THREE PHASES of the European and World Revolution
© 2010-2015 KIMBALL FILES

Table of Contents =
(0) Definitions = Revolution
(1) Phase One = The Liberal Revolution [EREV#1]
(2) Phase Two = The Rise of Social Democracy [EREV#2]
(3) Phase Three = The Statist/Managerial Revolution [EREV#3]
(4) Bibliography = Academic Theories of Political Culture (War and Revolution, gnr plt.clt ETC) ALWAYS cross-check BYD
(5) ETC
(6) Illustrations

A 4-part definition of "revolution" =

(1) Revolution is a conscious assault on an existing structure of ruling or governmental institutions.

An assault simply to change who is in power is, by itself, not revolution. We call that "coup d'état". Therefore =

(2) Revolution seeks to put another set of ruling or governmental institutions in the place of the old.

So far, this definition of revolution is a lot like the definition of war, especially wars of conquest. In fact, revolutions have historically been associated with wars -- before, during and/or after revolution. A research group once concluded that revolution ought to be called "internal war". Thus a third component is necessary to distinguish revolution from inter-state or international war (between two existing governmental systems) =

(3) Revolution originates from within the targeted governmental authority, and
participants from within that authority are at the center of the action.

To be a revolution, events must be largely "home grown", not introduced from beyond the limits of the institutional system under revolutionary assault. Thus modern revolution is understood within a widely accepted world view that includes "sovereignty" [ID]

The most famous revolutions involved great masses of participants and a degree of violence, though the numbers involved and the levels of violence are not essential to the definition. Certainly the effects of authentic revolution will always involve great masses of people, whether they actively participate or not. That is so because sovereign governmental institutions are always intertwined with the life of all within the systems' jurisdiction.

Let's add a final component to our definition, at least for consideration =

(4) Revolution is a distinctly modern experience

Not all epochs experienced revolution. For one thing, revolutions are unlikely in times or places where there does not exist the idea of "progress" or "restoration" and the belief in the possibility -- maybe we should say "the democratic imperative" -- of popular political mobilization toward fulfillment of progressive or restorative goals. Only in the modern historical epoch has revolution become one of the standard (if ultra extreme) forms of domestic political behavior. Three early modern European "thinkers" captured these modern ideas or sentiments and left a legacy that has proved controversial but enduring and globally influential = John Locke [ID], Jean Jacques Rousseau [ID], Jeremy Bentham [ID]. Into the 19th century, four further figures gave wide credence to related but different visions of history as progress = Charles Fourier [ID], Saint-Simon [ID], Auguste Comte [ID], and Karl Marx [LOOP]


The era of European liberal revolution began with what some call the "Atlantic Revolution"

Ideas and ideals were only part of the equation. Great changes caused by revolutionary transition from pre-modern ways ("feudal" in Europe) to modern ways have everywhere forced a rebalancing of traditional relationships. The modern world has posed a profound challenge to traditional cultures, in "The West" and everywhere else =

"The Left" and "The Right"

Out of the French Revolution came the now universal symbolism for the spectrum of political opinion that arose in response to this transformation of public life = "left", "center", "right".  These cardinal points in the European political universe might not be best arrayed in a straight line, left to right, but around a near-circular Greek letter "omega" =

liberal   conservative
radical      reactionary

Around these points on the political spectrum that great swarm of 19th-century "-isms" hived themselves.

Liberals strove for independence from institutional authority and maximum individual freedom
Social ties were understood less in a traditional "communitarian" way, more in terms of what came to be widely designated as "the social contract", such as espoused by John Locke [EG]. [LOOP on "liberal" from 1780s to 1880s]

Conservatives strove to preserve traditions and sustain historically proven ways of life
Social ties were understood to be hierarchical and stable in a traditional "community", such as espoused by Edmund Burke [EG]

Radicals strove for a better future, such as had not yet been experienced, only conceptualized
Social ties might be thought of in rigorous and confining communitarian terms [EG],
or in an opposite direction, utterly spontaneous and anarchistic [EG]

Reactionaries strove to restore a past perfection, also not yet experienced, only conceptualized
Society was generally subordinate to authoritarian regulatory agencies, such as church, state, censors, police and military,
as urged by Joseph de Maistre [EG] or Metternich [EG]

The omega form presented above reminds us that liberals and conservatives do group together around the upper curve
While radicals and reactionaries are at the extremes, they seem almost to make contact with one another at low center

Post-French-Revolutionary Chronology

Historical Contradictions within Liberalism

At the heart of the "Atlantic" or "liberal" revolution two sets of contradictions festered =

  1. Freedom vs. equality [EG]
  2. Nationalism vs. civil liberty [EG]]

Striking different compromises along the ridge of these contradictions, European nations shaped their various domestic political, social and economic futures [more on relationship of political/institutional and economic changes in this era]

"Crunch Time" =


The central feature of the second phase of the European Revolution =
 the clash of interests of workers with the interests of owners
If the first phase can be called "liberal", the second can be called "social-democratic"
Big SAC LOOP on "wage-labor", from 1860s up to WW1

The era of social-democratic reform and revolution evolved out of the European liberal revolution and came into conflict with it.

Liberalism had long struggled against opponents to the "right", and that struggle continued. But now opposition arose on the "left", and it arose from the midst of liberal movements themselves. A "left-wing liberal" trend, increasingly designated as "social-democracy" or "socialism", sought to resolve the contradictions between freedom and equality in new and more radically egalitarian ways -- though not necessarily more democratic ways.

The social-democratic phase, like the liberal phase before it, revealed an eventually tragic set of contradictions. The old liberal contradiction still could not be transcended, IE=The contradiction between freedom and equality. But a new set of contradictions were soon visible in the growth of aggressive military-statism and imperialistic internationalism, along with intense self-centered, often racist and chauvinistic nationalism.

Two remarkable developments, one in France and other in the northern German-speaking territories of middle Europe, signaled growing crisis in the hitherto ascendant liberal revolution =

1) The two decades (1850-1870) of Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III) in France [5-hop LOOP] were clear warning that the French Revolution could go sour, not just in the relationship of capitalists with labor but also in the relationship of the nation state to civil freedoms (including the so-called "free market")

2) Otto von Bismarck [6-hop LOOP] was born a Prussian but engineered creation of a new European nation-state, an imperial nation-state, the German Empire [MAP#1] [MAP#2]

*1906: Gaston DaCosta was a representative of EREV#2. He was a survivor of "The Paris Commune" [above], a shocking urban uprising in a major European metropol. He penned an angry, somewhat eccentric but brilliant and insightful interpretation of events 35 years after the event [E-TXT] =

The third phase of the European Revolution was inevitable once the habits, presumptions and practices of European Imperialism came home to roost

The violence and disorder of the Paris Commune came at the tail-end of a disturbing war between France and Prussia. This clusteration of events was evidence of transition from the grand 19th-century liberal phase toward the troubling third phase, the 20th-century phase of the European revolution.


Important reverberations of the previous two phases ran through the 20th and into the 21st centuries. The legacy of the previous two phases was far from extinguished. But however frequently we meet it, the traditional European political spectrum of "left" and "right" [ID] gives little authentic guidance to those who would try to understand this third phase of the European revolution

But we can point to three salient features of what SAC calls the third phase, managerial statism. Each salient feature arose in the late 19th century and are often captured in the terminology of that century's great "isms" =

  1. Industrialism. The organizational demands of "The Second Industrial Revolution" promoted the rise of economic "managerial elitism" in the control of gigantic new industrial and financial enterprises, all this reflected also in the harmonious rise of political "managerial statism" [ID]
  2. Militarism. The organizational demands of rising European militarism represented a domestication of imperialist habits perfected abroad over the previous centuries [EG#1 | EG#2 | EG#3] "Class war", "struggle for survival", "If you love your freedom, thank a marine"
  3. Imperialism. European imperialist domination was coming under attack by those who were earlier its victims. The great metropols had to mobilize to protect themselves and their control over far-flung and domestic peripheries [ID]

French historian and political theorist Elie Halévy's widely influential lectures and writings, gathered in The Era of Tyrannies, anchored themselves in point two above, "Militarism", possibly exaggerating the role of socialist militarism [ID]. Halévy devoted little attention to points one and three

How do the three 20th-c Russian revolutions (1905 [ID], 1917fe [ID], and 1917oc [ID]) fit in?

At first, the Russian revolutions, particularly the second (1917fe) seemed to harbinger a new era of social-democratic victory, a resolution of contradictions and a realization of ideals met in the first [ID] and the second [ID] phases of the European revolutionary tradition

Europeans widely assumed that the first phase made the second phase possible. Some thought it made it inevitable. The strengths of what we are calling the first two phases of the European Revolution complimented one another. The second phase fulfilled the first. Some greeted this fulfillment with enthusiasm. Others dreaded it with equal enthusiasm.

"Unnamed Revolution" =

There seemed some uncertainty about the nature of these two Russian revolutions, swiftly one after the other. Uncertainty was reflected in the fact that the second of the two Russian revolutions in 1917 bore so many different names = "Russian Revolution", "Communist Revolution", "Soviet Revolution", and "Bolshevik Revolution"

Calendar reform in 1918 further blurred the picture as it put the anniversary of the second Russian revolution, the "October Revolution", in November [ID]. Nonetheless, official Soviet designation was "Great October". (SAC prefers "Soviet Revolution")

Sociologist Harold Lasswell identified the Soviet Revolution as "The Unnamed Revolution" [Lasswell.UNNAMED], and he set about to define this novel third phase of the European revolution which swept out of eastern Europe and across the global landscape in the 20th century

-- Bibliography --

Academic and Other Theories of Political Culture,
with special reference to War and Revolution

<>Ackerman,Bruce| a{}
*1980:N.CN:YUP|>Social Justice in the Liberal State| ((plt.trx not same as Mds & Fedor|This is A’s “dialogue as it might be” but then he turned to “dialogue as it is” SO,GO “Neo-federalism”:”entire approach to political legitimacy centers on the possiblility of successful dialogue” [“Neo-federalism”:156] ))
*1988:EC&D:153-93| “Neo-federalism?”| ((fdr idl=rvs legitimacy,not an oxymoron but as final essential moment in rvs process; thus of global significance (vs.Arendt idl of local sig of AREV)|Fedor=3rd way of legitimacy (combining #1=permanent rvs & #2=“rvsy amnesia”) by positing “dualistic conception of political life”: (1) common good,ratified [rzr] by mobilized mass,expressing assent through extraordinary tUt forms [cf=mainly #49] [highest cncept,but shd dominate only rarely] & (2) normal politics|Normal plt is “representational”|Not “mimetic” but “semiotic” (symbol is not the thing represented, and obviously so,explicitly a stand-in) [169!] Dahl is most wrong to say Mds sought rxp w/o virtue, i.e., as solution of problem posed by Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees [173] idl is to “economize on virtue”;presume neither that it will prevail nor that it will cease to be needed [173,quotes #57] Mds thought highest virtue in pbl life,but recognized duality embraced in common phrase:PRIVATE CITIZEN [174-5] cst=“creative synthesis”of two great zpd traditions of pbl virtue [cvc.virtu] and private salvation))
*1993ap02:MNe#14:3| “Boris Yeltsin and George Washington”| ((R&A2.cst YlcB |W also tore up cst= 1781:Art.of Confdr calling for unanimous assent of 13 colonies to any amendment |rvs act now forgotten:cst.Convention said 9 wld do| “By lending his immense prestige to the Convention’s revolutionary break with legality,Washington made it possible to make the new cst more than a piece of paper|By seeking ratification [rzr] by the People, and not merely their standing governments, Washington began the long and complex process of making the Constitution into a specially compelling symbol of dmkic legitimacy”|YALE Sterling prf of lwx & plt.scs|W & YlcB “It is easy to mock the comparison”|A contrasts promise of strong YlcB w/ Havel CZC loss of unity & POL decline| Many mistakenly put ekn rfm ahead of plt,but that is mistake|As a man,Yeltsin does not have the qualities of either Havel or Walesa| “But his dmkic instincts are sounder”))

<>Adams,Brooks| a{}n{}o{ ID
*1913:NYC|_Theory of Social Revolutions| ((REV.trx| Mainly looks at the French Revolution))

<>Adelman,Jonathan R|>Adelman.wrx&REV| a{}n{~~hst trx
*1980:Boulder CO|_Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and Chinese People's Liberation Armies ((UO))
*1985:Boulder CO|_Revolutions, Armies, and War: A Political History| (())

<>Aksakal,Mustafa|_The_Ottoman Road to War in 1914...|>Aksakal.OTM| ((UO| WW1a OTM.TRK| See ch3:57-92 "The Ottoman Empire within the international order"| stt.ndp and MPR=Intro:1-18 re- "pursuing sovereignty in the age of imperialism"| No ARM in ndx| Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War, late October 1914? The war's devastations were by then perfectly clear| One leading TRK svt said TRK leaders were "simple-minded" and "below-average". Compared with, say, OST leaders the first contention does not distinguish TRK leaders. It is doubtful that comparison with many other wartime leaders would distinguish TRK leaders. Many emphasize that War Minister Enver Pasha, the key TRK leader, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams. Aksakal challenges these common views. He holds that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a wider politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities. The catastrophic consequences of TRK entering WW1 had seismic impact on the Empire but far beyond that on the Middle East [AfroAsia] as a whole, and that impact is felt even today))

<>Albertini,Luigi| a{1871}e{1941}n{}o{
*1952-1957:LND,OxUP|_The_Origin of the War of 1914| 3vv| ((UO| WW1a| ToC =
v1= European relations from the Congress of Berlin to the eve of the Sarajevo murder
v2= The crisis of July 1914. From the Sarajevo outrage to the Austro-Hungarian general mobilization
v3= The epilogue of the crisis of July 1914. The declarations of war and of neutrality))

<>Amann,Peter H| a{}
*1962mr:PSQ#77,1:36-53| “Revolution: a Redefinition”| ((8x11 REV.trx stt.mpy (dms stt.ndp)|48:REV=“when the state’s mpy of power is effectively challenged & persists until a mpy of power is re-established”| Weakness? fdr rpz gvt etc has no plt.mpy, yet rvs challenge possible| Better say mpy of physical violence cf=BBL/Castoriadis))
|>Revolution and Mass Democracy: The Paris Club Movement in 1848|P.NJ:1975| ((obx REV48))

<>Arendt,Hanna| a{
*1963:NYC|On Revolution| ((REV.trx noWbr USA| “The sad truth of the matter is that the French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local importance” [55-6 (as in Ackerman,“Neo”:158)]))
*1993:MNC,Piper|_Hannah Arendt,Was ist Politik? Fragmente aus dem Nachlass|EBy Ursula Ludz| ((235p| trx plt.clt *1993fa:Telos#97:172-7 Margaret Canovan rvw| plt=freedom, miraculous power to start afresh| Practical GRK & Roman achievements, ways in which ctz~ acting together gave standards to themselves| C repeats the formula w/emphasis:“acting together created binding standards for themselves. Humans can stand against destruction & create civilization & frdom because they are plural” [C:175]. Socrates superior to Plato for this reason| Freedom of Athenian ctz~ consisted of their ability to talk and think together, and to initiate something new together [dialogue & labor] Cf.analogy of oasis and desert [C:177]))

<>Artz,F. B|
*1934:|_Reaction and Revolution,1814-1832|Langer series| ((rxn rvsREV#1 CIV))

<>Baechler,Jean|_Les_phénomènes révolutionnaires. PRS: 1970

<>Barker,A.J|_The_Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-1918| *1967:LND,Faber|>Barker.NEGLECTED| ((SMT 8x11:WW1b| AfroAsia IRQ))

<>Bartlett,Th|_Military History of Ireland| ((ndr.sbk wrx&REV ch~ by *:|>Ohlmeyer,Jane (re. 1603-1660:) and Fitzpatrick,David (re. 1900-1922) ))

<>Bauer,Arthur. Essai sur les révolutions. PRS: 1908

<>Bayly,Christopher|The Birth of the Modern World|>Bayly.BIRTH ((Σwrx&REV| CF=Osterhammel.TRANSFORMATION))

<>Bell,John| a{}n{BUL krx}o{}
*:|>Bell.BULGARIA|_Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski [Aleksandar Stamboliyski] and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923| ((UO| WW1a WW1c| Wki CF=Marx Against the Peasantry))

<>Benda,Harry J| a{}n{Twrl ntg}
*1960no:Austrailian Journal of Politics and History#6,2:205-18| “Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites”| Reprint in KtsJH.PC:235-51

<>Bendix,Reinhard| a{}n{}o{
*:|_State and Society [ E-TXT]
*:|_Kings or People [ E-TXT]

|_Peasantry in Revolution|:| ((HN13.B4| krx REV.trx))

<>Berghahn,Volker| a{}n{hst.gph WW1a WW1c}o{GRM & EUR hstian mltism
Coliumbia University homepage
*1966:|_Der_Stahlhelm. Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918-1935|>Berghahn.STAHLHELM| ((UO))
*1973:|_Germany and the Approach of War in 1914| ((UO))
*1982:|_Militarism : the history of an international debate, 1861-1979|>Berghahn.MILITARISM| ((UO))
*1987:|_Modern Germany : Society, economy, and politics in the twentieth century|>Berghahn.MODERN| ((UO| ))
*1994:|_Imperial Germany, 1871-1914 : Economy, society, culture, and politics|>Berghahn.IMPERIAL| ((UO))
*2006:|_Europe in the era of two World Wars : From militarism and genocide to civil society, 1900-1950|>Berghahn.cvc.pbl| ((UO| Intro:1-6 | ch#1 "Europe before World War I, 1895-1914":7-32 | Industrial Economy and Civil Society:7-15 | The Curse of Ethnonatinalism and Colonialism:15-25 | Premonitions of Total War:26-32 || ch#2 "Violence Unleashed, 1914-1923":33-57 | Mobilization, 1914:33-9 | The Totalizaton of Warfare:39-47 | The Wars after the Great War:47-57 ))

<>Bertrand,Charles ??, ed| a{}
*1977:Montreal,Proceedings of the Interuniversity Centre for European Studies 2nd International Colloquium||>Revolutionary Situations in Europe,1917-1922: Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary| ((sbr trx RSR.trx rvs.sit.trx GRM ITL OST EREV#3))

<>Blackey,Robert,ed|_Revolutions and Revolutionists: A Comprehensive Guide to the Literature| ((REF Z7164.R54.B55| rvs REV))

<>Blair,Dennis, Admiral|_Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions| *2013:WDC,Brookings Institution Press| 2vv| ((wrx&REV mlt&dmk| The response of an autocratic nation's armed forces is crucial to the outcome of democratization movements throughout the world. But how can military officers and defense officials in democratic nations persuade their counterparts in autocratic regimes to favor democratic transitions? Here, Admiral Dennis Blair confronts this hard-edged challenge with a primer on the factors that affect military behavior during democratic transitions. makes the strong case for why the armed forces of any country should favor democracy and why, contrary to conventional wisdom, many military leaders have supported democratic transitions in different regions of the world. Further, it explains why military support, active or tacit, is essential to the success of any democratic transition. Blair provides incisive commentary on civil-military relations and outlines the foundational elements of armed forces in a democratic country. He presents sound advice to defense officials and military leaders in established democracies that can be put into practice when interacting with colleagues in both autocratic regimes and those that have made the break with dictatorship. [Blair] analyzes democratic transitions in five major regions and surveys the internal power dynamics in countries such as Iran and North Korea, dictatorships that are hostile toward and fearful of democratic influences. Blair juxtaposes the roles, values, and objectives of military leaders in autocratic nations with those in democracies. In turn, highlights how cross-networking with international military delegations can put external pressure on autocratic countries and persuade them that democracies are best not only for the country itself, but also for the armed forces. Volume one of this two-volume project provides the educational foundation necessary so that military officers from established democracies can raise their game in achieving effective dialogue on democratic development))

<>Blanchard,William H| a{}
*1984:Santa Barbara,Clio|_Revolutionary Morality: A Psychosexual Analysis of Twelve Revolutionists| ((bxo~ psx.trx masochism rvs.mrl lbv| Lawrence,TE RssJJ TolL KrpP Gandhi MrxK Sun Yat-sen TrtL Guevara,Che Castro,Fidel LnnV Mao))

<>Blickle,Peter|_The_Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a new perspective|>Bickle.REV| Translated by >Brady,Thomas A,Jr. and H.C. Erik Midelfort| ((GO/SAC/1521 | wrx&REV krx.wrx krx.REV GRM rlgP.rfm))

<>Bluntschli,Johann Kaspar| a{808}e{881}n{}o{prf plt.trx stt.ndp inx.lwx tntn.lwx
*1861+:Heidelberg.unv prf
Took position on post-USA cvl.wrx irx,lwx issue USA.v.ENG, the Alabama Claims [ID]
*1864:|_Denkwürdiges aus meinem Leben| ((slf.bxo))
*1895:O.ENG,Clarendon:|_Theory of the State| ((stt.trx))

<>Brinkley,George A|_The_Volunteer Army and Allied intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921; A study in the politics and diplomacy of the Russian Civil War| *1966:NotreDame.IN,UNDP| ((UO| wrx&REV WW1b/WW1c Gwrx|
pt1= Russia and the World War:
The disintegration of Russia
The impact of German occupation
pt2= Allied intervention in South Russia:
The post-war [?but is this best thought of as "post"-WW1?] intervention
The French and the volunteers in Odessa
Britain as a buffer
pt3= The rise and fall of the volunteer army:
Denikin's military and political strategies
Retreat and the end of Allied aid

STUDENT REVIEW = [This] is a study of the relations between allied powers and the Volunteer army. This book focuses on the central questions of why the allies decided to intervene in south Russia, and why they failed to defeat the Bolsheviks. Initially the allies sought intervention in south Russia in order to reopen the eastern front against Germany; they believed victory over Germany required a Russian effort. Then after Germany was out of the picture, reasoning for intervention became muddled. According to public propaganda, intervention was a continuation of the anti-German war, and struggle against the Bolsheviks who had broken the Entente. Brinkley aggressively denies another thesis; the idea that allied intervention was a “coordinated conspiracy on the part of western imperialism” (Brinkley, 277). This is clearly false in his mind because of the disarray of allied orders and goals. The allied governments hesitated on numerous occasions, there was disagreement between Britain and France, and military morale from allied troops was egregiously low. Politics in London and Paris caused confusion throughout the intervention as ambivalent policies forced generals to walk a thin line and make decisions for themselves.

