1974jy:RRe1#33:269-83|
“The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics”|
*1977:CaliforniaSlavic Studies#10:45-86| “Russia’s Banquet Campaign”|
*1983:CMA|_The_Formation of Political Parties
and the First National Elections in Russia|| ((Wbr correct (ASS 22:244) lbx “essentially brz” in
Lebenshaltung,while not so in ekn conditions))
<>Emmons,Terence, and Wayne S. Vucinich, eds| a{}
|>The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government| C.ENG:CUP,1982| ((>Emmons.Zmv| JS6058.Z46|
sbr.ndr Zmv stt noWbr|
Starr before Zmv.rfm|
McKenzie in stt|
Atkinson & krx|
Manning 864:14;& plt|
Fallows 890:14;& stt.apx qin|
Brooks edc of nrd|
Ramer,Samuel public hlt|
Frieden,mdx|
Johnson,Rbt avc & lbx:Zmv xtx|
Gleason VsR Union of Zmv & WW1|
Rosenberg in 917 & SSR|
Emmons Zmv in hst perspective
))
<>Engelstein,Laura| a{}
--|_Moscow,1905:Working-Class
Organization and Political Conflict| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
First, we must understand what life was like in urban 1905 Russia.
Engelstein gives the statistics as 60% of the Moscow textile force housed in
a factory with more than 500 workers, and 75% in St Petersburg under the
same conditions. By no means was the number of Russian people who lived
under these circumstances negligible.
In addition to factory workers, the working class also included laborers,
pharmicists, railroad workers, soldiers, clerks, printers, and numerous
others. These people, both men and women, shared a life marked by 13-18 hour
days, and were unable to vote, hold political office, or gather legally for
political purposes.
According to Engelstein, the political action of 1905 begins with the
intelligentsia, not with the working class. Social Democrats, working under
the principles of Marxism, have been trying to motivate the working class
population to revolutionary political action with limited success. Before
1905, Social Democrats (and Anarchists) had engaged in a public awareness
movement which included sending young radicals to “teach” groups of
laborers.
The fruits of this labor seem to be a politically aware minority among
Russian workers, but certainly not the revolutionarily active majority which
the Social Democrats had hoped for. Lack of central organization, fear of
state violence, and unfamiliarity with strike politics seemed to keep most
of Russia's working class away from the politics of the labor movement.
Engelstein cites the formation of Zubatov Councils as one reason for the
changes in Russia's work force. Zubatov Councils were typically
paternalistic groups formed by the state as an outlet for worker's
grievances. These councils were unintentionally politicized when Father
Gapon lead a group of members in a peaceful march towards the winter palace.
The marchers were armed with a list of grievances to be addressed. In this
incident, state forces fired on the marchers and onlookers without
discretion, wounding or killing at least 1,000 in the crowd. This act of
state repression helped to politicize the workers and gain sympathy for the
cause among the Russian majority. This was January of 1905.
But politicized workers are not necessarily organized workers, as Engelstein
points out here. The sporadic outbreaks of strikes in January and February
of 1905 fizzle due to lack of organization, experience, and unity. It seems
that each person is striking for a different reason.
The September and October strikes are the prelude to the December Uprising.
The September strikes are initiated by printers, without planning by
intellectuals. Demands center around hours and wages. Engelstein states that
these strikes have no political motivation. However, in the ranks of
strikers are men and women familiar with strike tactics from January
involvement. In the streets, the strikers mix with students and middle class
citizens, all of whom are the targets of state sponsored violence. Under
these circumstances, Engelstein argues that the strike movement snowballs.
In October, an important group of diverse workers joins the strike movement:
the railroad workers. Within the railroad workers as a whole, the blue and
white collar workers are united as a striking body. This striking body has
the power to paralyze Russia, as Engelstien argues. Moreover, the railroad
union has Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Anarchists, and assorted
other liberals at the helm, all co-existing.
The December Uprising is a natural event, considering (as Englestein has)
the factors of a newly politicized working class, a sympathetic population,
and the attempted quashing of the labor movement by an increasingly
conservative city council, and the random violence of the Black Hundreds.
))
<>Fainsod,Merle|
a{}n{apx }o{
}r{
--|_Smolensk Under Soviet Rule
*1963:| “Bureaucracy and Modernization: the Russian and Soviet Case”|
In Bureaucracy and Political
Development:233-67|
G/Hough,J
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Fallows,Thomas S| a{}
*1981 Harvard University PhD Dissertation| “Forging the Zemstvo Movement:
Liberalism and Radicalism on the Volga,1890-1905”| (( SAR.gbx Zmv lbx rdx RREV1))
|>kng
<>Farnsworth,Beatrice| a{}n{wmn}
--|Aleksandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism, and the Bolshevik Revolution|
((SSR scx RREV3))
<>Farnsworth,Beatrice, and Lynne Viola, eds| a{}
*1992:O.ENG|_Russian Peasant Women| (( sbr krx RUS2))
<>Ferro,Marc| a{
}r{
*1972|_The_Russian Revolution of February,1917: The
Fall of Tsarism and the Origins of Bolshevik Power|
*1980| October 1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution|
*1985| The Bolshevik Revolution: A Social History of the Russian Revolution. Methuen,1985. NoUO
--|_Citizen solders in the revolutionary struggle [Brower.RR:]
--|_Aspirations of Russian society [Pipes.RR] | *1971:SlR| More aspirations
*1991:|_Nicholas II: The Last of the Tsars
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Figes,Orlando| a{}n{krx Gwrx gbx RREV.gnr}o{
}r{
*1989::O.ENG|_Peasant Russia,
Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917-1921|
*1996:L.ENG Cape|_A_People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924|
STUDENT REVIEW =
As the title of this book says, this book is about the story of the Russian revolution. The major questions
the book answers are: why did the revolution take place?, how did it affect the people’s lives?, what did
people demand and how the government and political leaders reacted to them?. The author’s basic
evaluation on the Russian revolution was disappointment because Imperial Russia was merely replaced
by the new autocratic Soviet and its people remained under permanent repression by the new ruler. Given
the fact that most of the political leaders wanted to establish the democratic state and ordinary people
yearned for economical and political freedom from the political and economic restraints, the results
were devastating for people. The author’s analysis of the 1905 and 1917 2, 10 revolutions helped us
understand the essence of the revolutions.
As the author pointed out, the 1905 revolution took place unexpectedly without the help and initiative
of the political parties. The humiliating defeat against Japan and the widespread famine directly
triggered the revolution. But, people were not well organized and their demands focused more on
their everyday life. The political leaders had a very naive idea to limit a Tsar’s power only by
introducing a parliamentary system. As a result, the revolution failed to create the new political
system based on democratic principles. The reasons of the failure were, as the author mentioned, attributed
to the low political consciousness of the ordinary people and the absence of the political leadership
who were in exile or abroad at that time. However, although the revolution did not lead to real
reforms, several meaningful advancements appeared in the overall society. First of all, the revolutionary
potential continued to grow; the emergency of the third element, diversification of the class, increase
of urban labor population could provide a ground for political leaders to unite people’s
revolutionary potential. Secondly, the suspension of the land reforms deepened the peasant’s
mistrust for government, finally, made them challenge the Tsar’s authority. It had a lot of
implications because the peasant had fear of the Tsar based on old and religious traditions
and these attitudes played as barriers to take further action against Tsar. As a result, the
above mentioned elements made the 1917 February revolution more organized and politicized
movement, compare to the 1905 revolution.
As the author maintained, the 1917 February revolution took place due to almost same reasons
as did the 1905 revolution; the serious food shortage, the catastrophic economic situation and
the outbreak of the First World War. The devastated economy evoked people’s uprisings, and
thanks to the lessons of the 1905 revolution people succeeded to expel the Tsar
government. However, the opposition political party leaders including socialist revolutionaries
and socialist democrats were hesitant to take over the power despite the peoples’ demands. According
to the analysis of the author, they believed that Russia was not ripe for the proletarian
revolution, and therefore without bourgeois revolution advancing, the proletarian revolution
could not succeed. Furthermore, they were concerned that if proletariat class would have
seized the power, the state would have fallen into the anarchistic conditions. Ironically,
their hesitation led the nation into chaos, in particular, in the country side. As a
result, this provided the reason for the Bolsheviks to take power. Even though Lenin
was a great leader of the Bolshevik party, Lenin was always a minority, in all political
parties and within the Bolshevik. When he declared “April These” to urge militant
struggles and achieve the proletarian revolution, majority of the political leaders
refused Lenin’s idea and reprimanded him for betraying Marxism. However, only Lenin
exactly caught people’s demands and succeeded to create the Bolshevik party dictatorship
by using militant methods and destroying all the system opposed to the new Soviet. The
author regarded the 1917 October revolution as the political coup because well armed
and organized Bolsheviks took power with less participation of the masses.
Finally, as the author asserted, the failure of the revolution was, in part, attributed to
the despotic and autocratic political tradition of old Russia. However, the discontinuation
of the reforms carried out by the Tsar government seemed to be more critical in that the
government lost not only trust from people but also last opportunities to keep Tsarism
just by adding some democratic elements to the political and administration system. Another
point that the author criticized was that majority of the political leaders strictly
excessively adhered to Marxism and rejected the people’s demand to take power. As a
result, this situation caused a vacuum of the power and it resulted in anarchistic
crisis all over the country, which ironically brought about another type of an absolute
regime called Bolshevik party dictatorship.
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Fischer,Ben B| a{}
|
Okhrana
the Paris operations of the Russian Imperial Police [Washington DC] : History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, 1997.
View full record| ((G/Okhrana
STUDENT REVIEW =
The publication consists of a preface written by Fischer which describes the
story of the Okhrana in Paris and the recovered files. The rest is a series
of organized essays written for the CIA counterintelligence by an unknown
author. All of these articles had previously appeared in the journal called
Studies in Intelligence, which was published by the CIA. These articles are
detailed descriptions of the Okhrana's operations in Paris and all of the
actors involved. Finally, the conclusion consist of a letter and the preface
that inspired it which discussed the idea the Joseph Stalin was an Okhrana
agent.
The preface, which is by Ben Fischer, discussed a number of issues
surrounding Okhrana and the CIA. He also makes a number of conclusions with
regard to the Tsarist regime and the Bolsheviks. One of Fischer's first
points states that the opening of the Paris Okhrana in 1883, “a sign of both
success and failure on the part of the tsarist authorities”(pg 1). The
statement made reflects that Fischer believed it was more of a failure on
the part of the tsarist than a success of the revolutionaries. France,
especially Paris, had become a haven for the many Russian revolutionaries
that had been thrown out of Russia, and these revolutionaries were able to
take advantage of the west's liberties to conduct anti-regime activities.
The main body of the book consist of seven different articles written by an
unknown CIA analyst. The articles are all interrelated and discuss stories
of the Okhrana, its agents, and the Bolsheviks counterintelligence
operations. One of the articles testifies to a Okhrana double agent during
World War I. An agent named Dolin had Russian revolutionaries and the
Germans convinced that he was working for them, while all along working for
Okhrana. The author makes certain conclusions about the success of this
operation and the fruits that it bore. The agent was able to dissuade German
and Bolshevik attacks on Russia while also would give, “Okhrana regular
information on the enemy's intentions, methods, and program”(pg.80). This
article and statement testifies to the instructiveness of these articles and
the usefulness that the CIA had for the Okhrana files.
At the end of the publication there are to texts that discuss the idea that
Josef Stalin was an Okhrana agent. They both only have circumstantial
evidence that Stalin was a deep cover agent. This idea had been around for a
long time and many hoped that the publication of these files would shed some
light. Unfortunately the Okhrana kept no official record of their deep cover
agents, so even if Stalin was ever an agent there would be no mention of him
in Okhrana's files in Paris or St. Petersburg. This publication provides a
lot of insight into a subject that is typically very difficult to research.
It provides a simple preface discussing the Okhrana and what it did while
also providing detailed and interesting stories that are entertaining and
educational.
))
<>Fischer,George| a{}
*1956:CMA|_Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia| ((lbx plt gnt dvr ntg| defines lbx very
broadly,but lst of lbx~ does not reach back to RS1| Billington rvw noted irony that KDs left lbx~ harkened back
to 860s:rdx~:MxiNK & Hzn))
*1957:HSS#4:| “The Russian Intelligentsia and Liberalism”| ((ntg lbx))
<>Fitzpatrick,Sheila| a{}n{edc.plt
STL| RREV3}o{}
On Lunacharskii
*1978:Boomington IN|>Fitzpatrick,Sheila,ed| Cultural Revolution in Russia,1928-1931| ((LA831.8.F56. another call#
DK266.4.C86 1978| clt))
*1979:SlR#38,3| “Stalin and the Making of a New Elite,1928-1939”|
*1979:ENG CUP| Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union,1921-1934| ((LA831.8.F57))
*1982: & subsequent editions|_The_Russian Revolution, 1917-1932| ((
STUDENT REVIEW = Sheila Fitzpatrick examines the Russian Revolution in a new way from the popular historical
interpretation. Fitzpatrick extends the revolution into Stalin’s reign from the February Revolution of 1917. From
the 1860s to after the Civil War were all stepping stones toward the Revolution that all connected and linked
together. Fitzpatrick even claims that revolution tendencies and legacies continued until the fall of the Soviet Union.
Fitzpatrick began her analysis of the Russian Revolution with the early stages starting in the 1860s with the Emancipation
of Serfs. The Serfs and Peasants didn’t feel this was adequate enough and they felt they were entitled to more land than
they had received. In 1864 Zemstvos began. These were “Elected local government bodies that were institutionally quite
separate from the state bureaucracy and frequently in conflict with it” (Fitzpatrick, 23). The people of Russia were
beginning to have a say in the happenings of the area, but this power began to become a conflict with the national
government. The national government needed the money that the Zemstvos had collected from taxes and felt the Zemstvos had
obtained too much control. Throughout the 1860s legal reformations occurred. Through these an independent court system was
created. In the 1870s there was an upsurge of revolutionary terrorism. The plans thickened to destroy the autocratic
Russia. These events set the stage for revolutionary ideals.
What could be considered as the first revolution had occurred in 1905. Fitzpatrick however just sees this as another
step in the revolution that already had begun to surface. This entailed of urban revolution, peasant uprising and
labor strikes. This appeared to be a faiure according to revolutionists “From the revolutionary standpoint it was no
gain to have a façade of legal political institutions and a new breed of self important, chattering liberal
politicians. It was also deeply, almost unbearably disappointing for the revolutionary leaders to return to the familiar
dreariness of émigré life” (Fitzpatrick, 35). Fitzpatrick sees this as a failed attempt at a revolution and this could
lead to why she does not view it as an entirely separate revolution. The presence of revolution and necessity for reform
still lingered after this and lead to the next set of uprisings. After these event the stage was set for a revolution.
In February of 1917 the autocracy collapsed. A dual power of soviet and provisional government had taken over. This was
another stepping stone through the revolution. “The February coup d’etat passed off so smoothly that even then one felt a
vague presentiment that this was not the end, that such a crisis could not pass off so peacefully” (Fitzpatrick, 46). This
revolution was not the end but only the beginning to the current revolution.
The October Revolution of 1917 was the Bolsheviks unlawful seizure of power. This was the led to the new soviet regime
and laid the foundation for Stalinism. It also led to the Russian Civil war between the Anti-Bolsheviks and the
Bolsheviks. This civil war devastated the economy, it depleted privatization and created inflation. The Bolsheviks found
victory in the war and began their reign in Russia.
The Bolsheviks’ rise to power revolutionized many Old Russian policies. A new economic policy was put in place, the
NEP. This permitted a revival of legal private trade. The intentions were to restore the devastated economy. When Stalin
gained power the NEP was taken out and a Five Year Plan of centrally planned economy was put into place.
After Lenin’s death in 1924 the Communists needed to find a new leader, thus entered Stalin. Stalin’s rise to power also
maintained the feeling of revolution. Stalin enforced the First-Five-Year plan and this called for lower grain
prices. The Peasants were not pleased with this and Stalin forced peasants to still sell grain. He did this by barn searches
and confiscated any grain found on farmer’s property, this lead to unhappy peasants.
Fitzpatrick presents the idea that there is only one Russian Revolution from 1917 to 1932. The setting included the events
that occurred from 1860 to 1917. The revolution ended in 1932 with the success of the First-Five-Year plan and the
somewhat stability of the economy. The revolution however maintained a legacy and revolutionary tendencies until the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
))
<>Fitpatrick,Sheila, ed|
*1991:B.IU Press|_Russia in the Era of NEP
<>Friedgut,Theodore H| a{}
*1989:P.NJ,PUP|_Iuzovka and Revolution|| 2vv| ((v1=Life and Work in Russia’s Donbass,1869-1924|grn prl rvs.mvt RREV1 RREV3 NEP))
<>Footman,David| a{}
*1945|_Red Prelude: The Life of the Russian Terrorist Zhelyabov|
((UO| bxo JlbA krx rvs trr ppx NaV
STUDENT REVIEW = The main purpose of the book [...] was to give a background to the political party Narodnaya Volya
that arose in the 1870’s. The book begins by giving background stories of the key members of the party. The book also
outlines key people that were involved in the organizing and shaping of the ideals in which the members followed. The
book is an attempt to explain why Zhelyabov and his friends abandon their original policy of reform and become revolutionary
terrorist. This book also tries to explain what they did, how they did it, how the felt, and what happened to them. This
book is written in terms of point of view and experience, instead of merely stating the facts of what happened on what day
and who did it.
One of the key people of this book is Andrei Zhelyabov. He grew up in a poor family attended school at the University of
Odessa. From the time he was a student he was active in student activism and critical thinking of the government. In 1879
he was known as an “illegal” because of his activities. Before becoming involved in the Narodnaya Voyla he was married and
had a son but once he became apart of the Executive committee he abandoned them in order to protect them.
An important aspect, and due in large part to the popularity of the party, was their ability to appeal to different levels
of society. They especially appealed to the student population and the working population. They accepted all who were willing
to fight for change and overthrow the Emporer. Although, they may have had a lot of support that does not necessarily mean
that they were active in the party. There were only about twenty who played an active role in the terrorism acts.
The main ideals of the party were outlined by Zhelyabov, “Therefore it was the duty of the Social Revolutionary party to
overthrow the government and bring about a state of affairs in which such a struggle was possible. In other words the first
duty of the wary was to secure political liberty, and with this it would unite with all elements capable to of political
activity.” (Footman, 100) they strongly believed that only through socialist principals could humanity attain
liberty, equality, fraternity, general maternity, and well-being. Zhelyabov became the leader and put into action terrorist
acts against the Emperor. But that is not to say that they were only against the Emperor, they were actually against all
of the wrong doing that he had done to people and they only way to end this was through killing him.
The party is known for the attempts to assassinate the Emperor Alexander II. They tried several times, once through placing
dynamite on a railway and having it explode when the Emperors train passed by. But the switch didn’t ignite the
dynamite. There was also another attempt to assassinate the Emperor in Petersburg but this also was unsuccessful. Finally
the party was able to assassinate the Emperor on March 1. They used hand grenades, but also had a huge mine set up
underneath a road. This attempt was successful and greatly rattled the country. After the assassination six individuals
were arrested and tried in a court. Zhelyabov quickly admitted to planning the assassination but he was not actually
involved in the actual event. While in court Zhelyabov tried to explain why they had done what they had, that it was not
only to kill the Emperor but to bring justice to the people. All six were hung.
This book in important because he highlights all the different people involved, it gives a background to their lives and
how they became to be apart of the party. One of the key aspects of this book is how much planning and time went into the
preparations for the final event. Members set up false shops, broke people out of prison, collected funds, recruited new
members, and falsified names and passports. This was not just a group of people who met once and then decided to kill
the Emperor. They carefully planned and made preparations for their final event. But the key fact about the Narodnaya Volya
is that they were more than just a group of people that wanted to murder Alexander II. They wanted justice brought and to
end the atrocities that Alexander II had brought upon the people. They believed that he only cared for the rich and everyone
else fell by the wayside. This book highlights how this new party was passionate and stopped at nothing to achieve their goal.
))
*1963:NYC|_The_Civil War in Russia| ((Gwrx))
<>Freeze,Gregory L|
a{}n{ChxO rlg dxv pbl.hst}o{}
*1969mr:SlR#28:81-91| “A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901-1903”| (( Zmv lbx RREV1| Emmons,Formation:232 cites
re.Wbr & RUS lbx not ekn but Lebenshaltung| Freeze employs only bürgerliche Intelligenz [ASS 22:243-4] ))
--|In O&S| “Church and politics in late Imperial Russia: crisis and radicalization of the clergy”
<>Frieden,Nancy M| a{}
|_Russian Physicians in an Era of Reforms and Revolution,1856-1905| P.NJ:1981| ((|>Frieden,mdx| 5x8mdx| Prg.obx grt.rfm RREV1))
<>Frank,Stephen P. and Mark D. Steinberg, eds|
*1994|_Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class Values, Practices,
and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia| ((>CiF| pbl wrk prl plt.clt))
<>Frierson,Cathy| a{}
|>Peasant Icons| ((OWN|krx| ntg plt.clt))
*1987sp:SlR#46,1:55-69| Article on district courts| ((lwx.sud vls.sud krx))
<>Fröhlich,Klaus| a{}n{RREV1 plt orx cvc.pbl obx Wbr}o{}
*1981:|_The_Emergence of Russian Constitutionalism,
1900-1904: The Relationship Between Social Mobilization and Political Group Formation in Pre-revolutionary Russia|
((321n(336) notes that 22:234 explains Wbr ~~Kistiakovskii.
STUDENT REVIEW =
Klaus Fröhlich examines the emergence of a liberal-minded civil society which culminated
in the Constitutionalist movements and the 1905 revolution, and seeks to
answer the question of how this could have happened in the Russian
political context—that is, one without a precedent of parliamentary or
other democratic institutions. In this situation, we might be reminded of
similar political developments in industrial Germany, and the author does
indeed point out the parallels in how social/political mobilization came
after industrialization and resulted in top-down reforms (seen to a much
more limited extent in Russia). The author also cites the ideas of German
sociologist Max Weber, particularly the sentiments of
anti-bureaucratization (in the case of Russia, anti-autocracy as well)
fueled by the demands of the (bourgeois: urbanized, educated, professional
pedigree) bürgerliche Intelligenz class that had the most at stake
economically in such a modernizing society run by an autocracy that granted
them little to no political power.
The individuals behind the Constitutionalist movement acted in the
context of the “public movement”—a broad term to encompass the activities
of those involved in developing a Russian civil society following the
1860’s wave of political reforms (such as the establishment of the zemstvo
system of self-government that run certain, often specific and technical,
matters in provincial rural areas), with the focus on “small deeds”
liberalism involving public works and pushing for marginal liberal reforms
in a legal manner to limit the hindering effects of the autocracy. This
mitigated the tendency in Russian politics towards drifting to the extremes
of reactionary and revolutionary parts of the spectrum, and one of our
author’s main themes is stressing the degree of careful political
maneuvering that was necessary for the Constitutionalists to succeed in
gaining popular support while avoiding the overt wrath of and crackdown by
the government.