Brinkley goes on to point out the conflicting views and ideologies of well-regarded statesmen from France and England. In summary, French and British forces tried to act as buffers and mediators for the numerous factions fighting in South Russia against the Bolsheviks. However, intervention seemed to have a very different ideology than practice. For example, France did demand economic commitments in South Russia in exchange for military supplies, for example grain supply. Why did the intervention and the Volunteer army fail? Brinkley concludes that intervention failed because Allied aid was severely insufficient, there was massive disunity between political anti-Bolsheviks groups, and General Denikin was unable to gain popular support and compromise. Furthermore, the Volunteer Army developed a “class character” which hindered its wider support. Allied forces and the Volunteer Army were unquestionably superior to the Red Army, but infighting and the lack of whole-hearted support from Allies led to Bolshevik victory. In fact, French policy was not to spill any French blood in Russia, but rather to supervise and coordinate. Due to their policies of victory at the least cost, the allies abandoned the responsibility which they had assumed by intervening in south Russia.

Brinkley concludes by analyzing the greater impact of the intervention on Soviet-Western relations. Bolshevik antagonism towards Western governments was not founded on allied intervention in the Russian Civil War. Rather it was an ideological difference beginning with the Revolution, pre-dating intervention. He also spends a great deal of time on the responsibility of the Volunteer Army leader Denikin in the failings of the Volunteer army. Clearly, as its leader, fault is due, but Brinkley dives into his political failings much more so than those of his military action. These failings include idealism, and an inability to compromise [his independence in relation to cooperation with] the allies. Though both sides of the anti-Bolshevik forces were at fault, Denikin had the most to lose, and therefore should have compromised on his firm ideals in order to benefit from more Allied military support. Brinkley’s analysis of Denikin incites some opposition in the scholarly world. Yet, Brinkley’s study is highly regarded by the academia, especially for its scholarship and footnotes. His analysis of conflicting political policy in the intervention as well as political factions in south Russia is particularly noteworthy. The writing is elegant and thoughtful, and provides pages of invaluable footnotes which may be used for further research.

<>Brinkman,Carl|_Soziologische Theorie der Revolution| Göttingen: 1948| ((REV.trx))

<>Brinton,Crane| *1938|_Anatomy of Revolution| ((JC491.b7 1965))

<>Brovkin,Vladimir N| a{}n{ndr & prm SDs(m) NEP vqt }o{}
*1994:PNJ,PUP|_Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922| ((UO| Gwrx wrx&REV
STUDENT REVIEW = This book outlines the effects and reactions of peasants towards the varying factions that fought for control of Russia during the civil war. The Red Army, White Russians (the political faction, not the drink) and the Greens all vied for the control of the peasantry. What ended up happening was that the peasantry revolted as well. The Greens and other village strong factions all doubted the power, and suffered under the power of the White and Red Russian forces.

Spanning the time of the revolution (1918-1921) the book overviews the many geographically isolated events and western Russian events that occurred during the civil war when it came to the peasants getting themselves downtrodden all over. However, they did not let the rival factions completely eradicate them. While they (the peasants) were ultimately expendable when it came to war or sacrifice, they were also invaluable to the Russian economy. The agrarian policies of both the Reds and the Whites devastated the peasantry and rewarded it as well. Some factions levied heavy taxes on grain production centers and when they didn’t get exactly what they asked for, then they got the end of a gun pointed at them. Intimidation was the rule when it came to dealing with the uneducated masses. Both the Imperialistic views towards peasants of the Whites, and the distrust the Reds had for the Kulaks made it so the everyman couldn’t get what he wanted with any side. This peasant distrust of both sides led to the myriad of peasant uprisings and the “Greens” becoming a pressing force on the soon to be victorious Soviet government.

The book argues that during the civil war, what truly became the driving force behind a united Russia and a united peasantry was for the factions to compromise with each other in some way. Most people agreed that the old Czarist imperial Russia had to go, but what continued the fighting were the disagreements others had within to the political climate of Russia, that spurred the fighting further. In the end the politics was settled with the war of the Reds vs- the Whites. The book puts it as two equally incompetent fighting forces. But one of which had a better center of production (the Soviets). That was the political war. The domestic unification war was the Whites vs- the Greens, and the Greens vs- the Reds. This ended with the NEP allowing the farmers to continue their work, while the growing soviet powers began to consolidate the economy and industry to new heights.

<>Burke,William A| *1961se:Military Review:| “Guerrillas Without Morale-- The White Russian Partisans”| ((mlt.hst.gph WW1c Gwrx wrx&REV))

<>Burns,Cecil D. The Principles of Revolution: A Study in Ideals. LND: 1920. “Popular” account, but last three chapters suggestive

<>Bushnell,John| a{}
|_Mutiny Amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906| ((RREV1 wrx&REV sld mlt|no WBR))

<>Calvert,Peter. A Study of Revolution. Oxford: 1970

<>Carley,Michael J|_Revolution and Intervention: The French Government and the Russian Civil War,1917-1919| *1983:Kingston.CAN,McGill-Queen's UP| ((wrx&REV WW1c Gwrx FRN irx))

<>Carr,Edward Hallett| G/Carr.REV

<>Cecil,Hugh P. and >Liddle,Peter eds|
*1966:LND,Cooper:|_Facing Armageddon : the First World War experienced|>CFA| ((UO| WW1b vqt ndr.sbk|

pt1= A world at war =
The substance of the war / John Terraine
The civilian dimension of the war / Imanuel Geiss
pt2= Command : responsibility and stress =
Winston Churchill and the strain of office, 1914-1915 / Martin Gilbert
Kitchener at the War Office / George Cassar
Ludendorff and Germany's defeat / Martin Kitchen
Haig and Pershing / Frank Vandiver
The French High Command and the mutinies of Spring 1917 / Leonard Smith [wrx&REV]
British decision-making 1917 : Lloyd George, the generals and Passchendaele / Trevor Wilson, Robin Prior
War experience and armistice conditions : generals and politicians / Bullitt Lowry
pt3= The naval and air war =
The German naval war 1914-18 : strategy and experience / Werner Rahn
The British experience of enforcing the blockade : the armed merchant cruisers in 1915 / Chris Page
The Britich merchant seaman at war / Tony Lane
Brothers in arms : the British Army and Navy at the Dardanelles / Geoffrey Till []
Italy and the war in the Adriatic / Renato Sicurezza
The war in the air : the men and their machines / Jack Bruce
A German airman and his war : Oscar Bechtle / Peter Kilduff
pt4= Soldiers : national and unit identity--general [sld~ sld.vqt]
The French soldier in the trenches / Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau [FRN.sld =]
Little Mehmet in the desert : the Ottoman soldier's experience / Erik Zürcher [ TRK.sld]
The American soldier in France 1917-1919 / James Cooke [USA.sld]
The reactions of Irish officers in the British Army to the Easter Rising of 1916 / Jane Leonard
Ernst Jünger : German stormtrooper chronicler / Thomas Nevin
The last hurrah : cavalry on the Western Front, August-September 1914 / Richard Holmes
pt5= Soldiers : national and unit identity--British [GBR.sld] =
The war experience of a typical Kitchener division--the 18th Division / Peter Simkins
The Scottish soldier at war / Edward Spiers
The British working man in arms / John Bourne [wage-labor]
The experience of the British Special Brigade in gas warfare / Donald Richter
The forgotten army of women : Queen Mary's Army Auxilliary Corps / Diana Shaw [wmn.sld.vqt]
pt6= Soldier morale =
The morale of the German Army 1917-18 / Hew Strachan [GRM.sld]
Morale in the Austro-Hungarian Army: the evidence of Habsburg Army campaign reports and Allied intelligence officers [OST-MGR.sld] / Geoffrey Wawro
Officer-man relations, discipline and morale in the British Army of the Great War / Gary Sheffield [GBR.sld cnp GBR.ofr]
The Russian soldier's morale from the evidence of tsarist military censorship / Irina Davidian [ RUS.sld.vqt]
Morale & discipline in the Italian Army, 1915-18 / John Gooch [ITL.sld]
pt7= Medicine and experience [mdx hlt] =
Health systems in khaki : the British and American medical experience / Nick Bosanquet
Not a doctor's work? : the role of the British Regimental Medical Officer in the field / Ian Whitehead
The fight against disease in the Mesopotamian campaign / Mark Harrison []
Facial surgery : the patient's experience / Andrew Bamji
Dr. James Dunn and shell-shock / Keith Sampson
pt8= Peoples at war [wrx.vqt]=
British loyalties : the evidence of an archive / Peter Liddle
A nation at war : the Russian experience / Vladimir Buldakov, Sergei Kudryashev, Genadii Bordiugov []
Germany, the Home Front []:
(1) The physical and psychological consequences of Home Front hardship / Peter Lowenberg|
(2) blockade, government and revolution / Alyson Jackson [wrx&REV]
The Home Front in Italy [] / Luigi Tomassini
Peoples of the underdeveloped world / Bernard Waites [Twrl,]
pt9= Resisters : rebels and dissenters=
The flames of Louvain : the war experience of an academic community / Mark Derez
Life in an occupied zone : Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing / Annette Becker
The Arab experience of the war / Rashid Khalidi []
The experience of Yugoslav agitation in Austria-Hungary, 1917-18 / Mark Cornwall []
Opposition to the war in France : the case of Clovis Andrieu [FRN.pcx.mvt] / Jean-Jacques Becker
The British experience of conscientious objection [GBR.pcx.mvt] / Keith Robbins
pt10= The war experience projected : propagandists and their audiences [wrx&clt wrx.prp]=
German teachers at war / Eberhard Demm
War correspondents and conducting officers on the Western Front from 1915 [ wrx.jrn] / Keith Grieves
Tommy's sisters : the representation of working women's experience [prl.vqt wmn] / Sharon Ouditt
The experience of war in American patriotic literature [blt] / Patrick Quinn
French children as target for propaganda / Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau
Through the eye of the camera : contemporary cinema audiences and their experience of war in the film [FLM], "Battle for the Somme" / Nicholas Reeves
pt11= Interpreting war experience : the arts and post-war reflection [wrx&clt]=
British war novelists / Hugh Cecil
British "anti-war" writers and their critics / Brian Bond
The French war novel : the case of Louis-Fedinand Céline / Frank Field
The experience of British artists in the Great War / Paul Gough
Painting armageddon / Jay Winter
Sir Ian Hamilton after the war : a liberal general reflects / John Lee

The book is a collection of over sixty different scholars from all over the World, edited by Hugh Cecil and Peter H Liddle. It focuses on the subject of the experience of men and women in a world war, both the leaders and those that they led. Through this it attempts to encompass many different aspects of the First World War. It sets out to analyze the kind of war that it was, demonstrate the technology in the war, the context that soldiers, sailors and airmen fought in as well as explain the hardships faced by women, children and non-combatants. It does all of this and more by being broken into 11 different parts, each covering a different aspect.

Part I of the book, A World At War, focuses on what the war was really about and serves to provide an introduction and overview of exactly what the First World War was. Part II, Command: Responsibility and Stress, then takes a look at the extreme stress placed on the leaders of the major belligerent countries and focuses on the burden of executive-office and it’s impact on the office holder during the war. Part III, The Naval and Air War, examines the experience of the German, Italian and British Navies as well as the Air Forces of various countries. Furthermore, it serves to highlight the major advances made in the machines of war. Part IV, Soldiers: National and Unit Identity – General, puts the spotlight on the soldiers of the First World War, starting with the French Soldiers’ experience in the trenches. Part V, Soldiers: National and Unit Identity – British, is much the same as Part IV, however, it only studies the experiences of the different peoples of Great Britain encompassing the experience of the Scottish Soldier all the way to that of the women of Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps. Part VI, Soldier Morale, studies just that, the morale of the soldiers of the various armies that fought in World War One. Additionally, it scrutinizes the relationship between officers and enlisted men in the British Army. Part VII, Medicine and Experience, surveys the struggles of the men and women who attempted to provide care for the massive amount of casualties experienced by belligerents on all sides. Part VIII, Peoples at War, shines the spotlight on the people serving not on the front lines but back in the home fronts and the major hardships that they endured. Part IX, Resisters: Rebels and Dissenters, demonstrates the experience of the people who either refused to serve, deserted or kept the fight alive while living in an occupied zone. Part X, The War Experience Projected: Propagandists and Their Audiences, provides insight into the experience of the people who attempted to keep the home fronts’ as well as the soldiers’ hearts and minds in the fight. Finally, Part XI, Interpreting War Experience: The Arts and Post-War Reflections, takes a look at the ensuing arts and subsequent contemplations of the War.

In conclusion, this book does a wonderful job of providing one with very in-depth yet concise accounts into the experiences of many different facets of the First World War. It does, however, tend to focus more on the experience of the British and is slightly lacking in the area of the Russian Experience, which is clearly a major theme in this course.


<>Cederman,Lars-erik|>Camber,Warren|>Didier,Sornette| "Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War" | *2011:International Organization#65(4):605-638| ((wrx&REV| Drawing on Clausewitz's classic theory, [the authors] argue that the emergence of mass nationalism following the French Revolution profoundly altered the nature of [international relations among European states], thereby transforming the conduct of interstate warfare. To validate these assertions -- and thus to test Clausewitz -- [the authors] rely on quantitative evidence at the macro level, with a particular focus on the global distribution of interstate war sizes, measured in terms of battle deaths, over the past five centuries [CF:Sorokin]. Drawing on extreme value theory [W-ID], [the authors] demonstrate that temporal discontinuities in the shapes of the tails of such distributions can be used to draw inferences about the nature of the mechanisms underlying the bloodiest events in world history [An unfortunate sentence]. This approach allows us to show that the interstate system experienced a fundamental shift in the mechanisms underlying the production of [?that determined] war sizes: a shift that can be dated to the years 1770–1810, and that resulted in a systematic increase in war severity. These same tools also allow us to rule out a number of alternative explanations for this shift (including changes in population sizes and changes in weapons technology), while providing evidence for a specific account of war severity rooted in the mobilizational capacities of states))

<>Chapnik,Richard Herzl| 1979:Colorado University PhD dissertation| “Toward a General Theory of Political Revolution: An Historical Analysis of the Preconditions of the Russian Revolution of 1917”| ((DK265.C46 3v| REV.trx RREV2 RREV3))

<>Chickering,Roger| a{}n{}o{
*1998:C.ENG,CUP|_Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918|>Chickering.GREAT| ((UO ! 8x11:WW1b| GRM
*--The war begins. The "spirit of 1914" ; The plan ; Tannenberg and the Marne
*--The war continues. Bureaucratic foundations ; Mobilizing industrial resources [35-40] ; Feeding soldiers and civilians [40-6] ; The mobilization of morale  [46-50]; The campaigns of 1915 ; Falkenhayn and Bethmann Hollweg [60-4 re. wrx.aims(8x11)]
*--The war grows total. The land campaigns of 1916 ; Hindenburg and Ludendorff ; The Hindenburg Program ; Occupied Europe ; The war at sea
*--The war embraces all. Warriors ; Homefront and battlefront [] ; Paying for war ; War and social class ; Gender ; Generations young and old ; Confession
*--The war breeds discord. The war and "culture" ; Cold and hungry ; Criminality and war ; Early opposition ; Industrial unrest: the labor movement splits ; War aims and constitutional change
*--The war ends. "Peace feelers" [168-72 pcx] ; The enduring face of warfare ; The Ludendorff Offensive ; The end ; The "stab in the back"
*--Epilogue: a great war))
Much more at UO, EG=

*2000:WDC|_Great War, total war: Combat and mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918| Edited with Stig Förster|>CGW| ((UO|
WW1b =

From cabinet war to total war / Hew Strachan
World War I and the theory of total war / Roger Chickering
World War I and the revolution in logistics / Martin Van QREVeld
Mass warfare and the impact of technology / Dennis E. Showalter
Total was as a result of new weapons? / Rolf-Dieter Müller
Planning total war / Holger Afflerbach
Most extensive experiment that the imagination can conceive / Wolfgang U. Eckart
War between soldiers and enemy civilians, 1914-1915 [] / John Horne and Alan Kramer
Blockade of Germany and the strategy of starvation, 1914-1918 / Avner Offer
Total rhetoric, limited war / Holger H. Herwig
First air war against noncombatants / Christian Geinitz
Bullying the neutrals / Marc Frey
Poincaré, Clemenceau, and the quest for total victory / John F.V. Keiger
Strategy and unlimited warfare in Germany / Wilhelm Deist
Strategy of unlimited warfare / David French
French strategy on the western front, 1914-1918 / David Stevenson
Strategy and total war in the United States [USA] / Russell F. Weigley
War aims, state intervention, and business leadership in Germany [wrx&ekn] / Gerald D. Feldman
Lloyd George and the management of the British war economy / Keith Grieves
Better late than never / Elisabeth Glaser
How (not) to pay for the war / Niall Ferguson
Mobilizing German society for war / Richard Bessel
Women's wartime services under the cross [wrx&wmn] / Jean H. Quataert
Pandora's box / Jörg Nagler
Painting and music during and after the great war [wrx&clt] / Arthur Marwick | wrx&clt wrx&xdj


<>Chorley,Katherine|_Armies and the Art of Revolution| *1943:LND| ((UO| wrx&REV))

<>Cobb,Richard| a{1917}e{1996}n{}o{}
*1987:New Haven.CT,YUP|>Cobb.ARMIES|_The_people's armies : the armées révolutionnaires, instrument of the terror in the departments, April 1793 to floreal year II| ((UO| wrx&REV| CF:Pipes.RR:288-9))
*--W#1 | W#2

<>Cohn,Norman| a{}n{}o{}
*1957:NYC|_The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and Reformation Europe and its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements| ((mdv ChxP rlg&REV Protestant Reformation and mdn sttism EREV#3))

<>Colton,Ethan T. Four Patterns of Revolution: Communist USSR,Fascist Italy,Nazi Germany,New Deal America. NYC: 1964

<>Comaroff,John L. and >Stern,Paul C|_Perspectives on Nationalism and War| *1995:|>C&S.NTNism| ((UO| ndr.sbk ntn.sttism wrx&REV
Self-interest, group identity / Russell Hardin
Social-psychological aspects of nationalism / Daniel Druckman
Why do people sacrifice for their nations? / Paul C. Stern
Rational nationalism: the passionate nationalism of rational choice / Fernando Coronil
Nationalism, the mass army, and military power / Barry R. Posen| WW1
States and nationalism in Europe, 1492-1992 / Charles Tilly| WW1
Nationalism and modernity: a methodological appraisal / Edward A. Tiryakian | Comments / Vincente Raphael| mdn
Ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of difference in an age of revolution / John L. Comaroff| wrx&REV))

<>Crozier,Brian Rossiter| a{1918}e{2012}n{CWX wrx&REV EREV#3}o{jrn W-ID
*1958no:The Twentieth Century| “The Anatomy of Rebellion”
*1960:The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections
*2005:|>Crozier.VICTORY|_Political_Victory: The Elusive Prize Of Military Wars| ((E-TXT excerpt| crn=1870-2005
*--Contents (NB! E-TXT excerpts) =
*----3 The First Two Franco/German Wars, 1870-1914 [SAC ID#1 | ID#2]
*---13 Postwar Disasters
*---21 The Third War, 1939-1945 [SAC ID]
*---31 MacArthur's Japanese Legacy
*---39 Post-Colonial Conflicts
*---41 Frances Defeat in Vietnam, 1945-1954 [SAC ID]
*---49 The Algerian Disaster, 1945-1962 [SAC ID]
*---63 Britain's Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
*---69 Americas Defeat in Vietnam, 1961-1975 [SAC ID]
*---77 The India-Pakistan Antagonism
*---85 Moscow's Afghan Obsession
*---87 The Tempting Country
*---91 The Fatal War, 1980-1989 [SAC ID]
*---97 Soviet Methods
*--101 The Rise of the Taliban, 1995-1996
*--113 Collapse of the Soviet Empire, 1989-1990 [no E-TXT | SAC ID]
*--123 Three Minimal Wars [no E-TXT]
*--125 The Suez Fiasco, 1956 [no E-TXT]
*--133 Before and After the Six-Day War, 1967
*--143 The Falklands Case, 1982 [no E-TXT]
*--151 Tyrant Wars [no E-TXT]
*--153 Saddam Husseins First War, 1980
*--161 Lessons of the Second War, 1990
*--171 Lessons of Kosovo, 1998 [SAC ID]
*--179 Looming Threats [no E-TXT]
*--181 The Chinese Threat, Part I
*--189 The Chinese Threat, Part II
*--199 Is Peace Possible? [no E-TXT]
*--209 Notes
*--217 Index


<>Cunha,Euclides da| a{866}e{909}
|_Rebellion in the Backlands|| ((trx krx.rvs “The” classic study of primitive social rebellion sd Hobsbawm.PRIMITIVE))

<>Dadrian,Vahakn and >Akçam,Taner|_Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials|>D&A| ((1920 trials of O.TRK officials ~~ARM KmlM| ToC =

<>Dahrendorf,Rolf. “Über einige Probleme der soziologischen Theorie der Revolution”. Archives Europeenes de Sociologie v2 #1 (1961)

<>Dangerfield,George| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{WW1 wrx&plt}o{
*1935:NYC,Smith & Haas|_The_Strange Death of Liberal England|>Dangerfield.STRANGE| ((UO WW1a| lbx plt.clt|

ToC = Their lordships die in the dark, May, 1910-August, 1911| Hubris, 1911-1913| The crisis, January-August, 1914| Epilogue
The lofty shade|
Winter,Jay explores turbulence [NOpcx clt.violence] of pre-wrx ENG pbl; violence or its threat omnipresent = Home Rule in IRE, wmn suffrage & wage-labor demands))


<>Davies,James C| a{}n{}o{}
*1962fe:American Sociological Review#27,1:5-19| “Towards a Theory of Revolution”| ((A social scientific restatement of the Tcqian trx that REV~ follow general “progressive” period in the grip of reversals. Expectations continue to rise while fulfillment falls. Concludes with some curious remarks on predicting revolutions))
*1971:LND|Davies,James C.,ed|_When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution

<>Downing,Brian M? a{}
*1992:P.NJ,PUP|Downing.MILITARY| _The_Military revolution and political change: Origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe | (())

<>Drucker,Peter F|
*1993sp:WWQ#17,2:52-73| "The Rise of the Knowledge Society"| ((svt ntg ))

<>Dulffer,Jost| a()n()o()
*:|_Planned Memory: The History Boom Surrounding the First World War| ((UO| WW1 hst.gph General overviews such as Christopher Clark's 'Sleepwalkers' or Herfried Munkler's 'Der Grosse Krieg' [The great war] have achieved enormous print runs. Oliver Janz's '14' wins over readers with its concise analysis, while Jorn Leonhard's 'Buchse der Pandora' [Pandora's box] surprises with its innovation und synthetic power. 'The Cambridge History of the First World War' is trailblazing))

<>Dunn,John|_Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon| Cambridge, England: 1972| ((mdn))

*1965:H&T#4,2:133-63| “On the Etiology of Internal War”| ((wrx&REV trx| E-TXT))

*1964:Glencoe IL|_Internal War: Basic Problems and Approaches| ((wrx&REV trx))

<>Edwards,Lyford P. The Natural History of Revolution. Chicago: 1927

<>Ekman,Diana Russell. “A Comparative Study of the Relation Between the loyalty of Armed Forces and the Outcome of Mass Rebellion in the Twentieth Century”. PhD dissertation, Harvard University,1970| (( 86wi: bbt.rqt| wrx&REV))

<>Elliott-Bateman,Michael,ed. Revolt to Revolution: Studies in the 19th and 20th Century European Experience (1974)

<>Ellwood,Charles A. “A Psychological Theory of Revolutions”. American Journal of Sociology 11 (July 1905): 49-59. “Revolutions are disturbances in the social order due to the sudden breakdown of social habits under conditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those habits, IE=the formation of a new order. In other words, revolutions arise through certain interferences or disturbances in the normal process of the readjustment of social habits.”

<>Elwood,R. C.,ed. Reconsiderations on the Russian Revolution. Cambridge MA: 1976

<>Esler,Anthony,ed| a{}o{}
*--"Youth in Revolt"|In txt Mod EUR Social Hst ??| ((REV rvs std ~~ CIV re.830s:FRN generation REV30 REV48))
*1974:Lexington.MA,Heath|_The_youth revolution : the conflict of generations in modern history| ((prm.sbk ndr.sbk|
*--Conflict of opinion
*--What is a generation?
Ortega y Gasset,J. The importance of generationhood
Mannheim K. What is a social generation?
Rintala, M. Generations in politics
*--Generations in conflict
Treitschke, H. von. Focus on the movement, the German student unions
King, B. Focus on the youth leader, young Italy
Lutz,R.R. The generation as a social myth, the Viennese Academic Legion
Brower, D.R.A sociological analysis, fathers and sons in tsarist Russia
Loewenberg, P.A psychological approach, the Nazi generation
Samson, M. and Beke, L. Street people speak, the Hungarian revolt
Ehrenreich, B. and J.A radical analysis, the May days in Paris
*--Generational revolt, a force in history:
Feuer, L.S. Generational upheaval as a pathological factor in history
Moller, H. Rebellious youth as a force for change
Esler, A. After the youth revolution, what?))

<>Feierabend,Ivo K.,and L. Rosalind. “Aggressive Behavior within Polities,1948-1962: A Cross-national Study”| *1966:Journal of Conflict Resolution v10: 249 ff| (())

<>Feldman,Gerald| a{}n{}o{GRM.hstian
*1972:|_German Imperialism| G/Feldman.MPR
*1975:JMH#47(1):1-47| "Economic and Social Problems of the German Demobilization, 1918-19"|>Feldman.DEMOB| ((WW1c wrx&REV))

<>Ferguson,Niall| a{}n{fnc bnk wrx.gnr| 8x11:WW1 ?wrx&REV? crt of F's emphasis on dms plt in his account of wrx&plt wrx&irx}o{gnr.hst
*1995:|_Paper and iron : Hamburg business and German politics in the era of inflation, 1897-1927| ((UO WW1c GRM bzn fnc))
*1998:|_The_House of Rothschild| ((fnc bnk))
*2001:NYC|_The_Cash Nexus: Money and power in the modern world, 1700-2000| ((UO| fnc))

*2006:LND,Allen Lane|_The_War of the world: History's age of hatred|>Ferguson.WAR| ((UO| WW1+ to CWX|

The world at the beginning of the 20th century seemed for most of its inhabitants stable and relatively benign| Globalizing, booming economies married to technological breakthroughs seemed to promise a better world for most people| Instead, the 20th century proved to be overwhelmingly the most violent, frightening and brutalized in history with fanatical, often genocidal warfare engulfing most societies
ch#1= Empires and races
ch#2= Orient express []
ch#3= Fault lines
ch#4= The contagion of war
ch#5= Graves of nations
ch#6= The plan
ch#7= Strange folk
ch#8= An incidental empire
ch#9= Defending the indefensible
ch#10= The pity of peace
ch#11= Blitzkrieg
ch#12= Through the looking glass
ch#13= Killers and collaborators
ch#14= The gates of hell
ch#15= The osmosis of war
ch#16= Kaputt
Epilogue : the descent of the West
pdx#1= The war of the world in historical perspective
*2011:|_Civilization: The West and the rest| ((UO| rise of "The West"

<>Ferro,Marc| a{
*1971se:SlR#30:484-97,500-511| "The Russian Soldier in 1917: Undisciplined, Patriotic and Revolutionary"|>Ferro.SOLDIER| [E-TXT | Also in Brower.RR:] wrx&REV
*1972|_The_Russian Revolution of February,1917: The Fall of Tsarism and the Origins of Bolshevik Power|
*1980|_October 1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution|
*1985:Methuen|_The_Bolshevik Revolution: A Social History of the Russian Revolution| ((NoUO))
*--|_Aspirations of Russian society [Pipes.RR]
*1971:SlR| More aspirations
*1991:|_Nicholas II: The Last of the Tsars| ((N-1))

<>Figes,Orlando| a{}n{krx Gwrx gbx RREV.gnr}o{
*1989::O.ENG|_Peasant Russia, Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917-1921|

*1996:L.ENG Cape|_A_People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924| ((DK260.F54+1996b| gnr |NB! 33y-long RREV=bfr and after N-1| WW1 Grwx| esp. pp246-307))

As the title of this book says, this book is about the story of the Russian revolution. The major questions the book answers are: why did the revolution take place?, how did it affect the people’s lives?, what did people demand and how the government and political leaders reacted to them?. The author’s basic evaluation on the Russian revolution was disappointment because Imperial Russia was merely replaced by the new autocratic Soviet and its people remained under permanent repression by the new ruler. Given the fact that most of the political leaders wanted to establish the democratic state and ordinary people yearned for economical and political freedom from the political and economic restraints, the results were devastating for people. The author’s analysis of the 1905 and 1917 2, 10 revolutions helped us understand the essence of the revolutions.

As the author pointed out, the 1905 revolution took place unexpectedly without the help and initiative of the political parties. The humiliating defeat against Japan and the widespread famine directly triggered the revolution. But, people were not well organized and their demands focused more on their everyday life. The political leaders had a very naive idea to limit a Tsar’s power only by introducing a parliamentary system. As a result, the revolution failed to create the new political system based on democratic principles. The reasons of the failure were, as the author mentioned, attributed to the low political consciousness of the ordinary people and the absence of the political leadership who were in exile or abroad at that time. However, although the revolution did not lead to real reforms, several meaningful advancements appeared in the overall society. First of all, the revolutionary potential continued to grow; the emergency of the third element, diversification of the class, increase of urban labor population could provide a ground for political leaders to unite people’s revolutionary potential. Secondly, the suspension of the land reforms deepened the peasant’s mistrust for government, finally, made them challenge the Tsar’s authority. It had a lot of implications because the peasant had fear of the Tsar based on old and religious traditions and these attitudes played as barriers to take further action against Tsar. As a result, the above mentioned elements made the 1917 February revolution more organized and politicized movement, compare to the 1905 revolution.

As the author maintained, the 1917 February revolution took place due to almost same reasons as did the 1905 revolution; the serious food shortage, the catastrophic economic situation and the outbreak of the First World War. The devastated economy evoked people’s uprisings, and thanks to the lessons of the 1905 revolution people succeeded to expel the Tsar government. However, the opposition political party leaders including socialist revolutionaries and socialist democrats were hesitant to take over the power despite the peoples’ demands. According to the analysis of the author, they believed that Russia was not ripe for the proletarian revolution, and therefore without bourgeois revolution advancing, the proletarian revolution could not succeed. Furthermore, they were concerned that if proletariat class would have seized the power, the state would have fallen into the anarchistic conditions. Ironically, their hesitation led the nation into chaos, in particular, in the country side. As a result, this provided the reason for the Bolsheviks to take power. Even though Lenin was a great leader of the Bolshevik party, Lenin was always a minority, in all political parties and within the Bolshevik. When he declared “April These” to urge militant struggles and achieve the proletarian revolution, majority of the political leaders refused Lenin’s idea and reprimanded him for betraying Marxism. However, only Lenin exactly caught people’s demands and succeeded to create the Bolshevik party dictatorship by using militant methods and destroying all the system opposed to the new Soviet. The author regarded the 1917 October revolution as the political coup because well armed and organized Bolsheviks took power with less participation of the masses.

Finally, as the author asserted, the failure of the revolution was, in part, attributed to the despotic and autocratic political tradition of old Russia. However, the discontinuation of the reforms carried out by the Tsar government seemed to be more critical in that the government lost not only trust from people but also last opportunities to keep Tsarism just by adding some democratic elements to the political and administration system. Another point that the author criticized was that majority of the political leaders strictly excessively adhered to Marxism and rejected the people’s demand to take power. As a result, this situation caused a vacuum of the power and it resulted in anarchistic crisis all over the country, which ironically brought about another type of an absolute regime called Bolshevik party dictatorship.

<>Fischer,Fritz| a{1908}e{1999}n{WW1b}o{GRM hstian}
*1967:NYC,Wiley&Sons|_Germany's Aims in the First World War| Tlng of Griff nach der Weltmacht|>Fischer.AIMS| ((WW1b GRM| rvw G/Jenkins,J| Whole issue of JCH#48(2) devoted to Fischer.AIMS | Feldman.MPR
ToC =
German imperialism: From great power policy to world power policy [WW1a]
Germany and the outbreak of war: The miscalculation on British neutrality
1: 1914-1916
In expectation of a Blitz victory: from Bethmann Hollweg in class
The promotion of revolution: means and ends
Popular pressures: publicists, societies, parties and princes
The war aims policy of the Reich's leaders, 1915: From depression to the claim for hegemony
The war aims policy of the Reich's leaders, 1916: Feelers for a separate peace in west and east
The objectives of war aims policy, I: Vassal states, a Germanic north-east and economic integration
Germany and the United States: submarine warfare and the Belgian question
War aims programmes: Germany and her allies, November, 1916 to March, 1917
2: 1917
A Hindenburg peace or a Scheidemann peace? War aims and internal policy
Maintenance of Germany's war aims programme: Parrying Austria's desire for peace
Germany and the new Russia: the promotion of revolution and attempts to make a separate peace [RREV wrx&REV]
War aims in the July crisis of 1917: change and continuity
Michaelis and Kuhlmann: renunciation in the west?
The re-shaping of war aims policy: maintenance of eastern aims []
The objectives of war aims policy, II: between annexation and self-determination
3: 1918
The peace of Brest-Litovsk: the first realization of German war aims []
The elaboration of Mitteleuropa: the peace treaties with Finland and Rumania-Poland and Mitteleuropia
The elaboration of the Ostraum: the Ukraine, the Crimea, the Don Transcaucasia [wrx&REV RREV]
Germany between whites and reds: policy towards rump Russia
The vision of world power: objectives of war aims policy, III
The expectation of final victory: climax of power and reverse, and the continuity of war aims


<>Fitzpatrick,David|_Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921 : provincial experience of war and revolution| bbt order Ireland wrx&REV

<>Florinsky,Michael T| a{1894}e{1981}n{}o{}
*1931:NH.CN,YUP|_The_end of the Russian empire|>Florinsky.END| ((272pp !WW1b wrx&REV G/Shotwell | kng issued also without editor's preface as thesis (PH.D.) Columbia University))
*1953:NYC|_Russia:A History and an Interpretation| 2 vols|N.NY: ((G/GLOS| rfr gnr.txt| noWbr))

<>Forster,Robert| a{}
*1970:|_Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe| With >Greene,Jack P., eds| ((EREV.trx rvs.sit))
*1980:In Pelenski.EREV:| "The French Revolution and the 'New' Elite,1800-50"| ((FREV ntg rvs EREV#1 [ID] ))

<>Friedrich,Carl J.,ed| *1966:NYC|_Revolution| (())

<>Fülöp-Miller,René|>FMiR| a{}b{}c{}d{}e{}n{}o{
*1928:NYC,Knopf|>FMi.MIND|_Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An examination of cultural life in soviet Russia| ((UO| REV&clt)) *1935:NYC|>FMi.LEADERS|_Leaders, Dreamers, and Rebels: An Account of the Great Mass Movements of History and of the Wish-Dreams that Inspired Them| ((A bit rhapsodic, but always interesting))

<>Gelven,James L|_The Arab Uprising: What Everyone Needs to Know|>Gelven.ARAB| *2015=ed#2 = [Hardcopy | *2012:ENG,OUP=ed#1 = [ E-TXT#1 | E=TXT#2] ((AfroAsia SaA ISL.REV wrx&REV |
*2010de:2011;Middle East -- NB! EGP TUN YEM and LYB = "Middle East" here, though 3of4 are in N.AFR and thus SAC term "AfroAsia" also applies| Revolt ("uprisings") swept the region, shocking the world and ushering in a period of unprecedented unrest. Protestors took to the streets to demand greater freedom, democracy, human rights, social justice, and regime change. What caused these uprisings? What is their significance? And what are their likely consequences?

Part#1 = A Revolutionary Wave?;
What is the Arab world?;
How homogeneous is the Arab world?;
Why do Arabs identify with one another?;
What was political life in the Arab world like on the eve of the uprisings?;
Why have authoritarian governments been so common in the Arab world?;
What was the state of the economy in the Arab world on the eve of the uprisings?;
What benefits did Arab regimes originally promise their populations?;
Why and how did Arab regimes renege on the promises they had made to their populations?
How did the demography of the Arab states make them vulnerable to uprisings?
How did a food crisis make Arab states vulnerable to uprisings?;
Why did populations wanting change in the Arab world have to take to the streets?;
Can we pinpoint the factors that caused the uprisings?;
What was the spark that ignited the Arab uprisings?;
Where did the demands for democracy and human rights come from?;
How appropriate is the word wave to describe the spread of protests throughout the Arab world?
Where did the phrase "Arab Spring" come from, and how appropriate is it to describe events in the Arab world?