The primary forum for Constitutionalist ideas in the period before the
1905 Revolution was the journal Osvobozhdenie (Liberation), in which former
“legal Marxist” Peter Struve pushed the Constitutionalist ideals (of
autocracy abolishment, support for individual liberties free from violent
police crackdowns, non-class representation) without calling for specific
practical, organizational political action for fear of seeming too radical
and non-inclusive. Although this created conflicts for the editor in the
form of criticisms from fringe supporters of being too vague, abstract or
non-political, the author notes that in its time the journal was indeed
widely respected (or at least read) by moderates and radicals alike, as
well as government officials and conservatives who saw it as a key voice of
legitimate public opposition to the autocracy that demanded their
attention. In facing charges of being too cowardly or too revolutionary
from both sides, Struve’s editorial stance allowed a fluid and “liberal”
approach to the eventual formation of the Union of Liberation in Russia. We
can see one result of this in an early conference of liberals at Lake
Constance Germany (where, it should be noted, all such open meetings took
place at first and where the editorial office of Osvobozhdenie was located)
in which the conference resulted in what Fröhlich notes as a good degree of
trust and harmony on a burgeoning program of supporting a constitutional
order that would eventually abolish the autocracy.
While many in the Constitutionalist movement, and primarily Struve, saw
the importance of the working class and their inclusion in and support for
this liberal movement, we must be reminded that many saw it as their duty
as the most educated and able to dictate the terms of a Constitutionalist
program in the best interests of all Russians. The essential economic
privilege and high social profile that many Constitutionalists enjoyed
meant that many were at first wary of involving lower-classes to an
extensive degree, yet by the Second Congress meeting of the Union of
Liberation in 1904, enough shifts within the movement had occurred (owing
much to the gradual and open-ended approach espoused by Struve) that
universal suffrage and “protection of the interests of the working masses”
were now stated as key objectives of the movement (remarkable change given
that at this same time the Union chose to make its existence known
publicly). Thus, a movement that was initially comprised largely of
educated urbanites from the metropolitan centers St. Petersburg and Moscow
and members of the so-called 3rd Element (public servants that commonly
comprised the zemstvo—teachers, physicians, agronomists, statisticians,
etc.) now opened its doors to the voice of the proletariat, in large part
due to the desire to undermine the effectiveness of more dogmatic and
revolutionary socialist forces. The political ideals that drove
Constitutionalist luminaries are familiar enough to those of us raised in
the Western traditions of parliamentarianism and individual liberty: What
was different in the case of Russia was the need for a gradual approach to
Constitutional order through the elevation of guaranteed civil and
political liberties over the power of the autocracy as well as its
subordinate bureaucracy. This would lead, as Pavel Milyukov put it, to a
political order evolving under the “laws of political biology” of
representation-thru-Constitution, despite the widely-recognized crisis of
“backwardness” in Russia. He saw this tendency as being inherently
symptomatic of the development of higher culture and as “indifferent to
national peculiarities” as the use of the alphabet, printing press, or
electricity. (78) While history as cited here by Milyukov seemed to be on
the side of the Constitutionalists, subsequent events and revolutions would
perpetuate the legacy of Russia as a political pariah.
Another key theme that Fröhlich emphasizes in detailing the rise of the
Constitutionalist movement, and one of its key strengths, is its flowering
in tight-knit, domestic settings that involved politically subversive, but
non-violent and undogmatic activity. The settings for many early meetings
were political salons and homes, out of the public eye by necessity.
Gradually this close circle of “friends”, as Fröhlich repeatedly refers to
them, expanded to cooperation across physical boundaries through primarily
journalistic endeavors (no less than 3 political journals including
Struve’s Liberation are detailed as having a critical effect in the
political mobilization of the movement) and the building of a rapport
between those in the relatively indistinct “moderate” spectrum of Russian
politics that would culminate in the Union of Liberation. The author also
notes that the generation of those born in the 1860’s and raised in the era
of industrialization along with increasing social mobilization (most
constitutionalists were between the ages of 40 and 60) played a huge factor
in mobilizing these individuals to demand political reform by the turn of
the century. This once again reflects the notions that the rise of a
“middle class” (bourgeois, bürgerliche Intelligenz, etc.) as seen in the
West would lead to the unraveling of old autocratic orders restrictive to
individuals and their rights. In short, the answer to the “how” and “why”
of political group formation in Russia lay within the circumstances of this
generation and their opportunity at social and political mobilization.
))
<>Galai,Shmuel| a{}n{RREV1 rvs}o{}
|_The_Liberation
Movement in Russia,1900-1905|C.ENG:CUP,1973| ((noWbr))
<>Gal’perin,Grigorii Boris*| With Aleksei Ivanovich Korolev, and Nina Ivanovna Vasil’eva| a{}
|_Pervaia rossiiskaia revoliutsiia i samoderzhavie| LGR:LGR.unv,1975| ((DK263.v32
GRS:222| RREV1 stt| 151p| 86:quotes Reisner MA re.“absolyutizme, prinyavwem formy ljekonstitucionalizma” Wbr.idl))
<>Gaman-Golutvina,O. V. (2006). Politicheskie ėlity Rossii: Vekhi istoricheskoĭ evoliutsii. Politologiia Rossii. Moskva: ROSSPĖN.
<>Gammer,Moshe| a{}n{ISL QQN}o{}
*1994:|_Muslim resistance to the tsar : Shamil and the conquest
of Chechnia and Daghestan
*2006:|_The_lone wolf and the bear : three centuries of Chechen defiance of Russian rule| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
This is a chronicle of “Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule”. The Chechens have traditionally inhabited the Caucasian mountains
and its lowlands. The geographic area of the Caucasus is especially rough with forests and hazardous mountains making the land especially
inhospitable. These labyrinths of dense forests and dangerous mountaintops have presented a nearly unbeatable challenge to any would-be
invader- even in the 21st century.
A central theme that Gammer explores in his historical analysis is the repeated attempts at achieving unity among the Caucasian clans
in an effort to resist Russian conquest. Alone the fiercely independent clans had little chance of halting the conquests of their
large, expansive neighbor to the north. Islamic spiritual leaders, often sheikhs, realized early on “that in religious reform lay
the one chance of preserving their cherished liberty and independence.” (Gammer, 27) The first to attempt this endeavor was Sheikh
Mansur, who preached that through Sufi’ism and Sha’ria unity could be achieved and the Russians beaten back. He resisted Russian
conquest using these means for a number of years though was eventually forced to surrender. His status as “’the first to preach and
lead’ the struggle against the ‘Russians in the Caucasus’” made him a national hero among the Chechens. He set the trend for spiritual
leaders to lead military resistance by waging gazavat, a form of Islamic holy war, against the Russian invaders and later, against
the Russian occupiers. A more prominent symbol of Chechen defiance of Russian conquest was Imam Shamil who emerged some 30 or 40 years
after Mansur. His military exploits won him renown and his name still maintains its legacy of defying Russia (notably through the
emergence of Shamil Basayev, a more recent example of a Chechen spiritual leader
attempting to unite the tribes to resist- and adopting the name of a more famous
rebel before him).
Gammer’s insight into the relationship between Islam and the Chechens’ struggle offers valuable information that sheds light on
the current situation in the Caucasus. While Islam became ingrained in the psyche of those struggling to resist Russian rule, it was
not until later in the 20th century that Islam’s firm tie to Chechen nationalism and identity was completed. Using increasingly harsh
methods to subjugate the restless Chechen and Ingush populations, Joseph Stalin “Carried out what so many Russian generals… had
suggested but never dared to do.” (Gammer, 165) He deported nearly the entire ethnic populations of the Ingush and Chechen people
far into Kazakhstan, where the harsh environment killed off many. It was in this extreme environment that “ethnic solidarity” was
maintained through the various branches of Islam adhered to by the deported ethnicities. When sent back to their homelands in 1956
this fundamental tie between ethnic identity and religion was already firmly cemented. To this end Moshe Gammar sheds light on the
current conflict by exposing the centrality that Islam plays in the national struggle of the Chechens, an event likened to
Poland’s “national solidarity” being inexorably tied to Catholicism.
Russian intervention has been a central component of Chechnya’s recent history. Gammer makes note of this and puts the actions
of Chechens in the appropriate context: they are simply responses to actions initiated by Russia. “It is Russia as the great
power, neighbour to a small people, that has dictated the events and the agenda for more than three centuries. The Chechens have
mainly reacted to Russia’s moves and policies, not initiated their own.” (Gammer, 219) The evolution of Chechen nationalism shows
this point most clearly. Islam became integrated into Chechen nationalism when the first resistance leaders used it to lead their
armies against Russia, becoming firmly entrenched in the national psyche as it proved its use once again in resisting Russification
in the inhospitable areas of Kazakhstan. Russia has been always been a menacing neighbor to the Chechens, looming as a backdrop
against which all of Chechnya’s actions are decided. To the Chechens freedom does not mean a certain type of governance aside from
self-governance. Freedom to the Chechens is in an absolutely negative light, meaning simply freedom from Russian intervention. This
is why people like Sheikh Mansur and Imam Shamil have been able to reach such a colossal stature among Chechens, as they embody this
natural longing for a people to dictate their own actions in accordance with their own will, not the will of their more-powerful
neighbors and occupiers. Chechnya represents an interesting challenge to democracy and Russia. By examining the Chechens we can see
the evolution of democracy in an area concerned almost solely with their own emancipation from another’s rule. This poses special
challenges to the maturation of democracy in an area driven forward primarily by the worst of external factors – war.
))
<>Geifman,Anna| a{}
|_Thou
Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917| ((trr
STUDENT REVIEW = = As the title suggests, the book Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary
Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 by Anna Geifman discusses the issue of
terrorism during the revolutionary period in Russia. Though the subtitle
places the book between the years 1894 and 1917, Geifman is primarily
concerned with the periods of the First Russian Revolution, from 1905 to
1906, and its immediate aftermath, from 1907 to 1909. Thou Shalt Kill is
an overview of the evolution of the use of terror as a political
statement and a tactic with three main objectives. Geifman explains that
these main objectives of terror were to destabilize the Russian
government, to protect the revolutionary movement, and to punish the
revolutionaries’ oppressors and enemies.
Geifman traces this evolution of terrorism within the main
revolutionary parties from their inception to World War I. These parties
include the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries, the Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, and the Constitutional Democrats, or the
Kadets as they were also called. Geifman also discusses the use of
terror among various anarchist groups and various other fringe groups,
as well as individuals who used terror but were not necessarily
affiliated with one of these parties. Of these parties, the
Socialists-Revolutionaries, or the SRs used terror the most frequently,
even going so far as to create a separate unit within the party. This
was the Combat Organization whose sole role was the planning and
implementation of terrorist activities. Throughout the chapters devoted
to each of these groups, Geifman seeks to explain how the use terror
became a part of their political doctrines, the differences in how each
party implemented terror, and the differences in how each viewed and
treated the terrorists.
One important fact that is worth noting about Thou Shalt Kill is that
Geifman does not define in depth the political and ideological
differences between the aforementioned parties, except concerning her
focus on terrorism. If that is what the reader is looking for, perhaps
another book would be more suited to this interest. It is not a failing
on Geifman’s part per se; her focus is merely on a different aspect of
these parties’ doctrines. That said, at least a basic understanding of
each of these parties is valuable when reading Geifman’s Thou Shalt
Kill.
Throughout the book, Geifman describes several of the different groups
who became targets of terrorism during the revolutionary period.
Government employees, police officers, military officers, and guards
were all targets during this time period. According to Geifman, these
people were symbols of the authority and the oppression of the
government. Other targets of terrorism were factory owners, land owners,
managers, bankers, and even workers who refused to strike. These people,
Geifman explains, were symbols of capitalism and the oppression of the
market. It is important to note that targets of terrorism were not
limited to people because many terrorists also plotted and carried out
attacks on structures and materials as well, such as oil rigs. Another
aspect of terrorism is what Geifman refers to as “expropriation.”
Expropriation included acts of robbery and extortion to fund both the
political and terrorist wings of the movement.
An interesting aspect of this book is that she takes the time to
explain terrorist activities within the rest of the Russian Empire as
well. These areas include Armenia, Georgia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia and the Duchy of Finland. She does not go entirely in depth into
these regions and gives only an overview of the use of terror within
them. However, this overview is very useful in understanding terrorism
in a broad context. In addition, an interested reader is able to consult
Geifman’s bibliography for additional sources.
A final feature of Thou Shalt Kill that is worth noting is this
bibliography. Geifman neatly arranges her sources into categories for
easy perusal. These categories include archives, periodicals and other
public documents, memoirs, and secondary sources. The bibliography is a
valuable resource should the reader desire to follow up with any of the
parties, topics, events or terrorists discussed in Geifman’s book.
))
>Geifman,Anna, ed| a{}
|_Russia under the
last tsar : Opposition and subversion, 1894-1917| ((>O&S| plt.pty~ SDm SDb
Jwx SRs anx ntn Dmx lbx KDs SoO rxn plc GoS OChx dxv
>Liebich,Andre| Mensheviks
>Williams,Robert C| Bolsheviks
>Lokshin,Aleksandr| Bund in the Russian-Jewish historical landscape
>Melancon,Michael| Neo-populism in early twentieth-century Russia: the Socialist Revolutionary party ...
>Geifman,Anna| Anarchists and the “Obscure extremists”
>Weeks,Theodore R| National minorities in the Russian empire, 1897-1917
>Morison,John| State Duma : a political experiment
>Stockdale,Melissa| Liberalism and democracy: the Constitutional Democratic Party
>Pavlov,Dmitrii B| Union of October 17
>Bokhanov,Aleksandr| Hopeless symbiosis: power and right-wing radicalism ...
>Daly,Jonathan| Security police in late Imperial Russia
>Korros,Alexandra S| Legislative chamber history overlooked: the state council ..., 1906-1917
>Freeze,Gregory L| Church and politics in late Imperial Russia: crisis and radicalization of the clergy
))
<>Getzler,Israel| a{}
*1967:LND| Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat| ((SDs(m) ))
*1983:ENG, CUP|_Kronstadt,1917-1921: The Fate of a Soviet Democracy| ((RREV3
Gwrx vs.SDs(b) mlt))
<>Geyer,Dietrich| a{}
*1958:IntRevSocHis#3,2/3:| ((re. RREV1 & GRM SDs))
*1987:Leamington Spa|_Russian Revolution.| ((163pp RREV))
<>Gill,Graeme J| a{}
|>The Origins of the Stalinist Political System|C.ENG:CUP,1990| ((JN6511.G53| ndr|STL|ch4:“The Divided Elite”:135-98 (esp:171-72) Struggle
w/fxn~ [175f] Realities of fxn [185] Quotes Trt “pty always right” [187] ch8:“Elite Ravaged”:275-306|Conclusion:“Why Stalinism”:307-27))
|>Peasants and Government in the Russian Revolution|L.ENG:1979| ((B&N Imports,text edition $28.50,ISBN:0-06-492406-8| krx stt RREV2))
<>Gleason,Abbott| a{
}r{
Young Russia: The
Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s
<>Gleason,Abbott,Peter Kenez,and Richard Stites,eds| >Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution| ((>Blw.clt| sbr,ndr))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Griffiths,Gordon|
a{1914}
*1968:O.ENG|_Representative government in Western Europe in the sixteenth century: Commentary and documents
for the study of comparative constitutional history| A publication of the
International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary
Institutions| ((JN94 .R3|622p bbl| prm plt.clt stt.dmx ZmS
cst))
<>Guroff,Gregory, and Fred V. Carstensen, eds| a{}
|>Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union| P.NJ:PUP,1983| ((sbr trd kpq ekn cpt))
<>Haimson,Leopold|
*1955:CMA|>Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism| ((HX313.H3))
*1964de:SlR#23: 619-42 and 1965mr:SlR#24: 1-22| “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia,1905-1917”| ((Reprinted in
CSH:341-380))
<>Haimson,Leopold,ed|
*1979:IUP|>The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-1914| ((sbr.ndr skz krx RREV1 noWbr))
<>Hamburg,Gary M| a{}
*1978:Stanford University PhD dissertation| “Land Economy and Society in Tsarist Russia: Interest Politics of
the Landed Gentry During the Agrarian Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century”| ((dvr plt ekn INX pbl))
*1979jy:RRe#38:323-38|
“The Russian Nobility on the Eve of the 1905 Revolution”| (())
*1984:New Brunswick NJ|_Politics of the Russian Nobility,1881-1905| ((noUO?|dvr clx sSs| dvr sSs clx pbl.mvt plt RREV1 “Lacked
a common identity” | “class analysis is generally inappropriate” Bruce Lincoln rvw SlR 44:46))
*2001:Kritika|Review of four Russian titles devoted to
political conservatism
*1992:S.CA, SUP|_Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism,1828-1866| ((Qqr lbx prf MVA.unv unv svt
STUDENT REVIEW =
Until quite recently Boris Chicherin has been largely neglected by historians in their narratives of Russian political culture in the
19th Century. Compared to populist socialism and Slavophilism, the two main currents of Russian thought leading during this period, Russian
liberalism appealed to neither a large section of the intelligentsia nor the broader masses. Despite its political shortcomings, however, it
played a vital role in the great ideological debates leading up to the Peasant Emancipation, leaving behind a bulk of largely neglected
material that has become part of an increasingly relevant “liberal tradition” in Russia. G. M. Hamburg in Boris Chicherin and Early Russian
Liberalism: 1828-1866 attempts to remedy this perceived “oversight” by concentrating on the political thinking of its most prolific early
commentators.
Expectedly, Hamburg starts off his study of Chicherin by giving a brief account of his childhood. Chicherin was born in Tambov, a
provincial town southwest of Moscow, in 1828. He was of was of noble origins and spent his childhood in like manner. Before dedicating
himself to scholarship, Chicherin spent his time among Moscow high society, frequenting elaborate balls and lavish dinner parties. Chicherin
it seemed was on his way to becoming a 'superfluous man'. Fortunately, he found his way at Moscow University, coming under the spell of
the great Westernizer historian T. N. Granovsky and later the readings of Hegel; both of which having a profound influence on Chicherin's
philosophy of history as well as his more mature political writings.
Hamburg spends considerable time delineating the early ideological movements in Russia that would later color Chicherin's later
thinking. Chicherin was at once a Westernizer, Hegelian and to a certain extent classical liberal, though his interpretation of Russian
history steered him away from out and out liberal solutions to Russia's problems. Indeed Hamburg seems most comfortable defining his
political philosophy as 'conservative liberalism'.
[EUA=]
According to Chicherin modern Russia was defined first and foremost by the state, which until recently didn't hinder progress but
spurred it forward. The Eurasian steppe demanded concentrated government not only to resist foreign invaders but help facilitate basic
social functions across vast areas. When one speaks of Russian society then, he or she is speaking not of an organic, self-perpetuating
unit as was the case in Europe but a product of the state. The only actor in Russia capable of imposing meaningful reform then was the state.
These views were first laid out by Konstantin Kavelin in his largely overlooked essay entitled
Survey on the Juridical Life of Ancient
Russia (1847). In it Kavelin advanced the theory that (1) the Russian state was a beacon of individual liberty and progress and (2) that
the Petrine Transformation represented not a deviation from the policies put in place by the great Muscovite autocrats, as the Slavophiles
contended, but their logical continuation. Hamburg necessarily deals with the political thought of Kavelin. Like Chicherin with whom he
collaborated often, Kavelin would play a central role in the debates leading up to the Peasant Emancipation, where the term “Russian
liberal” was for the first time used in Russian political culture.
Their theory of the Russian state – described today as the “statist school” of Russian historiography – tended to play down the role
of representative democracy and the peasant commune (or obshchina) in Russia's historical development. Chicherin believed Russia
wasn't “ready” for the former while pushing for the abolishment of the latter, seeing it as barrier to Russia's progress along liberal
lines. This view enraged populist socialists, who regarded the obshchina as the foundation for Russia's future purely communal
existence. Hamburg does an exceptionally good job of highlighting this early divide within Russian political culture.
Alexander Herzen of course played a crucial role in providing an outlet for these great early debates in his Free Russian Press, of
which Hamburg goes into great detail, and to absolutely wonderful effect. These make for the most illuminating passages in Hamburg's
study – Chicherin's run in with Herzen is especially notable, setting the tone for the rest of his work.
At worst then, Chicherin might be viewed as an apologist, even defender, of Russian autocracy, as many of his contemporaries in
fact did. His political philosophy left him little immediate hope for democracy, clearly placing too much stock in the ability of
the state to facilitate meaningful change. Yet Chicherin, and Hamburg would certainly attest, should not be judged too harshly. He
was after all in favor of reform and left behind a considerable body of work in defense of his statist position; work that would
ultimately become the basis for the political thought of later more robust liberal thinkers such as Paul Miliukov and Maxime Kovalevsky.
))
<>Hardy,Deborah| a{}
*1987:NYC| Land and Freedom: The Origins of Russian Terrorism| ((ZIV trr plt.clt))
<>Haskell,Thomas L., and Richard F. Teichgraeber III, eds| a{}
*1993:ENG CUP| The Culture of the market: Historical essays| ((|HM101.C933 1993|524p sbr cpt plt.clt ekn mkt))
<>Hausmann,Guido et al|
|>Gesellschaft als locale Veranstaltung.... | ((grd cvc.pbl|
Two imperial decrees, in 1870 and 1892,
adjusted the city council [gorodskaia duma] to strengthen but also to limit
urban self-administration. This book, written by German and Russian scholars,
argues that deficiencies once attributed to Russian cities, and to these
decrees, are largely the deficiencies of old “Western” interpretive concepts
themselves. We can no longer gloss over actual bodies of self-organization and
self-realization among the wide variety of home-grown urban dwellers. We can no
longer ignore the poor, women, national minorities and religious communities. We
should no longer premise “civil society” on the ascendancy of a unified and
isolated or independent “middle class”, the reified “bourgeoisie”. Chapters then
take up these topics = Moscow City Duma between 1870 and 1916; Moscow elites
(owners of grand homes); Women who supported health and charitable institutions
(representing ca. 80 leading Moscow merchant families); Social composition of
city officials, 1893-1917, with 30 bios of mayors in Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Riga,
Kharkov, Tomsk, Kazan and Saratov; Urban governance in Siberia and the Caucasus;
The “New Club” organized by Kazan merchants; Burgeoning urban wage-labor
population and their organizations, and beggars. The full story suggested in the
subtitle of this book -- Selbstverwaltung, Assoziierung und Geselligkeit
[self-administration, association and sociability] -- requires clarification of
how self-mobilization in rural Zemstvos and towns coincided and reinforced one
another, and how village and rural district activation fits in. We also need to
know more about the liberal and technical professions and their organizations,
more than we get from the brief mention of the Literacy Committee of the Free
Economic Society [116-125] and the chapter on the “New Club”. This book is
mainly about the shaping effect of the 1870 and 1892 urban decrees. There is no
parallel account of the remarkable decrees handed down in 1867, 1874 and 1895
restricting independent Selbstverwaltung, Assoziierung und Geselligkeit, whether
in cities or anywhere else in the Empire. This mounting sequence of suffocating
laws sought to criminalize all voluntary association not explicitly approved,
licensed and monitored by the bureaucratic state (any group that assembled
outside the jurisdiction of the police [bez vedoma policii]).
))
<>Henze,Charlotte E| a{}n{hlt mdx}o{
}r{
*2010:Hoboken|_Disease, Health Care and Government in Late
Imperial Russia: Life and Death on the Volga, 1823-1914
STUDENT REVIEW =
Charlotte Henze looks to discuss how Russia was afflicted by cholera for much of the 1800s and early 1900s and
what role government had in the spread of the disease. To better gain a frame of reference, Henze uses a case
study from the southern Russian city of Saratov, which was particularly ravaged by cholera, but not unique in
how the politics of cholera played out within the city.