Part#2 = The Beginning: Tunisia and Egypt;
What characteristics do Tunisia and Egypt hold in common?; How entrenched were the autocracies ruling Tunisia and Egypt?;
Were there political parties in Tunisia and Egypt?; How did the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt attempt to control their populations?;
How widespread was corruption in Tunisia and Egypt?;
How did the Tunisian uprising play out?; Was the uprising in Egypt like that of Tunisia?
What did protest leaders in Egypt learn from earlier protests there?
Why was one of the groups that organized the January 25 protests called "We are all Khaled Said"?;
What was the role of social media in the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings?;
Who led the Egyptian uprising in Cairo?;
Why did the Tahrir Square protesters and others adopt the tactic of nonviolent resistance?;
[wage-labor = ] What was the role of labor in the two uprisings?;
What was the role of Islamic groups in the two uprisings?;
Why did the armies in Tunisia and Egypt refuse to put down the uprisings?
What changes did the uprising in Tunisia bring about?
What changes did the uprising in Egypt bring about?;
What are the ten greatest myths about the Egyptian uprising?;

Part#3 = Uprisings in Weak States: Yemen and Libya;
What did the political systems of Yemen and Libya have in common before the uprisings?;
What was political life in Yemen like before the uprising there?;
What was political life in Libya like before the uprising there?;
Why do political scientists consider Yemen and Libya "weak states"?
Why is the fact that Yemen and Libya are weak states important for understanding the uprisings there?

2015:ed#2 | Description: A revolutionary wave? -- The beginning: Tunisia and Egypt Uprisings in weak states: Yemen and Libya -- "Coup-proofed": Bahrain and Syria -- The regional and global meanings of the Arab uprisings

"The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know answers readers' questions about the history and current state of the Arab world and addresses all aspects of the uprisings of 2010 to 2011, including their causes, the role of social media, the diverse paths they have taken, the role of the United States and the uprisings' impact on the United States, and possible outcomes"

<>Gerwarth,Robert and >Horne,John| a{}n{}o{wrx&REV WW1b WW1c mltism wrx&pcx}
*2010:Contemporary European History#19,3:267-273| "The Great War and Paramilitarism in Europe, 1917–23"| [E-TXT]
Influential hst.gph trends in study of political and paramilitary violence, with particular reference to the relationship between wartime and post-war violence. The heuristic value of the ‘aftershocks’ metaphor is considered, as are the advantages (and potential pitfalls) of the contributors’ transnational approach. Finally, the authors suggest an agenda for future research on paramilitary violence, which looks at the phenomenon in a global perspective

*2012:Ox.ENG,OUP|Gerwarth.PARAMILITARY|_War in Peace: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War: an introduction| ((UO wrx&REV mltism
|>Rosenberg,William G| "The syndrome of violence in Russia's civil wars, 1918-1920" | Gwrx
|>Gerwarth,R and John Horne| "Bolshevism as fantasy: Fear of revolution and counter-revolutionary violence, 1917-23"|
|>Gerwarth,R| "Fighting the red beast: counterrevolutionary violence in the defeated states of central Europe"|
|>Pertti Haapala and Marko Tikka| "Revolution, civil war, and terror in Finland in 1918"| ((wrx&REV))
|>Gentile,Emilio| Paramilitary violence in Italy: the rationale of fascism and the origins of totalitarianism [wrx&REV FSCm total.sttism]
|>Yekelchyk,Serhy| "Bands of nation builders? Insurgency and ideology in the Ukrainian civil war"| mltism UKR
|>Balkelis,Tomas| "Turning citizens into soldiers: Baltic paramilitary movements after the Great War"|
|>Newman,John Paul| "The origins, attributes and legacies of paramilitary violence in the Balkans"|
|>Ungör,Uğur Ümit| "Paramilitary violence in the collapsing Ottoman Empire"| OTM.TRK
|>Eichenberg,Julia| "Soldiers to civilians, civilians to soldiers: Poland and Ireland after the first world war"| cvl.mlt ~~ hst~~ | POL IRE wrx&REV
|>Dolan,Anne| "The British culture of paramilitary violence in the Irish War of Independence"| 8x11 wrx&REV IRE
|>Horne,John| "Defending victory: paramilitary politics in France, 1918-26. A counter-example"| FRN mltism

<>Goldstone,Jack A|>Goldstone.REV| a{}n{}o{}
*:|_Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies|
*--Theories of revolution =
1. Classical approaches
2. The debate on modernization
3. A structural approach to revolutions
*--Comparative and historical studies of revolutions
4. The origins of revolutions
5. Peasants and revolution
6. The outcomes of revolutions
Conclusion: revolutions in world history

*2014:NYC,OUP|_Revolutions : a very short introduction | ((??NYUAD SYL~ a fairly superficial hop skip & jump through the centuries

<>Gottschalk,L. “Causes of Revolution”. American Journal of Sociology 50,no. 1 (July 1944): 1-8. Revs the result of “multiple causation”. Must link with historical specifics

<>Gould,Mark|_Revolution in the Development of Capitalism: the Coming of the English Revolution| Berkeley CA: 1987. HN398.E5G68

<>Gouldner,Alvin W|_The_Future Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class: A Frame of Reference, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest of the Modern Era| Series: “The Dark Side of the Dialectic,” vol. 2. NYC: 1979;reprint,NYC: 1982. HM213.G68

*1955:Weimar|Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff: Entstehung und Entwicklung| ((SMT| *1956oc01:AHR#62,1:97-98|>Brinton,Crane rvw E-TXT | ENG summary in Lubasz.REV:55-61| “Emergence of the Concept of Revolution”| xrx))

<>Gurr,Ted Robert| a{}n{REV.cause}o{}
*1968de:PSR#61:1104-1129| “A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices”|
*1970:P.NJ,PUP|_Why Men Revolt|

<>Halévy,Élie|>Halevy,Elie| a{1870}e{1937}n{wrx&REV}o{
*1913:|_A_History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century| [v1: "England in 1815" E-TXT]

*1929:Ox.ENG, Rhodes Memorial Lecture|>Halévy.WW1|>Halevy.WW1| "The World Crisis of 1914-1918: An  Interpretation"| 3 parts= "I. Towards Revolution, II. Towards War, III. War and Revolution" | Pub'd 1930:Ox.UP [E-TXT#1 | E-TXT#2] | Reprint=Halévy.ERA:209-47, with Fritz Stern interpretive essay on Halevy.WW1 [In Halévy.ERA:317-24]
*1938:PRS|_L'Ére des tyrannies: Études sur le socialisme et la guerre|>Halévy.Ére| ((OWN| tlng= Halévy.ERA))
*1941:Economica#8,29:77–93|>Halévy.AGE| "The Age of Tyrannies" [E-TXT]
*1965:NYC,Anchor|_The_Era of Tyrannies: Essays on Socialism and War|>Halévy.ERA|>Halevy.ERA| IBy Fritz Stern (with essay on Halevy.WW1:317-24)| TBy R. K. Webb, with his preface:vii-xvii|
(((ToC (here the several previous publications gathered in ERA are listed in their original crn order)

*1902mr22:Sorel,George [ID], a deliberation on his thesis, pdx#1 of Halevy.ERA:287-9
*1907:|>StSC's|Saint-Simon's ekn doctrine:21-60
*1908:StS's... #2:60-99 [GO 1924 blw]
*1919je04:ENG Whitley Councils [W-ID]:105-57
*1921:Problem of Worker Control:159-81
*1922jy02:Social Question in ENG:183-207
*1924:Conclusion to StS's... [1907+:abv]:99-104
*1929:World Crisis [Halevy.WW1]
*1934:Socialism and dmkic Parliamentarism:249-64
*1936:composition of Halévy.Ére abv, reprint in ERA:265-85
*1936no28:Further thoughts, pdx#2 of ERA:291-316

Halévy reaches back to the era of the Enlightenment in his search for the roots of 20th-c. tyranny, but for him the immediate take-off point was the outbreak of WW1 in August, 1914, when the belligerent nations first adopted forms of social organization appropriate to the demands of modern total war, characterized by two salient features =
(1) Nationalization of all means of production (tools, factories, raw materials), distribution (transportation and markets) and exchange (money, finances), plus state co-optation of labor leaders and their unions in support of nationalization. This may be called "State Socialism". It combines elements of syndicalism [ID] and "corporatism" [EG]
(2) "Nationalization of ideas" in the public sphere [cnp] which takes two distinct forms =
  (2a) One form can be called negative because it suppresses all expression of opinion that the state considers a threat to  national interests and security
  (2b) The other form can be called positive. Halévy described this second form (nationalization of ideas) as "the organization of enthusiasm"
*--After WW1, national trends continued to follow points (1) and (2). Halévy labels them all, whether revolutionary socialist or reactionary capitalist, with one "ism", namely, Socialism, more specifically, "state socialism". These dominant 20th-c trends were "derived from this war-time organization far more than from Marxism". These trends were simply "the continuation of war-time organization in time of peace." These trends showed the ubiquitous 20th-c contradiction between nationalist military and industrial liberation and managerial military and industrial organization. In the 1924 Conclusion to StS's... [1907 and 1908 abv]:99-104 =

Now that the 'liberals' are no more than an intermediate or 'center' party [ID], the conflict is between a Caesarist étatisme and a democratic étatisme, between a corporatism [ID] with capitalistic and Christian tendencies and a syndicalism [ID] with emancipationist tendencies [103-4].


*1969:Journal of International Affairs#23,1:54-75| “A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation”| ((8x11-rvs.sit))

<>Hatto,Arthur| “ 'Revolution': An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term”| *1949:Mind#63:495-517| ((wrd.hst| E-TXT| *1950ja:Mind#59(233):144 brief detailed corrections))

<>Hobsbawm,Eric J| a{1917}e{2012}n{mrxism}o{hstian
*1965:|_Primitive Rebels...| ((UO|))
*1973:|_Revolutionaries| ((REV.trx))
*1975au22+:SF.CA,Proceedings of XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences|_Revolution|
*1990:C.ENG,CUP|_Nations and nationalism since 1780 : Programme, myth, reality|>Hobsbawm.NTNism| ((UO| ntn.sttism ToC =

The nation as novelty: from revolution to liberalism
Popular proto-nationalism
The government perspective
[*1870-1918:] The transformation of nationalism 1870-1918
[*1918-1950:] The apogee of nationalism 1918-1950
[*1950+:] Nationalism in the late twentieth century

*1994:|_The_Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991| ((UO| wrl.hst
The age of total war
The world revolution
Into the economic abyss
The fall of liberalism
Against the common enemy
The arts 1914-1945
End of empires
Cold War
The golden years
The social revolution 1945-1990
Cultural revolution
The third world
R̀eal socialism'
The crisis decades
Third world and revolution
End of socialism
The avant-garde dies - the arts after 1950
Sorcerers and apprentices - the natural sciences
Towards the millennium
New light on our understanding of the twentieth century, with incisive assessments of events that have marked this turbulent period
Both personal and scholarly perspectives [on] such events as the great economic depression of the 1930s, the Cold War, the rise of military regimes, revolutionary changes in the arts, and technological advances in the sciences
Three parts -- The Age of Catastrophe, 1914-1950; The Golden Age, 1950-1973; and The Landslide, 1973-1991 -- look at the legacy of the two world wars, the end of colonialism and the growing importance of the Third World, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union
The third quarter of the twentieth century [...] brought about the "most profound revolution in society since the Stone Age."
In conclusion, Hobsbawm looks to the next millennium, pointing up the dilemmas posed by a burgeoning population, destruction of the environment, and the growing economic disparity between rich and poor
Writes Hobsbawm, "Our world risks both explosion and implosion. It must change."
An astonishing command of historical details and data))

<>Heenan,Louise Erwin| a{}n{}o{}
*1983:University of Texas PhD Dissertation| “Russia's Fatal Blunder: The Summer Offensive of 1917: Diplomatic,Military,Political and Social Aspects”|
*1987:NYC,Praeger|_Russian Democracy's Fatal Blunder: The Summer Offensive of 1917|>Heenan.FATAL| ((UO 8x11:WW1b wrx&REV))

<>Hoffer,Eric. The True Believer

<>Hopper,Rex D. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements”. Social Forces 28,no. 3 (March 1950): 270-279. xrx|

<>Hovannisian,Richard G| a{}n{ARM WW1b WW1c Grwx}o{}
*1971-1996:B.CA,UCP|_The_Republic of Armenia|>Hovannisian.ARM| 3vv: v1=The first year, 1918-1919| v2= From Versailles to London, 1919-1920| v3= From London to Sèvres, February-August, 1920| v4= Between crescent and sickle--partition and Sovietization| ((ntn))
*:| Check UObbt for WW1b WW1c Grwx ARM CAS|

<>Hunczak,Taras,ed|_The_Ukraine,1917-1921: A Study in Revolution|>Hunczak.UKR| *1977:C.MA,HUP| ((UO| RREV3 wrx&REV Gwrx WW1b WW1c))

<>Janos,Andrew C| a{}n{plt.clt 1pty fxn}
*1970| “The One-Party State and Social Mobilization”, also re.grp pltics in CMN cvc.pbl| In _Authoritarian politics in modern society; the dynamics of established one-party systems, edited by Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore| ((ndr| 1pty fxn plt.clt))
*1976:|_Authoritarian politics in Communist Europe: uniformity and diversity in one-party states| Contributors, Zygmunt Bauman ... [et al.]| ((JN96.A3 1976 .A97))

<>Jenkins,Jennifer| *2013:JCH#48(2):397-417| "Fritz Fischer's 'Programme for Revolution': Implications for a Global History of Germany in the First World War"| ((WW1 GRM & wrl.hst G/Fischer.AIM))

<>Johnson,Chalmers. Revolution and the Social System. Stanford: 1964. A model of social-scientism gone to extremes
--|Revolutionary Change. Boston: 1966

*1967:LND|_Russia,1917: The February Revolution|
*1980:LND|_The_Kornilov Affair: Kerensky and the Break-up of the Russian Army| ((RREV3 mlt wrx&REV))

<>Kautsky,John H|>KtsJH| a{}n{wrl ntg}
*1962:|_Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism| EBy KtsJH|>KtsJH.PC
*1982:|_The_Politics of Aristocratic Empires|

<>Kenez,Peter| n{WW1c Gwrx wrx&REV| FLM clt.hst}o{
*1971:B.CA,UCP|_Civil War in South Russia, 1918: The First Year of the Volunteer Army|

<>Kennedy,Paul M| a{}n{}o{
*1980:Allen and Unwin|_The_Rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860-1914| ((UO| WW1a))
*1985:Boston,Allen.Unwin|>Kennedy.wrx.plans|_The_War plans of the great powers, 1880-1914| ndr.sbk| ((UO| WW1a ndr.sbk|

Diplomacy and war plans in the United States, 1890-1917 / J.A.S. Grenville
Naval operations plans between Germany and the USA, 1893-1913... / H.H. Herwig and D.F. Trask
Imperial cable communications and strategy, 1870-1914 / Kennedy,PM
The revolution in British military thinking from the Boer war to the Moroccan crisis / J. McDermott
The Royal Navy and war planning in the Fisher era / P. Haggie
Joffre reshapes French strategy, 1911-1913 / S.R. Williamson
A German plan for the invasion of Holland and Belgium, 1897 / J. Steinberg
The development of German naval operations plans against England, 1896-1914 / Kennedy,PM
The significance of the Schlieffen plan / L.C.F. Turner,LCF
Moltke and Conrad : relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German general staffs, 1909-1914 / Stone,N []
The Russian mobilisation in 1914 / Turner,LCF []
Includes ndx))
*1987:NYC,Random|_Rise of Fall of the Great Powers : economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000|>Kennedy.R&F| ((UO| WW1+ irx MPR Σwrx&REV|
The rise of the western world [The West]
-- The Habsburg bid for mastery, 1519-1659
-- Finance, geography, and the winning of wars, 1660-1815 [fnc&ggr ?territory or ekn?]
-- Industrialization and the shifting global balances, 1815-1885 mfgR ??pp.194-275 re-mobilization
-- The coming of a bipolar world and the crisis of the "middle powers" : part one, 1885-1918 [?Define "bipolar world"]
-- The coming of a bipolar world and the crisis of the "middle powers" : part two, 1919-1942
-- Stability and change in a bipolar world, 1943-1980
-- [?DITTO] To the twenty-first century))
*2006:NYC,Random House|_The_Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations|>Kennedy.UNO| ((UO| tntn.gvt wrl.gvt
Makes sense of UNO commissions and committees, and how the six main operating bodies operate and interact| How five permanent members of the Security Council overcome political antagonisms, EG=To spearhead military supervision of aid in humanitarian crises, and how lack of cooperation among the great powers has hamstrung such initiatives, EG=ecx control of greenhouse gas emissions and exacerbated effects of globalization on developing nations' economies As a body, the UN emerges here for what it is: fallible but indispensable
pt1= Origins -- The troubled advance to a New World Order, 1815-1945
pt2= The evolution of the many UNs since 1954
The conundrum of the Security Council
Peacekeeping and warmaking
Economic agendas, north and south
The softer face of the UN's mission
Advancing international human rights
"We the peoples": democracy, governments, and nongovernmental actors [NGO~]
pt3= The present and the future
The promise and the peril of the twenty-first century
Appendix: Charter of the United Nations))

<>Kettle,Michael|_Russia and the Allies,1917-1920| ((wrx&REV WW1b Gwrx))

<>Kharkhordin,Oleg|>XrxO| a{1964}n{cvc.pbl}o{plt.trx
}l{UCBerkeley PoliSci PhD
SPB European University plt.trx
*1998se:Europe-Asia Studies#50,6:| “Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity”| ((E-TXT| OChx rlg| G/.MAIN blw))
*2001my:History and Theory#40,2:| “What Is the State?: The Russian Concept of Gosudarstvo in the European Context”| ((E-TXT| cvc.pbl trx| G/.MAIN blw))
*2001no:European Journal of Social Theory#4,4:| “Nation, Nature and Natality: New Dimensions of Political Action”| ((E-TXT| G/.MAIN blw))
*2005:MA Cambridge, MIT|_Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy| “Things as Res Publica: Making Things Public” (pp. 280-9)| ((UO| rpx| G/.MAIN blw| Search UO catalog for gnr bbl re. "Making Things Public"))
*2005:|_Main Concepts of Russian Politics|>Kharkhordin.MAIN| ((SMT| Draws together previous four titles))

<>Kimball,Alan| a{}n{}o{}
*1991su:Telos#8:187-95|Kimball, Alan, and Gary Ulmen| "Weber on Russia"| ((H1 .T44))

<>Kirchheimer,Otto. “Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs”. American Political Science Review 59 (1965): 964-974

<>Knapp,Newton Ben. The Psychology of Ecstatic Crowds: A Paper Read Before the Contemporary Club,Davenport,Iowa,May 1,1919. Davenport,Iowa: 1919

<>Kolonitskii,BI| a{}n{mlt & plt.clt wrx&REV}o{
*2001:|_Simvoli vlasti i bor'ba za vlast': K izucheniiu politicheskoi kul'tury....

<>Konrad,Gyorgy [George here],and Ivan Szeleny. The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. Translation by Andrew Arato and Richard E. Allen of “Az Ertelmiseg utja osztalyhatalomhoz” NYC: 1979. HM213.K6813

<>Kornhauser,William. Revolutions. Comparative/International Series,Institute of International Studies,University of California,reprint no. 386. Berkeley: [n.d.]