Cholera is mostly a disease of sanitation and proper hygiene. In today’s modern times we do not see very
many outbreaks of cholera because of our relatively advanced sanitation measures. In Russia, and the rest
of the Westernized world, however, modern sanitation was not widely in effect when the first worldwide
outbreak struck in 1823. Because of the lax sanitation and hygiene measures cholera, therefore, was able
to rapidly infect the populous. In Russia, however, cholera remained a savage disease, and it killed
over 2 million people between 1823-1914 in four major epidemics. Cholera claimed more lives in Russia
than it did in any other country. Despite the fact that Russia had, as Henze notes, the most prolific
anti-cholera campaign out of any other European country, it was unable to successfully fight the
disease as effectively as other nations.
This book looks to explain the reasons why Russia failed to stop cholera’s lethal wrath. Henze argues
that a lack of willingness to modernize was the driving force that caused Russia’s cholera epidemics
to be so devastating. Although the fundamental reason cholera was so brutal was because of an
unwillingness to embrace modernity, other issues were involved including a fear of government
from the peasantry, an economically driven government, an unwillingness to listen to the medical
community, and a breakdown in communication between the Imperial government and local authorities.
The book begins with a brief history of cholera in Russia and how the disease’s progression compared
with the rest of Europe at the time. When cholera first came to Europe in 1823, most of Europe, including
Russia, implemented the same disease fighting tactics on cholera as it had done with the plague centuries
earlier. For the most part this meant military and government backed quarantine. Because of cholera’s
epidemiology, keeping people densely enclosed is the least ideal way to combat the disease. Most
European governments soon realized that harsh quarantine efforts were not effective and eased up
on the directive, but not Russia. Henze argues that because of Russia’s unwillingness to modernize, the
useless quarantine measures were kept in effect.
The people soon became wary of the strict measures, and tried to leave their enclosures. Additionally, the
quarantine measures often unnecessarily targeted the country’s poor. This led to mass confusion and
fear within the general population, and soon the people began to flee, mostly along the Volga. The
flight of the people further perpetuated the disease’s reach and more people became ill as a result.
While these strict quarantine measures appeared to be in good faith to save the populous, Henze argues
that it was mostly economically motivated. When it became clear that traditional quarantines were not
working, the government decided to ban the sale of wares from businesses, yet, quite paradoxically
allowed for ships to continue trading with other nations. Permitting ships to trade with other
nations allowed for the government to maintain its income. Many people’s livelihoods were destroyed
when they were banned from selling their wares, and this further perpetuated the people’s hatred
and fear of the government. This notion of retaining wealth further illustrated, according to
Henze, that the government was unwilling to embrace modernity.
Not only was the government keen on retaining its wealth, but it was also unwilling to listen the
medical community on ways to combat the disease. While it is true that at the beginning of the
cholera epidemics little was known about the disease, by the time of 1892 (the worst years of
cholera in Russia) there was a consensus from the medical community that cholera could be treated
with better sanitation and hygiene. Despite the advice from European doctors, Russia’s government
was unwilling to listen to the advice. Henze argues that this was most likely due to the fact
that the government was fearful that this would empower the people in a time when the autocracy
was trying desperately to reign in power.
This isn’t to say, however, that the government didn’t have a plan of action when cholera outbreaks
did occur, on the contrary, actually. By 1892, Russia’s government had a very specific plan of
dealing with cholera. Unfortunately, however, because of Russia’s immense size, it was often
difficult for government-backed directives to be properly implemented. When the outbreak of 1892
began, local officials often were hesitant to publicly admit that cholera was in their
cities. Naturally, then, they did not implement the government’s directives.
The 1892 cholera outbreak was the worst to date. It was particularly devastating because so
many people assumed that the previous outbreaks were the worst to come and couldn’t imagine
cholera wreaking more havoc than before. When people were dying in record numbers, Russia
slowly began to allow for positive change that helped successfully combat the disease. This
was mainly accomplished by empowering physicians and for local governments to implement the
doctors’ mandates.
Before the 1892 epidemic, doctors were seen as “servants of the state” and yielded little
power. But, in late 1892 the government gave the local zemstva power to rule the medical
profession. As a result, the zemstva gave the local doctors the political power needed to
effect change. This eventually allowed for the doctors to treat cholera and they helped
to stop the savagery of the 1892 epidemic.
Many cities began investing in better infrastructure and sanitation measures as a result
of advice from the medical community. It is important to note, however, that the modern
sanitation efforts were mostly funded by cities alone and not by the Imperial
government. However, the efforts for better hygiene proved to be successful and cholera’s
spread was eventually quelled.
Because of cholera’s ease of prevention, when there are epidemics, it is usually a symptom
of political failure. Starting from the mid-1800s Russia’s government was in a decline and
was desperately trying to cling onto power. This unfortunate political position allowed
for cholera to run rife throughout the country in four major epidemics from 1823-1914. Because
the government was enacting policy based on trying to “save-face” rather than on trying to
save the people, cholera’s spread through the empire was the worst in any European country
during that time.
<>Hildermeier,Manfred| a{}
|_Die russische Revolution 1905-1921| Frankfort:1989| ((DK263.H48 1989|RREV1 RREV2 RREV3))
*1978:Koeln-WEN| Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands: Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900-1914)|
((noUO| SRs RREV1| rvs))
<>Hogan,Heather|
*1993:IUP|>Forging Revolution: Metalworkers, Managers, and the State in St. Petersburg, 1890-1914| ((prl RREV1 mfg
ekn.apx stt plc.scx?))
<>Holquist,Peter| a{}
*1997jy:RRe#56,3:445-50| "Anti-Soviet /svodki/ from the Civil War: Surveillance as
a Shared Feature of Russian Political Culture"| ((plc.spy Gwrx))
<>Hough,Jerry F| a{}n{SSR mfg.apx KPS Twrl trx CWX R&A}
*1969:|>The Soviet Perfects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making|
*1979:C.MA,HUP|>Hough,Jerry F.,and Merle Fainsod|>How the Soviet Union is Governed|
((JN6531.F3 1979| ndr gnr.txt| cf=Fainsod))
*1986:|_Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates
and American Options,The|>H.Twrl|
<>Hunczak,Taras,ed| The Ukraine,1917-1921: A Study in Revolution. Cambridge MA: 1977| ((DK265.8.u4u335| Gwrx))
<>Hutchinson,John| a{}n{hlt mdx}o{}
*1990:B.MD,JHUP|_Politics and Public Health
in Revolutionary Russia, 1890-1918
<>Husband,William B|
*1990:O.ENG|_Revolution in the Factory: The Birth of
the Soviet Textile Industry,1917-1920| ((256p))
<>Janos,Andrew C| a{}n{1pty fxn}
*1970| “The One-Party State and Social Mobilization”, also re.grp pltics in CMN cvc.pbl|
In >Authoritarian politics in modern society; the dynamics
of established one-party systems, edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore| ((ndr| 1pty fxn plt.clt))
*1976:|_Authoritarian politics in Communist Europe:
uniformity & diversity in one-party states / contributors, Zygmunt Bauman ... [et al.]| ((JN96.A3 1976 .A97))
<>Johnson,Robert Eugene| a{}
*1979:|>Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century| ((HD8530.M62.J63| krx prl clx))
|>avc & lbx:Zmv xtx [Emmons,Zemstvo]
<>Jones,Adrian| a{955
}m{LaTrobe unv
}r{
|>Late-Imperial Russia, an Interpretation: Three Visions, Two Cultures, One Peasantry| Bern, etc:Peter Lang,1997| ((noUO| rfr txt
mnt.hst plt.ekn nrd.svt.e xtx: krx| mnt&ddd:ntg, stt & krx all speak))
|>rtl~ ~~FREV w/ RREV
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Jones,Anthony G/LRF
<>Jones,Robert Edward| a{}
*1973:The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785|
((
Some interpret Catherine's "emancipation" of the nobility
[ID] as a confirmation of
their status as a "ruling class". Jones does not. The gentry, as gentry, was not
the ruling class in Russia. The emperor and high state officials (chinovnichestvo)
were the true ruling class. Chinovniki were those who earned or were granted chin [rank] on
the Table of Ranks [ID]. Aristocrats had "insider advantage" in these matters, but
aristocrats were not, as aristocrats, the ruling class. Those who held official
administrative rank were the ruling class, and the higher the rank the greater
the degree of "rule". Catherine simply put pomeshchiki out to pasture, so to speak
Yes, they had lordly ascendancy over villagers out there in the provinces, and
these serfs were bound to them. But most pomeshchiki had very few serfs and few
of them prospered. If pomeshchiki wanted back in the capitals in an active role, they would have to choose to go the route of state service.
They were now no longer legally obligated to do so, but most found it an
economic necessity. As one mid-19th-century public figure put it, a non-serving
pomeshchik was as rare as a white crow.
))
<>Josephson,Paul| a{}
*1991:BUC| Physics and Politics in Revolutionary Russia| ((scs fzz plt.clt 917:41;LGR STL.clt))
<>Julicher, Peter| a{}
*2003:NC Jefferson, McFarland and Co.| Renegades, Rebels and Rogues under the Tsars| ((
This is a course textbook about tsarist political authorities and their opponents over a 370-year period
preceding collapse of the Romanov dynasty in 1917. Colorful and menacing
characters gather on all sides -- tsar Ivan IV and Prince Andrei Kurbskii, more
than one false Dmitrii, Ivan Bolotnikov, Patriarchs Filaret and Nikon,
Archpriest Avvakum, Boyarina Feodosiia Morozova, Regent Sofiia and elite
military police, the Strel’tsy, and several Cossack leaders, Stepan Razin,
Kondratii Bulavin and Emiliano Pugachev. Later Sergei Nechaev appears as “one of
the fiercest revolutionary fanatics in Russian history” [189]. Then terrorists
in Narodnaia Volia assassinated tsar-liberator Alexander II. Action is anchored
in political institutions and governmental policies. Tsar Aleksei and the
disorders of 1648 are understood together. The devastating schism among Russian
Orthodox believers is associated with state policy. Aleksei, son of Peter I and
heir to the throne, died under torture because of dealings with political
opposition. Dissatisfied high state functionaries were leading conspirators
against Empress Anna and helped murder emperors Peter III and Paul. Officers of
the massive imperial armed forces were dominant figures of political opposition
in the 19th century. Father Gapon, labor leader on “Bloody Sunday”,
and Dmitrii Bogrov, Prime Minister Petr Stolypin’s assassin, were police agents
as well as associates of the terrorist underground. And finally in the
catastrophic era of World War One, Grigorii Rasputin and the Empress Alexandra
symbolized squalor at highest bureaucratic-administrative levels.
Julicher concludes that the rise of an imperialistic military and police
state [mlt], financially insecure and jealous of its prerogatives and thus unwilling to
tolerate an independent public sphere, caused and conditioned these episodes [255-9]. Old-Believers
arose from the same larger institutional matrix that promoted terrorism in the Social Revolutionary Battle
Organization. The Decembrists and Nicholas I might be thought of as peas from the same pod.
Julicher’s intended audience appears to be US
citizens of high-school age. The book presumes a casual grasp of “democratic
traditions necessary for a modern state” [v]. While “principled dissidents”
(implying a distinction not spelled out) have been harassed and vilified in
America and “other western countries”, still opposition there has been respected
and has sometimes succeeded. In Russia, however, “such cases are non-existent”
because no “loyal opposition” has been possible. Political powers have treated
criticism and resistance as treason; officials attacked opponents with militant
ferocity [5].
Casual reference above to “traditions” detracts
from the book’s more discrete emphasis on institutions and policies. And the
conventional but deceptive word “western” might create the erroneous impression
that military/police statism and vigorous, extreme resistance are altogether
unique to Russia, or characteristic of the “non-western” world alone. In order
to judge these issues, young people need to know more about “democratic
traditions” and the ups and downs of “Western” values. The Thirty Years War, for
example, could provide context for judging Russian 17th century
politics. Similarly comparison of English treatment of the Irish, and Irish
response, with Russian treatment of its imperial subjects, and their “roguish”
response, might prove suggestive. Julicher finesses 20th and
early 21st century issues. He opens with a brief history of the
Soviet Revolution, and he more than once lightly associates violence and outrage
up to 1917 with the extremes of subsequent Stalinism and Communist Party rule.
But what of the last twenty years, from Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to
Vladimir Putin? It might be best to think of these as discussion points that
could be raised with students fortunate enough to be taught by Julicher or his
textbook.
The publisher must be scolded for second-rate
proof reading. Many misspellings and typographic errors mar this presentation:
Karakazov for Karakozov, and Prizhkov (etc.) for Pryzhov, just to mention two.
Nechaev is a big part of the story, but he does not make it into the index. Many
excellent illustrations are taken from Russian-language sources, but these are
often identified in imprecise transliteration. Three-fourths of the endnotes
cite no sources. They simply extend the main narrative, back where students will
not read them. To counterbalance this, a good map [xi] helps locate most of the
action and underscores the wholesome awareness throughout the text that the
frontier plays a vital role in the story. Bibliographies reveal Julicher’s debt
to The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, and they guide
students to useful additional reading.
))
<>Kahan,Arcadius| a{}
*1965:CHI| In Education and Economic
Development| “The 'Hereditary Workers' Hypothesis and the Development of a Factory Labor Force
in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Russia”| ((krx-prl wrk clx))
<>Kappeler,Andreas| a{}
*2001|_The_Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
Andreas Kappeler's book [...] is
an ambitious attempt at presenting the history of Tsarist Russia from
the perspective of the Empire's ethnic minorities. Other standard texts,
such as Nicholas Riasanovsky's "A History of Russia" or George
Vernadsky's book by the same name, are invaluable for gaining an
understanding of the broad sweep of Russian history, including accounts
of the reigns of various monarchs, the plight of serfs, and the
challenges that the Empire faced in its attempt to modernize and survive
the era of liberalization and industrialization. Such accounts, however,
can in some ways be called truly "Russian" -- or at least Russo-centric
-- histories. That is to say that even large ethnic minorities such as
the Poles and the Ukrainians are treated in a somewhat cursory fashion
and they only enter the narrative when they become important to Russians
or the Tsarist government. Other, smaller ethnic groups are frequently
given an even more summary treatment: in the edition of Vernadsky's "A
History of Russia" on my desk (Fifth Edition), for examples, the country
Georgia receives only one mention in the index, and "Georgians" as a
people receive two; the Caucasus as a whole warrants only twenty-three
mentions in a nearly five-hundred page monograph.
Kappeler's book, by contrast, seeks to turn this situation on its head.
As the title suggests, this is an account of Russian Imperial history
that places the Empire's ethnic minorities at the center, which is not
unreasonable given that by the time of the 1897 census (which is given a
reasonably thorough treatment -- see Kappeler, Ch. 8) Russians comprised
only 44% of the total population (Kappeler, 397).
The book begins in the 16th century, when Ivan IV ("The Terrible") began
to conquer the various Khanates that had descended from the Golden Horde
and incorporate their territory into Muscovy. By the end of the third
chapter, the reader has arrived at the 19th century. Poland, Ukraine,
Bessarabia and Belorussia have been added to the Russian lands and
Muscovy has become the Russian Empire. The steppe tribes have been
mostly subdued and the first expeditions into Siberia have been
undertaken. Chapter four pauses for a moment to take stock of the
situation, ending with a section entitled "The Character of the
Pre-modern Russian Multi-ethnic Empire."
As Kappeler's narrative progresses through the 19th century, more and
more territory, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the
Far East, are incorporated into the Russian Empire. Unfortunately for
Russia, these territorial additions temporally coincided with the
awakening of nationalist sentiment in the Empire, which arose first
among the Poles and eventually spreading to the Georgians and Armenians
as well as the various groups of Caucasian and Central Asian Muslim groups.
The final four chapters of the book, then, detail the challenges that
newly self-aware national minorities posed to the stability and
cohesiveness of the Russian state, as well as the various means by which
the Imperial government sought to defuse or suppress nationalist
sentiment. Kappeler does a reasonable job in discussing the
inconsistencies in policies toward national groups: some were subject to
intense "Russification,"and banned from learning their own languages in
schools while others escaped relatively unscathed. Some, like the Jews,
became victims of insidious propaganda and violence. Kappeler also shows
how these policies varied in degree over time, with some areas like
Finland and Poland suffering periods of relative repression only to have
restrictions later relaxed.
During the revolutionary period and continuing into the First World War,
the national question became even more vital, as national minorities
were frequently seen as undermining the stability of the state, even
after the so-called "Springtime of the Peoples" after 1905, when
national groups were able to form political parties and have
representation in the Duma. In large part, this was due to the fact that
peripheral areas were frequently the sites of elevated levels of unrest
and violence. In the Duma, national groups as a whole represented
somewhat less than one-half of the total, and Kappeler points out that
in many cases national representatives were unable to even attend
proceedings, meaning that their power was further diluted. Nevertheless,
Jewish, Ukrainian, and Polish groups were able to have their grievances
aired in the Duma, even though their demands were seldom met. Increasing
Russian nationalism meant that, by the time of the Third Duma, the
institution was explicitly conceived of as a "Russian" institution.
If Kappeler's book succeeds due to its broad focus -- and I would argue
that it does, if only for the fact that it fills a gaping hole in
general "Empire-wide" historiography on Tsarist Russia -- it also fails
because of it. Too often the book almost falls into the trap of listing
events and its wide sweep means that there is little space for lengthy
discussions of particular personalities or policies. This means that the
book is mostly useful for getting a general sense of Russian history
from a "minority" perspective. Unfortunately, its utility as a
jumping-off point for further research is also inhibited by the fact
that the vast bulk of its bibliography is in German and Russian.
Non-German or Russian-speakers, especially at the undergraduate level,
will therefore find themselves frustrated by both the book's lack of
depth and the fact that it provides few clues as to where to go next to
pursue more comprehensive research.
These caveats aside, "The Russian Empire: A Multi-ethnic History" is
nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature and a useful
counterpart to the more Russo-centric accounts of Russian history one
finds in other standard texts.
))
<>
Kassow,,Samuel D| a{}
*--GO Cowles,Between
*1989:BUC|_Students, Professors and the State in Tsarist Russia| INTERNET TXT| ((480p| unv prf std stt RUS2 mainly 899:901;unv.rbx thru RREV1|unv as tUt threat to principles of stt [14-15]
STUDENT REVIEW =
[This book] details the politics and policies of the University systems under tsarist control. Through this model, Kassow explores the
causes behind the revolution, as well as attempts to define the identity of each branch involved. Students centers mainly on the time
period 1899 through 1917, but it also delves heavily into the events that lead up to this period of reform.
The book begins by describing the alienation and fear held by the state towards the professorship, and visa versa. As Kassow aptly
explains, “The government tended to take a utilitarian view of higher education.” The government saw the university system as an
opportunity to train loyal civil servants who would move on to become patriotic members of society, such as lawyers or doctors. Within
this structure there were several types of universities such as “closed schools, military academies, specialized institutes, women's
institutes, polytechnic institutes, commercial institutes, private universities and institutes such as Moscow's Shaniavskii
University, and state universities.” The majority of these institutions fell under the rule of the Ministry of Education. By
the 1860s, the policies and politics of the Russian education system had become intertwined in the growing dissonant movements.
Kassow describes that the government was unsure as to how to continue to deal with education. Conservatives wanted to turn the
universities into closed institutions, while others held up the example of Oxford and Cambridge, where the main goal of the
university experience was moral education. Their first attempts at a laissez-faire system of control over the universities
through the 1863 Statute was short lived. This was quickly replaced by the University Statute of 1884, which stripped many
academic freedoms from the hands of professorship and put them firmly in control of the Ministry of Education. Despite the
tightening grip of the government on the education system, it wasn’t until the mid 1900s that schools would completely lose
their autonomy and become satellites of the Ministry.
The student movements of the 1850s, leading up to the 1905 revolution are presented as a prominent factor in the evolution of
the education system. Kassow describes, “Russian universities were the incubators of a student subculture, a meeting place
where thousands of provincial youth, often poor but having little in common with the popular masses and even less with the
ruling elite, joined a proud new social group, the studenchestvo, and then left to become teachers, doctors, lawyers, civil servants, or, in a few cases, embittered revolutionaries.” Some individuals within the student body believed that there needed
to be a balance between self-interest and the self-sacrificing ideals of the collective. As the 19th century came to a close
however, there were a growing number of students who believed that the whole idea behind
studenchestvo was false. They saw the
role of the student as an individual set on their own path, each being vastly different from one another. In other
words, studenchestvo began to be seen as, “an exercise in self-delusion, a last chance to play with idealism and courage
before the students became judges, civil servants, and comfortable lawyers.”
Students does an excellent job outlining the knife’s edge that the professorship walked during the 1850s-1910s. Suspected by both
the student body (for being too soft) and the government (for planting the seeds of revolution in the mind of the students), the
professors strode to define their own roll in the education system. Many of the professors saw themselves as researchers whose
success lay in, “the need for academic freedom, secure power within the academic structure, and a free hand in enforcing internal
university discipline.” While Kassow asserts that professors wanted academic freedom, they were frustrated by the student
movements, and would have been content to stay within the boundaries set by the government, as long the government didn’t
completely impede day to day teachings.
Kassow places the student movements, specifically the events which lead to Bloody Sunday as a paradigm shift in Soviet
history. “Bloody Sunday was a turning point for both students and the teachers. The scale was much larger than previous
uprisings as well as the scope which included the professorship.” In some sense Bloody Sunday forced the hand of the professorship
to side with the students. From here Kassow explores the last days under the tsar and the role that higher education played throughout.
This book is an excellent resource to help understand the conflicts of natal and assigned identity within each section of
the Universities. I would recommend this book to anyone who is looking for information pertaining to the student movements
of 1899-1905. Finally, this book contains a great amount of raw data concerning the make up of university enrollment. A great and
insightful read overall.
))
<>Kautsky,John H|>KtsJH| a{}n{wrl ntg}
*1962:|_Political Change
in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism| EBy KtsJH|>KtsJH.PC
**1982:|_Politics of Aristocratic Empires,The|
<>Keep,John L. H|
*:| “The Bolshevik Revolution: Prototype or Myth?” In Anatomy of Communist Takeovers: 46-60| ((xrx HX518.S8A522))
*1976:NYC| The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization. NYC: 1976
*1977:Coliumbus OH| “The Great October Socialist Revolution”. In Samuel H. Baron and Nancy W. Heer,eds., Windows on the Russian
Past: Essays on Soviet Historiography since Stalin: 139-56
*:|_Power and the People: Collected Articles and Essays on Russian History| ndr plt.clt
*:|_Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874| ((mlt))
<>Kharkhordin,Oleg| a{}
*1998se:Europe-Asia Studies#50,6:| “Civil Society
and Orthodox Christianity”| ((OChx rlg| G/Main Concepts blw))
*2001my:History and Theory#40,2:| “What Is
the State?: The Russian Concept of Gosudarstvo in the European Context”| ((cvc.pbl trx| G/Main Concepts blw))
*2001no:European Journal of Social Theory#4,4:| “Nation, Nature
and Natality: New Dimensions of Political Action”| ((| G/Main Concepts blw))
*2005:MA Cambridge, MIT|_Making Things Public: Atmospheres
of Democracy, pp. ??| “Things as Res Publica: Making Things Public”| ((rpx| G/Main Concepts blw))
*2005:|_Main Concepts of Russian Politics| ((noUO G/Summit| Draws together previous four titles))
<>Khristoforov,Igor G|
--|“Aristokraticheskaia” oppozitsiia Velikim
reformam....|
((
In the era of “Great Reforms”, certain noble groups with economic roots in the countryside
[pomeshchiki] organized for political purposes. They opposed massive reforms designed with state interests in
mind rather than “class interests” of either provincial nobles or villagers. But Russian nobles wielded
political power only via state service. Social estate itself granted no power; Table of Ranks did. Bureaucrats
were the imperial ruling class. Yes, provincial gentry lorded over
serfs, but that was the very power targeted by statist reform. For about 600,000
nobles, serf emancipation meant that the state expropriated half their land
(with compensation) and nearly all their authority over village labor (with no
compensation). Interior Minister Petr Valuev sought to mollify or co-opt them,
most notably with Zemstvo institutions of local self administration. But
ambitious and independent-minded “aristocrats” wanted more for themselves and,
naturally, less for certain other interest groups.
They mobilized in small but articulate and well-connected circles (IE=in
kruzhki rather than more open political
parties). They sought to join the political fray, to create for the first time
in modern Russian history something like an authentic political arena. However,
these “aristocrats” had insufficient social/political organization or habit to
sustain decisive opposition. It is more accurate to say that “aristocratic”
opposition failed than that it was defeated.
For one thing, it could never clearly distinguish its interests from those
of tsarist administrators, nor could it conceptualize a
workable relationship to the great mass of villagers. Nothing better expresses
the complexity of this story than a brief “prosopography” of Khristoforov’s main
characters. These are identified en masse in two places: first, a collection of
27 portraits of leading figures presented on 16 unnumbered pages sewn between
pages 240 and +241, and, second, a biographical file with basic information on
those who appear in the narrative (pp. 397-427). Sixteen of the 27 portraits are
of high-ranking statesmen. Only four are representatives of what might be called
“civil society” [ID]. Seven of the 27,
however, bridge the domains of state and society. Biographical
files include sixty main activists who sort themselves out in a similar fashion.
Only 21 of these could be called “public figures”, as opposed to state servitors
active also in public life (n=14) or purely governmental figures (n=25).
This is a much needed account of non-urban establishmentarian conservatism
in a struggle to carve out a political space for
itself, independent of autocratic managerial authoritarianism and in a superior
relationship to volost’-level or village organizations. Some might wish that
Khristoforov were more skeptical about ideological taxonomies (his “isms”, as in
liberalism vs. conservatism, or conservatism vs. socialism). Those thus
disappointed can take heart from abundant attention to actual groups with ustav
and sostav. Here the most important are the editorial boards of Vest’ and
Russkii mir, and the voluntary association Obshchestvo vzaimnogo pozemel’nogo
kredita (Mutual Land Credit Society).
All readers will be pleased with the full and accurate publication here
of Aleksandr Illarionovich Vasil’chikov’s manuscript
essay “Tainaia politsiia v Rossii”, composed 1872-1874. Valentina Chernukha and
others have dealt with this remarkable political tract, but Khristoforov does a
great service to present it in full for the first time (320-81). Vasil’chikov
was convinced, as is Khristoforov, that a genuine conservative political
movement is doomed if it depends on the likes of Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, Chief
Gendarme and Director of the Third Section of His Majesty’s Own Chancery [the
infamous imperial secret police].
--|Daniel Field wrote an extended review [TXT]
))
<>Kimball,Alan| a{}
*1991su:Telos#8:187-95|Kimball, Alan, and Gary Ulmen| "Weber on Russia"| ((H1 .T44))
<>Kingston-Mann,Esther| a{}
*1985:O.ENG| Lenin and the Problem of Marxist Peasant Revolution| ((OWN Mrx Lnn krx|Is there a
NYC:1983 ed.? noWbr))
>Kingston-Mann,Esther and Timothy >Mixter eds|
Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia| ((sbr.ndr krx vlg))
<>Knight,Amy W| a{}
*1977:L.ENG| The Participation of Women in the Revolutionary Movement in Russia from 1890 to 1914|Dissertation...??|
(( wmn RREV1))
*1988:B.MA| The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union| ((hv8224.k57| plc USA5))
<>Kochan,Lionel| a{}
|>Russia in Revolution, 1890-1918|L.ENG:1966| (( gnr RREV Wbr))
<>Lampert,Evgenii| a{}
*1965:Oxford|_Sons Against Fathers: Studies
in Russian Radicalism and Revolution| ((Qrn Dbr Psr idl
STUDENT REVIEW =
The eighteen sixties was a turbulent decade as the effects of
emancipation rippled through society. In Sons Against Fathers, E.
Lampert provides an analysis on how people, philosophies and events
contributed to the revolutionary thought and the recognition of a need
for change immediately after the emancipation of serfs. Although action
would not be taken until Russia was on the brink of revolution, the
inspiration for revolution was deeply rooted in the discontent from this
era. This book dissects some of the main emerging philosophies, and
gives context to their formation.
The political setting prior to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 was
“top heavy” with bureaucratic weight. The rigid system left little room
for the society to adjust with changing times and a continually
expanding world. There was an immense potential for development as Tsar
Alexander II ascended to the throne, but with a lack of direction the
possibilities were thrown away. Attempting to be proactive, emancipation
was granted before it was taken by force. This political move proved
ineffective, and hindered government control rather than motivated it to
advance Russia into the next steps of reform. With a glimpse of freedom,
the government could no longer keep such immense reigns on the public,
and the influence of public opinion began to play a greater role.
The immediate reaction to emancipation was a calm somberness as new
concerns for society arose, and a need for solutions emerged. With a
slowly growing need for industrial workers and an accumulation of debt
due to redemption payments, jobless peasants were unable to adapt to
their new status. The few gains made on an intellectual level with an
increase in public opinion were retracted with the tsar’s subsequent
reactionary measures, which inhibited the ability to publish unapproved
documents or meet publically. Lampert views this response as not only
failing to fix Russia’s growing problems, but it became a “symptom of
the disease” itself.
With continuing countryside rebellions and an expansion of Russian
philosophical thought, Tsar Alexander’s attempt to consolidate
autocratic power merely provoked opposition. Lampert argues that
distinctly opinionated groups formed - conservatives, liberals,
radicals, and the church. Each division exposed deeply rooted dilemmas,
and are all proof of the inadequacies of an unyielding system. Once
formed, public opinion expressed through these groups could not be
removed from society. The fundamental bases of the formation of these
groups allowed a continuing recognition of a need for change, and
provided the inspiration for it to take place.
To show the formation of opinions and how they fit into this setting,
Lampert describes the intellectual product of the eighteen sixties
through three men. Their contributions helped to shape the period, and
they each took a stand outside of government consent. The first of these
individuals is Nikolai Chernyshevsky. A muckraking journalist who wrote
for the Contemporary, Chernyshevsky identified with the characters he
wrote about, and appealed to logic as well as emotions. In a time where
the influence of literature was crucial for the intellectual and social
evolution of Russia, he contributed to the hopes for a revolution, and
fueled discontent with the condition of politics. Lampert identifies the
draw of people to Chernyshevsky was their ability to relate to his
characters – he appealed to understanding on an intellectual level as
well as a moral. The topics of his work mirrored the situations of
society, and Chernyshevsky was able to make his own impact.
Similar to Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobrolyubov was a literary critic and
journalist, and wrote for the Contemporary as well. He presented few
original ideas due to his close relationship with Chernyshevsky, but he
still managed to have an impact of his own. He is known for being a
social analyst, and disagreed that a society of sympathizers was ideal.
He instead maintained that hope itself would lead to greater
understanding. He asserted that history was created by the conflict of
the rational progressive and the irrational reactionary, and sided with
progress because a stagnant society would be incapable of movement. The
driving force of movement would come from the unsteady base of society –
the peasantry.
Finally, the last character Lampert discusses is Dimitry Pisarev.
Differing greatly from Dobrolyubov, he focused on individual behavior as
opposed to inspiring the masses. Labels such as “liberal” and
“westerner” failed to characterize men, but instead imposed uniformity
on an individual. He believed that a model for mankind would be a “new
man,” someone that would not reflect unoriginal principles, but rather
have spontaneous and genuine morality. Merely four years after his
death, Pisarev’s work was the popular source of debates amongst the
younger generation, in part due to the fact that he was a crystallizer
of thought, rather than an original thinker. He strongly based his
beliefs in science, and as a writer he aimed to teach rather than
provoke emotion.
Lampert’s analysis removes the stigma of radical liberalism often
associated with these three intellects. By doing this, he is able to
provide insight into the true contribution of their philosophies on the
rapidly changing political culture. Due to the mass growth of opinion,
the eighteen sixties had a continuing im+pact on progressive thinking and
presented issues that would challenge conventional attitudes, laying
fertile ground for revolution.
))
<>Lane,David Stuart| a{}n{xtx bxo SDs pbl clx RREV1| cvc.pbl SSR Grb Prs}o{}
*1969:Assen|_The_Roots of Russian Communism: a Social
and Historical Study of Russian Social-Democracy,1898-1907|
*1992:LND,Rutledge|_Soviet Society Under Perestroika| Complete revision of original 1990 edition| ((dk288.L36))
<>Lane,David Stuart,ed|>LRF| a{}n{sbr.ndr Prs G.rfm}o{}
*1992: Aldershot ENG, Edward Elgar |_Russia
in Flux: The Political and Social Consequences of Reform|
((
Lane on SSR elites|
Rahr,Alexander on Top Leadership(MVA & gbx)
Slider,Darrell on gvt in gbx|
Mitrokhin,Sergei on pbl grp~ & new dmk (CF:plt.clt table abv)|
Jones,Anthony on avc|
Tolz,Vera on jrn & mxx|
Teague,Elizabeth on prl|
Abrahams,Ray on fmy skz in EST|
Riordan,Jim on chd|
Browning,Genia & Armorer Wason on wmn & plt|
Kryshtanovskaia,Olga on bzn elite|
McAuley,Alastair on bdn grp~|
Andrusz,Greg on dms.rfm & cvc.pbl conflict
))
<>Laqueur,Walter| a{}
|>Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia| NYC:Harper/Collins,??| ((B100 rxn plt.mvt))
*1968| “Revolution”| International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 13:501-507
<>Laruelle,Marlene| a{}n{EUA}o{
}r{
*:|_Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire
STUDENT REVIEW =
As has been pointed out in multiple recent monographs on the topic, Eurasianism has long been an under-examined aspect of
the history of Russian political thought, at least in monograph form. Marlene Laruelle’s
Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, is one of the first English language attempts to rectify
this deficiency. Having already written on other aspects of Eurasianism, including its origins, Laruelle
here seeks to examine more contemporary strains of what she calls “Neo-Eurasianism,” a movement that she
argues is distinct from the thought of the interwar Eurasianists.
Laruelle’s primary research purpose in this work is to discover the origins of contemporary Eurasianist
theory, and to ascertain what influence it has on contemporary Russian and Eurasian political discourse, and
more importantly, how it built its influence. To this end, she first briefly establishes the origins of
Eurasianism in the 1920s, before examining three prominent thinkers associated with contemporary
Eurasianism, before finally moving into a discussion of Eurasianism’s broader impact within Eurasia
itself. This last part focuses on Russian Muslims, Kazakhstan, and Turkey.
For the interwar Eurasianists, geography, and not any other marker of identity, was the most important
element of Eurasia and Eurasianism. Eurasianists believed that the common heritage of the steppe
united the peoples of the former Russian Empire, and was a more important identifier than
nationality, ethnicity, or religion. This ideology was well suited to the world the interwar
Eurasianists found themselves thrown into after the collapse of the Russian Empire.
One of the main arguments Laruelle makes is that contemporary Neo-Eurasianists are not, in
fact, directly linked to their forbears in the interwar Eurasianist movement. On the
contrary, she argues that the original Eurasianist movement was a response to a very specific
set of circumstances (Italian Fascism, the Russian Revolution, and the “Decline of the West” theories
popular at the time), while the contemporary movement, while formed in somewhat similar circumstances, came
into being in a very different ideological context. This argument leads into one of her most interesting
contentions, that interwar Eurasianism as a philosophy is not indigenous to Eurasia, rather, it is
a “Western” philosophy, that owes more to ideas such as fascism and the philosophy of Hegel. She argues
that this is also true of many contemporary strains of Neo-Eurasianism as well. While men such as Alexander
Dugin may not agree with the conclusions of work such as Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, they
accept many of its premises, such as cultural determinism.
Laruelle also argues that the Eurasianists were never able to reconcile their desires for a unified
Eurasia, as well as their stated respect for other regional institutions, such as “Eastern” religions, with
their desire to view Russia, and Russians themselves, as the leading partner in Eurasia. While they argued
for Eurasia as a natural, independent construct, they were unable to truly give up their feelings of
Russian Nationalism. Contemporary Russian Neo-Eurasianists frequently hold even stronger views on the
subject, though Laruelle notes that Dugin has been willing to promote economic Eurasianism within Turkey
while downplaying his more Nationalist Russo-centric views. This flexibility (some might say tendency
towards contradiction) is part of why Eurasianism remains important, even if in a very different form
from its original interwar roots.
Ultimately, Laruelle is successful in showing that contemporary Neo-Eurasianism, while occasionally
influenced by the original interwar movement, is a recent ideological development. Just as the
interwar Eurasianist movement was designed to meet the ideological requirements of the Russian émigré
community, Neo-Eurasianism, both in its Russian and non-Russian forms seeks to meet the needs of
contemporary Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. That Eurasianism has been adopted outside of Russia,
however, can be seen as a sign of the interwar Eurasianist’s success in crafting a flexible ideology
that provides an alternate framework for viewing the world.
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Leonard, Carol|
--|_Agrarian Reform in Russia: The Road from Serfdom| ((UO| Stp.rfm krx skz| NB! Skidelsky, Road from Serfdom))
<>Levin,Alfred|
*1963mr:JGO#??:??| “Russian Bureaucratic Opinion in the Wake of the 1905 Revolution”
*1965de:JMH#??:??| “Peter Arkad'evich Stolypin: A Political Appraisal”| ((Stp stt.srv RREV1 Dmx2 Dmx3))
*1940:CN.YUP| The Second Duma: A Study of the Social Democratic Party and the Russian Constitutional Experiment| ((SDs))
*1973:CN Hamden| Third Duma, Election and Profile| ((Dmx3
STUDENT REVIEW =
After the collapse of the Second Duma, Russia was a nation of changing ideas
and many fundamentally different political philosophies. Among the large,
frustrated peasant base was a growing call for Marxist and Socialist
beliefs. Already viewing the parliamentary system as nothing more than a
com+promise with the people, the Tsar sought to assure that the Third Duma
would be a more conservative body cleansed of these “untrustworthy elements”
that had caused the dissolution of the previous two Dumas.
With this purpose in mind he issued the Election Laws on June 3, 1907 to vastly limit the
elections and, by means of a system of gerrymandering and limiting
registration to property owners, create the envisioned conservative Duma.
This law decreased the peasantry's electoral strength by one half. This
caused many people of the lower class to become apathetic of the political
process now that there was little chance of getting their voice heard.
The Law also had an effect on the political parties of Russia. There was a
multitude of different political parties, yet most that were elected to
Third Duma seemed to be struggling with the same problem: maintaining
stability. While conservatives were struggling with maintaining the status
quo, parties like the Octobrists were struggling with maintaining social
stability in a time when liberals seemed to be creating a revolutionary
situation in Russia. After June 3 1907 popular opposition to the government
voiced by the Duma became “unthinkable”. As a result, while many in the
Octobrists secretly wished for reforms, they instead spent most of their
energy cooperating with the regime and limiting excessive speech that would
hurt the image of the Duma. For this reason, among liberals, they were known
as the party of “sad necessity”.
Levin states that “Only Social Democrats
stayed strongly opposed to the government”. Landlords mobilized under the
idea of defeating the ideas of the reformers while many liberal parties
struggled with intra-party struggles. Violations at the polls and low
turnout from the lower classes aided the conservative victory, to the
satisfaction of the Tsar. More than anything, the election and the election
results clarified a growing problem in Russia: growing government repression
and irreconcilable differences between the peasantry and Russian State.
))
<>Lewin,Moshe| a{}n{krx STL.skz Lnn NEP}o{}
*1968:NYC|_Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study
of Collectivization|
*1985::NYC:|_The_Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia|
--|_Lenin's Last Struggle|
((Contains critical 1921:1924; primary documents))
--|_Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates| ((full Soviet era))
--|_Social Background of Stalin [Tucker,Stalinism]
*2009: Essay on the Russian and Soviet past and its meaning for the future
<>Macey,D,David A. J| a{}n{stt&krx tUt StpP S.rfm RREV1}o{}
*1987:D.IL,NIUP|>Government and Peasant in Russia,1861-1906: The Prehistory of the Stolypin Reforms|
<>Matossian,Mary| a{}n{trx mfgR ekn.bkwess Twrl}
*1958ap:Economic Development and Cultural Change#6,3:217-28| Reprint in KtsJH.PC:252-64| “Ideologies
of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities”|
In VP9
<>Male,D. J| a{}
*1971:C.ENG, CUP|>Russian Peasant Organization before Collectivization: A Study of Commune
and Gathering, 1925-1930| (( vlg.o krx orx vlg.sxd NEP))
<>Matern,Frederick| "The Discourse of Civilization in the Works of Russia’s New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin" [TXT] ((EUA))
<>Mayzel,Matitiyahu|
*1979:Osnabruck: Biblio-Verlag|_Generals
and Revolutionaries: the Russian General Staff during the Revolution; A Study in the Transformation of a Military Elite|
((mlt RREV2 RREV3))
<>Mazour,Anatole| a{}n{DKB}o{}
*1937:|_The_First Russian Revolution,1825: The Decembrist
Movement; Its Origins, Development, and Significance| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
As a relative beginner in 19th century Russian history, I very much appreciated
the well-rounded approach Anatole Mazour takes in telling the
tale of the Decembrist movement. He relates to us the political and economic
background in Russia and contemporary Europe, the foreign and
nationalistic influences of the founders, the marked division in their ideals
and strategy as well as their geography, the events within
the actual acts of revolt, the reasons for their failure, the details of their
trial and punishment, the experiences of the Siberian
exiles, as well as their social and political legacy in the coming struggles for
reform in Imperial Russia (and Siberian development). All
of this he completes with an abundance of primary and closely witnessed
secondary sources that come from both within the movement and
also from the state, an autocratic bureaucracy in which many of them
operated while simultaneously plotting its demise. Although the
choice of title directly connects the Decembrists to the 20th century
revolutions, I believe Mazour has given us this history without
bias towards later political ideologies in Russia. He paints each character
with both their qualities and their seeming inadequacies,
stripping the heroes of protection from glorified legacy while still noting
their patriotic intentions. Altogether he leaves us with
the impression that this was an important step towards modernizing a country
still clinging to feudalism in an industrial Europe, but
that its failure was due to the exclusivity of its membership and their fear of the peasant masses.
In the development of the movement, he makes sure that we are aware of the
conservative atmosphere in which the movement was born. Some
of the original Decembrists had returned to a harshly ruled Russia with
experiences from an increasingly liberal Western Europe. As the
secret project of young military officers of the high noble rank, the
original members sought, quite patriotically, to modernize the State
so as to accomplish the kind of economic modernization and class
mobilization developing in the rest of Europe. They simply did not want
their beloved Russia to be left behind in the competitive imperial world;
for many of the Decembrists of a higher caste, the desire for
democratic values such as the emancipation of the serfs came only
with the concept that they could be better put to use in a
factory. Because of their fear of an uprising of the illiterate masses,
inspired by the bloody French Revolution as well as the Pugachev
rebellion of the previous century, this secret society maintained
elite ties throughout the military and bureaucracy and were never able
to truly utilize the desperation of peasants and soldiers even in the
days of their actual revolt. There was plenty of logic in their
stance to revolutionize the State in a country where the economy
lagged severely and justice was a matter of wealth, but the divisions
within the movement and the personal failures and betrayals of members
who were raised to fear and admire the monarchy led to the
downfall of the revolt and harsh reaction by the prevailing autocracy.
Surely, there are plenty of the Decembrists who Mazour reveres as honest men
who followed through on a mission that they believed
was imperative for their beloved country. His portrayal of their subsequent
punishment and the various manners in which they received
it demonstrates the author’s deep analysis of each figure in this movement
and the veracity of their dedication. He holds up as heroes
the members who stuck to their vision of helping Russia come out of the dark,
some by continuing to press for reform and others by
putting their elite education and organizational skills to work for the
Siberian population around them. Writing in 1937, he would have
known how their legacy had already been strong with later reform and
constitutionalist movements and I’m sure Anatole would not be
surprised by the continued co-optation of the Decembrist ideal by political
movements in an ever-changing Russia. For any student who
wishes to understand any aspect of the Decembrist movement, this book is a great base.
))
<>McCaffray, Susan
Purves| a{}n{RS2 RREV1 mfg obx nrg.c tkh ntg, cptists w/RUS face}o{}
*1996:D.IL:NIUP|_The_politics of industrialization in tsarist Russia : the Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers, 1874-1914|
((RUS2 874:Represented nearly 60 firms responsible for RUS most nrg.c and steel production in south))
<>McKean,Robert B| a{}n{Dmx3 Dmx4 cst prl
}r{
*1977|_Russian Constitutional Monarchy, 1907-1917
*1990|_St.Petersburg Between the Revolutions: Workers
and Revolutionaries, June 1907-February 1917
}s{}t{}8{}
<>McReynolds,Louise| The News Under Russia's Old Regime: The Development of a Mass Circulation Press| ((tpg mxx))
<>Mehlinger,Howard, and John M. Thompson| a{}n{Wtt RREV1
stt.srv}o{}
|_Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in
the 1905 Revolution| ((noWbr
STUDENT REVIEW =
The breakdown in Russian politics did not just happen instantly, but was merely a slow erosion of relations with the upper class bourgeoisie, peasantry,
and ruling elite. The declining state of affairs in Russia’s political atmosphere led Nicholas II to turn to Sergei Witte to help rescue Russia from
its declining state of affairs. Many people are familiar with Witte because his “Witte System” was a mix of financial and economic policies, which were
in essence a trial run in state capitalism. People, though, tend to overlook Witte’s role in the Russian government in the early 20th century, which
is an interesting time period because of the ensuing elections and new laws being drafted by the Russian government.
One of the main points Mehlinger and Thompson want to emphasize is that the relationship between Witte and Nicholas II was anything but fine and
dandy. Witte believed that Tsar Nicholas II only had two options: one was to move along a path of reform and the other was to choose a dictator and
try to end the civil unrest by forceful repression. The question of reform and progress has come up many times in Russian history before the
early 20th century example. One instance of this comes from Russian serfs and the abolishment of serfdom in 1861. Under Nicholas II and Witte, we
now see these former serfs requesting more rights and liberties because of their working conditions and breakdown in government leadership. Witte
believed that only by creating situations in which the peasants could exercise their own initiative, could Russian agriculture flourish.