*1969:Studium Generale| |“Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff als geschichtliche Kategorie”| ((REV.trx))
*1985:C.MA.HUP|_Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time| tlng of *1979:FaM|Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten| TBy Keith Tribe|. ((REV.trx= “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution” (39-54) ))

<>Kuhn,Thomas|_The_Structure of Scientific Revolutions| CHI:1967

<>Labor Research Study Group,Scott Nearing,leader. The Law of Social Revolution. NYC: 1926

<>Larson,Reidar. Theories of Revolution,from Marx to the First Russian Revolution. Stockholm: 1970

<>Lasswell,Harold D|>Lasswell.UNNAMED| “The Unnamed Revolution (The Permanent Revolution of Modernizing Intellectuals)”. In _World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements| *1965:C.MA| ((mdn
Introduction: The study of political elites, by H.D. Lasswell
The world revolution of our time: A framework for basic policy research, by H.D. Lasswell
The Politburo, by G.K. Schueller
The Fascists: the changing elite, by H.D. Lasswell with R. Sereno
The Nazi elite, by D. Lerner with I. de S. Pool, and G.K. Schueller
Kuomintang and Chinese Communists elites, by R.C. North with I. de S. Pool
The coercive ideologists in perspective, by D. Lerner|
With the exception of chapters 1 and 7 and much of chapter 2, the text is reproduced from Hoover Institute studies, 1951-52, and from the American Political Science Review, v31))

<>Lasswell,Harold D.,and Abraham Kaplan|_Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry| Chapter 10: “Process,” pp. 240-285| *1950:NH.CN

<>LeBon,G. The Psychology of Revolution. NYC: 1913. See esp. book II of part one,“The Forms of Mentality Prevalent During Revolution,” pp. 75-122

<>Leiden,Carl,and Karl M. Schmitt|_The_Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World| NYC: 1968| ((wrx&REV))

<>Lenk,Kurt. Theorien der Revolution (1973)

Leonhard,Jörn| a{}n{}o{} *2004:Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory,#8(-1):17-51| "The Semantics of Liberalism in European Comparison"| ((lbx wrd.hst ~~hst))

<>Lijphart,Arend| a{936au17}b{Netherlands}n{fxn}o{plt.scs
*1997:Democracy in Plural Societies| ((Introduced notion of ‘co-social or consociational democracy’, made up of FOUR ELEMENTS =
(1) Authority constituted by a large coalition of political leaders of all significant segments of a multi-component society
(2) Mutual veto or the role of ‘coinciding majority’, which are an additional guarantee of minority segments’ vital institutions
(3) Proportionality = main principle of political representation, distribution of positions in the state machinery and state budget according to each segments' proportion
(4) High quality of autonomy of each segment in managing its own internal affairs))

<>Lincoln,W.Bruce| a{}n{}o{}
*1986:NYC,Simon and Schuster|>Lincoln.ARMAGEDDON|_Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in war and revolution, 1914-1918| ((UO| gnr WW1b wrx&REV RREV2 RREV3 637pp ndx

Throughout Lincoln’s diverse research of Russian society during the period between 1914-1918, time and time again the book revolves around two major themes that paint a picture of Russia’s experience within World War I and the inevitable revolutions. First, the tsar Nicolas II and his Romanov imperial family had almost completely disenfranchised the people of the empire, and instead had chosen an inner circle of friends and “holy men” that further led them astray from ruling in the interest of the common citizen. Then secondly, once Russia had entered the Great War, there was a complete disregard in planning for lack of resources, armaments, ammunition and transportation. These problems were then proliferated by a outmoded utilization of 19th century tactics in a 20th century battlefield which then forced public organizations like Zemstvo to realize that they must produce incredible results for the war effort where the Russian government had failed. Lincoln’s writing highlights the various ways in which the mismanagement of nearly every aspect of government led to a socio-economic implosion, civic disorder and an evaporation of legitimate, Russian imperial sovereignty.

In regards to the first problem of Nicholas II’s incompetence in finding affinity with his own people, there are several roots to the issue. Beginning with the fact that Nicholas came into the royal throne with an obvious lack of experience in government and foreign affairs, to make matters worse his wife Aleksandra manipulated him on several occasions to disregard the advice of experienced statesmen and military leaders. Instead, Lincoln explains the Romanov family found solace in the company of “holy healers” like the French Charlemagne Dr. Phillipe and the Serbian cult leader, Rasputin who served by comforting their ailing hemophiliac son while the prayers of the starving proletariat class went unanswered. The tsar’s malleability continued blind his judgment on tours of the frontline defensive strongholds (which were made insufficient due to mobile military tactics) and military hospitals where he was allowed only the optimistic glimpses of his army’s performance by nervous officers. Until it was too late he truly believed that his soldiers were well equipped and holding strong on the front lines while the reality of the conflict was exponentially grimmer. Lincoln does a fantastic job covering the war from all angles and has many thought provoking facts that give detailed insight into the spectrum of lives touched by war: from the struggling war ministers, struggling to keep order with insufficient supplies, to the peasant soldier trying to make it home alive from impossible odds. For this analysis of wartime decisions and complications that were encountered by Russian forces in World War I, Passage Through Armageddon may very well be an appropriate source for research pertaining to the relationships between Russian officers and their mutinous forces.

In the case of roots to revolt and the overthrowing of the Royal Family, this is where Lincoln excels in his connection of public organizations to the war effort, which we can conclude became the spark of the revolution preceding the end of the Great War. Due to the ridiculous stress that last minute militarization burdened working class citizens of Russia, women and children quickly filled positions formerly held in factories, mines and mills by their husbands and fathers. With the dangerous amalgamation of long hours and unsafe working conditions, compiled by skyrocket market prices, the likely survival rate of the common proletariat family plummeted, resulting in unionization and mass riots. On the front lines soldiers had lost their nationalistic pride and decided that fighting for the Motherland had become a lost cause; so in many cases the peasant soldier returned with their rifle (if they were even issued one) and joined their families in the streets of urban centers to protest. All in all, the future social discontent that would shake the nation in coming years after 1915 is displayed concisely by Lincoln’s research and his vast records give a detailed, “behind-the-scenes” account of an empire in turmoil. Much can be taken away from [this book], but at the heart of the issue is the relationship between the devastation of the Great War and the socio-economic complications that fueled revolutionaries to take action against a tyrant who had traded the responsibility of his starving country for a bourgeoisie lifestyle far away from the front lines.

*1990:DeKalb.IL,NIUP|_The_Great reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia| ((grt.rfm EGR))
*1994:NYC|_The_Conquest of a Continent: Siberia and the Russians| ((SBR frn MPR))

<>Loewenhardt,John,ed|_Political Parties in Post-Communist Russia| *1998:Routledge| ((E-TXT| ))

<>Lounsbery,Anne|*2007:C.MA,HUP| _Thin Culture, High Art: Gogol, Hawthorne, and Authorship in Nineteenth-Century Russia and America| ((R&A rdg blt clt| Marvelous, but no apparent ref. to Weidle))

<>Lovell,David W. From Marx to Lenin: An Evaluation of Marx's Responsibility for Soviet Authoritarianism. Cambridge ENG: 1984

<>Lubasz,Heinz,ed|>Lubasz.REV| _Revolutions in Modern European History| Series: “Main Themes in European History”| NYC: 1966| ((OWN wrx&REV))

<>Macfie,Alexander Lyon|_The_End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923| *1998:LND,Longman|>Macfie.END| ((UO| WW1a WW1b WW1c re.Orientalism, AfroAsia, Eastern Question, hst.gph| Intro:1-19 sets OTM.TRK in wrl.MPR system and expanding cptism| Young Turks:20-55| Balkan Wars (and rise of ntn.sttism and ntnism):71-94| [PRS.pcx=] Peace of Paris & aftermath, ch10,11,12 & conclusion:182-239| EUR MPR and OTM.TRK))

<>MacMillan,Margaret| a{}n{}o{
*2002:NYC,Random|>MacMillan.PARIS|_Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World| ((UO| WW1c PRS.pcx| G/1919ja18

pt#1 Getting Ready for Peace
1. Woodrow Wilson comes to Europe
2. First impressions
3. Paris
4. Lloyd George & British Empire delegation
pt#2 A New World Order
5. We are the league of the people
[6. Russia| 7. The League of Nations| 8. Mandates]:63-109
pt#3 The Balkans Again []
9. Yugoslavia
10. Rumania
11. Bulgaria:136-42
12. Midwinter break
pt#4 The German Issue
13. Punishment and prevention
14. Keeping Germany down
15. Footing the bill
16. Deadlock over the German terms
pt#5 Between East and West []
17. Poland reborn
18. Czechs and Slovaks
[19. Austria| 20. Hungary]:243+
pt#6 A Troubled Spring
21. The Council of Four
22. Italy leaves
23. Japan and racial equality:306+
24. A dagger pointed at ... China
pt#7 Setting the Middle East Alight [ AfroAsia wrx&REV:347-455]
25. Greatest Greek statesman since Pericles [Venizelos]
26. end of the Ottomans
27. Arab independence
28. Palestine
29. Atatürk and the Breaking of Sèvres
pt#8 Finishing Up
30. Hall of mirrors
pdx= Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points [?appearing late in txt]
*:|_The_War that ended peace: The Road to 1914|>MacMillan.ROAD| Variant subtitle = How Europe abandoned peace for the First World War| ((UO 8x11:WW1a| pzn! ?pop.hst.gph?
ToC = War or peace?
Europe in 1900
Great Britain and splendid isolation
"Woe to the country that has a child for king!" : Wilhelm II and Germany
Weltpolitik : Germany's place on the world stage
Dreadnought : the Anglo-German naval rivalry
Unlikely friends : the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain
The bear and the whale : Russia and Great Britain
The loyalty of the Nibelungs : the dual alliance of Austria-Hungary and Germany
What were they thinking? : hopes, fears, ideas, and unspoken assumptions
Dreaming of peace
Thinking about war
Making the plans
The crises start : Germany, France, and Morocco []
The Bosnian crisis : confrontation between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans []
1911: the year of discords : Morocco again
The first Balkan Wars
Preparing for war or peace : Europe's last months of peace
Assassination at Sarajevo
The end of the Concert of Europe : Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia []
Turning out the lights : Europe's last week of peace
The War
*2013no15:TLS:3 rvw of MacMillan.ROAD by Philpott,William =
It is a slow-motion disaster unfolding: the metaphorical driverless freight train [what of celebrities listed above?] packed with explosives accelerating past the various halts on the line before the eventual crash. In a world in which old values of war and antediluvian systems of government rattle over social aspirations [and that sounds pretty serious], the popular will for reconciliation expressed in a growing peace movement is powerless to derail it. [...] The volume is so dense in its detail in places, however, that those who do not enjoy the cut and thrust of diplomacy may find it hard going. Macmilllan's thesis [is credible =] that the statesmen of Europe confined themselves into an increasingly narrow channel [though they are here said not to be driving the freight train] that would eventually bring them to blows [...]. Whether Lord Salisbury's eccentric dining habits and the fact that he was bullied at school had any bearing on that, howeverr, is harder to discern

<>Malefakis,Edward E| a{}n{ wrx&REV 1936-1939:SPN.cvl.wrx [SAC] }o{}
*1970:|_Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War| ((skz srf.rfm rvs CIV))
*2006:Madrid,Taurus|>Malefakis.GUERRA|_La_Guerra Civil española| ed#2 of La guerra de España, 1936-1939|

<>Manzano Baena,Laura| "NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY: THE PEACE TREATY OF MÜNSTER, 1648"|>Manzano.SOVEREIGNTY| *2007:HPT#28,4:617-641 [E-TXT]

<>Marwick,Arthur and >Emsley,Clive et al. eds| a{1936}e{2006}n{wrx&pbl wrx&pcx vqt WW1}o{
*1968:B.MA,Little,Brown|_Britain in the century of total war; war, peace, and social change, 1900-1967| ((Samuel J. Hurwitz,Samuel J. rvw E-TXT))

*1989:|>Marwick.WAR&PEACE|_War, Peace and Social Change in Twentieth-Century Europe| Editors Emsley and Marwick joined here by >Simpson,Wendy| ((UO| ndr.sbk| wrx&pcx wrx&REV

Total war / Ian F.W. Beckett
The persistence of the old regime / Arno J. Mayer [wrx&REV]
The birth of the modern : 1885-1914 / G.D. Josipovici [mdn]
Domestic conflict and the origins of the First World War : the British and the German cases / Michael R. Gordon [wrx&REV]
Italian peasant women and the First World War / Anna Bravo [krx wmn]
Epilogue to Army, industry and labor in Germany, 1914-1918 / Gerald D. Feldman
Recasting bourgeois Europe / Charles Maier
Conquest, foreign and domestic, in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany / MacGregor Knox [WW2]
Hitler's foreign policy / Norman Rich
Hitler's war and the German economy : a reinterpretation / R.J. Overy
The effects of World War II on French society and politics / Stanley Hoffmann [wrx&REV]
The 'levelling of class' / Penny Summerfield
The impact of World War II on Leningrad / Edward Bubis and Blair A. Ruble [WW2]
World War II and social change in Germany / Mark Roseman [wrx&REV]
Accompanying material for an honours-level history course produced by Open University
*1990:Bristol.PA,Open University Press in association with the Open University|>W&P| |_War, peace, and social change: Documents, Europe 1900-1955| W&P,1= 1900-1929| W&P,2= 1925-1959| ((prm.sbk| WW1 WW2 CWX| wrx&REV pcx))

*1990:Open University Series: War, Peace and Social Change: Europe 1900-1955

  1. Europe on the Eve of War
  2. World War I and Its Consequences [UO]
  3. Between Two Wars
  4. World War II and Its Consequences
  5. War and Change in Twentieth-Century Europe [UO]
*1990:Bristol.PA,Buckingham|>Marwick.WAR&CHANGE|_War and change in twentieth-century Europe| ((UO| ndr.sbk WW1 WW2
ToC =
Nature and causes of war / Bernard Waites and Clive Emsley
The processes of change / Arthur Marwick, John Golby and Bernard Waites
The impact of total war / Clive Emsley, John Golby and Arthur Marwick []
Main issues relating to war, peace and social change in 20th-century Europe
Nature and causes of war
Debates over effects of two world wars on both geopolitical and social developments in the 20th century

<>Mawdsley,Evan| a{}e{}n{wrx&REV WW1b Gwrx RREV3}o{}
*1978:NYC,B&N:|_The_Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet: War and Politics, February 1917-April 1918| ((mlt nvy))
*1987:B.MA|_The_Russian_Civil War| ((Gwrx))

<>Mayer,Arno| a{1926}b{Luxembourg}n{WW1c}o{
Princeton unv hst prf(emeritus)
*1959:NH.CN,YUP|_Wilson vs. Lenin|>Mayer.WvL| Original title = The_Origins of the New Diplomacy| ((TXT excerpts))

*1967:NYC,Knopf|_Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919|>Mayer.P&D| ((UO| rvw#1 by Craig,Gordon [E-TXT] | rvw#2 | rvw#3 |

((ToC [NB! chapters on, but how does influence Mayer's general conclusions? !No OTM.TRK and no Sèvres in ndx, TRK only 8 listings!]=
*--Prologue:3-30 Excellent general summary| Mayer's words [with SAC editor pedagogical augmentation in brackets] =
In order to appreciate the world historical importance of the Paris Peace Conference, it is necessary to view it against the background of the extreme complexity of the international and domestic politics of 1918-19. This complexity was due to

[1] the convergence of the end of the Great War with the start of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia,
[2] the collapse of political authority in Eastern and Central Europe,
[3] the threat of revolution throughout defeated Europe, and
[4] the right-wing upsurge inside the victorious nations [dms.plt].

These unanticipated and unintended consequences of the war produced conditions of national and international [?imperialist] disequilibrium that rendered this peacemaking task more extensive and more intricate than any previously on record. Moreover, the interplay of national and international politics reached unequaled intensity. As a result, more than ever before, peacemakers had to be [transnational] politicians in addition to being diplomatists [representing their own nation-state]. Also, the opportunities, purposes, and instruments for [international] intervention in the affairs of other states assumed unparalleled proportions. [Mayer.P&D:29-30]
1. The Allied Left in Retreat:33
2. The Victors and the Armistice:53
3. The Vanquished and the Armistice:90-116
4. United States: Congressional Elections:119-132
5. Britain: Khaki Election:133-166 [Britain:133-66, 604-46]
6. Wilson's Grand Tour:167-193
7. Italy: Sonnino's Triumph:194-226

 PART THREE= CONTAINMENT [wrx&REV Mayer.P&D:229-337| G/1919ja18]
8. German Revolution: Between Washington and Moscow:229
9. The Allies and the German Revolution:253
10. The Allies and the Russian Revolution:284-343
11. Location, Delegations, Agenda, Intelligence:347
12. The Stillborn Berne Conference:373
13. Russia: The Buckler Mission and Prinkipo Summons:410
14. Russia: The Bullitt Mission:450
15. Storm Signals:488
16. The Rise of Bela Kun [Mayer,P&D:521-56, 559-603, 716-50, 827-51, 139pp in all] G/1919mr21
17. The Hungarian Jolt:559-603
18. Intrusion of Politics: Britain:604-46
19. Intrusion of Politics: France:647-72
20. Wilson's Fiume Appeal:673
21. Bela Kun in Power:716-750
22. The Versailles Treaty:753
23. Recognition of Kolchak:813
24. Overthrow of Bela Kun:827-851
25. Abortive General Strike:853-73
[26] Epilogue= Disillusioned Intelligentsia:875-93 [??Add quotes]


<>Mayzel,Matitiyahu| a{}n{wrx&REV}o{}
*1979:Osnabruck: Biblio-Verlag|>Mayzel.GENERALS|_Generals and Revolutionaries: The Russian General Staff during the Revolution; A Study in the Transformation of a Military Elite| ((GWt mlt.ofr~ WW1b RREV2 RREV3|

Having read many historical studies, I feel confident saying that [this] is a great read. First and foremost it is written more like a story than a historical writing. It drew me in as I flipped page to page, feeling as if I was in the story and not just an observer; something I rarely find in books of this nature. Using many primary sources, Mayzel educates the reader on the workings of the Russian army and its impact on World War 1 and revolutions between the late 19th century till the end of the Bolshevik revolutions.

The [book] sets up the way the Russian military was run and how officers gained their posts. The many different academies that officers went through and the process required. Through this, the reader gains knowledge on many of the pre war and revolution conditions of the military; primarily the stark differences between soldiers, officers, and generals. Each group considers themselves apart from the other and it is these divisions that will have an impact on the way war and revolutions end up. Mayzel spends most of his time explaining the workings of the General Staff, referred to as the Genshtabisty, and its effect on Russia. The Genshtabisty tend to be conservative generals who do not fraternize with the rest of the military, believing themselves to be expert war theoreticians. They are very apolitical and distance themselves from politics, focusing rather on the military and war.

As the war with Germany got worse, many up and coming young officers from the academies began to see a need for a change within the military, as well as politics. This group of officers was nicknamed “Young Turks” [ID]. Shortly after the abdication of the Tsar [ID], there was a shuffling of war ministers within the new government. Many of these “Young Turks” saw this as an opportunity to better their station and began getting involved into politics, something the old army had never thought of. Mayzel uses many letters between officers to show the radicalization of the officers. As the military began to be more political, there was a harsh distinction between the new and the old officers. As the situation came to a head, many conservative generals deemed it necessary to involve themselves in politics, because the way things were going within Russia was weakening their efforts in the war against the Germans, who were advancing on Petrograd and Moscow. This lead to the Kornilov Affair [ID], where the general Kornilov attempted a coup of the provisional government set up after the absence of Tsar Nicholas II. The coup ended poorly and soured the conservative Genshtabisty desire to get involved in politics.

Many officers and some Genshtabisty still involved themselves with the socialists, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. However, those generals gave up who believed the changing of governments would deliver Russia into German hands. They began to sit aside and take orders from their “new masters”. Mayzel speaks on the complexity of the situation within the leadership of the military and how this led to their reaction to the events within Russia, as well as the war. He focuses on the more political sides of the Genshtabisty and rarely touches on the officers who are actually on the front fighting the war.