Witte faced many challenges in trying to implement his reform plan because he needed to find a middle ground in policy-making. Witte was caught
between two imperatives: one was to see order restored and the other to initiate the reform platform on which he had gained power. The Manifesto of
October 17, 1905 saw many mixed reactions between the Russian citizenry, but primarily they were mass demonstrations. Witte’s obstacles were due to
some unforeseen circumstances because he far left and right groups would have their qualms about the Manifesto, but he wasn’t expecting such a critical
and demanding reaction from the people in the middle. Witte, himself, is at partial blame for this response to the Manifesto because he appointed some
leaders that were not going to help his cause and cause more grief instead.
Mehlinger and Thompson use the first chapter of the book to introduce the situation and the man that was ultimately given the responsibility to
fix the conditions in Russia, Sergei Witte. They move on to describe the October 17 Manifesto and the first few weeks of Witte’s government, where
he puts his government and cabinet together. The reader begins to realize, at this point, that the Russian government was full of factional politics
and no matter who Witte relied on, others would have valid arguments against them. The second half of the book deals with the peasant question and
the different strategies and reform plans Witte went over to deal with the peasant problem. Additionally, the book deals with the “loan” that
saved Russia in 1905, when the Russian government borrowed a half million francs from the French. Mehlinger and Thompson believe that this loan
was somewhat a temporary fix to a larger financial problem, which would all come down to the eventual 1917 revolution. The book ends with the
actual results of the election to the first duma and how the whole process worked. I found the election process very confusing and jumbled because
the authors bring in some groups that were never mentioned, until the election chapters. However, the election data and chapters show how wide the
split was between political groups and the importance of the people that voted and/or were eligible to vote in the election.
Overall, one must understand the situation Witte was in. Witte was a man that believed in autocracy, but realized that Russia needed to become
more democratic to achieve progress. Mehlinger and Thompson’s book does a good job of emphasizing the role Witte played in running Russian politics
and how that led to the elections of the First Duma. In trying to balance inside government influence and doing what was right for the Russian
populous, Witte was put in a sticky situation and was basically destined to face criticism, no matter which side he supported more.
))
<>Mints,II| *1967-1973:MVA| Istoriia Velikogo Oktiabria| 3vv|>Mints.RREV|
<>Mironov,Boris N| a{}
*1975:LGR| Istorik i matematika:matematicheskie metody v istoricheskoi issledovanii| ((D16.M66| xtx
trx|svt pst on Khlebnye tseny v Rossii za dva stoletiia,XVIII-XIX vv. LGR:1985 & Vnutrennyi rynok Rossii
vo vtoroi polovine XVIII--pervoi polovine XIX v. LGR:1981(HF3625.M57)))
*1984:LGR| Istorik i sotsiologiia| ((HM36.M66| xtx trx))
*1985fa:SlR#44:438-67| “The Russian Peasant Commune After the Reforms of the 1860s”| ((krx.rfm vlg.o))
*1989:MVA, Progress| V chelovecheskom izmerenii:226-46| “Sem'ia: Nuzhno li ogliadyvat'sia v proshloe?”|
((Several subtitles: Perestroika: glasnost' demokratiia sotsializm; Vyite iz korolevstva krivykh zerkal; Demograficheskii
isk; Instituty dlia liudei ili liudi dlia institutov?| xrx fmy vlg.o krx Grb))
| Sotsial’naia istoriia Rossii
| The Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917 | ((
Reginald Zelnik review [2001de:AHA#106,5] = Hard as it is to summarize so long and
rich a scholarly work, the thread that seems to run through the story Mironov
wants to tell looks something like this: Russia was, at least potentially, a “normal”
European country, but a European country that was not lacking
in important peculiarities, including what is sometimes described as the
relative backwardness of its economic, social, and political development. To
use Mironov's language, Russia experienced all the important developments
in these areas, but they were “a-synchronic” (asinkhronnye) in the way they
evolved. Russia's peculiarities, most of which are familiar to specialists, are
not presented as virtues (in Slavophile style) but as obstacles
or impediments to a broad and balanced “social modernization,” an
outcome whose positive value Mironov has no wish to deny. But these were obstacles that
could be mastered with time, and Mironov goes to great pains to help us follow the sometimes
tortuous but nonetheless rapid processes that suggest that the
obstacles were being genuinely if (on the eve of world war and revolution)
incompletely overcome. At the same time, he is too honest a historian to ignore
the contradictory, more depressing, “pessimist” evidence of incomplete modernization
and continued, even growing, social tension and political crisis, so
much so that one can read whole paragraphs—his discussion of the civilizing
of the Russian village versus the partial “peasantization” of the Russian city
is a good case in point—that seem to take opposite positions, or at least to
produce conflicting moods and expectations in the reader as one moves from
page to page. In the still contested (if by now somewhat hoary) debate over
the degree of influence of close peasant background on the social and political
volatility of industrial workers, Mironov judiciously explains the case for each
side but ends up with something resembling a neo-Menshevik position: that
peasant disrespect for private, individual wealth, and peasant attachment to
collectivist institutions and habits help explain the rapid rise of working
class radicalism and indifference to market-based liberalism in the early twentieth
century. For this and many other reasons, Mironov's admittedly
forceful case for Russia's evolution toward a “normal” European form of social
and political life is undermined by an equally forceful if at times
reluctant recognition of significant evidence to the contrary. If, as he concludes,
the October Revolution was in some respects an “anti-modernist”
rebellion, then popular resistances to the Europeanizing processes that he values
weaken the case for the approaching advent of “normality.”
))
<>Mitrany,David|
a{}n{plt.trx irx krx.plt EEUR FSC mrxism.v.krx}o{[ID]
}r{
*1951|_Marx
against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism| ((In EEUR,
krx or vlg-based, political cultures came to the forefront in the years
after WW1, but were defeated by radical nationalist governments (of a distinctly
fascistic sort). Many of these rural political cultures gained life again in the
years after WW2, only to be defeated now by Soviet-style communist regimes ))
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Mohrenschildt,Dmitri| a{}
*1978oc:RRe#37,4:387-404| “Shchapov: Exponent of Regionalism and
the Federal School in Russian History”| ((WwaAP hst.gph gbx fdr))
*1981:Rutherford, Farleigh Dickinson UP|>MTU| Toward
a United States of Russia: Plans and Projects of Federal Reconstruction of
Russia in the Nineteenth Century| ((USA2.cst fdr plt.clt lbx))
<>Nechkina, M. V., ed| a{}n{}o{}
*1953:M.AnnArbor, UMP| Russia in the Nineteenth Century| v2 of the History of Russia| DK188.8.N418 1976| ndr.txt
<>Neuberger,Joan|
*1993:Berkeley|_Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power
in St. Petersburg, 1900-1914| | ((crm RREV1))
*1994| CiF
<>Nichols, Robert L., and Theofanis G. Stavrou, eds.Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime. Minneapolis:1978. BX491.R87| sbr.ndr
<>Nochlin,Linda| a{}
|_The_Politics of Vision: Essays on Nineteenth-century Art and Society| ((91de:to be rvw- in TLS| gnr trx obx
plt.clt.gnr xdj.plt))
<>2009:Kaliningrad|>Нуреев,Р.М. and Ю. В. Латов|_Россия и Европа: эффект колеи (опыт институционального анализа истории экономического развития)| ((AMP PEc))
<>Obolonskii,Aleksandr Valentin*| a{
}r{
*1987|:MVA, Nauka|
Chelovek i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie| ((KM.O1274c 1987 | 252p| At head of title:
Akademiia nauk SSSR. Institut gosudarstva i prava| lwx plt.clt stt.apx))
*1994:MVA, In-t gosudarstva i prava [RAkN]|
Drama rossiiskoi politicheskoi istorii: Sistema protiv lichnosti| ((DK61 .O26 |
bbl:339-52| tlng into ENG!| plt.clt stt&pbl))
--|_The_Drama of Russian Political History
}s}s{}t{}8{}
<>Owen,Thomas C| a{}n{RS1 tpg| ekn cptism pbl kpq dvr MVA RUS3}o{}
*1975:JGO#23,1:26-38| “The Moscow Merchants and the Public P??,1858-1868”| ((kpq tpg))
*1981:C.ENG, CUP|_Capitalism and Politics in Russia: A Social History of the Moscow Merchants,1855-1905| ((|>OCP| part xrx 8x11| p22 (uses Wbr def. of cpt & says it fits wltiest 1 & 2 gld kpq of RUS| Quotes General Econ History [NYC:1927]:276-8 dealing w/MVA kpq & mfg discontent w/autocracy frm 890:91;famine ~~w/Zmv lbx grew| “In Weberian terms, the rationalism implicit in modern cptism--the need for impartial and predictable rules--more and more conflicted with the arbitrariness of the autocratic system.” [166]
STUDENT REVIEW #1 =
The prestige of the merchants and manufacturers in Russia steadily grew in the late 19th and early 20th century despite an economy heavily depended on its agriculture. To understand the growth of the industrial elite from the traditional agrarian state, I chose to read Thomas C. Owen’s Capitalism and Politics in Russia. To sum up the overall economic picture prior to 1858, out of a total population of 62 million persons, only 6 to 10 percent comprised of merchants (Owen 2). Yet, in the mid 19th century, a transformation began with the leading merchant families as economic education progressed throughout the generations. To better break down the evolution, Owen’s breaks down the progress into three stages: from the first traditional merchants, to capital merchants and finally after the Revolution of 1905, a class-conscious bourgeoisie.
The traditional merchants struggle in the early 19th century was ultimately a result of lack of education. Unlike the West at this time, the Russian merchants shunned both commercial education and modern management techniques. The furthest point of education was said to end at the book of Psalms. As a result, business practices were backwards, unethical and simply idiotic. Owen’s reported that they kept their business numbers in their heads without any system of bookkeeping. The traditional merchant society as a whole struggled in the early 19th century. In the end, it took a rude awakening for any progress to be made.
The next transformation, to capital merchants occurred in 1854 as the British and the French invaded the Crimea, part of the Russian homeland. The Russians found their fleet of sailing ships to be no match for the British and French steam-powered gunboats. On top of this, Russians lack of railroad to the Crimea prevented any reinforcements from reaching the battlefront (Owen 30). The disastrous war opened the eyes of the merchant elites and it became clear that change was needed. As a result, Russia turned to the Slavophile intellectuals with the goal to modernize Russia’s backwards economy (Owen 43). Following the war, commercial, financial, light industrial and transportation enterprises flourished with governmental aid (Owen 53). As the economy began to improve, the merchants began to wish for their economic independence from the state. However, for their continued prosperity, the merchants increasingly grew dependent on the state because of the protective tariff, financial support for corporations and banks, and subsidies for shipping companies and railroads (Owen 69). Yet, the drive towards self-sufficiency continued while the state’s policies began to shift in the merchants favor.
By turn of the 20th century economic progress continued to prosper due to the states continued support of the railroad systems and increased tariffs. For the first time, merchant children were born into as high of a pedigree as the nobles (Owen 139). However, as the industries capitalized on the success built off the state, trouble began to arise. Issues over labor rights became a hot topic as strikes turned violent throughout many factories across all of Russia. On top of this, by 1904, merchant leaders occupied positions all along the political spectrum across the state government. Success arose because of the state, but new ideology began shifting the playing field.
The beginning of 1905 began fiery times. On January 9, 1905 innocent workers were shot down at a peaceful protest outside of a factory in St. Petersburg. As a result of the fatal shootings, famously known as “Bloody Sunday”, erupted political movement among the merchant elite. The autocratic state did help the merchants rise to power, but at the same time, they felt the states’ tight control was holding them back. Change was near as the liberal elite, all the way to the radical elite, allied together to rid the obstacle of the Russian state towards economic and social progress. The solution outlined was to create a constitutional monarch led by a legislative Duma to ultimately overrule the supreme power. The Tsar was pushed against the wall. As a result, Sergei Witte wrote the October Manifesto to destroy the united opposition by promising a new order based on full civil freedoms (of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and personal inviolability, universal suffrage, and a Duma with the power to approve or reject legislation and to supervise the bureaucracy (Owen 191). Tsar Nicholas II quickly signed the manifesto. Violent revolution was averted.
Lives were saved as a result of the manifesto. The united politicians were overcome with joy. Owen’s claimed older members in the Duma broke down in tears when they heard the news (Owen 192). The majority of the population believed in the new system as the right step needed towards a progressive, successful future. At first the industrialists targeted to overthrow the Tsar, in the end though, it was they who salvaged his power and his life.
The Revolution of 1905 brought together the generation of merchant leaders, as Owen’s calls as a new “mature, class-conscious bourgeoisie” (Owen 206). However, the bourgeoisie knew their struggle was not over because of the dominant economy of Western Europe. The merchants still had to rely on the state to protect their own markets by the use of tariffs and the continued aid of the developing railroads. It is true they did not become completely independent. However, in the end the merchant elite came together and gained the rights that were needed to prosper into the 20th century.
STUDENT REVIEW #2 =
The merchant class of Russia developed into a class with a bit of political influence. The
rise of the merchant class, as well as their influence, acted as
a catalyst for many political as well as social struggles within Russia in the period before and during 1905.
Before 1855, the Merchant class of Russia was based upon a system of patriarchal
business tradition. The heads of merchant families conducted day to day business based
on person to person relationships rather than practical commercial
transactions. These men were the
head of the family, which meant they had the last say in every matter that
had to do with business or the family. Their educational background was based upon Orthodox religion rather
than business or commercial practices. An obligation to run for public service and the potential to lose
one's trade license due to unpaid guild fees, discouraged the early merchant
class from breaking with traditional business practices, which retarded the
estate's growth. However, a
healthy backing and promise of protection from the Russian government helped
the Russian merchants not fall to the competition of the European markets.
In 1855 this all began to change. The
old, traditional, patriarchal merchant class gave way to the sons
of that generation who began to take over the head of the household. These
new merchants were better educated, more savvy in the ways of
business, and did not hold as true to the distrust of Western commercial
technology. This catapulted the Russian merchants into a period of growth
and innovation. Over the next 40 years, economic growth continued and the merchant
class only grew stronger politically as the government realized that it
needed to heed the merchants' demands, since their economic growth was
essential to national power. Signs of an emerging bourgeois were apparent. Merchants
were becoming increasingly critical in Russian society
because of the money they controlled. They would never become as powerful as the Western bourgeoisies,
mainly because of their numbers, but nevertheless had vast wealth.
The increase in industry and economy led to the emergence of a social class new
to Russia, the paid laborer. Disputes arose between the lower classes and their employers and soon
political lines were drawn. The merchants largely wished to rely on the repressive might of the government
to put down disturbances, whereas the liberals were willing to cede
concessions to the workers. These struggles and calls for social reform would continue all the way into
the early 1900's and would dominate Russian political culture for 50 years.
“Capitalism and Politics in Russia” was an eloquent
portrayal of the rise and development of the merchant class
as a social and political force in the mid and late 19th century. Owen
concentrates on the process of change the merchants go through
from before 1855 into the early 20th century, but he also
dedicates much of the book to the development of the political ideology
within the merchant class and its effects on Russia and her social classes.
))
*1995:O.ENG|_Russian Corporate Capitalism, from Peter the Great to Perestroika| [Excerpt TXT]
<>Peregudov,Sergei| a{}
*1993my01:Sociological research#32,3:6-| “Civil Society As a Political Phenomenon”| ((UNCOVER NWO cvc.pbl plt))
<>Perrie,Maureen| a{}n{krx.mvt| RREV1 plt.pty SRs skz}o{}
*1972:P&P#57:134f|
“The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907: Its Social Composition and Revolutionary Significance”|
*1976:C.ENG, CUP|_The_Agrarian Policy
of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its Origins through the Revolution of 1905-1907|
<>Petro,Nicolai N| a{
}r{
*1990su:WWQ#14,3:114-122| “Toward a New Russian Federation”| ((dms| Grb fdr ntn plt.pty stt&pbl|
See also:21 rvw of Tismaneanu))
*1995|_Rebirth of Russian Democracy:
An Interpretation of Political Culture
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Pipes,Richard| a{}
*1954:C.MA|
Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism,1917-1923| ((DK266.P53))
*1955ap:WoP#3/7:371-401| “Max Weber and Russia”| ((D839.W57| OWN xrx|
Wbr RUS| Mommsen,WbrP:56| Rests heavily on Mayer,Wbr| :22,re. patrimonial
dominance (Wbr,Theory:318; & W&G)| Here Wbr seen as a more finished Hobbes|
Dominance based on tradition,but highly personal| “Sultanism” in its most
extreme form| “...the economic element absorbs,as it were,the political.”
[Earlier:20,Wtt model fully misunderstood,set aside| Pipes takes gnr proposition
of Wtt & ignores WOD,chs. 9-10,where specific applications to
RUS--“semi-Asiatic”--fully spelled out.] Another Pipes citation:198,Wbr on
city:None in RUS but NVG & PSK))
*1960:RRe#19,4:316-337|
“Russian Marxism and Its Populist Background: The late Nineteenth Century”|
((Mrx ppx SDs))
*1963:C.MA| Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897| ((HX312.P55| SDs prl SPB Mrx))
*1964:SlR#3:441-458| “Narodnichestvo: A Semantic Inquiry”| ((OWN ndr
ppx hst.gph))
*1968| “Origins of Bolshevism: Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin”| In
Pipes.RR ((chd))
*1970:1980; C.MA|
Struve| v1: “Liberal on the Left,1870-1905”|
v2:“Liberal on the Right,1905-1944”| ((lbx RREV1 Mrx plt| xrx re.Wbr))
*1981c:|_U. S. Soviet Relations in the Era of Detente| ((prm CWX))
*2005:|_Russian conservatism and its critics: A study in political culture| ((>Pipes.cnx idl plt.clt[W review#1 | W review#2]
STUDENT REVIEW =
This piece was published shortly after Russian Political Scholar Richard Pipes delivered his lectures to an audience at Harvard University. This
particular publishing touches on the inevitable tension and reality that was conservatism in Russian Political Culture. Pipes is credited to being
one of the main scholars that focuses on this notion of conservatism. And it is important to remember that during the time of the mid-nineteenth
century, Russia’s Political scheme (and social structure) was influenced and ultimately defined by this sense of Conservatism among the state.
At the beginning of his lectures, Pipes clearly explains to his audience the definition of “Russian Conservatism,” as contrasted to other familiar worldwide definitions. Where the US state defines conservatism as “applying less government” into the political agenda, the Russian culture during the mid-nineteenth century saw conservatism as applying “more government” into the political scheme. This is the focal point that we must remember when studying the big picture behind Russian political culture leading up to the 1905 and 1917 revolutionary eras.
However, throughout his lectures Pipes jumps to many points that are seemingly supposed to defend this point of Russian conservatism. This makes the lectures hard to follow, read, and draw together for our own understanding. Throughout his lectures, Pipes discusses the role of the individual state powers (including Alexander II), the church, and even the rural classes in response to the increasing autocratic government. This proves as a flaw in his presentation because it makes it increasingly harder to point out the significant points that proved Russian political culture to be what it was. If there were anything that could be rendered in the publication, it would have to be organization. Although, in a lecture setting it would be difficult to organize it in an ideal manner so we must work with what we have.
With every main argument there is a root or theme that ties the whole effort together. And so when studying the big picture behind Russian Political Culture, it is imperative to ask ourselves, “What is the main point we must reference back to when painting the giant picture?” Pipes states this point that Russian conservatism is clearly marked by the increase in government policies in the land. This ultimately led several outbreaks in the rural classes including the rise of the intelligentsia, Litfond, Literary societies, and the Primary Education advocacy groups. And so, Pipes’ lectures serve the purpose of providing us with a landmark of where we can draw back on when explaining the big picture behind Russian Political Culture.
))
<>Pipes,Richard, ed|>Pipes.RR|
a{}n{ sbr.ndr RREV2 RREV3}
*1968:|_Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium|
<>Pisotkin,MI| a{}
*1988:MVA| Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoe upravlenie: Uroki istorii i perestroika| ed#2| ((HC335.P428 |335p| Grb stt.apx
tUt gvt hst.gph plt.clt))
<>Poe,Marshall| a{
}r{
--|_The_Russian
Moment in World History| Argues three main points = (1) For
centuries, Russia was the only non-Western power to defend itself against
Western imperialism. (2) Russia carved out for itself the only non-Western path
to modern society, neither European nor Asian but distinctly Russian and based
on autocratic governmental authority and command economics. (3) The Soviet era
must be seen as a natural continuation of Russia's long-term past, i.e., points
one and two. Does this argument apply also to post-Soviet Russia?
<>Pomper,Philip| a{}
*1970:NYC|
The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia|
((rvs ntg idl RUS3))
*1972:C.IL| Peter Lavrov and the Russian Revolutionary Movement| ((rvs
ppx RS2 LvrP bxo))
*1979:NJ New Brunswick| Sergei Nechaev| ((rvs RS2 NqvS))
*1990:CUP| Lenin,Trotsky, and Stalin: The Intelligentsia and Power| ((|446p| Lnn Trt Stl RREV STL rvs.ntg RUS3))
<>Porter, Thomas Earl| a{}
|_The_Zemstvo and the Emergence of Civil Society in Late Imperial Russia, 1864-1917| Edwin Mellen Press| ((Four
titles by Porter in SUMMIT, including UW dissertation and a 2001 DWT Papers pbc| Zmv cvl.pbl))
<>Pospielovsky,Dimitry| a{}n{plc.scx prl unx RREV1|
RChx SSR.vs.rlg}o{}
*1971:LND|_Russian Police Trade Unionism: Experiment or Provocation?|
*1984:|_The_Russian Church under the Soviet Regime,1917-1982| 2vv
<>Putnam,George| a{}n{lbx idl cnx RREV1 ntg.vs.Mrx}o{}
*1965je:SEER#43,101:335-353| “Russian Liberalism Challenged from Within: Bulgakov and Berdyayev
in 1904-5”|
--|Russian Alternatives to Marxism
<>Raeff,Marc| a{}n{rxn lbx KtkM ngt| }o{
}r{
*1952jy:RRe#11:157-67|
“A Reactionary Liberal:M. N. Katkov”| stt.tUt apx qnv| stt&pbl| gte| trx plt.clt
*1959jy:RRe#18:218-30|
“Some Reflections on Russian Liberalism”| ((Must distinguish:rdx lbx
cnx rxn| How avoid blur:219-20| Different approaches| Discount rigid definition
or absolute def:220-21| Likes “pragmatic methods” but has to discard it:221-2| In
RUS lbx gnry meant anti.autocracy & bureaucracy [vs.mnx TSR qin srv| NB! R does
not list here ChxR] Method may be best def yet:therefore it is negative in RUS
[anti this & that] & tended not to be able to distinguish itself frm rdx~))
*1971:NYC|>Imperial Russia, 1682-1825:The Coming of Age of Modern Russia| Series:Borzoi
History of Russia, v4| ((DK127.R24| ndr gnr.txt))
*1979ap:AHR#84:399-411| “The Bureaucratic Phenomena
of Imperial Russia,1700-1905”|
*1984:NYC|_Understanding
Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime| TBy Arthur Goldhammer| Foreword by John Keep|
((trx stt&pbl))
*1990:O.ENG|_Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration,1919-1939| ((256p))
*1993:Political studies#41 spec:93-??| “The People,
the Intelligentsia, and Russian Political Culture”|
--|_Collected Historical Articles and Essays| 2vv
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Raleigh,Donald J|_Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov (Ithaca NY: 1986)
<>Read,Christopher| a{}n{ntg
clt rvs rlg cnx idl RREV1 SSR}o{}
*1979:Totowa NJ|_Religion,
Revolution and the Russian Intelligentsia,1900-1912: The Vekhi Debate and its
Intellectual Background| ((|??Excerpt in Coquin,1905:385-96
STUDENT REVIEW =
The Russian intelligentsia of the late 19th
and early 20th c centuries was a circle within the educated classes
that was committed to creative work, critical thought and the addressing the
conditions of the oppressed classes. By the 1890s, the majority of the
intelligentsia had moved from populism to Marxism and had adopted a
revolutionary stance which included atheism, socialism and within the
Kadet Party, constitutionalism.
There had been a euphoric response to the revolution of 1905 and the
resulting October Manifesto but that response gave way to despair with the
autocratic crack down in 1906. The intelligentsia was at a crossroads. No
one accepted the status quo of the autocratic state and all were agreed in
the goals of social justice but the intelligentsia was split over the
tactics to accomplish the transformation of society. The
Vekhi essays challenged the
religious and philosophical presuppositions of the intelligentsia.
Vekhi (Landmarks) was a small book comprised of seven essays written by previous
Marxists who were critical of revolutionary solutions. The writers were:
Berdyaev, Frank, Bulgakov, Izgoev, Kistyakovsky, Struve and Gershenzon. Read
insists that this was not a conservative book but was often treated as one.
The writers attempted to persuade the intelligentsia to re-examine their
uncritical faith in the ability of socialism to transform society by
changing social structures and institutions. Each writer, in his own way,
proposed spiritual change (the individual's inner life) as the source of
revolutionary transformation of society. Most of the writers argued that
Marxism was a religious position; the worship of the people, the saving of
the people and ultimately (messianic qualities) the perfectibility of the
people. This notion was called mangodhood or godbuilders. Vekhi
insisted that this ideology of the intelligentsia was as religious,
dogmatic, intolerant and fanatical as Orthodoxy. The Vekhi writers can be separated
into three groups: the new religious consciousness, Kadet Party, and despisers of the
revolutionary underground.
In the first years, Vekhi sparked interest from
liberals and socialist. The interest was almost entirely negative.
Discussion groups packed meeting halls throughout Russia. Lenin used
Vekhi for propaganda purposes. He connected Vekhi with the
Kadet Party and accused them of counter revolutionary liberalism which only served the interest of the
status quo. By 1910 the interest in Vekhi had waned. Many historians see
Vekhi as an attempt to raise the political dialogue and construct an authentic political response to the
times; one that acknowledged the religious quality of the Russian people and addressed the class oppression.
There is a great deal of detail in this account. Read describes the
various groups in the new religious consciousness. He goes into a lot of
detail in his discussion of Berdyaev and Bogdanov and their concept of Godmanhood. He is able to
demonstrate the ability Lenin had to keep the party focused and disciplined
while being attacked from both the right and the left. Anyone interested in
the political thinking of artists in this time period will enjoy reading
excerpts from Gorky, Minsky and Merezhkovsky (pp.121-140.)
))
*1990:B.ENG, M|
Culture
and Power in Revolutionary Russia: The Intelligentsia and the Transition from
Tsarism to Communism| ((DK266.4.R43| ntg clt RREV SSR RUS3| 266p)
*2002:The Historical Journal#45,1:195-210|
“IN SEARCH OF LIBERAL TSARISM : THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AUTOCRATIC DECLINE” [TXT]
<>Reichman,Henry| a{}n{RREV1 rrd prl}o{}
|_Railwaymen and Revolution: Russia,1905|
<>Remington,Thomas F| a{}n{RREV3 Gwrx NEP}o{}
*1984:Pittsburgh PA: UPP| Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and
Industrial Organization,1917-1921| ((mfg bzn.apx))
*1985fa:SlR#??| “Politics and Professionalism in Soviet Journalism”|
<>Reshetar,J. S.,Jr| The Ukrainian Revolution,1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism| Princeton: 1952| ((ntn UKR RREV3 Gwrx))
<>Retish,Aaron B|
*2008:
Russia's Peasants in
Revolution and Civil War
STUDENT REVIEW =
The author [...] covers the beginning of WWI, or Great War in 1914. [He] ends with the Russian military victory
which was the prelude to the ensuing famine after the war, as well as the New Economic Policy in 1921. The
author, Aaron Retish, focuses on the Viatka Provinces as he saw that the
peasants were fundamental in the Great War, Revolution, and the Civil War. He
does refer back to the Russian population at large, but he mainly stays within Viatka Province.
The war was a huge change in the established status quo of peasant life, millions of young men were being sent
up to the front and thus created a huge burden for those still at home. “Wartime drained the village of its
most basic items. Conscription and the astounding number of casualties stole and, often, multiple male members
from households, disrupting peasant traditions and the family cycle” (Retish, pg 54). Rural families would
donate what they could to the war effort but for them they were always straddling a thin line between starvation
and making it to the next harvest. Often families would petition the government to try to receive pardons for
sons going off into war because if they were killed then there would no one to carry on the name, or to help in
the fields to bring in the harvest.
Retish sides with the idea that the wartime mobilization, as well of the destruction of the tsarist system, fostered
an environment that allowed the rural population to break away from the traditional norms. In the eight subsequent
chapters, Retish catalogues and explains, in chronological order, the eight years from the Great War to
the Revolution. In chapter one, Retish focuses mainly on the call to arms and the mobilization of the peasant
class on July 18, 1914. The war brought villages closer and turned the population into a front for the war. He
explains the life altering effect the mobilization had on peasants. In chapter two and three, Retish looks into
the peasant participation in the 1917 Revolution. Chapter four re-examines when land was sanctioned following
the Bolshevik Decree on Land. The peasants saw that under the Soviet ideology that land ownership was a fundamental
right of citizens and this was a huge incentive for the peasants to idealize and adopt a Pro-Soviet standing. Chapters
five through eight look at how peasants coped with the violent changes of the Civil War from 1918-1922. Chapter five
gives a more in-depth look at Viatka’s grain politics and military conflicts. The peasants saw the ruling class
both unorganized and greedy which then turned to angering the peasants because they did not always have enough
food to spare for the war effort; even after the New Economic Policy of 1921 was introduced that reduced the
amount peasants would have to put out. Chapter six talks about how the Soviet State, as well as the Communist
party, was able to permeate the village. Chapter seven shows that both the peasant’s language, as well as
identity was becoming more Soviet following party and propaganda campaigns. Chapter eight focuses
on “The Citizens’ Hunger” and explains the devastation on the Civil War which led to millions of deaths.
This book
argues that the peasants did not dream of complete autonomy, rather, Retish
would argue they wanted both to be able to redistribute the land amongst
themselves as well as achieve a sense of freedom for landowners. This
gives an insight on how the peasants viewed themselves compared to the state as well as what the peasants would
eventually want out of the revolution.
Villages and communes acted as one to take advantage of the overthrow of the tsarist order and claim land and forests that they had coveted. Seizures of merchant and landlord estate land in the southern districts received the most press and space in the official documents as it was what educated society feared the most (Retish, pg 96).
The story of peasants in revolution is one of violence and terror as much as it is of freedom, emancipation, and negotiation. Peasants were able to help create a participatory political system that was aimed at helping them through their lives.
<>Riasanovsky,Nicholas| a{}
*1976:O.ENG|_A_Parting
of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855
STUDENT REVIEW =
The early 19th Century is a time period when Nicholas Riasanovsky sees
the first signs of divide in the relationship and discourse between Russia’s
autocratic government and the nation’s intellectual elites that eventually fed
the climate of upheaval and revolution that characterized much of Russia’s 19th
and early 20th century political culture. In A Parting of Ways, Riasanovsky
traces the origins of this split beginning from the Petrine reforms of the early
18th century when Peter the Great’s westernizing reforms signaled to Riasanovsky
the beginnings of modern Russian educated opinion. This period also represented
the beginning of enlightened despotism in Russia as tsarist rule became
influenced by the European enlightenment and was closely aligned with the growth
of the intellectual gentry as both groups shared common progressive goals and
outlooks. Being a part of this educated class meant being aware of European
ideas and systems and represented only a small fraction of Russian society as
both the merchant and peasant classes were excluded from this characteristically
aristocratic group.
With the second wave of enlightenment, that occurred in 1801 with the ascension
of Alexander I to tsar, hints and promises of serf reform and most importantly a
Constitution further increased expectations among the educated gentry. However,
Riasanovsky notes the initial rift in the relationship between the government
and educated public occurred during the second half of tsar Alexander’s rule as
his initial hints at major reforms failed to come to fruition as the ideology of
enlightened despotism increasingly became reactionary. This initial rift caused
by the inaction to live up to the anticipated reforms was highlighted by the
Decembrist societies, whose members were culturally educated leaders of elite
military regiments [mlt] who radically responded with revolting force in response to
the failed promises of constitutionalism that ultimately resulted in the
disastrous 1825 Decembrist revolt. The mutual alignment in the relationship and
aspirations between the two sides that characterized the period of enlightened
despotism, soon gave rise to subsequent alienation, as reaction and restoration
became the official ideology.
Riasanovsky denotes much of his analysis to the reign of tsar Nicholas I whose
conservative rule of reaction and restoration further split the discourse and
sense of allegiance between the government and the educated public. Nicholas’s
rule was termed Official Ideology as emphasis was placed on restoring the three
principles of religion, authority, and tradition in efforts to quiet the
intellectual segment of Russian society. The policies of Official Ideology under
Nicholas’s rule represented an important theme in Riasanovsky’s examination as
he highlights the intensive steps token by the Russian autocracy to reassert
dominant control over Russian society. Revolutionary events throughout Europe
and the 1825 Decembrist Revolt contributed to Nicholas’s desire to restore the
divine and unalienable appearance of the autocracy. Among the steps of
restoration noted by Riasanovsky included the controlled curriculum in schools
that were taught to the tsar’s specifications and education was advised not to
exceed one’s social position. Additionally, the Official Nationality ranked the
Russian public in order as Christians, loyal subjects, and Russians, reasserting
the autocracy’s control over Russian society as well as loyalty to the tsar.
However, the conservative policies of Official Ideology further fueled the
alienation of the educated gentry as Riasanovsky notes a changing ideology among
the group. Detachment from western European culture and ideas, growing concerns
over the system of serfdom serving as the center of the Russian economic system,
and a growing university and journalistic system that inspired and spread added
criticisms toward the government were among the new concerns of the educated
elites that estranged them from the government. Romanticism is also an important
ideology that took prevalence in the educated gentry discord as early ideology
from the Age of Reason were replaced by romanticism goals that spoke to people’s
hopes and became a driving force in calls for revolution and change.
The inaction and policies of restoration on the half of the autocracy and the
changing ideology of the educated gentry are reasons cited by Riasanovsky for
the severing in the discourse and alignment between the two sides that had
existed from the time of the Petrine reforms until the second half of
Alexander’s rule. Riasanovsky thus provides the outline and reasoning for the
initial rift between the influential Russian educated gentry and the government.
))
<>Rice,Christopher| a{}n{SRs plt.pty RREV1 scx rvs prl krx wrk}
|
Russian Workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary
Party through the Revolution of 1905-07|
<>Rigby,T. H|
*1979:ENG CUP| Lenin's Government: Sovnarkom, 1917-1922| ((RREV3 Gwrx tUt SOV))
<>Riha,Thomas| a{}
--|A Russian European: Paul Miliukov…| ((MlkP lbx KDs
STUDENT REVIEW =
This biographical piece serves as a chronicle of the life of prominent political moderate and founder of the Kadet party, Pavel (Paul) Miliukov. Riha allows his readers to glean insight on Miliukov’s career by having his audience view him as a dynamic and complex figure. As the reader comes to know Miliukov in this work, two men emerge: Miliukov the Historian, and Miliukov the Politician. Miliukov’s identity as a Russian European – after the 1917 revolution – is here realized as an amalgamation of his academic and political character.
The beginning of Miliukov’s political career ostensibly began while he attended Moscow University. During that period of time he became chairman of the student court, and found a journalistic home in the periodical Russkaia Mysl. While at the University he also wrote a well received piece (his dissertation) on Peter the Great and the ways in which he came to be Europeanized. He later transitioned into the wider realm of Russian politics whereupon he came to be viewed as a figure of restraint, caution and compromise. He ultimately comes to be viewed by Riha as a politician of moderate tendencies who ‘flip-flops’ between allegiances that best tend to suit his liberal intentions during the periods of (and in between) revolution.
Riha divides Miliukov’s political life into three phases: “the revolution of 1905-7, the decade following, and the year 1917” (Riha 333). His began his career looking for ways to remedy domestic problems within Russia and then, when the problems he sought to rectify (e.g. the implementation of a constitution that allowed co-operation between the monarch and a legislative assembly elected under restricted suffrage) turn to naught, he began to look toward issues involving foreign policy. He developed pacifistic views regarding aforementioned policy, but these views proved to work to his detriment politically by the year of 1917. During the period of the Balkan Wars, Miliukov’s leftist foreign sentiment began to gravitate to a more right-wing belligerency, as he came to favor the war. Some interesting questions here were raised in the text: was Miliukov a hypocrite in this respect? Where did his interests lie?
As it seems evident in Rhia’s work, Miliukov’s factional allegiance ultimately lied with his liberally inclined group, the Kadets, but he and the Kadets had a fickle tendency to shift their perspective along the political spectrum as moderates. As Miliukov was a moderate at heart, when the Duma would come to view an issue from an overtly right-wing or, alternatively, revolutionary standpoint, he would often promote a stance that would try to remedy/moderate the right or left-wing excess. Miliukov stated himself: “[o]ne of the common phenomena of these revolutions is the successive passage of power from the hands of the moderate factions to those of others, with more extreme ideas” (Riha 327). Part and parcel of Miliukov’s job as a politician (and the Kadets’ job as a political force) was to attempt reconcile all of the fractional chaos present during and between times of revolution. As they could not lead because of their impartiality, Riha states, “[c]aught in the middle the Kadets could at best mediate” (Riha 337). So at the time of their disbandment, the legacy they (and Miliukov) left behind was one that both attempted to counter the revolution and extremism; their purpose was to democratize (Europeanize?) Russia using mutual agreement as a precept. A Russian European is a work that looks at a history of factionalism and also, of failure, both realized and reconciled through an important look at the self proclaimed rationalist Pavel Miliukov.
))
<>Robinson,G.T| a{}
--|Rural Russia under the Old Regime| ((krx
STUDENT REVIEW =
Robinson begins the history of the Russian peasant situation in the 16th century. At this point in time serfdom was rearing its head as a result of increasing numbers of people being bound to the land in some way or another. Omitting the vast amount of details Robinson includes up to the end of the 18th century that have no relevance to our time period of focus, I started summarizing the book where the author describes the peasant conditions of the early 19th century. Landowners were allowed to make serfs work three days a week except Sunday and holidays according to the recent work week law passed by the government. Around this time period the redistribution of lands to communes begins “a manifestation of collectivism,” in Robinson’s view. By the middle of the century serfs were seen as a necessary element in order to keep the land producing. This caused an interesting phenomenon that is noted in the time period from 1854-59. The sale of lands with serfs greatly exceeds those of lands without serfs. At this point politicians and Russian national leaders (and even some serfs who were catching on) are beginning to see the balance of leverage shift towards the peasantry. Seeing the writing on the wall, Tsar Alexander II, proclaims in 1856 that “It were better that emancipation come from the top as opposed to the bottom.” The ramifications and implications of this statement are somewhat straight forward. The peasant force was being viewed as a group that was going inevitably to receive concessions from their oppressive brothers. In 1861 the peasants are emancipated, but this does not necessarily mean that there quality of living changed as a group. Other things did change though. A good example of this is their participation in the national and local governments. Because of economic disparities and hierarchies within the local governments there begins to be some degree of separation within the peasant class. Some could argue that emancipation also caused a large enough group to come together in order to allow the possibility of several factions. Despite this, and who is to say it is necessarily a bad thing, the peasants begin forming Volosts, which are the heads of groups of communities in the same regional volost. The leaders from the volosts would represent the peasants in the Zemstvos which were institutions put in place by the Tsar. Between 1861 and 1905 the peasantry undergoes many social and political changes. At this point in the book (Ch 5, 6, 7) Robinson is basically saying they became more proactive in their own political interests and organized along social lines. During this forty-five year time period the peasant bloc is experiencing resistance from the nobility and the Tsar. In fact it is more complicated than that. The Tsar and the nobility are more or less struggling to gain the support of the peasantry against the other. This creates a three way interaction between the groups. Also in regard to some legislation the Tsar and the Duma or earlier, the nobility, team up to pass various reactionary laws in order to slow the collection of power by the peasants. These included economic as well as political maneuvers. This is a gross oversimplification of this topic, but Robinson does a good job with the material.
One other very large concept or movement that Robinson dissected was the Agrarian movement. He argues that some historians believe that the revolution of 1905 was a continuance of the grievances of 1902 that spilled over into later years and was never really solved one way or (politically speaking) the other, until 1917. The basic and fundamental cause was a lack of grain or food. Unfortunately this caused the peasants to react violently. During times like these (when the peasants forcibly took control of manor houses and massacred the families) the government would attempt to give concessions or placate the peasantry, but the main problem with this strategy was that could not determine what would3 please them as a whole without giving them the whole country. By and large the peasants wanted more land. This does not mean that giving some peasants land made other peasants complacent. In fact in some instances more problems arose from peasants feeling that as members of the same class the government could not treat them differently. This is where the concept of communism comes into historical orbit. Robinson indirectly questions whether the communes’ organization and establishment decades previous had anything to do with this idea of one class.
Robinson conveys his belief that there are two critical time periods that contributed to social and political of the peasantry. The first is from 1861-1905 and the second is from 1905-1917. When I first read this I sort of thought it should just be one time period considering its chronological position in time, but after I read more Robinson states multiple reasons why these two time periods are different and without the first one the second would never have materialized. Without the social organizations from the 1860’s and 70’s the turn of the century political parties of the peasants would not have existed. Another major change was the communication between the various classes and authorities. This allowed the Bolsheviks to ally with the peasants the correct government agencies in order to survive the revolution.
))
<>Roeder,Philip G|
*1991ja01:WoP#:| “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization”| ((UNCOVER ntn fdr))
*1993:P.NJ, PUP|_Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics| ((jn6511.r44 plt.clt:14-16| Roeder
“privileges” politics, he is “objectivist” [his term] looking at tUt~ rather
than “subjectivist” [who privilege plt.clt IDL & learning]))
<>Rogger,Hans| a{}n{cnx rxn FSC vs.Jwx}
*1964:CSS#3:66-94| “The Formation of the Russian Right,1900-1906”
*1964de:JMH#36:398-415| “Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People”
*1966je:JGO#14:195-212| “Reflections on Russian Conservatism”
*1966de:SlR#25:615-29| “The Beilis Case: Anti-Semitism and Politics in the Reign of Nicholas II”
*1975:CSS#8:15-76| “Russian Ministers and the Jewish Question, 1881-1917”
*1976ja-mr:CMR#17:5-25| “Government, Jews, Peasants and Land in Post-emancipation Russia”
*1983:|_Russia in the Age of Modernisation
and Revolution, 1881-1917| ((gnr.txt))
<>Roosa,Ruth A| a{}n{mfg obx RREV1}o{}
*1975:RHi#2,2:124-148| “Russian Industrialists, Politics, and Labor Reform in 1905”|
((mfg prl rfm.rvx|Wbr??))
*1997:|_Russian industrialists in an era of revolution : the Association of Industry and Trade, 1906-1917|
((SUMMIT| G/Owen))
<>Root,Hilton L| a{}
|_Peasants
and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism|
((Melton recommend| gnr trx obx krx lnd mnx stt|Confirms Tcq argument that stt
replacd dvr as primary plt force|Unlike Tcq,R sd strong stt “actually increased
the power of the community” [12] Royal apx promoted collective ownership of
prperty & collective responsibility fr debts in order to extract good and
service frm krx|“the crp vlg became a vital component of the centralized stt
structure” [10]))
<>Roosa,Ruth| a{}n{mfg prl rfm.rvx RREV1}
--| RUS trd & future: Idl re.ekn dev,1906-17 [Curtiss,Essays]
*1975:RHi#2,2:124-148| “Russian Industrialists,Politics, and Labor Reform in 1905”| ((Wbr??))
--|_Book on same topic|
<>Roosevelt,Priscilla, Life on the Russian Country Estate: A Social and Cultural History| ((gnt.lnd clt))
<>Rosenberg,William G| a{}n{lbx RREV2 RREV3 KDs plt.pty}
--|_Liberals in the Russian Revolution| ((
STUDENT REVIEW =
This book provides an account of the non-soviet liberal movement following
the Tsar’s resignation. Specifically, it provides a detailed analysis of the
Kadet’s political actions and their positive and negative impacts on both their
own party and the revolution as a whole. The Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets),
second only to the Soviets in influence in 1917, laid much of the framework for
the 1917 Provisional Government. Despite being composed of the professional
class, the Kadets consistently claimed to represent the struggle of all Russian
Peoples.
The party followed three basic principles: gosudarstvennost’,
nadpartiinost’,
and rule of law. Gosudarstvennost’, “state
system,” represented the Kadets’ national philosophy that the individuals’
or even city’s needs must be subordinate to those of the state. Furthermore,
it represented the belief that political changes must come before social
changes.
Nadpartiinost’ represented the Kadets’ political beliefs at the
party level. The Kadets strongly believed that in order to create a strong
state one must abandon the party system and simply vote or act upon one’s
own conscience.
The Kadets’ most important principle was its commitment to law. For this
reason the Kadets believed that the governmental system could only have
power if it was given to them by the constituent assembly. Without the
constituent assembly, the Kadets believed that no major political or social
reform could be acted upon (the constituent assembly was not elected till
two months after the Provisional Government’s collapse).
Over the eight months of the Provisional Government’s existence and the
following civil war, these three principles would continually distance the Kadets from the revolutionary movement.
Rosenberg argues that because the Kadets’ staunch commitment to Gosudarstvennost’and
Nadpartiinost’ the Kadets were forced
rightward in the political spectrum, distancing themselves from the radical
movements within both the peasants and military. Rosenberg further explains
that the major fault with the three coalition governments (joint cabinets
formed of both Socialists and Kadets) was that the Kadets would not allow
for any substantial social changes that were being demanded for by the
peasants and military without the formation of a constituent assembly. This
was viewed by the masses as further evidence of the failure of the current
government regime, and would aid the Bolshevik’s recruitment. Special
attention is directed towards Manuilov, the Kadet party head throughout the
book.
))
<>Rosenberg,William G., and Marilyn Young| a{}
*1982:O.ENG| Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century|
((REV.trx RREV CHN cmp CIV krx? Wbr?))
<>Rowney,Don K| a{}n{stt apx.tUt MID}o{}
--|Transition to Technocracy: The Structural Origins
of the Soviet Administrative State|
<>Sabanaeff,Leonard|
--|RRe#24:4| “Religious and Mystical Trends in Russia at the Turn of the Century”| ((rlg Silver Age))
<>Sablinsky,Walter| a{}n{RREV1 prl plc.scx}
|_The_Road to
Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905|
<>Sakwa,Richard| a{}
*1988:St.Martin's| Soviet Communists in Power: A Study of Moscow during the Civil War,1918-21| ((UO order| Gwrx MVA))
<>Saul,Norman| a{}
*1978:Lawrence KS, KU|_Sailors
in Revolt: The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917| ((mlt nvy RREV2 RREV3
STUDENT REVIEW =
Perspective and Causality: Norman Saul’s Examination of the Pre-Revolutionary Russian Baltic Fleet
According to Norman Saul, sailors of the Russian Baltic fleet were among the more radical elements at the time of the October Revolution, as demonstrated by numerous violent acts and open opposition to the Provisional Government in Petrograd. In his book, Sailors in Revolt, he attempted to explain why they became the way they were by telling the story of the fleet from its inception until the events of 1917. Using the first eight chapters to tell his story, he concluded his book with personal observations and an analysis of the contributing factors.