<>Mazlish,Bruce. The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type. NYC: 1976

<>Mazour,Anatole| a{}n{DKB}o{}
*1937:|_The_First Russian Revolution,1825: The Decembrist Movement; Its Origins, Development, and Significance| ((

As a relative beginner in 19th century Russian history, I very much appreciated the well-rounded approach Anatole Mazour takes in telling the tale of the Decembrist movement. He relates to us the political and economic background in Russia and contemporary Europe, the foreign and nationalistic influences of the founders, the marked division in their ideals and strategy as well as their geography, the events within the actual acts of revolt, the reasons for their failure, the details of their trial and punishment, the experiences of the Siberian exiles, as well as their social and political legacy in the coming struggles for reform in Imperial Russia (and Siberian development). All of this he completes with an abundance of primary and closely witnessed secondary sources that come from both within the movement and also from the state, an autocratic bureaucracy in which many of them operated while simultaneously plotting its demise. Although the choice of title directly connects the Decembrists to the 20th century revolutions, I believe Mazour has given us this history without bias towards later political ideologies in Russia. He paints each character with both their qualities and their seeming inadequacies, stripping the heroes of protection from glorified legacy while still noting their patriotic intentions. Altogether he leaves us with the impression that this was an important step towards modernizing a country still clinging to feudalism in an industrial Europe, but that its failure was due to the exclusivity of its membership and their fear of the peasant masses.

[mdn=] In the development of the movement, he makes sure that we are aware of the conservative atmosphere in which the movement was born. Some of the original Decembrists had returned to a harshly ruled Russia with experiences from an increasingly liberal Western Europe. As the secret project of young military officers of the high noble rank, the original members sought, quite patriotically, to modernize the State so as to accomplish the kind of economic modernization and class mobilization developing in the rest of Europe. They simply did not want their beloved Russia to be left behind in the competitive imperial world; for many of the Decembrists of a higher caste, the desire for democratic values such as the emancipation of the serfs came only with the concept that they could be better put to use in a factory. Because of their fear of an uprising of the illiterate masses, inspired by the bloody French Revolution as well as the Pugachev rebellion of the previous century, this secret society maintained elite ties throughout the military and bureaucracy and were never able to truly utilize the desperation of peasants and soldiers even in the days of their actual revolt. There was plenty of logic in their stance to revolutionize the State in a country where the economy lagged severely and justice was a matter of wealth, but the divisions within the movement and the personal failures and betrayals of members who were raised to fear and admire the monarchy led to the downfall of the revolt and harsh reaction by the prevailing autocracy.

Surely, there are plenty of the Decembrists who Mazour reveres as honest men who followed through on a mission that they believed was imperative for their beloved country. His portrayal of their subsequent punishment and the various manners in which they received it demonstrates the author’s deep analysis of each figure in this movement and the veracity of their dedication. He holds up as heroes the members who stuck to their vision of helping Russia come out of the dark, some by continuing to press for reform and others by putting their elite education and organizational skills to work for the Siberian population around them. Writing in 1937, he would have known how their legacy had already been strong with later reform and constitutionalist movements and I’m sure Anatole would not be surprised by the continued co-optation of the Decembrist ideal by political movements in an ever-changing Russia. For any student who wishes to understand any aspect of the Decembrist movement, this book is a great base.

<>Mazower,Mark| a{}n{ irx.plt plt.clt Nap1 wrx&REV tntn.plt tntn.gvt wrl.gvt wrl.fdr wrl.plt ntn.stt LoN UNO }o{
Mazower's professional webpage [E-TXT]
Personal webpage [E-TXT]
*2012:|>Mazower.GOVERNING|_Governing the World: The History of an Idea: 1815 to the Present| ((UO|

Era of internationalism. The concert of Europe, 1815-1914
Under the sign of the international Brotherhood
The empire of law
Science the unifier
The League of Nations
The battle of ideologies Governing the world the American way. "The League is dead. Long live the United Nations"
Cold War realities, 1945-49
The second world, and the third
Development as world-making, 1949-73
The United States in opposition
The real new international economic order
Humanity's law
What remains : the crisis in Europe and after

World government, from the first post-Napoleonic visions of the brotherhood of man to the current crisis of global finance
Publisher's blurb [with bold-face, hypertext links, and some reformatting inserted by SAC editor] =

The story of global cooperation between nations and peoples is a tale of dreamers goading us to find common cause in remedying humanity’s worst problems. But international institutions have also provided a tool for the powers that be to advance their own interests and stamp their imprint on the world. [This book] tells the epic story of that inevitable and irresolvable tension—the unstable and often surprising alchemy between ideas and power. From the beginning, the willingness of national leaders to cooperate [with one another] has been spurred by crisis:
EG=The book opens in 1815 [ID], amid the rubble of the Napoleonic Empire
The Concert of Europe [ID and EG] was [devised] with an avowed [two part] mission =
  1. to prevent any single power from dominating the continent and
  2. to stamp out revolutionary agitation before it could lead to [further] war
But if the Concert was a response to Napoleon, internationalism was a response to the Concert
[This is Mazower's most difficult idea, and the publisher's blurb expands on it =]
  • [Monarchical] courts [the sphere of insider aristocratic power] and monarchs disintegrated [EG#1 | EG#2 | EG#3 | EG#4 | EG#5 | EG#6 | ]
  • Medieval monarchies were replaced by revolutionaries and bureaucrats
  • 19th century internationalists included bomb-throwing anarchists and the secret policemen who fought them
  • Marxist revolutionaries [EG] and respectable free marketeers [were equally internationalist] [EG]
  • But they all embraced nationalism, the age’s most powerful transformative political creed
  • [And they all] assumed that nationalism and internationalism would go hand in hand
  • [WW1c=] The wars of the twentieth century saw the birth of institutions that enshrined many of those [internationalist] ideals in durable structures of authority| Most notably the League of Nations in [?after?] World War I [LOOP] and the United Nations [LOOP on UNO] after World War II [enshried those ideals]
    Throughout this history, we see that international institutions are only as strong as the great powers [IE=great sovereign nation-states] allow them to be
    The League was intended to prop up the British empire
    With Washington taking over world leadership from [the English Foreign Office at] Whitehall, the UNO became a useful extension of American power
    [However,] two things followed from the late 1960s on [according to Mazower],
    1. America lost control over the dialogue
    2. The rise of the independent Third World [ID] saw a marked shift away from the United Nations and toward more pliable tools such as =
      The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [LOOPS]
    [fnc=] From the 1990s to 2007, [...] a new regime of global coordination built upon economic rule-making by central bankers and finance ministers [...]
    [It is] a regime in which the interests of citizens and workers are trumped by the iron logic of markets
    Now, the era of Western dominance of international life is fast coming to an end
    A new multi-centered global balance of forces is emerging
    We are living in a time of extreme confusion about the purpose and durability of our international institutions
    History is not prophecy, but [...] the current dialectic between ideals and power politics in the international arena is just another stage in an epic two-hundred-year story
  • }s{
    Wki bxo

    <>Mearsheimer,John J|_The_Tragedy of Great Power Politics| ((E-TXT |>Mearsheimer.TRAGEDY| wrx&REV RREV3 sct on "Soviet Union (1917-91)" emphasizes "realism" of RUS and then SSR irx. Less promotion of REV than protection of INX| Mearsheimer's approach is termed “offensive realism” [ID]
    <>Mearsheimer,John J., and Walt,Stephen M|_Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy| ((irx ISR|GO/SAC))

    <>Mensel,Alfred. “Revolution and Counter-revolution”. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 13 (first edition): 367-376

    <>Mitrany,David| a{}n{plt.trx macro-ekn.trx irx krx.plt EEUR FSC mrxism.v.krx}o{[ID]
    *1951|_Marx against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism| ((>MvP| mdn mfgR grd~ lbx.ekn.mnt doomed krx vlg.skz ekn & clt| See Don Treadgold rvw [E-TXT] In years after WW1c EEUR, krx or vlg-based, plt.clt~ came to the forefront, but were defeated by radical nationalist governments (of a distinctly fascistic sort). Many of these rural political cultures gained life again in the years after WW2, only to be defeated now by Soviet-style communist regimes ))

    <>Moore,Barrington,Jr| a{}n{SSR.stt idl pbl| trx plt.scs| RREV R&A| lbx G.rfm Prs Grb}o{
    *1950:C.MA|Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power; The Role of Ideas in Social Change| ((ch11:“The Organization of Authority”:247-76| Comparison of fxn plt tUt in USA & ENG parliament [262-3] But fxn cannot simply be 1 pzn:264 plt give & take does not occur in open tUt setting in SSR| BUT ch goes on to expose how incredible the presumption of single-person decision-making must be| Totalitarian model dominant here,but Moore too smart to be fully drawn into it| Compare w/M’s Liberal Politics))
    *1958:C.MA|_Political Power and Social Theory: Six Studies| ((xrx 8x11 Wbr))
    *1966:B.MA|_Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World| (([525] contains Wbr,Entwicklungstendenzen| NB! great AREV ch. “The American Civil War: The Last Capitalist Revolution”:111-155| While book promises RUS,it shys away from that topic,so central to the larger theme))
    *1978:White Plains NY| Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt| ((xrx REV rdg))
    *1989no15:NYC:Harriman Institute |Liberal Prospects under Soviet Socialism: A Comparative Historical Perspective| First Annual W. Averell Harriman Lecture| ((30p OWN| ~~w/M’s Sov.Politics))

    <>Nadel,George. “The Logic of the 'Anatomy of Revolution,' with Reference to the Netherlands Revolt”. Comparative Studies in Society and History 2,no. 4 (July 1960): 473-484| ((REV.trx| lively,intelligent inquiry into the problems of defining “rev” and applying the definition to actual historical events))

    <>2009:Kaliningrad|>Nureev,RM and >Latov,Yu.V|_Rossiia i Evropa...|>Нуреев,Р.М. and Ю. В. Латов|_Россия и Европа: эффект колеи (опыт институционального анализа истории экономического развития)|_Russia and Europe: The Effect of Turning Points ["paths", 'forks in the road"] (An Essay in the Institutional Analysis of Economic Development History)|
    AMP plt.ekn ekn&tUt [ekn&plt plt&ekn] mdn RUS&zpd R&A | txt blw is a poor www ENG tlng from the RUS.lng, but SAC editor has lightly touched up the tlng, introduced boldface for emphasis, and entered hypertext links to SAC so that the main ideas might better poke through))

    <>Ober,Josiah|_Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens| ((TLS 8x11| plt.trx dmk plt.clt))

    <>Omer,Bartov and >Weitz,Eric D| *2013:B.IN,IUP|>Omer.SHATTERZONE_Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands_| E-TXT | WW1a wrx&REV ntnism in MPR peripheries of GRM OST-MGR OTM.TRK))

    <>Osterhammel,Jürgen| a{1952}n{wrl.hst tgf pxd rrd ntn.stt WW1a WbrM }o{
    PRIMO lists large bbl! Base=CHN.hst, but he has super-novaed into wrl.hst
    *1997:|_Colonialism: A Short History| ((UO))
    *2001:Geschichte und Gesellschaft,27(3):464-479| "Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?"| ((E-TXT via PRIMO| tntn.gvt))
    *2005:P.NJ,PUP|_Globalization: A Short History| ((UO))
    *2006:LND,German Historical Institute|_Europe, the "West" and the civilizing mission| ((UO| zpd and MPR))
    *2014:P.NJ,PUP|_The_Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century |>Osterhammel.TRANSFORMATION| TBy Patrick Camiller|

    ((UO=850909580| wrl.hst WW1a Σwrx&REV| ch10:514-71 "Revolution: From Philadelphia via Nanjing to Saint Petersburg"
    Osterhammel has been called the “Braudel of the nineteenth century”. He “moves beyond conventional Eurocentric and chronological accounts with breathtaking global scope and towering erudition”. He examines the “long nineteenth century”, taking readers from New York to New Delhi, from the Latin American revolutions to the Taiping Rebellion, from the perils and promise of Europe’s transatlantic labor markets to the hardships endured by nomadic, tribal peoples across the planet. Osterhammel describes a world increasingly networked by the telegraph, the steamship, and the railways. He explores the changing relationship between human beings and nature, looks at the importance of cities, explains the role slavery and its abolition played in the emergence of new nations, challenges the widely held belief that the nineteenth century witnessed the triumph of the nation-state, etc
    *2014je01:Library Journal| rvw by David Keymer, Modesto CA = Even if the 19th century was not yet wholly modern, it was the gateway to the modern age, setting patterns (inklings of a global economy, the gradual triumph of liberal institutions [lbx tUt], the start of a worldwide communication system) that would dominate the century to come. With its emphasis on the analysis of systems and networks, this grand synthesis is as much social science as history but [?but] is infused with the sensitivity to difference (variance, exception) that the best historians bring to their work. Osterhammel's principal area of study is Chinese history: that focus is a virtue for this book because it brings a perspective that sees a broader civilization than just an imperial Western world with a tail. This superb study gives form to a global history that lasts from the late 18th well into the 20th century and it does so without oversimplifying. It is exhilarating to find a system builder with such a feeling for nuance and difference. The only study comparable is Bayly.BIRTH

    <>Paice,Edward|_World War I: The African Front| *2008:NYC,Pegasus|>Paice.AFR| ((OWN| ))

    <>Paret,Peter, et al., eds| _Makers of modern strategy: From Machiavelli to the nuclear age| *1986:P.NJ,PUP|>MMS| ((ndr.sbk wrx mltism| ToC =

      The origins of modern war
    Gilbert,Felix| Machiavelli : the renaissance of the art of war
    Rothernberg,Gunther| Maurice of Nassau, Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the "military revolution" of the 17th century
    Guerlac,Henry| Vauban : the impact of science on war
    Palmer,RR| [ntn.sttism] Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow : From dynastic to national war
      The expansion of war
    |>Paret,Peter| [wrx&REV] Napoleon and the revolution in war
    Shy,John| Jomini
    Paret,Peter| Clausewitz
      [wrx&mfgR] From the Industrial Revolution to the First World War
    Earle,Edward Mead| [wrx&ekn] Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: Economic foundations of military power
    |>Neumann,Sigmund and von Hagen,Mark| [wrx&REV] Engels and Marx on revolution, war, and the army in society
    Holborn,Hajo| [GRM.mltism] The Prusso-German school : Moltke and the rise of the general staff
    Rothenberg,Genther E| Moltke, Schieffen, and the doctrine of strategic envelopment
    Craig,Gordon| Delbrück: the military historian
    Pinter,Walter| [RUS.mltism] Russian military thought : the Western model and the shadow of Suvorov
    Porch,Doublas| [wrx&MPR] Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey : the development of French colonial warfare
    Weigley,Russell| [USA] American strategy from its beginnings through the First World War
    Crowl,Philip| Alfred Thayer Mahan : The naval historian
    From the First to the Second World War [WW1 to WW2]
    Craig,Gordon| The political leader as strategist
    Howard,Michael| Men against fire : The doctrine of the offensive in 1914
    Geyer,Michael| [wrx&mfgR] German strategy in the age of machine warfare, 1914-1945
    Bond,Brian and Alexander,Martin| Liddell Hart and De Gaulle : The doctrines of limited liability and mobile defense
    MacIsaac,David| Voices from the central blue : The air power theorists
    [SSR.mltism] The making of Soviet strategy / Condoleezza Rice
    Matloff,Maurice| Allied strategy in Europe, 1939-1945
    James,D.Clayton| [USA JPN] American and Japanese strategies in the Pacific War
      Since 1945 [CWX]
    Freedman,Lawrence| The first two generations of nuclear strategists
    Carver,Michael| Conventional warfare in the nuclear age
    |>Shy,John and >Collier,Thomas W| [wrx&REV Twrl] "Revolutionary war"
    Craig,Gordon and >Gilbert,Felix| Reflections on strategy in the present and future

    <>Pelenski,Jaroslaw,ed|>Pelenski.EREV|*1980:Iowa City,|_The_American and European Revolutions,1776-1848: Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects| ((ndr.sbk AREV FREV REV30 REV48 [SAC] ))

    <>Peregudov,Sergei| a{}
    *1993my01:Sociological research#32,3:6-| “Civil Society As a Political Phenomenon”| ((UNCOVER NWO cvc.pbl plt))

    <>Perrie,Maureen| a{}n{krx.mvt| RREV1 plt.pty SRs skz}o{}
    *1972:P&P#57:134f| “The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907: Its Social Composition and Revolutionary Significance”|
    *1976:C.ENG, CUP|_The_Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its Origins through the Revolution of 1905-1907|

    <>Pethybridge,Roger|_The_Spread of the Russian Revolution: Essays on 1917| *1972:LND| ((RREV|
    CF= 1975:Cautionary rvw by Allan K. Wildman [E-TXT] ))

    <>Pettee,G. S|_The_Process of Revolution| ((REV.trx))

    <>Pipes,Richard, ed|>Pipes.RR| a{}n{ ndr.sbk WW1b wrx&REV RREV2 RREV3}
    *1968:|_Revolutionary Russia| ((ToC:
    Erickson,John, "The Origins of the Red Army" Pipes.RR:286-325 (pb edition pages)
    Meijer,Jan, "Town and Country in the Civil War" Pipes.RR:259-82

    <>Porter,Roy, and Mikulas Teich,eds|_Revolution in History. Cambridge ENG: 1986|(())

    <>Price,D. C|Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution,1896-1911| *1974:C.MA| ((QREV & RUS))

    <>Rejai,Mostafa, and Kay Phillips| a{}
    *1983:New Brunswick.NJ|_World Revolutionary Leaders| ((USA3.rvs REV.trx rvs))

    <>Remington,Thomas F| a{}n{RREV3 Gwrx NEP RPR=G/1999 blw}o{}
    *1984:Pittsburgh PA: UPP|_Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization,1917-1921| ((mfg bzn.apx))
    *1985fa:SlR#??| “Politics and Professionalism in Soviet Journalism”|
    *1986:MA.B,Little,Brown|_Politics in the USSR| With Frederick C. Barghoorn| ((CWX take on earliest stirring of Grb's Prs))
    *1999+|_Politics in Russia|>RPR =

    <>Reshetar,J. S.,Jr|_The_Ukrainian Revolution,1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism|>Reshetar.UKR| *1952:Princeton| ((ntn UKR RREV3 Gwrx))

    <>Reynolds,Michael A| a{968}n{OTM.TRK & RUS MPR}o{
    *2011:C.ENG and NYC,CUP|_Shattering empires : the clash and collapse of the Ottoman and Russian empires, 1908-1918|>Reynolds.SHATTER| ((UO| WW1a WW1b WW1c wrx&REV MPR&REV| 303pp lxt MAPS bbl ndx

    ToC = The high politics of anarchy and competition
    Troubles in Anatolia: imperial insecurities and the transformation of borderland politics
    Visions of vulnerability: the politics of Muslims, revolutionaries, and defectors
    Out of the pan, into the fire: empires at war
    [MPR ntn.stt=] Re-mastering Anatolia: rending nations, rending empires
    [CAU.Mts=] Brest-Litovsk and the opening of the Caucasus
    Forced to be free: the geopolitics of independence in the Trans-Caucasus:191-218
    Racing against time|
    pbr blurb= "... unraveling of these empires [?wrx&REV as MPR&REV] was both cause and consequence of World War I .... It irrevocably changed the landscape of the Middle East and Eurasia and reverberates to this day in conflicts throughout the CAU and AfroAsia| kng draws on extensive research in the Ottoman and Russian RXV~ .... vs-accounts that portray their clash as one of conflicting nationalisms [not ntn~ in conflct], ... argues that geopolitical competition and the emergence of a new global interstate order = key to understanding ... history in the Ottoman-Russian borderlands [metropols compete in contested peripheries, ?but only 2 metropols| No ENG or FRN?] in the twentieth century"))

    <>Retish,Aaron B|
    *2008:_Russia's Peasants in Revolution and Civil War| ((wrx&REV))

    The author [...] covers the beginning of WWI, or Great War in 1914. [He] ends with the Russian military victory which was the prelude to the ensuing famine after the war, as well as the New Economic Policy in 1921. The author, Aaron Retish, focuses on the Viatka Provinces as he saw that the peasants were fundamental in the Great War, Revolution, and the Civil War. He does refer back to the Russian population at large, but he mainly stays within Viatka Province.

    The war was a huge change in the established status quo of peasant life, millions of young men were being sent up to the front and thus created a huge burden for those still at home. “Wartime drained the village of its most basic items. Conscription and the astounding number of casualties stole and, often, multiple male members from households, disrupting peasant traditions and the family cycle” (Retish, pg 54). Rural families would donate what they could to the war effort but for them they were always straddling a thin line between starvation and making it to the next harvest. Often families would petition the government to try to receive pardons for sons going off into war because if they were killed then there would no one to carry on the name, or to help in the fields to bring in the harvest.

    Retish sides with the idea that the wartime mobilization, as well of the destruction of the tsarist system, fostered an environment that allowed the rural population to break away from the traditional norms. In the eight subsequent chapters, Retish catalogues and explains, in chronological order, the eight years from the Great War to the Revolution. In chapter one, Retish focuses mainly on the call to arms and the mobilization of the peasant class on July 18, 1914. The war brought villages closer and turned the population into a front for the war. He explains the life altering effect the mobilization had on peasants. In chapter two and three, Retish looks into the peasant participation in the 1917 Revolution. Chapter four re-examines when land was sanctioned following the Bolshevik Decree on Land. The peasants saw that under the Soviet ideology that land ownership was a fundamental right of citizens and this was a huge incentive for the peasants to idealize and adopt a Pro-Soviet standing. Chapters five through eight look at how peasants coped with the violent changes of the Civil War from 1918-1922. Chapter five gives a more in-depth look at Viatka’s grain politics and military conflicts. The peasants saw the ruling class both unorganized and greedy which then turned to angering the peasants because they did not always have enough food to spare for the war effort; even after the New Economic Policy of 1921 was introduced that reduced the amount peasants would have to put out. Chapter six talks about how the Soviet State, as well as the Communist party, was able to permeate the village. Chapter seven shows that both the peasant’s language, as well as identity was becoming more Soviet following party and propaganda campaigns. Chapter eight focuses on “The Citizens’ Hunger” and explains the devastation on the Civil War which led to millions of deaths.

    This book argues that the peasants did not dream of complete autonomy, rather, Retish would argue they wanted both to be able to redistribute the land amongst themselves as well as achieve a sense of freedom for landowners. This gives an insight on how the peasants viewed themselves compared to the state as well as what the peasants would eventually want out of the revolution.

    Villages and communes acted as one to take advantage of the overthrow of the tsarist order and claim land and forests that they had coveted. Seizures of merchant and landlord estate land in the southern districts received the most press and space in the official documents as it was what educated society feared the most (Retish, pg 96).

    The story of peasants in revolution is one of violence and terror as much as it is of freedom, emancipation, and negotiation. Peasants were able to help create a participatory political system that was aimed at helping them through their lives.

    <>Richards,Michael D| a{}
    *2004:NYC,Routledge|>Richards.REV|_Revolutions in World History| ((noUO ndx 8x11:xrp| wrx&REV:15 & 90
    gnr.trx:1-9 [8x11]
    RREV(2 parts, 1917 & STL):37-53
    Summary on REV~ in wrl.hst:86-98 [8x11]
    NB! noFREV noAREV| Implication= EREV is root of AREV and FREV and set model for wrl, so REV bcm non.zpd hst))

    <>Rogan,Eugene| a{}n{wrx&REV WW1 OTT.TRK}o{}
    *2015:NYC,Basic Books|>Rogan.FALL|_The_Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East| ((jpeg 8x11:TiP-28; 49-52 (ch1="A Revolution and Three Wars, 1908-1913":1-28), Conclude))

    <>Roosa,Ruth. “Russian Industrialists,Politics,and Labor Reform in 1905”. *1975:RHi#2,2: 124-148

    <>Rosenberg,William G., and Marilyn Young| a{}
    *1982:O.ENG|_Transforming Russia and China: Revolutionary Struggle in the Twentieth Century| ((REV.trx RREV QREV cmp CHN&RUS CIV krx? Wbr?))

    <>Rougle,Charles. “The Intelligentsia Debate in Russia,1917-1918”. In Nilsson, Art: 54-105

    <>Rudé,George| z{}
    *1964:NYC| The Crowd in History,1730-1848: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England,1730-1848. NYC: 1964
    --|Ideology and Popular Protest

    <>_Russian [through 1992::SSH#30= “Soviet”] Studies in History: A Journal of Translations|>RSH|>SSH| ((UO has hard copy from 1962 thru 2008:RSH#46| More recently, Sharpe digitized TXT

    <>Rutherford,Ward| a{}n{WW1b}o{}
    *1992:C.ENG,I.Faulkner|_The_Tsar's war, 1914-1917 : The story of the Imperial Russian army in the First World War| Revision of *1975:LND,Cremonesi|_The_Russian Army in World War I| ((UO| Shotwell Series 321pp bbl ndx))

    <>Ryder,AJ| a{}
    *1959:LND,Routledge&Paul|>Ryder.GREV|_The_German Revolution, 1918-1919| ((UO| wrx&REV G/1918no09| bbt search on "German Revolution, 1918-1919" gives many kng~ & rtl~ EG=White))

    <>Saul,Norman| a{}
    *1978:L.KS,KUP|_Sailors in Revolt: The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917| ((wrx&REV mlt nvy RREV2 RREV3

    Perspective and Causality: Norman Saul’s Examination of the Pre-Revolutionary Russian Baltic Fleet

    According to Norman Saul, sailors of the Russian Baltic fleet were among the more radical elements at the time of the October Revolution, as demonstrated by numerous violent acts and open opposition to the Provisional Government in Petrograd. In his book, Sailors in Revolt, he attempted to explain why they became the way they were by telling the story of the fleet from its inception until the events of 1917. Using the first eight chapters to tell his story, he concluded his book with personal observations and an analysis of the contributing factors.

    In the first chapter, “The Baltic Fleet Before 1914,” Saul breaks the topic into different aspects: the history of the fleet from the time of its creation by Peter I through its trials in the Crimean War, its rebuilding process, and an examination of the sailors during that time frame. When looking at the rebuilding process, he focused on events starting in 1870 that saw the fleet ignored, later built up, destroyed in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima, and then built up again in time for the Great War with Germany. Of note was how the Great Reforms limited funding from 1870 – 1894 because most of the budget was geared towards revitalizing the Black Sea fleet, which was devastated in the Crimean War, and building up the new Pacific fleet in Vladivostok. French pressure to strengthen the alliance against Germany finally forced Russia to shift its budget to building new ships for the Baltic fleet, which were then lost—along with most of the 3500 crewmembers—in the Battle of Tsushima. Saul’s attention to this point raised due questions about the impact of the Great Reforms on the fleet, implying by the start date of the policies that they may have served as the genesis for subsequent events leading to the October Revolution. In the end, Saul didn’t paint a very rosy picture of the condition of the fleet, equipment-wise, inasmuch that they were seemingly in a constant state of repair and replacement.

    [wrx&REV=] When looking at the fleet personnel, Saul used a few statistics to illustrate how some ideological historians had wrongly given the impression that the Baltic sailors were united in a revolutionary mindset because of their working-class background. Through his research of Soviet Naval Archives, he found that wartime recruits (1914-1916) indicated “only 25.4 percent were actually workers; the others were ‘semiproletarian’ (26 percent) and peasant and petty bourgeois (48.6 percent).” Additionally, their literacy rate was relatively high (75.5 percent), which meant that, because the sailors spent three-quarters of their time ashore, they had both access to revolutionary materials and the ability to read it. When looking at the combined statistics against the backdrop of Saul’s lengthy examination of how most of the sailors simply weren’t interested in political discourse or causes, one gets a clearer picture of a fleet that wanted prompt and meaningful redress of terrible conditions and treatment, but not necessarily a fleet bent on overthrowing the tsar himself.

    In subsequent chapters, Saul continued to examine conditions within the fleet as Russia progressed through World War One, highlighting a cascade of problems ranging from the shipbuilders, to an ineffective leadership from the top down, to the promulgation of radical elements within the ranks of the fleet. He pointed out that many Russian shipyards had been corrupt and incompetent due to shady business practices and lazy, unskilled workers. Poor decisions and non-responsive dictatorial leadership from the Ministry on down into the ranks of the naval fleet officers further fomented the sailors’ dismal morale into acts of rebellion and revolt. As for the revolutionary elements that made their way into the rank and file of the enlisted corps, Saul had found that only about one percent of the sailors were actually affiliated with a revolutionary party, but that small number was extremely effective in stirring up discontent to such as degree that by 1915, naval crews were rebelling over almost anything from a mistrust of foreign commanding officers to not getting their ration of meat.

    After events led to the February Revolution and the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, Bolshevik elements convinced the Baltic military forces to form organizations with which to address the various grievances and demands. What was most interesting in this regard was that their initial list of demands essentially consisted of three items: guaranteed pay of at least nine rubles per month, freedom to roam around the town without having to ask permission first, and freedom to drink as much as they wanted. This revelation truly solidified Saul’s assertion that the sailors were not a united band of revolutionaries bent on establishing a proletarian nation. Rather, it demonstrated that many of them simply wanted an end to the harsh, draconian conditions in which they were forced to live and work as members of the Russian navy.Saul summarized these observations fairly well in his concluding chapter, giving due credit to all of the various factors that brought the sailors of the Baltic fleet to rebellion and revolution in 1917. He did not discount the socialist movement within the ranks of the seamen, but did add perspective in that many revolted for their own personal reasons or, simply, to go along with the mob. Saul gave a good analysis of the events, backed by stacks of primary source materials, but did not address any possible explanation as to why the fleet, on the whole, did not resort to all-out rebellion prior to 1917. Investigating this question would have strengthened his argument tremendously, but its absence should not detract from the fact that Saul did an admirable job examining a topic that was politically charged in many academic circles at the time. Because of the broad range of contributing factors that led to the Baltic sailors rebelling, this book should be a must-read for anyone examining pre-revolutionary Russian history.

    <>Schapiro,Leonard, ed|>Schapiro.1pty| a{}n{sbk plt.clt fxn R&A}
    *1972:|_Political Opposition in One-party States| ((G/Bauman“Second| Also,gnr discussion of Q:“Can the Party Alone Run a One-party State?” Many interesting trx issues--when 2pty opposes 2 similar pty~,is that not in functional truth a 1pty? [32] But heart of matter=all systems, including “totalitarian” are [I wld say] fxnized in the very process of (1) recruiting leaders (ambitions clash), (2) mobilization of initiatives (various opinions; but a natural ggr or spacial fdrization, & (3) orx of dsn (someone will be offended) [31]))

    <>Schoenbaum,David. Hitler's Social Revolution

    <>Schwartz,David C| “A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior”| In Davies.WHEN:109-132

    <>Sedov,LA| a{}
    *2007:Russian Social Science Review#48,6:47-63| "Traditional Features of R. plt.clt in Their Current Perspective" | ((plt.clt.trx ))

    <>Seton-Watson,Hugh| a{}n{wrx&REV}o{}
    *1960:NYC|_Niether War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post War World| ((ndr CWX))
    *1965:NYC,Praeger|_The_East European Revolution| ((ndr CWX))
    *1967:O.ENG,OUP| G/Seton-Watson/ in REF sct
    *1977:|_Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism| ((prm ntn & ntn.stt ntnism CIV))

    <>Sheehan,James J| n{wrx&REV wrx&pcx}o{
    *2008:Boston,Houghton Mifflin|_Where have all the soldiers gone?: The transformation of modern Europe|>Sheehan.WHERE| ((UO WW1c WW2 pcx trx=cvl.stt|

    Prologue : War and peace in the twentieth century
    pt1= Living in peace, preparing for war, 1900-1914:3-65 | "Without war, there would be no state":3-21| Pacifism and militarism:22-41| Europeans in a violent world:42-65
    pt2= A world made by war, 1914-1945:69-144 | War and revolution
    [wrx&REV]:69-91 [G/1918no09]| The twenty-year truce| The last European war
    pt3= States without war. The foundations of the postwar world| The rise of the civilian state| Why Europe will not become a superpower
    Epilogue : The future of the civilian state
    Radical shift in EUR history. For centuries, nations defined themselves by willingness and ability to wage war
    But after WW2, EUR began to redefine statehood, rejecting ballooning defense budgets in favor of material well-being, social stability, & ekn growth [?!] ))

    <>Shils,Edward| a{}n{ntg Twrl}o{
    *1960ap:WoP#12,3:329-68| “The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States”| Reprint in KtsJH.PC:195-234

    <>Short,James F.,Jr., and >Wolfgang,Marvin E.,eds|_Collective Violence| *1972:Chicago| ((wrx&REV))

    <>Shy,John,and >Collier,Thomas W| “Revolutionary War”| In MMS [wrx&REV]

    <>Sil,Rudra, and >Katzenstein,Peter|_Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics| ((8x11 wrl.hst trx ))

    <>Skocpol,Theda| a{}n{FREV RREV QREV ~~hst| wrx&REV}o{}
    *1979|_States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China
    *1985|_Bringing the State Back In|>Skocpol.Bringing|>Skocpol.BRING |>Skocpol,Theda, Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer,eds| ((ndr.sbk stt trx little direct ref. to Wbr, tho generous & opaque acknowledgment of his influence: quotes Alfred Stepan's version of Weber's definition of the state because Stepan “captures the biting edge of the Weberian perspective.” [7] Skocpol used “Weberian” ideas rather than the ideas of Weber))

    <>Snow,Edgar| a{}n{wrx&REV QREV}o{ jrnist
    *1939:| ed#2=1944| ed#3=1968:Grove Press "reprint" w/ substantial revisions and annotations |>Snow.RED|_Red Star Over China|

    E-TXT#1 (ed#3) ch#6 through ch#13 (VI-XIII:35-82), ch#15 through ch#22 (XV-XXII:87-132), ch#24 through ch#26 (XXIV-XXVI:150-164..., up to *1927au07:Party Conference), plus clickable "Common terms and phrases" = Click on "Red Army" |
    E-TXT#2 abridged|
    E-TXT#3 125-year QREV crn |

    ((prm QREV Mao| Snow was not available to read proofs of the initial London and New York editions, but he revised the text of the 1939 and 1944 editions. The Publisher's Note in the 1939 edition explained that Snow added a "substantial new section" of six chapters bringing the narrative up to July 1938 as well as "many textual changes". Snow made the textual changes partly to polish, but he also responded to friends and reviewers. Some of them felt Snow's account of party history had been too critical of Soviet policy, and others felt that he had given too much credit to Mao for independent Chinese strategies. Snow toned down but did not remove the implicit criticisms of Stalin. The 1944 edition was allowed to go out of print in the 1950s))

    <>Sokol,Edward Dennis|>Sokol.REVOLT |_The_Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia| *1954:B.MD| ((SMT| 8x11:WW1b CASA wrx&REV AfroAsia| map))

    <>Sorel,Georges|_Reflections on Violence| 1908) ((wrx&REV| See especially the later eds with appendix “In Defense of Lenin” ))

    <>Sorokin,Pitirim| a{}n{}o{
    *1937:NYC|_Social and Cultural Dynamics|>Sorokin.wrx&REV = v3: “Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War and Revolution"| ((
    v1 = Fluctuation of forms of art
    Part one:
    Forms and problems of cultural integration and methods of their study -- Ideational, sensate, idealistic, and mixed systems of culture -- Concrete illustrations of the chief types of culture mentality -- Sociocultural fluctuations: concept and forms of sociocultural process
    Part two:
    Fluctuations of ideational, idealistic, and sensate forms of art: Is there any uniform sequence in the flourishing of various arts in the history of any given cuture? Preliminary critical survey of theories of the subject -- Is the curve of art development uniformly similar in various sociieties and cultures? Preliminary critical survey of the subject (continued) -- Ideational, sensate (visual), and mixed (idealistic, cubistic, and other) styles in art: painting and sculpture -- Recurrence in social space and fluctuation in time of the ideational, visual, and mixed styles in painting and sculpture (qualitative outline) -- Recurrence in social space and fluctuation in time of the ideational, visual, and mixed styles in painting and sculpture (qualitative outline) (continued) -- Qualitative description of the fluctuations of the main styles and their satellites in the painting and sculpture of Western Europe --Fluctuation of ideational and visual forms of architecture -- Fluctuation of ideational, sensate, and mixed forms of music -- Fluctuation of ideational and mixed forms of literature and criticism
    v2 = Fluctuation of systems of truth, ethics, and law
    Part one:
    Fluctuation of ideational, idealsitic, and sensate systems of truth and knowledge (Wissenssoziologie) : Fluctuation of ideational, idealistic, and sensate systems of truth and knowledge (Quantative)
    Qualitative clarification of the fluctuation of the systems of truth and knowledge
    Movements of scientific discoveries and technological inventions
    Fluctuation of "First Principles" : I: Fluctuation of idealism and materialism
    Fluctuation ... : II: Fluctuation of eternalistic temporalistic mentality
    Fluctuation ... : III: Fluctuation of the influence of realism, conceptualism, and nominalism
    Fluctuation ... : IV: Fluctuation of the influence of sociological universalism and singularism
    Fluctuation ... : V: Fluctuation of realistic, nominalistic, and mixed conceptions of the juridiscal personality: corporations and institutions
    Fluctuation ... : VI: Fluctuation of the influence of deterministic and indeterministic mentalities
    Fluctuation ...: VII: Fluctuation of the linear, cyclical, and mixed conceptions of the cosmic, biological, and sociocultural processes
    Fluctuation of the basic categories of human thought: causality, time, space, number
    Fluctuation of general and special scientific theories
    Part two:
    Fluctuation of ideational and sensate forms of ethical and juridical culture mentality (dynamic of ethical values)
    Fluctuation of ideational, sensate and mixed systems of ethics in the Greco-Roman and Western cultures
    Fluctuation of absolutism of absolutism and relativism, optimism and pessimism, in ethicophilosophical thought -- Fluctuation of ethicojuridical mentality in criminal law
    v3= Fluctuation of social relationships, war, and revolution [CF=Cederman] =

    v4= Basic problems, principles, and methods: Part one: The sociocultural system and its properties: Peculiar nature of the empirical sociocultural system versus pure causal and pure meaningful systems -- Empirical sociocultural systems: their structural and dynamic properties -- Composition and structure of the total culture of an area -- Part two: How culture changes: Does the total culture of an area chqnge in togetherness or independently in its varios parts? -- Genesis, multiplication, mobility, and diffusion of sociocultural phenomena in space -- The uniformities: synchronicity and temporal order in sociocultural change -- The uniformities: synchronicity and temporal order in socio-cultural change (continued) -- Uniformities of rhythm and phases in sociocultural change -- Problem of periodicity of sociocultural rhythms -- Criticism of the meta-empirical, cosmic, biological, and mixed theories of social rhythms and periodicities. Sociologistic theory of periodicity -- Tempo and tempo uniformities in sociocultural change -- Part three: Why and how of sociocultural change: Principle of immanent change of sociocultural systems and congeries --The principles of immanent change in the history of social thought and in contemporary research -- The "why" of sociocultural rhythms and swings. The principle of limit -- The problems of ever-linear, ever-new, and strictly circular sociocultural change -- The reason for the super-rhythm of ideational-idealistic-sensate phases in the Greco-Roman and Western super-systems of culture --The twilight of our sensate culture and beyond


    <>Special Operations Research Office [ID]|_Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare|>CRW| ((wrx&REV| 4vv in series =
    [1] Cuba, 1953-1959. Primary research responsibility: N.A. LaCharité (1963)
    [2] Algeria, 1954-1962. Primary research responsibility: P.A. Jureidini (1963)
    [3] Vietnam, 1941-1954. Primary research responsibility: B. Cooper, J. Killigrew, and N. LaCharité (1964)
    [4] Guatemala, 1944-1954. Primary research responsibility: N.A. LaCharité, R.O. Kennedy, and P.M. Thienel (1964) ))