In the first chapter, “The Baltic Fleet Before 1914,” Saul breaks the topic into different aspects: the history of the fleet from the time of its creation by Peter I through its trials in the Crimean War, its rebuilding process, and an examination of the sailors during that time frame. When looking at the rebuilding process, he focused on events starting in 1870 that saw the fleet ignored, later built up, destroyed in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, and then built up again in time for the Great War with Germany. Of note was how the Great Reforms limited funding from 1870 – 1894 because most of the budget was geared towards revitalizing the Black Sea fleet, which was devastated in the Crimean War, and building up the new Pacific fleet in Vladivostok. French pressure to strengthen the alliance against Germany finally forced Russia to shift its budget to building new ships for the Baltic fleet, which were then lost—along with most of the 3500 crewmembers—in the Battle of Tsushima. Saul’s attention to this point raised due questions about the impact of the Great Reforms on the fleet, implying by the start date of the policies that they may have served as the genesis for subsequent events leading to the October Revolution. In the end, Saul didn’t paint a very rosy picture of the condition of the fleet, equipment-wise, inasmuch that they were seemingly in a constant state of repair and replacement.
When looking at the fleet personnel, Saul used a few statistics to illustrate how some ideological historians had wrongly given the impression that the Baltic sailors were united in a revolutionary mindset because of their working-class background. Through his research of Soviet Naval Archives, he found that wartime recruits (1914-1916) indicated “only 25.4 percent were actually workers; the others were ‘semiproletarian’ (26 percent) and peasant and petty bourgeois (48.6 percent).” Additionally, their literacy rate was relatively high (75.5 percent), which meant that, because the sailors spent three-quarters of their time ashore, they had both access to revolutionary materials and the ability to read it. When looking at the combined statistics against the backdrop of Saul’s lengthy examination of how most of the sailors simply weren’t interested in political discourse or causes, one gets a clearer picture of a fleet that wanted prompt and meaningful redress of terrible conditions and treatment, but not necessarily a fleet bent on overthrowing the tsar himself.
In subsequent chapters, Saul continued to examine conditions within the fleet as Russia progressed through World War One, highlighting a cascade of problems ranging from the shipbuilders, to an ineffective leadership from the top down, to the promulgation of radical elements within the ranks of the fleet. He pointed out that many Russian shipyards had been corrupt and incompetent due to shady business practices and lazy, unskilled workers. Poor decisions and non-responsive dictatorial leadership from the Ministry on down into the ranks of the naval fleet officers further fomented the sailors’ dismal morale into acts of rebellion and revolt. As for the revolutionary elements that made their way into the rank and file of the enlisted corps, Saul had found that only about one percent of the sailors were actually affiliated with a revolutionary party, but that small number was extremely effective in stirring up discontent to such as degree that by 1915, naval crews were rebelling over almost anything from a mistrust of foreign commanding officers to not getting their ration of meat.
After events led to the February Revolution and the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, Bolshevik elements convinced the Baltic military forces to form organizations with which to address the various grievances and demands. What was most interesting in this regard was that their initial list of demands essentially consisted of three items: guaranteed pay of at least nine rubles per month, freedom to roam around the town without having to ask permission first, and freedom to drink as much as they wanted. This revelation truly solidified Saul’s assertion that the sailors were not a united band of revolutionaries bent on establishing a proletarian nation. Rather, it demonstrated that many of them simply wanted an end to the harsh, draconian conditions in which they were forced to live and work as members of the Russian navy.Saul
summarized these observations fairly well in his concluding chapter, giving due
credit to all of the various factors that brought the sailors of the Baltic
fleet to rebellion and revolution in 1917. He did not discount the socialist
movement within the ranks of the seamen, but did add perspective in that many
revolted for their own personal reasons or, simply, to go along with the mob.
Saul gave a good analysis of the events, backed by stacks of primary source
materials, but did not address any possible explanation as to why the fleet, on
the whole, did not resort to all-out rebellion prior to 1917. Investigating this
question would have strengthened his argument tremendously, but its absence
should not detract from the fact that Saul did an admirable job examining a
topic that was politically charged in many academic circles at the time. Because
of the broad range of contributing factors that led to the Baltic sailors
rebelling, this book should be a must-read for anyone examining
pre-revolutionary Russian history.
))
<>Schapiro,Leonard| a{}n{ntg idl Vxi cnx rlg}
*1955de:SEER| “The
Vekhi Group and the Mystique of Revolution"| ((Reprint in
HRR,2))
<>Schapiro,Leonard,and Peter Reddaway,eds. Lenin: The Man,the Theorist,the Leader
<>Schneiderman,Jeremiah| a{}
*1976:Ithaca, CUP|_Sergei Zubatov
and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russian| ((ndr plc.scx
prl unx G/Pospelovsky))
<>Schorske,Carl E| a{}
*1955:C.MA|_German Social Democracy,1905-1917: The
Development of the Great Schism| ((GRM SDs RREV1|ch2,esp:36-42,Vorwärts gave daily coverage frm Bloody Sunday on|
GRM nrg.c-grners zbx~ encouraged by RUS events|905se17:BblA chm of GRM SDs address before Jena pty cng| As a product of this experience, Luxemburg
sharpened sense of (1) need for mass ddd guided by orx, rather than orx powered by mass ddd; and (2) anti-apxic attitude|
Her essay=“Mass Strike Party and Trade Unions”| CF:Schurer & Stern))
<>Sedov,LA| a{}
*2007:Russian Social Science Review#48,6:47-63| "Traditional Features of R. plt.clt in Their Current Perspective"
| ((plt.clt.trx ))
<>Shanin,Teodor| a{}n{trx krx RREV1 RREV2 Gwrx}
*1972:O.ENG|
The Awkward Class:
Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia, 1910-1925| ((OWN))
| Peasants [?? readings]|:| ((HT421.S368|sbr rdg krx|G/Danilov| G/Chaianov|))
*1985:1986??; N.CN, YUP|
Roots of
Otherness: Russia's Turn of Century| 2vv| ((OWN gnr hst.gph NTR RUS3
v1 subtitled
“Russia as a ‘Developing Society.’”|
VOLUME ONE, STUDENT REVIEW =
Teodor Shanin, analyses the peasant condition in rural Russia prior to the 1905 Revolution. The book is the first volume in a two-part series
titled, “The Roots of Otherness,” and ends with an open ended discussion about Russia’s ‘backwardness’ to which Shanin attributes a large portion
of his arguments. Although the 1905 revolution is not discussed in this first volume, Shanin draws together a wide variety of themes, attitudes, and
events which led to its inception. His goal is clear, his argument in this book is to analyze the ‘backwardness’ of Russia at the turn of the century, and
to bring to light ‘Rhythms’ which led to the 1905-07 era. As a warning to readers, however, Shanin’s work tends to deviate from the main topic of the
book, and many of the arguments made are unsupported by sources. Shanin argues his point, or points, effectively, and his writing flows well. The book
is organized efficiently and quite easy to navigate for quick referencing.
Before embarking on his main topic, Shanin writes a brief history of the overall condition of peasants since Kievan Rus, around the 11th Century of
the common era. Shanin explains how peasants were traditionally treated, and depicts the evolution of peasants into serfs, citing most notably (and
in most detail) Saint George’s day, and the 1649 Ulozhenie. Following this is a brief survey of how Serfs were treated, and the evolution of their
treatment under Catherine II and Peter the Great. Several notable figures who were heavily involved in shaping the condition of the peasants, or
serfs, failed to make any appearance in Shanin’s work, most prominent of all being Ivan IV. Understandably, Shanin asserted from the outset that
his analysis would take the perspective of someone looking up rather than someone looking looking down, meaning his goal would not be to examine
the Autocracy in depth. However, the sub-header for the first portion of the book is ‘The Evolution of Russian Autocratic Power.’ Likewise, the
larger portion of the text refers to either Catherine, Peter, or whichever Monarch suited the period covered.
Once this beginning analysis is finished, the book immediately delves into the issue of peasants and land distribution. The chapters
under ‘Russian Peasant Society’ point out the various socioeconomic issues the peasants faced following their emancipation from Serfdom. Shanin argues
that Russian backwardness in rural areas kept agriculture from effectively evolving as it had in Western Europe. For example, the Three-Field
System, which worked efficiently in Western Europe, gradually found its way into Russian rural areas, but failed to provide similar results. Shanin
attributes this failure to the structure of peasant society which was effectively a ‘closed society’ (pg. 74), which did not take kindly to new
innovations. Shanin points his finger at the Volost, a local administrative governing unit implemented after emancipation, as yet another source
for failures, drawing continuously on the idea of increasing localization (pg. 101).
Shanin’s socialist views come barreling through in the following section when he argues that capitalism had, in effect, taken a firm foothold in
rural Russia, and that this shift in rural political culture led to the revolutionary ideals sought in 1905. According to Shanin’s argument, the
rural areas were ‘working towards socialism’ in the way Marx had predicted it would in all capitalist societies (pg. 143). He also argues that the
revolutionary situations in the early 20th century were socialist upheavals which had come too early. This is argued through statistics: Capital
investment had not grown to large enough proportions, and wage-labor farming only accounted for ten percent of the overall rural workforce. Therefore,
according to Shanin, rural Russia was capitalist, but needed more time to become more so in order to ‘work towards socialism.’
Conclusively, Teodor Shanin’s work remains fascinating, yet somewhat suspicious. Shanin often times shoots himself in the foot with his own arguments
by making the opposing argument stronger than his own position, yet somehow stays firm in his own vindication (as with the example in which he claims
to survey the peasant situation from the bottom-up, yet his subheading to the chapter and analysis pertain uniquely to the autocracy). His views on
capitalism and socialism are clear: Socialism was inevitable in Russia, and made more affirmingly so in Rural Russia. Notwithstanding, if one were
to take into consideration the year of this work’s publication, one could extrapolate a political agenda from this book. Overall, this book was
entertaining, educational, and interesting; but not without its faults.
v2 subtitled “Russia,1905-1907: Revolution as a Moment of Truth”|
VOLUME TWO, STUDENT REVIEW =
Imagine a peasant that has nothing going for his, or herself. These people had been emancipated just 40 years earlier from a life of indentured servitude. Now imagine, that though they have been emancipated, they have very few opportunities, and the wages they are being paid, are becoming insufficient to cover rent costs of land. This is the picture Mr. Shanin paints in his book The Roots of Otherness Vol. 2. Summarizing the revolution of 1905 and its results, not as a whole, but by breaking down the revolution by class, party, and explaining just how these two are integrated into one another.
Shanin explains that two different types of peasants are perceived during this time, those who can help themselves, who are also literate, and those who cannot help themselves, and are illiterate. He explains that those who were literate were the ones reading the revolutionary text either given to them, or found by them. Shanin also explains that in 1905 these peasants were revolting for themselves, rather than for a change in government, and also that some of the revolting was done by stripping the “shire’s” (landlord) house of wood, to use for firewood. Shanin argues that the peasants came away as the most benefiting of those involved in the revolution, as they achieved higher wages, and succeeded in lowering the cost of rent for land. Shanin also cites that a crucial component to the revolutionary situation in Russia was “the crisis of agriculture, the branch of production providing the livelihood for most of the population.” This explains the why there was large amounts of demonstrations, and striking, as much of the population was facing near famine. This was not the first time that Russia had faced famine, as many regions of the state had been facing poor crop yield for many years prior.
Shanin also gives light to the involvement of individuals from the non-Russian peripheries. Georgia, Latvia, and Armenia in particular demonstrated great revolutionary potential, as the strikes were more considerable, and consistent than that of those in both St. Petersburg, and Moscow. The strike progressed even to the point that in Latvia as an example, a force of roughly 10,000 partially armed villagers, confronted the army. This was not an isolated event and resulted in revolutionary regime holdings in the countryside of many Baltic provinces.
Shanin explains the Stolypin Land Reforms, and how they were improving the quality of life in the rural communities, specifically on peasant communes. As there were two different classifications of peasants, as mentioned above, Stolypin explained, “We decided to lay the wager on the sturdy and strong, and not the drunken and weak.” This resulted in the privatization of peasant communal lands.
Statistics that break down peasant attacks, and workers striking show not relation between each other, however since the peasants and workers are influenced by different political parties. The workers were influenced by the Social Democrats, and the Social Revolutionaries influenced the peasants, one can see that the differences can be based on a number of different factors For example, it could be based on the involvement of the political party on that particular, or even an increase in rent that the peasants were facing.
This book painted a picture of a peasant that was strained thin on resources, and was willing to do anything to change their situation, and how the political parties they interacted with affected them. It also showed the outcome of the revolution, and the relation, and relevance to the 1917 revolution.
))
<>Shatz,Marshall S| a{}
| Jan Waclaw Machajski: A Radical Critic of the Russian Intelligentsia and Socialism|Pi.PA:1989| ((HX313.8.V65 S5 |272p|
bxo anx ntg 866:926;Makhaiskii plt.clt scx rvs RREV1))
<>Shelokhaev,V. V| a{}
*1991:MVA|
Ideologiia i politicheskaia organizatsiia rossiiskoi liberal’noi burzhuazii|
((lbx brz plt pty~ plt.clt USA RREV1))
<>Shlapentokh, D| Various titles on FREV in RUS plt.clt, 1865-1905 | EUAism | Soviet ideologies during Gorbachev
<>Shy,John,and Thomas W. Collier. “Revolutionary War”| In Peter Paret,ed| Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton NJ: 1986 [rvs.wrx]
<>Siegelbaum,Lewis H|_Politics of Industrial Mobilization in Russia,1914-1917: A Study of the War-Industries Committees
<>Smith,C. Jay,Jr|
*1958:GA Athens|>Finland and the Russian Revolution,1917-1920| ((ntn FIN RREV3))
<>Smith,Canfield| Vladivostok under Red and White Rule: Revolution and Counter-revolution in the Russian Far East,1920-1922| ((DK265.8| Gwrx SBR))
<>Starr,S. Frederick|
*1983:O.ENG|_Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union,1917-1930|
<>Stavrou,Theofanis G., ed|
*1983:Bloomington IUP| Art and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Russia| A&AA NX556.A1 A74
<>Steinberg,Mark D| a{
}r{
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Stern,Leo,ed|
*1954-1956:BRL| Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905-1907 auf Deutschland| 2vv|
((HD8443.A76 ndr RREV GRM noWbr in v2))
<>Stites,Richard| a{}n{pop.clt wmn rvs
}r{
*1989:OxUP| Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution| ((DK266.4.S75))
*1992:|_Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society Since 1900| ((pop.clt))
<>Stites,Richard,ed|
*1995:IUP| Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia| ((ndr WW2 dms.front pop.clt))
}s{}t{}8{}
<>Szamuely,Tibor| a{}
*1972su:Survey#18,8:56-90| “The Birth of Russian Marxism”| ((MRX))
*1974:|_The_Russian Tradition| ((DK61.S9 1974| trx))
<>Szeftel,M|
*1966:BRX| Russia Before 1917|Series: Bibliographical Introduction to Legal History and Ethnology| ((KM.5997r rfr bbl))
*1976:BRX| The Russian Constitution of April 23,1906: Political Institutions of the Duma Monarchy| ((noUO ndr stt.dmx1 RREV1 tUt))
<>Thaden,E. C| a{}
*1964:S.UW|
Conservative Nationalism
in Nineteenth-Century Russia| ((ntg ntn cnx idl
STUDENT REVIEW with emphasis on the "Pochvenniki" =
Enthusiasts of the Soil| The pochvenniki emerged in Russia in the latter half of
the nineteenth century as a group of conservative nationalist advocators who
could meet the intellectual challenges that faced Russian society at the time.
The group’s name derived from “soil” to illustrate their yearning for a “unique
organic unity and was devoid of the class antagonisms of Western Europe” (62).
Believing that a gap had generated that separated the intellectual elite of the
country from the common people the pochvenniki strived to create and promote
unanimity among all of Russia. They believed that the Emancipation of the Serfs
in 1861 paved the way for a new world. However, they also believed that the
emancipation inundated the country with alienated, vulnerable masses. There was
a great fear among conservative nationalists at the time that the newly freed
common people of Russia would look to the Western world for solutions to their
societal woes. It was a main objective of the pochvenniki to push the masses in
the direction of a singular, cohesive Russian identity.
This group knew the importance of national cohesion in modern society. In order
to achieve this cohesion, properly spread it’s word, and close the gap between
commoners and intellectual elites the pochvenniki produced two important
journals called Time and Epoch. The group intentionally strove to eliminate any
party labels from their journals and tried to act as a middleman between
Westernism and Slavophilism. This, of course, was yet another effort to produce
solidarity among Russians, but members of the pochvenniki themselves seemed to
be divided on the matter. Some sympathized with the Slavophile views, while
others believed that it was too radical and thus supported what they believed to
be the more realistic perception of the West. Some, like Fedor Dostoevskii,
appreciated what they referred to as “pure liberalism”, that is the support of
abstract ideas pertaining to freedoms (speech, thought, etc.) when no other
course of action could be administered. They believed that these Western ideals
could be adapted to any social or political system. The works in both the Time
and Epoch reflected these ideals, but coupled with nationalist undercurrents.
The work of the pochvenniki’s was merely a collection of the opinionated
expressionist sentiments of Russian culture at the time, and carried no
political or economic weight.
Although the pochvenniki emphasized and instilled the nationalist feeling it
failed, according to Thaden, to produce and offer specific examples of the ways
in which political and economic renovations needed to be dealt with. Their call
for industrialization and development of Russia in the 1860s was a noble idea,
but they lacked rationalization and understanding of the requirements that
intense modernization demanded. The group advocated for reforms in principle,
but underestimated the difficulty of modernizing an underdeveloped country to
vie against a superior Western society. Thaden gives examples for some of the
minimum requirements necessary to even begin to undergo a transformation of this
amplitude, “Capital must be accumulated; technicians, specialists, and leaders
must be trained…the land is not cultivated intensively and labor productivity is
low…” (61). In this arduous process, the peasant would be left bearing the brunt
of the load as the demands for a growing labor force increase, but pay and
housing opportunities remain low “because the workers’ initial lack of the
skills and training required by modern industry puts them at a disadvantage in
dealing with their employers” (62).
))
*1971:NYC|_Russia Since 1801: The Making of a New Society| ((gnr))
*1981:P.NJ| Thaden,et al|_Russification in the Baltic Provinces and
Finland,1855-1917 “Dilemmas of Borderland Policy in the Era of Great Reforms: Poland
and Finland,1855-1881”| ((DK511.B3 R77| MPR ntn FIN POL irx gbx BLT RS1 irx stt))
<>Thompson,Arthur William| a{}
*1970:|>The Uncertain Crusade: America and the Russian Revolution of 1905| ((SUMMIT))
<>Tobias,Henry J| The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905| ((Jwx.Bund prl.mvt RREV1))
<>Treadgold,Donald. Warren| a{}
*1955:NYC|_Lenin
and His Rivals: The Struggle for Russia’s Future, 1898-1906| ((RREV1
Lnn| Explores “1st popular front” KPS infiltration))
*1957:P.NJ|_The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement
from Emancipation to the First World War| ((TXT Excerpts |
SBR krx Stp R&A2 RUS3))
*1987:Acta Slavica Iaponica,5:1-20| "Soviet Historians' Views on 'The Asiatic Mode of Production' "
[TXT]| ((AMP hst.gph))
--|_Twentieth Century Russia| ((gnr.txt
REF))
--| In Adams.RR
--| In Stavrou.RU
--| In VP9
<>Treadgold,D. W.,ed|>TDU| Development of the USSR: An Exchange of Views (1964)| ((sbr.ndr))
<>Tucker,Robert C| a{}n{Mrx scx idl KPS REV| rvs chd Stl NEP Gwrx}o{}
--|Image of Dual RUS [Black,Transformation]
*1970:L.ENG|
The
Marxian Revolutionary Idea| ((rtl on stt&rvs))
*1973:NYC|
Stalin
as Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality|
*1987| Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev| ((
Links plt.clt to clt in gnr (cites Edward Tylor’s 1871
Primitive Culture where clt defined:
“that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, mrl~, law custom, and
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor
influenced by Gustav Klemm’s 1843-52, Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit)| A.L. Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of
Concepts and Definitions, list 164 definitions & summarize: “all cultures
are largely made up of overt patterned ways of behaving, feeling, and reaction.
But cultures likewise include a characteristic set of unstated premises and
categories (‘implicit culture’) which vary greatly between societes. [...]
culture is a product; is historical; includes ideas, patterns, and value; is
selective; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction from
behavior and the products of behavior.” [Tucker:1] Dismisses Geoffrey Gorer and
John Rickman’s “swaddling” psx trx, The
People of Great Russia: A Psychological Study [LND:1949]) He might have
mentioned Nathan Leites US-Air-Force-supported studies of “operational code” of
Politburo; he does mention Fülöp-Miller’s Mind and Face of Bolshevism
))
*1990:NYC| Stalin in Power, 1929-1941|
|Autocrats & Oligarchs [Lederer,Rus For Pol]
|RUS total.stt [TDU]
<>Tucker,Robert C., ed| a{}
*1977:NYC|_Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation| ((>Tucker.STL| HX313.S683 OWN sbr|
Cohen,S,STL &SDb-ism|
McNeal,R,Trotskyist Interpr|
Rigby,T. H.,Mono-Organizational Society|
Tucker,Robert,REV frm abv|
Lewin,Moshe,Social Background|
Erlich,Al,Mrx-n Growth Models|
Sharlet,Robert,SSR lwx clt|
Clark,Katerina,Utopian Anthropology as a Context of STL.blt|
Medvedev,Roy,New Pages frm STL plt bxo|
Brus,Włodzimierz,“People’s dmk-cies”|
Skilling,H. Gordon,CZC plt clt|
Kolakowski,Leszek,Versus Mrx-sm?|
Marković,Mihailo,Mrx-ism|
Tucker,conclusion
))
<>Venturi,Franco| a{}
*1952:Turino, J. Einaudi|
Il populismo russo|2 volumes|| ((krx.mvt Mrx rvs ppx RS1
RS2 RUS3|FRN ed has long,updated intro|badly served by title affixed to ENG tlng))
*1960:LND & NYC|_Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth
Century Russia|TBy F. Haskell| ((|>VRR| Mrx rvs ppx RS1 RS2|many eds since ITL orig,1952|FRN ed has long,updated
intro
STUDENT REVIEW =
One may believe that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was simply the
culmination of the violence in the Great War and the subsequent public
outrage at a seemingly endless and futile war effort. From this revolution, it may seem as if the overthrow and execution
of the tsar was a simultaneous assault on the autocratic regime. But in actuality, this regicide had been done before and the idea and
action had its roots in the decades prior. In Roots of Revolution by Franco Venturi, he succinctly
portrays a Russia decades and decades before this overthrow that was ripening towards revolution.
Over the 700 pages, Venturi is determined to objectively present the
relation of the state with its people and the humanism on the side of both
revolutionaries and reactionaries. This relation is important to understand for the same dynasty (the
Romanovs) had been in charge for centuries, since before Peter the Great in
the late 17th and early 18th century. By “humanism”
I suggest that Venturi explains necessarily the
rationale behind each side during the chaotic 19th century. What
we get from this book is a pattern of revolutionary (though that
term is misleading early on since most “revolutionaries” were more
interested in constitutional monarchies rather than democracies) movements
and reactionary legislation. For
example, we have the Decembrist uprising in 1825 that is immediately subdued
by the program of Official Nationality under the 30-year reign of Nicolas I. Also,
we see the pattern where Alexander II was assassinated by
terrorists which was followed by fierce reactionary legislation (led by
Constantine Pobedonostsev) up until the forgotten revolution of 1905. The
book essentially begins with the Decembrists and ends with the
chaotic year of 1881. Both endpoints are a time in which power shifted from one tsar to another.
The first two chapters introduce two major characters in the origins
of populism in Russia: Herzen and Bakunin. The book
continues at a solid temporal pace thoroughly mixing in the philosophy and
subsequent action of both sides. The reader truly notices how revolutionary ideas among the educated elite
progressed and why the government reacted the way it did. It allows the reader, whether an academic or simply a curious
intellectual, to notice that the terrorist acts of the 1870s and 1880s and
the so-called revolutions of the early 20th century were not
simultaneous acts but decades of pent up frustration along with the efforts
of the intelligentsia in educating and mobilizing the masses. “The People”
did not all of a sudden decide to act out on behalf of
their disgust for such an oppressive regime. For decades, the educated revolutionaries were educating the peasants
on necessary changes within the backward governmental system.
Venturi does a great job of mapping this revolutionary evolution out for the reader.
It goes over the success and ultimate failures of each movement
within the 19th century. But in those successes, we see how revolution was possible simply because
the ideas remained for future generations (i.e. Kolokol, Great Reforms,
student groups) even if their voices and actions failed at the time.
))
<>Verhoeven,Claudia| a{}
*2009:Ithaca,Cornell U.Press|
The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia,
Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism| (())
<>Verner,Andrew M| a{}
*1990:P.NJ|
The
Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution|
((DK258.v44| N-2 RREV1 stt| quotes FMV:239 & 236| Verner,Crisis:51(FMV:239);
54(FMV:236); 77(re. Macht & Herrschaft; potestas & auctoritas); 89(Rechtsstaat);
293(Charisma of N-2)))
*1995ja:RRe#54,1:65-90|
“Discursive Strategies in the 1905 Revolution: Peasant Petitions from Vladimir Province”| ((krx ptn))
<>Von Laue,Theodore| a{}
*1956:JGO#4,2:138-58| “Die Revolution von aussen als erste Phase der russischen Revolution 1917”| ((Places RREV ijn category with
rvs in backward countries Twrl| Shows how impulses for REV came from without from zpd rather than from internal sources| S&U lgc))
*1961mr:JEH|
“Russian Peasants in the Factory, 1892-1904”| ((krx nds))
*1961jy:CSinSH| “Imperial Russia at
the Turn of the Century: The Cultural Slope and the Revolution from Without”| ((rvs| cf. M. Wright))
*1963:NYC|
Sergei Witte and the
Industrialization of Russia| ((ekn mfg RUS3))
*1964:Ph.P|
Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian
Revolution, 1900-1930| ((DK246.V58| gnr RREV STL mfg MPR rvs CIV RUS3 Wbr:34n & 42| originally pbd 1960??))
*1965:SlR#24:34-46| “The Chances for Liberal Constitutionalism”| ((lbx cst RREV1))
*1969:Ph.PA|
The Global City: Freedom,Power and Necessity in the Age of World Revolutions|
((CB425.V64| REV.trx wrl idl CIV))
*1981:Soviet Union/Union Sovietique#8,1:1-17|| “Stalin among the Moral and Political Imperatives, or How to Judge Stalin?”|
((off-print frm VL OWN STL clt.clt mrl hst.gph))
--|stt & ekn [Black,Transformation]
--|Weakness of stt [Brower.RR:]
--|Crises in RUSn polity [Curtiss,Essays]
--|Prb~ of mdnion [Lederer,Rus For Pol]
--|Prb of mfgR [SLT]
<>Vucinich,Wayne, ed| a{}
*1968:S.CA| The Peasant in Nineteenth Century Russia| ((|>VP9| OWN krx sbr.ndr|
Matossian,Mary.krx Way of Life|
Emmons,Terence & krx.rfm|
Treadgold & rlg|
Curtiss,J. S. & mlt|
Watter,Francis M. & vlg.o|
Zelnik & zvd|
Petrovich,Michael. in 19th c. hst.gph|
Fanger,Donald. in blt|
Riasanovsky,N. V. Afterword:Prb of krx
))
<>Wade,Rex|
*1984:S.CA| Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution| ((DK265.W323| mlt))
*1969:S.CA| The Russian Search for Peace: February-October 1917|
<>Walicki,Andrzej|
--|_The_Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists
--|_The_Slavophile Controversy
--|_A_History of R Thought … to Marxism
<>Watters,F. M| a{}
*1966:University of California, Berkeley, PhD Dissertation| “Land Tenure and Financial Burdens of the Russian
Peasant,1861-1905”| ((krx ekn skz RREV1))
<>Weissman,Neil B|
| Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government,1900-1914|New Brunswick NJ:1981| ((JS6061.W44 ndr stt rfm
srv zmv RREV1 noWbr))
<>West,James L|
*1991:BTsP:41-56| “The Riabushinsky Circle: Burzhuaziia and Obshchestvennost’ in Late Imperial Russia”|
((Rbw.krj RbwPP brj cvc.pbl))
<>Wildman,Allan K|
*1967:CHI| The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social Democracy,1891-1903| ((SDs))
*1980:1988:PUP| The End of the Russian Imperial Army| 2vv = “The Old Army and
the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917)” and “The Road to Soviet Power and Peace”| ((RREV2 RREV3 mlt))
<>Williams,Stephen| a{}n{Stp.rfm krx fxx}o{}
*2006:S.CA,HoT|_Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime....
STUDENT REVIEW =
Williams evaluates events leading up to and through the 1906 Stolypin land reforms. He begins by
providing an explanation for his understanding of what “liberal democracy” is and whether the Stolypin
land reforms were working to promote this definition or not. He also attempts to address the
potential for these reforms to be considered a “revolution from above”. Williams proceeds to
provide a basic history of early Russian peasant life immediately following their emancipation
from serfdom. He introduces the reader to this period of Russian history from the perspective
of property rights.
Williams explains both the pros and cons of open plots, repartition, and family vs. individual household
management. He proceeds to discuss the restrictions commune members experienced when attempting to
leave the commune or sale/exchange property. He points to various government enforced restrictions
as well as communal restrictions such as the initial requirement for a peasant to have commune
approval before exit of the commune would be permitted. From here Williams provides a short
history of the early attempts at reform and the effects they had on the commune. He discusses
the political aspects of land reform and the conflicts between governmental parties, the
tsar, and the duma. Williams explains the motivation of these interest groups including the
incentives for the gentry and royal family to maintain their control over private property.
Williams finishes the book by providing a summary of the results of the Stolypin reforms and the
long term implications of them. He breezes through the short history leading up to World
War I and the events that prevented the completion of the land reforms. Overall I found the
language of this book to be friendly to the reader. This would be a good book for someone
without a lot of Russian history experience as well as the seasoned historian.
<>Wolfe,Bertram D| a{}
*1948:B.MA| Three Who Made a Revolution| ((rvs))
*1967:L.ENG| Marxism:100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine| ((OWN))3{Mrx idl mvt REV CIV|965:orig.pbd??))
--| FRN,GRM,idl,& flaw in Ntx1,Ntx2,Ntx3 [Curtiss,Essays]
<>Wood,Alan| a{}
*1987:L.ENG, Methuen |_The_Origins of the Russian Revolution,1861-1917|
((DK189.W66 gnr RREV|56p w/ggr noWbr))
<>Wood,Anthony| a{}
*1986:LND|_Russian Revolution| Second Edition| ((DK265.W62))
<>Worobec,Christine| a{}
|>Peasant Russia: Family and Community in the Post-Emancipation Period|P.NJ:PUP,1991|
((HN530.R87w67|257p lxt!| krx fmy RUS2))
<>Wynn,Charters, Workers, Strikes, and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870-1905, (Princeton, 1992)| ((prl zbs RREV1))
<>Yaney,George| a{}
*1982:IL.Urbana|
The Urge
to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861-1930| ((krx.rfm StpP.rfm))
<>Yarmolinsky,Avrahm|
| Road to Revolution...| ((>YRR| gnr ?NOndx?))
*1965:KS.UK| A Russian’s American Dream: A Memoir on William Frey| ((prm
ppx RS2 rdx cmn gte USA1~~))
<>Zacek, J. C| a{}n{ plt.clt TolDA rxn}o{
}r{
*1968my:The Historian#30:412-38| “Champion
of the Past: D. A. Tolstoi as Minister of the Interior, 1882-1889”|
}8{}
<>Zelnik,Reginald| a{}n{prl}o{
}r{
*1971:|_Labor
and Society in tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855-1870
*1976:RRe#35,4:417-47| "Russian Bebels...."| [W TXT]
((part two of series on Kalatchikov & Matvei Fisher))
*1995:|_Law and Disorder on
the Narova River: The Kreenholm Strike of 1872
*1999:|_Workers and Intelligentsia
in Late Imperial Russia: Realities, Representations, Reflections
}s{
}t{}8{}
<>Zeman,Z. A. B., and W. Scharlau| a{}
|>The Merchant of Revolution:the Life of A. I. Helphand (Parvus),1867-1924|L.ENG:1965| ((WW1 RREV3 Gwrx rvs SDs(b)))
<>Zevelev,A. I., ed| a{}
*1994:MVA Vyswaya wkola|
Istoriia
politicheskikh partii Rossii| ((450p| JN6598.a1i88| plt pty~ plt.clt
USA RREV1| cites Shelokhaev| gnr intro on methodologies & hst.gph [5-38] Brief
intro to origins of plt pty~ in zpd [39-40] Discussion of particulars of RUS sit
[41-52]))
--|_Politicheskie partii Rossii : istoriia
i sovremennost : uchebnik dlia istoricheskikh i gumanitarnykh fakultetov vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii / pod
redaktsiei A.I. Zeveleva, IU.P. Sviridenko, V.V. Shelokhaeva
<>Ziablikov,A| a{}
*2002:KOS,KGTU| "Iasnovidtsy revoliutsii": Rossiĭskaia khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia v politicheskikh bataliiakh
nachala XX veka...| ((UO xdj.plt plt.clt))
<>Zimina,VD| a{}
*2006:MVA,RGGU| Beloe delo vzbuntovavsheisia Rossii: Politicheskie rezhimy Grazhdanskoi voiny. 1917-1920 gg| (( 467pp|
V monografii rassmatrivaetsya
maloizuqennyi process formirovaniya i funkcionirovaniya politiqeskix rejimov v Rossii v 1918-1920 gg. V
centre vnimaniya avtora
naxodyatsya problemy legitimnosti vlasti, formy i metody bor'by protivoborstvuyuwwix politiqeskix sil za pravo realizovat'
sobstvennuyu koncepciyu social'no-politiqeskoi modernizacii rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti. Predprinyaty popytki tipologii
politiqeskix rejimov s toqki zreniya analiza ix gosudarstvennogo i institucional'nogo stroitel'stva i social'no-ekonomiqeskogo
reformatorstva krasnyx i belyx. V Prilojenii pomeqqwwy vospominaniya uqastnikov i oqevidcev dramatiqeskix sobytii
))
<>Zuckerman,Frederic| a{}
--|_The_Tsarist Secret Police
in Russian Society, 1880-1917| (( plt.plc
STUDENT REVIEW =
Fredric Zuckerman is currently a Senior Lecturer in History at the
University of Adelaide. He acknowledged that this volume began as a PhD
dissertation under the guidance of Professor William L. Blackwell at New
York University.
Zuckerman acknowledged his debt to the Hoover Institution as the location of
primary sources, makes a point of his use of a modified Library of Congress
transliteration system, and includes a note on the Julian Calendar used by
Tsarist Russia that ran 12 days behind the Gregorian in the 19th century and
13 days behind in the 20th century.
Additionally an introductory glossary and abbreviation guide is given that
identifies the common terms used by historians and contemporaries. Zuckerman
uses these subject specific terms and abbreviations through out the book and
the inclusion of a glossary was very helpful.
This volume is a comprehensive study of the political police system in late
Imperial Russia based on a vast bibliography of primary and secondary
sources, and on Zuckerman's research in the Hoover Institution's Archives.
The main focus of the work is on the operation activities of the tsarist
police between 1900 and 1917.
Zuckerman is not biased or prejudiced in any way and deals with persons and
events in an evenhanded manner. The Tsarist police are themselves unique in
history but the need for a modern state to protect itself and its citizens
is understood as a common feature of the modern nation state. Many European
states and even the U.S. examined the Russian experience when establishing
their own political police.
Introductory chapters give an overview of Russia's 19th century experience
in dealing with political dissent and then examines the lives and working
conditions of individuals who served within the tsarist system. A
sociological view of the bureaucracy by the identification of distinct
groups within the police; civil servants, gendarmes, and former
revolutionaries (sotrudniki). These individuals are shown to have conflicts
when forced to interact with each other and additionally the various
departments are shown to conflict within the system as departments vie with
each for power influence, and monies, as well as individual ministers have
agendas of their own which often conflict for personal reasons or for
tactical and strategic reasons.
What follows the look at the make up the political police is a detailed
chronological account of the failures and accomplishments of the Russian
political police from 1900 to 1917. The story is highlighted by events and
people that bring the revolutionary period into focus. The story follows the
police efforts and infighting of the many ministers and police chiefs who
came to their appointments through chance or as the result of a patronage /
clientele system.
Sometimes the best man available for a post comes into power, but as often
as not a mediocre or unsuitable man is chosen to lead the most important
section at the worst possible time. Another problem is the lack of a
strategic vision that could coordinate a single department much less
coordinate a number of departments that could work together to achieve a
desired goal. While not specifically laying the blame at the feet of
Nicholas II it is obvious that the fault is the Tsar's and the tsarist /
imperial system.
The volume concludes with a chapter that discuses the similarities between
the tsarist and Soviet secret police. I found this interesting but perhaps
out of place. Obviously Zuckerman draws on a vast knowledge and
understanding but this chapter is speculative and without the academic rigor
that was evident in the previous chapters. While reading the last few
chapters I had a feeling that Zuckerman had more to say as he made
statements that were not as circumspect as earlier in the book. Perhaps a
publisher's constraint or deadline came into effect. I must admit though
that I myself have been guilty of speculation at the end of a research paper
when insights gained during research find themselves added regardless of
their relevance to my topic and thesis, and so I gave the author the benefit
of the doubt and forgave, but some readers may be taken aback during the
final chapter.
While I enjoyed the book enormously I would not recommend it as an
introductory volume. Zuckerman presupposes a certain knowledge of his
subject, and a historical familiarity with many personalities and politics
of the period. On the other hand anyone who is interested in the period will
benefit from the huge bibliography that can be used as a guide for further
reading.
))
<>Zyrianov,P. N| a{}
*1984:MVA| Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v bor’be s revoliutsiei, 1905-1907 gg| EBy A. I. Klibanov|
((GRS:185| RREV1 chx rxn))
<>Alexeyeva,Ludmilla| a{}
*1985:Wesleyan UP| Soviet Dissent:Contemporary Movements for National,Religious, and Human Rights| ((Hrgt.mvt dsn rlg ntn|is name correct??;seeSuny rvw in 8x11))
<>Allworth,Edward, ed| a{}
*1967:NYC| Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule| ((sbr CAS ntn CASA))
*1971:NYC| Soviet Nationalities Problems| ((sbr|ntn))
*1973:NYC| Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia| ((dk855.4.a63| sbr))
*1988:Durham DUP| Tatars of the Crimea: Their struggle for survival; original studies from North America, unofficial
and official documents from Czarist and Soviet sources| ((DK508.9.K78T37 |394p| prm/ndr ntn TTR))
*1989:Durham DUP| Central Asia| ((dk851.c46| sbr.ndr USA5.MPR.ntn CAS))
<>Azrael,J., ed| a{}
*1978:NYC| Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices| ((sbr ntn SSR))
<>Bennigsen,Alexandre, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay| a{}
*1969+:PRS Mouton| Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie| SERIES: Societe et ideologies;2e Serie,Documents
et temoignages,3| ((BP65.R8 B4|bbl| prm.sbr ISL ntn pbl.mvt plt.mvt fdr RUS2))
<>Bialer,Seweryn, ed| a{}
*1989:Boulder| Politics,Society, and Nationality: Inside Gorbachev’s Russia| ((DK288.P66| sbr Grb etc ntn))
<>Blakely,Allison| a{}
*1985:WDC|
Russia and the Negro: Blacks in Russian History and Thought|
((DK34.B53 B55| USA3.srf/slv pbl mnt ntn srf))
<>Carrère d’Encausse,Hélène| a{}
*1993:NYC| The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations| ((UO| ntn KZX ARM AZR N-K GRZ KIR
fdr (pt.3:End of fdrism:113-95) MPR Prs))
<>Chalidze,Viktor| a{}
*1988| Natsional’nye problemy i perestroika|Benson VT:Chalidze,1988| ((DK288.C45 |215p| prm Grb ntn gte))
<>Conquest,Robert| a{}
*1960:L.ENG,M and NYC,St.Martin| The Soviet deportation of nationalities| ((DK33.C6 USA5.ntn nsx.xtx))
<>Gafurov,Bobodzhan| a{}
On ntn [RRC,3] prm
<>Getches,David H| a{}
| “Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American Indian Tribes
as Models for Expanding First Nations Self-Government”| Review of constitutional studies = Revue d’etud...,1,1:120-??|
((UNCOVER USA5.frn ntn stt.ndp))
<>Glazer,Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds| a{}
*1975:CMA|Ethnicity:Theory and Experience| ((hm101.e75| ntn USA3.nsx))
<>Glazer,Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan| a{}
--|_Beyond the Melting Pot|:| ((f128.9.a1g55| ntn USA3.nsx))
<>Haghayeghi,Mehrdad| a{}
*1994oc04:KIARS Meeting Report#12,3| “Islam and Politics in Central Asia”|
((crn OWN prm CASA YeB ntg Hannafi scl Wahhabi & Sufi sects|ISLic Revival Party(IRP)|ntn ID
more "centrifugal" than rlg ID|UZB MPR is major problem|dmk "can rely on sizable ntg~ created in these nations during the
Soviet period" (TRKan=exception) cst means of plt struggle will keep rlg forces in check))
<>Hall,Geoff R| a{}
*1992wi:University of Toronto Faculty of Law review#50,1:39-| “The Quest for Native Self-Government: The Challenge
of Territorial Sovereignty”| ((UNCOVER stt.ndp USA5.frn ntn cst fdr))
<>Hovannisian,R. G| a{}
*1971-1982:B.CA, UCP| The Republic of Armenia| 2vv| ((ntn))
<>Iivonen,Jyrki| a{}
--|_Independence or Incorporation: The Idea of Poland’s National Self-Determination and Independence
within the Russian and Soviet Socialism from the 1870s to the 1920s|Helsinki:|
((|334p 91ap17:bbt rqt| stt.ndp fdr POL ntn RUS2))
<>Kibrik,Andrei| a{}
*1993my21:MNe#21:2 & #22:2| “The New Constitution is Incompatible with Russia’s Present National-territorial
Division”| ((cst ntn fdr Attacks myth that "every ethnos shall have its statehood and state organization"|
Perpetuating old SSR ggr/ntn divisions))
<>Kostomarov,Nikolai Ivn*|>KstNI| a{817}n{PBL
}r{
Pvsp:193 sd Wwa & Kst =
new hst.gph sense of nrd; pbl heard “the voice of a living people” not as
passive material in hands of ddd stt,“no kak faktor,pytavwiisya samostoyatel’no
napravlyat’ istoriqeskii process, po men’wei mere vyrajavwii svoe otnowenie k
tem ili drugim ego storonam”}
*1847:GRM Augsburg| Knigi bitiia ukrains’kogo naroda| Translated as
Kostomarov’s "Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People"|IBy B. Yanivs’kyi [Volodymyr Mijakovs’kyj]|Mimeographed
Series:Research Program on the U.S.S.R.,60|NYC:1954| ((prm UKR KMO))
*1850s:SAR.gbx.vd
*1854:pbd nrd songs (got into trouble w/plc [KstN,Avto:218])
*1857:pbd rpt [?re.StO or Jwx ritual dth-?] Mordovtsev reprted this in
Pamiatnaia knizhka SARoi gubernii
[KstN,Avto:226 PmK]
*1857:|_Bogdan Khmel’nitskii i vozrashchenie Yuzhnoi Rusi k Rossii| ((UKR hst))
*1858:
Bunt Sten’ki Razina| ((rvs RS0 UKR))
*1860jy:Svm#7,3:75-92| "O kazachestve: Otvet ‘Vilenskomu vestniku"|
((Attacked idea that kzk anarchy,KstN tried to show that simple dmk idl motivated kzk;to protect dmk,they shifted
back and forth twixt RUS &POL [KstN,Avto:270-1]))
*1860:Klk#61:| ltr-edt Hzn re.UKR
*1861??: Osnova:| "Dve russkoi narodnosti"| ((prm UKR ntn nrd idl=UKR.distinctness; "clxless" "brz-less" nrd|
hst= whole nrd|All my hst work in the reform era has given rise to plm attacks|My idea that in udel system of
Rus a fdr principle existed, and that I intended that to apply to the present day,perhaps to predict future|
But I never said anything directly about that|People read things into my pst [he seems to be saying,in so many
words]|Esp. "Dve russ. narodnosti"| People have the habit of reading between the lines,esp. under severe cnp|
Even took me to be in favor of "serparatism",esp. after POL.rbx|Once that great fear passed,then people could
see how two RUS narodnosti fulfill one another|Still,I hve been acz- of "UKRainofil’stvo" [KstN,Avto:272-4]))
*1861??:Osnova:| "O federativnom nachale drevnei Rusi"| ((prm ntn fdr hst plt stt idl))
*1909:YSL:117-139| “Peterburgskii universitet nachala 1860-kh godov”| ((prm SPB.unv|xrx))
*1922:MVA|
Avtobiografiia...| ((HOT UIL;noNYP|8x11 xrp:210-226 "5. Zhizn’ v Saratove"| prm slf.bxo vsp))
<>Kozlov,Viktor| The Peoples of the Soviet Union| B.IN:IUP,1988| ((|>KzlViktor| rfr nsx ntn xtx ggr|278p MPR ntn lxt 48 tbl~~))
<>Lewis,Robert A., with Richard H. Rowland and Ralph S. Clem|
*1976:NYC|
Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970|
((HB3607.L47| xtx nsx ggr ntn gbx pbl RUS3))
<>Lind,Michael| a{}
*1994my01:FoA#73,3:87-| “In Defense of Liberal Nationalism”|
((UNCOVER lbx stt.ndp|NWO idl that every stt shd have its own stage has been the most powerful political force
of the past two hundred years|Yet in age of transnationalism and rising demands for stt.ndp, many view
secessionist movements as dangerous|USA policy harbors any prejudice