    <>Stevenson,David| a{1954}n{WW1a WW1b WW1c pcx & MIC Σwrx&REV}o{
    *1988:O.ENG,OUP|>Stevenson.WW1&irx|_The_First World War and international politics| ((UO))
    *1991:The Historical Journal#34(1):65-86| "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917"| E-TXT

    *1996:O.ENG,OUP|>Stevenson.ARMS|_Armaments and the coming of war : Europe, 1904-1914| ((UO WW1a mltism MIC|

    1. Arms and the Men
    2. Continental Equilibrium? 1904-1908
    3. The Breakdown of Equilibrium in the East: From the Bosnian Crisis to the Balkan Wars, 1908-1912 [ Bwrx]
    4. The Breakdown of Equilibrium in the West, 1908-1912 []
    5. The Great Acceleration, 1912-1913
    6. Vials of Wrath, 1913-1914
    Based on original research in several countries, the first full analysis of the politics of armaments in pre-1914 Europe
    Directs attention away from the Anglo-German naval race towards the competition on land between continental armies
    Defence policies & the interaction between growth of military preparedness & diplomatic crises in Mediterranean & Balkans
    Insights from political science and with a fresh conceptual framework for WW1a
    Provides case-study of the broader relationships between armaments and international conflict))

    *1997:NYC,St.Martin's|>Stevenson.OUTBREAK|_The_Outbreak of the First World War: 1914 in perspective| ((UO| WW1a

    1. Austria-Hungary and Serbia []
    2. Germany and the Blank Cheque
    3. Russo-French Response
    4. Towards World War
    5. The Search for Understanding
    Conclusion: The Vision of War))

    *2004:LND,Allen Lane|>Stevenson.1914|_1914-1918: The history of the First World War| ((UO WW1b))
    *2004:NYC,Basic Books|>Stevenson.TRAGEDY|_Cataclysm: The First World War as political tragedy| ((UO| WW1b WW1c pcx

    pt1= Outbreak. The destruction of peace ; The failure of the war of movement, summer-winter 1914
    pt2= Escalation. Making a new world, spring 1915-spring 1917| The widening of the war| War aims and peace negotiations| The land war in Europe: Strategy| Technology, logistics, and tactics| Manpower and morale| Armaments and economics| Naval warfare and blockade| The politics of the home fronts [ Σwrx&REV]
    pt3= Outcome. The third phase, spring 1917-autumn 1918| The February Revolution and American intervention, spring 1917| Towards exhaustion, summer-autumn 1917| The Central Powers' last throw, autumn 1917-summer 1918| The turn of the tide, summer-autumn 1918| Ceasefire
    pt4 Legacy. Peacemaking, 1919-1920| Rebuilding, 1920-1929| Demolition, 1929-1945
    Conclusion: The war becomes history|
    WW1 plt influence = politicians deliberately took risks that led to war in 1914; the war continued as a result of conscious choices including the acceptance of high casualties
    *2011:C.MA,HUP|>Stevenson.1918|_With our backs to the wall: Victory and defeat in 1918| ((UO WW1c mainly|
    Deadlock, 1914-1917
    On the defensive, March-July 1918
    On the attack, July-November 1918
    The new warfare: intelligence, technology, and logistics
    The human factor: manpower and morale
    Securing the seas: submarines and shipping
    [MIC] The war economies: money, guns, and butter
    The home fronts: gender, class, and nation
    Armistice and after

    At the end of 1917 Britain and France faced a strategic nightmare. Their great offensives against Germany had been calamitous, leaving hundreds of thousands of young men dead and wounded for negligible territorial gains. Despite America's entry into the war the US army remained tiny, the Italian army had been routed, and Russia had dropped out of the conflict. The Central Powers now dominated Central and Eastern Europe, and Germany could move over forty divisions to the Western Front. Yet only one year later, on 11 November 1918, the fighting ended [on] -- an arrangement between two [?two?] weary opponents to suspend hostilities, granting the Allies victory))

    <>Stone,Lawrence| “Theories of Revolution”| *1966ja:WoP#18,2:159-176| ((E-TXT| xrx REV.trx))

    <>Suny,Ronald Grigor| “Toward a Social History of the October Revolution”| *1983fe:AHR#88,1:31-52| E-TXT|

    <>Szamuely,Tibor| a{}
    *1972su:Survey#18,8:56-90| “The Birth of Russian Marxism”| ((MRX))
    *1974:|_The_Russian Tradition| ((DK61.S9 1974| trx))

    <>Tackett,Timothy|_Becoming a Revolutionary| ((REV.trx REV))

    <>Talmon,JL|_The_Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. NYC: 1960
    *1967:|_Romanticism and Revolution in Europe,1815-1847|
    *1980:|_The_Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth Century| ((ntn.stt&REV))

    <>Tanter,Raymond,and Manus Midlarsky. “A Theory of Revolution”. Conflict Resolution 11,no. 3: 264-279

    <>Thompson,John M| a{}n{}o{
    *1966:P.NJ,PUP [?1967]|>Thompson.PRS.pcx|_Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles peace| ((UO| WW1c wrx&REV 429pp))

    <>Tilly,Charles L| a{}n{hst.gph wrx.trx ekn.trx}o{
    *1973my:Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan|>Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby|_Handbook of Political Science| “Revolutions and Collective Violence”| ((Working Paper no. 83| 8x11”Rev Readings” OWN wrx&REV trx))

    *1975:|_The Rebellious Century,1830-1930| Written with Tilly,R| ((REV prl CIV))

    *1985: "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime"| In Skocpol.BRING| ((E-TXT| wrx))

    *1990:C.MA,Blackwell|_Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990|>Tilly.COERCION|



    <>Vagts,Alfred| a{}n{}o{
    *1959:NYC,Free Press revised edition| *1937:NYC,Norton = 1st ed|>Vagts.MLTism|_A_History of Militarism: Civilian and Military| ((OWN| wrx&REV mlt & REV:92-128| mltism ch#8:WW1:229-90 | "The Failure of the Aristocracy":245-9 | pt3 = "The Military and Politics" [ch#9 ch#10 and ch#11]:293-403))

    <>Wade,Rex| a{}n{WW1b wrx&REV RREV2 RREV3}o{}
    *1969:S.CA,SUP|_The_Russian Search for Peace: February-October 1917|>Wade.PEACE| ((UO| irx wrx&pcx))
    *1984:S.CA,SUP|_Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution|>Wade.RED| ((DK265.W323| mlt))

    <>Waites,Bernard|_A_Class Society at War: England, 1914-1918 |>Waites.CLASS| ((WW1b ENG wrx&pbl ?clx.wrx?
    [WW1a=] wrx&REV=Certain ENG contemporaries thought WW1 stifled growth of that class conflict that arose prior to 1914 [EG=Ernest Bevin]
    *--TXT of Norman Stone rvw of Waites. A vital topic but a bland and dense little book))

    <>Walt,Stephen M| a{}n{CF=Mearsheimer}o{}
    *1992ap:WoP#44,3:321-68| "Revolution and War"|
    *1996:I.NY,CUP|>Walt.wrx&REV|_Revolutions and War| ((E-TXT | ~~hst trx esp. FREV RREV & IRN.REV, w/ less concentrated attention to AREV MXO.REV TRK.REV QREV | 7 case studies| 365pp))

    <>Wawro,Geoffrey| n{}o{}
    *2003:|_The_Franco–Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871
    *2014:NYC,Basic Books|>Wawro.MAD|_A_Mad Catastrophe: The outbreak of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire| ((UO| WW1a WW1b (? OST.MGR SRB wrx&mfgR | GO 1917mr02

    ToC =
    The sick man of Europe [?OTM.TRK and/or OST.MGR]
    Between blunder and stupidity
    The Balkan Wars [Bwrx]
    Murder in Sarajevo
    The streamroller
    Lemberg and Rawa-Ruska
    Death on the Drina Warsaw
    The thin gray line
    Serbian jubilee
    Snowmen ))

    <>White,James D|>White.WW1c| "National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-19"| *1994ja01:Europe-Asia Studies#46,8:1349-1369| [ E-TXT] ((WW1c BAL.S GRM wrx&REV))

    <>Wildman,Allan K|
    *1967:CHI|_The_Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social Democracy,1891-1903| ((SDs))
    *1980:1988:PUP|_The_End of the Russian Imperial Army|>Wildman.END| 2vv = “The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917)” and “The Road to Soviet Power and Peace”| ((RREV2 RREV3 WW1b wrx&REV mlt

    The Russian Revolution of 1917 was an event that left a deep mark on history. Allan Wildman brings into perspective the importance of World War I and its influence on the Revolution of 1917. The Revolution of 1917 was distinguished by the politicization and by Russia’s millions of peasants, workers, and other suppressed groups. Wildman [...] chooses to look at one major group that many researchers and historians have overlooked or excluded. The group that many have forgotten to see or chosen not to consider are the soldiers of the Russian Imperial Army. The Russian Imperial Army was made up of men who were peasants, workers, or may have been part of another suppressed group. These men experienced the atrocities of the World War I and may have played a significant role within the Russian Revolution.

    Wildman discusses from the very beginning of Volume 1 in the Preface how Russia had been at war for 3 grueling years. He states, “Fifteen million of its people had been processed into the ranks, close to two million were never to return, several times that number returned crippled and scarred.” (XV) World War I was considered to be the Great War. World War I was a new era and changed the way the world would look at wars. Of those soldiers to return from the war were either crippled, scarred, or may have been lucky to be physically unharmed. But these men returned with deep wounds to their minds and souls. These wounds that would permanently remain in their lives, changed the way these men would think and feel. Maybe even change how they would view the world itself. But their wounds from the war would play a major role in their very own behavior throughout the Revolution.

    By March of 1915, the Russian Artillery was so low on shells, that there were entire regiments and divisions completely destroyed. The men at the front had no way of protecting themselves from the full frontal attacks and the flanking maneuvers that came to them from the enemy. By October and November there were very few replacements that would arrive. The replacements that would arrive were mostly untrained and unarmed. The officers and commanders were expected to arm these new replacements with rifles from the field. Many of these rifles were damaged or so worn from continuous use. (Ch. 3, 84-89)

    In Chapter 3, The Great Ordeal, Wildman shows how the peasant soldier “was experiencing the war in his own way and storing up vengeful thoughts against those who spoke so glibly of dying for Tsar and fatherland.” The common soldier, of whom were mostly peasants have portrayed this feeling of anger and a sense of betrayal. His is spoken to about how great it is to die for your tsar and for your fatherland, yet he is the one dying, not the man of whom has spoken to him. There is so much distrust at hand that by Fall of 1915 the Russian Army is barley holding together. There are cases of desertion, contempt for officers, and disobedience to orders were reaching large quantities. (Ch. 3, pg. 93). Wildman brings into perspective the nightmares that these men lived. The betrayal that they may have felt from their own government. Full regiments and divisions were destroyed due to the lack of ammunition supply and the lack of obedience by the commanding officer to distribute the ammunition sparingly. This ignorance cost the lives of thousands of soldiers.


    <>Willer,David,and G. K. Zollschan. “Prolegomenon to a Theory of Revolutions”. In G. K. Zollschan and Hirsch,eds., Explorations in Social Change. Boston: 1964

    <>Winik,Jay|_The_Great Upheaval: America and the birth of the modern world, 1788-1800|>Winik.GREAT| ((GO/SAC/1776jy04))

    <>Wittfogel,Karl August| a{896}b{}c{}d{}e{988}n{Mrx MRX Lnn REV.trx AMP RREV3}o{
    *1957:NHC|_Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power| (NB! chapters 9 & 10)| ((>WOD|

    p429 & 488,re. Zur Lage,Wbr noticed “Asiatic” qualities of RUS| Is Russia a European state and culture?
    2007:Penguin Custom Edition, devoted to “Interpretations of the Western World” opens with a section on “Early Empire, the State, and natural Resources: The Wittfogel Thesis”. The publisher described the section with these words: “Among the more influential theories concerning the origin of state power in early civilizations was the thesis developed by Karl Wittfogel (1896–1988): that early states developed totalitarian political and social structures in order to develop and control water resources for intensive agriculture, which in turn required the ability to command labor”. The essays presented in Wittfogel, “The Hydraulic Civilizations”, in Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth [general principles with limited relation to Russia]

    *1960jy: WoP:487-508| “The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution”| ((E-TXT))
    | “Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast”| SlR, reprinted in TDU:323-358 with full discussion| (())
    *1973:Current Anthropology#14.5:|>Mitchell,William| “The Hydraulic Hypothesis: A Reappraisal” [TXT]| ((Critique of Wittfogel's critics))

    <>Wood,Gordon S| a{}n{USA AREV Cst rdx.plt dmk}o{}
    *:|_The_Creation of the American Republic| ((USA2.REV|how rvs.idl developed after AREV))
    *1987:In Beeman, Beyond:69-109| “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution”| ((INX Mds cst| Federalists feared “good old American popular politics” (73) esp. states legislatures, IE: regional or provincial vitality; dmk not solution but problem(75) [Put this in terms that appear to conform to Telos glossary, Enlightened absolutist vs.populist axiology; cosmopolitans vs.gbx; court all this helps focus on the sttist!! quality of debate] Superior,distinterested pzn best suited to plt life [ntg?] (85,cf=Fed#35),but vs.fdrists knew better (89)| PS:mny of feds=interest on loans & lnd vs.feds (e.g.,William Findley [93-8])=freebooting entrepreneurial trd))

    *:N.NY:Knopf|>The Radicalism of the American Revolution| ((447p|Edmund Morgan rvw in 8x11 AREV in human relations,frm pbl order to pbl anx,frm hierarchy to eqly,frm know your place to make your place|Not intention of “Fathers” but all REV~ leave leaders behind|pbl changes made AREV “most rdxal and most far-reaching event in American history”|Look years bfr 1776,Am bcm like ENG,pbl bcm mnxal,vertical hierarchy etc|eqly in pbl relations,though,also grew|Crude dmk of behaviour|787:cst tried to check headlong dmk,but too late|Pursuit of happiness won out over notion of disinterested virtue|Cash nexus replaced pbl.hierarchy| Not eqy just of opportunity,or rough fxx,etc| “Equality became so potent for Americans because it came to mean that everyone was really the same as everyone else,not just at birth,not in talent or fxx or wlt,& not just in some transcendental rlgious sense of the equality of souls| Ordinary Americans came to believe that no one in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out manner was really better than anyone else|That was equality as no other nation has ever quite had it”|wrk essential

    <>Wright,Mary C| a{}
    *1962ja:CS&H#:| “Revolution from Without”| ((rvs REV.trx| cf=VonLaue))

    <>Vagts,Alfred|_A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military|>Vagts.MLTism ((OWN| wrx&REV))

    <>Wilson,Edmund|_To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History| *1940:LND|NYC: 1959:NYC;etc| ((HX36.W5 1972))

    <Wolf,Eric|_Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century|>Wolf.PEASANT| *1969:NYC| ((krx trx| wrx&REV|
    *1971au:American Anthropologist#73,4(new series):869-87|>Jayawardena,Chandra| rvw of Wolf.PEASANT E-TXT))

    <>Wolfenstein,E. Victor. The Revolutionary Personality| Princeton NJ: 1971 psx trx

    <>Woodside,A. B. Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (1976) ~~rvs

    <>Wright,Mary C| *1962ja:CSinSH| “Revolution from Without”| ((REV.trx| CF=Von Laue))

    <>Yoder,Dale| “Current Definitions of Revolution”| *1926:AJS#32:433-441| ((E-TXT|Elementary,but clearly organized summary,as of 1926))


    <>Airapetov,OR|_Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine (1914-1917)| Участие Российской империи в Первой мировой войне (1914-1917) Tom 1: 1914 god--nachalo| Tom 2: 1915 god--apogei| *2014:Moskva: KDU (Knizhnyi dom Universitet)| ((WW1b| 335 & 315pp))

    <>Astashov,AB|_Russkii front v 1914--nachale 1917 goda: voennyi opyt i sovremennost'| Русский фронт в 1914--начале 1917 года: военный опыт и современность| Moskva: Novyi khronograf, 2014. 736 p| ((WW1))

    <>Belarus' v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914-1918) : sbornik dokumentov|>BPV| Sostaviteli: V.V. Vrublevskii, i dr| Minsk: Belarus' 2014| ((WW1 BRUS CF=Beliavina| 352pp))

    <>Beliavina,VN|_Belarus' v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny| Беларусь в годы Первой мировой войны| Minsk: Belarus', 2013| ((WW1 BRUS| CF=BPV| 396pp))

    <>Coxwell,C.Fillingham (Charles Fillingham)| a{1856}|_Through Russia in war-time| New York : C. Scribner, [1917?] ((311ppDK27 .C6 1917))

    <>Danilov,YuN|_Russkie otriady na frantsuzskom i makedonskom frontakh : 1916-1918 gg| Русские отряды на французском и македонском фронтах : 1916-1918 гг. Moskva: Kniga po Trebovaniiu, 2013. 288 p| ((WW1))

    <>Englishman [pseudonym]|_The_Russian diary of an Englishman, Petrograd, 1915-1917| New York, McBride, 1919| ((228pp (maps) ))

    <>_Letopis' Velikoi voiny : 1914| Летопись Великой войны : 1914| Moskva: Kniga po Trebovaniiu, 2013| ((WW1 crn 300pp))

    <>Pavlovich,Mikhail|_Mirovaia voina 1914-1918 gg. i griadushchie voiny|
    Мировая война 1914-1918 гг. и грядущие войны| Moskva: Librokom, 2013| ((WW1b WW1c 344 p))

    <>Pierce,Ruth|_Trapped in "Black Russia". Letters, June-November, 1915| [Microform]. PUBLISHER Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918. DESCRIPTION 149 p. NOTES Microfilm. Woodbridge, Conn., Research Publications, [1977] 1 reel (part), 35 mm. (History of women, reel 917, no. 7678) SERIES: History of women ; reel 917, no. 7678| UO MICROFILM HQ1111 .H5 ser.1 reel 917

    <>Shambarov,Valerii|_Posledniaia bitva imperatorov : parallel'naia istoriia Pervoi mirovoi| Последняя битва императоров : параллельная история Первой мировой| *2013:Moskva,Algoritm| ((622pp| WW1))

    <>Simpson,James Young| a{1873}e{1934}n{}o{}|_The_self-discovery of Russia| *1916:NYC,George H. Doran Co| ((227pp))

    <>Smith,Clarence Jay|_The_Russian struggle for power, 1914-1917; a study of Russian foreign policy during the First World War| New York, Philosophical Library [1956] DESCRIPTION 553 p. 21 cm. NOTES Bibliography: p. 515-525

    <>Wilton,Robert|Russia's agony| a{}n{}o{Correspondent of The Times at Petrograd| New York, Longmans, Green; London, E. Arnold, 1918. 356 p. front., maps

    <>Zaliubovskii,AP|_Snabzhenie russkoi armii v Velikuiu voinu vintovkami, pulemetami, revol'verami i patronami k nim| Снабжение русской армии в Великую войну винтовками, пулеметами, револьверами и патронами к ним Moskva: Kniga po Trebovaniiu, 2013 reprint of original 1936 ed| ((WW1 MIC 138pp))

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    *1776:1826; The Atlantic Revolutionary epoch

    Early 20th-century photo of grape vines at Harmony Community

    *1831:Bristol riots put down violently by 3rd Dragoon Guards

    *1846:Anti-Corn Law League

    *1848:London Chartist meeting

    Contemporary newspaper gravure depicted same scene

    *1870c:Germany before unification

    *1871:Germany unified

    *1890:Punch cartoon depicted Kaiser Wilhelm "putting down the pilot" [Bismarck]